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VOLUME VIII

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THE

EXPOSITOR.

EDITED BY THE REV.

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SIXTH SERIES

Volume VIII

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London:
HODDER AND STOUGHTON,
27, PATERNOSTER ROW.

MCMIII.

Butler & Tanner,
The Selwood Printing Works,
Frome, and London.

THE EDITION OF THE REVISED VERSION WITH MARGINAL REFERENCES, 1898.

THE importance of illustrating and expounding the Holy Scriptures from those Scriptures themselves is fully recognized by students of the Bible, especially by those whose duty it is, as commentators preachers or teachers, to instruct others. Indeed the constant employment of this method of *exegesis* may be said to be one proof of the reverence felt for the Bible as the word of God; another characteristic which distinguishes it as regards its general use from any other book. Annotators of or lecturers on other works, classical or modern, may find frequent help in such illustrations from within. But nowhere is there anything to be compared with the labours in this direction of those who have sought to explain the Scriptures "given by inspiration of God." Whatever fresh light may be thrown upon these by modern criticism and research—and no one who is unprejudiced would seek to depreciate these aids—men must always look to the Bible itself as the greatest help towards discovering and imparting to others a knowledge of the truth.

The most remarkable mode of such illustration is that which has taken the form known as "marginal references." The somewhat scant number of these given in the Bible of 1611[1] has been supplemented by much fuller lists, compiled with various degrees of discretion and success, in what are called "marginal Bibles." A short account of the

[1] "The references found in the standard of 1611 scarcely amount to a seventh part of those printed in modern Bibles." More than half of them "are derived from manuscripts and printed copies of the Vulgate Latin Bible." (See Scrivener's *Paragraph Bible*, Introd. lv.)

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OCT 14 1959

latest provision of such help for readers of Scripture, which differs in some respects from all previous editions of the kind, may not be without interest.

The two Companies of Revisers, that for the New Testament, who issued the results of their work in 1880, and that for the Old Testament, the greater area of whose labours delayed the publication of this till 1884—only added occasional references in the margin, many of these being appended to marginal notes on variations of reading or rendering. But both Companies had contemplated, almost from the first, the issue of an edition of the Revised Version with fuller references, and a Committee was appointed by each to consider this question. Those selected by the New Testament Company had actually compiled a large body of such references, this work having been mainly done by two members, Dr. Scrivener and Dr. Moulton. It was not, however, till 1895, when the whole work of revision had been completed by the publication of the Apocrypha, this also having occasional references in the margin, that the University Presses agreed to meet the frequently expressed demand for such an edition, a demand made by Bible students in America as well as in England.[1]

A Committee was formed to superintend the work, consisting of the late Master of Pembroke College (Dr. Price), and the late Archdeacon of Oxford (Dr. Palmer), acting for the Delegates of the Oxford Press; and the Vice-Master of Trinity College (Dr. Aldis Wright), and the Regius Professor of Hebrew (Dr. Kirkpatrick), representing the Syndics of the Cambridge Press. On the death of Archdeacon Palmer, a few months after the commencement of the work, his place was filled by the Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford (Dr. Ince). The duty of editing the work was assigned to the writer of the present article, and four other Contributors were appointed to assist in com-

[1] See Preface to the edition with marginal references, 1898.

piling references for the Old Testament and Apocrypha.[1]

The Rev. Dr. Moulton had already undertaken to adapt to the requirements of this new edition the larger body of references on which he had been engaged, and frequent communications passed between him and the Editor with a view to ensuring work of the same character throughout.[2] Nor was this the only help which the Contributors derived from labours in the same field already in progress or completed. The full body of references in Dr. Scrivener's *Paragraph Bible*, which had been purchased by the Cambridge University Press, was placed at their disposal, and they were requested to take this as the basis of their work.

The Contributors were instructed that among special objects to be aimed at were:—

(1) *Simplicity*. Much consideration was given to the *number* of references desirable, so as to avoid perplexing the ordinary Bible reader by a crowd of passages, without unduly reducing the number to the exclusion of really important parallels.

(2) *Clearness*. With this object the system of indications described below was adopted.

(3) *Illustration of differences of rendering* between the Authorised and Revised Versions, this being of course a new and valuable part of the edition.

Every precaution was taken to ensure accurate and uniform work. Conferences of the Committee and

[1] This work was divided into five sections; the Pentateuch, the Historical Books, the Poetical Books, the Prophetical Books, and the Apocrypha. One of these sections was undertaken by each of the five Contributors; these being the Rev. Dr. Barnes, Fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge; the Rev. A. W. Greenup, of St. John's College, Cambridge; the Rev. E. R. Massey, of Exeter College, Oxford; the Rev. J. W. Nutt, late Fellow of all Souls' College, Oxford; and the Editor, the Rev. Dr. Stokoe, of Lincoln College, Oxford.

[2] On Dr. Moulton's death in February, 1898, the completion of this work was undertaken by his son, the Rev. J. H. Moulton, late Fellow of King's College, Cambridge, and the Rev. A. W. Greenup.

Editor were held, and the results of these meetings, embodied in a carefully drawn up code of instructions, were communicated by the latter to the other Contributors. Specimens of each Contributor's work were submitted to the Committee for criticism, and it was not till these preliminaries had been satisfactorily settled that the first "copy" of each section was sent to press.

It was soon found that the dealing with Dr. Scrivener's references involved much more than merely reducing their number. The edition now contemplated was to be a popular one, and many of the references given in Dr. Scrivener's scholarly work proved to be unsuited to such general use. In other cases references had been omitted by him which would be interesting and instructive to general readers. Liberty was therefore allowed to the Editor and Contributors to make such alterations as appeared to them desirable. It was felt to be advisable that references to lexical or idiomatic peculiarities, which might not be intelligible to the English reader, and (as far as possible) references involving controverted questions, should be omitted.

The Committee resolved that all references found in the Bible of 1611 were to receive special consideration, and that references entered by the Companies of Revisers were in all cases to be retained. The latter are divisible into two classes: simple references introduced by "See," and references appended as illustrations to notes given in the margin. For the sake of clearness, all such notes,[1] including, of course, any references attached to them, were now placed at the foot of each page, thus leaving the margin for simple references only; and any such references already

[1] Except those referring to some different division or order in the original. Another important change made in this edition was the transfer to their place in the text of the numbers of the verses, which in previous editions had been placed on the inner margin of each page.

found in the Revised Version were incorporated in the larger body, the "See" which had been prefixed to them being omitted.[1]

The Revisers' references on the Old Testament amount to a little under a thousand, the numbers of the two classes referred to above being almost equal. The simple references were such as :—

For Gen. 18. 19.	"See Amos iii. 2."
For 2 Kin. 18. 13.	"See Isa. xxxvi. 1—xxxix. 8, 2 Chr. xxxii. 1, &c."
For Ps. 53. 1.	"See Ps. xiv."
For Isa. 5. 10.	"See Ezek. xlv. 11."

The following are instances of references appended to notes :—

On Num. 25. 3.	"Or, *the Baal of Peor*. See ch. xxiii. 28."
On 2. Sam. 22. 46.	"So Ps. xviii. 45. The text has, *gird themselves*."
On Prov. 30. 1.	"Or, *Jakeh of Massa*. See Gen. xxv. 14."
On Jer. 22. 11.	"In 2 Kings xxiii. 30, *Jehoahaz*. Compare 1 Chr. iii. 15."

A few references, some fifty in all, are of a different character. Such are :—

On Deut. 12. 32.	"[Ch. xiii. 1 in Heb.]"
On Ezra 7. 12.	"[Ch. vii. 12–26 is in Aramaic.]"

These, as stated above in Note 4, were to be retained in the margin.

The New Testament references—under one hundred altogether, almost all being on passages in the Gospels and Acts—belong, with few exceptions, to the second class. Such are :—

On Matt. 10. 4.	"Or, *Zealot*. See Luke vi. 15; Acts i. 13."
On Acts 13. 18.	"Many ancient authorities read *bare he them as a nursing-father in the wilderness* See Deut. i. 31."

[1] To have retained this prefix would have introduced confusion into the plan of indications described below.

The few belonging to the first class are almost all references to a marginal note on some other passage. Thus :—

On Mark 6. 37. and on Rev. 6. 6. } "See marginal note on Matt. xviii. 28."

The references given on the Apocrypha amount to rather less than one hundred and fifty. They are mainly on passages in 1 *Esdras,* and in 1 *and* 2 *Maccabees,* the references elsewhere being scanty. They are introduced in various ways; sometimes without prefix, sometimes with "See," sometimes with "Compare," (while occasionally we find both combined,) and other prefixes. Thus we have :—

On 1 Esdras 5. 7.	"Ezra ii. 1, &c."
On 1 Macc. 7. 49.	"See 2 Macc. xv. 36."
On 1 Macc. 4. 40.	"Compare Num. xxxi. 6."
On 1. Macc. 10. 65.	"See ch. xi. 27; 2 Macc. viii. 9. Compare ch. ii. 18. ver. 16, &c."
On 2 Esdras, 13. 45.	"That is, *another land.* See Deut. xxix. 28.
On 1 Macc. 5. 65.	"Gr. *daughters.* Compare Num. xxi. 25."

The common plan of including in one list references differing widely in character, without anything to mark the special object of each or their relative importance, was exchanged in this new edition for a system of various modes of indication, whereby these differences should be clearly shown. It was felt to be desirable that every reader should be able to discover at once whether any reference was a case of exact quotation, or of close verbal parallel, or was selected merely for some similarity of idea or expression, or for illustration ; and that references given to longer passages should also be specially marked. While therefore every exact or close parallel was to have a simple index letter, it was decided to prefix "Cp." (=Compare) to all cases in which the resemblance was not so close ; [1] to place "Cited" or "Cited from" before all

[1] In this class were to be included cases of identity of person or subject, and contrasted passages (e.g. Matt. xii. 30, and Luke xi. 23; Mark ix. 40, and Luke ix. 50). Also any important historical or geographical references.

cases of actual quotation; and to prefix "See" to any reference to a longer passage, parallel or explanatory.[1] This last prefix was also to be used in referring to a parallel passage on which a body of references had been collected. When the number of parallels was too great for detailed enumeration, *al.* (for *alibi*, elsewhere) was to be added, after a few only of these had been given; and (?) was to be appended to the reference, wherever the identity or parallel was doubtful.[2]

A few instances taken from the various sections of the work will show the advantages of this plan. The comparison is made in each case between the Oxford reference Bible of 1886 and the Revised Version with references of 1898.

	A.V.	*R.V.*
On Gen. 27. 40. "Shalt serve thy brother."	Ch. 25. 23.	Ch. 25. 23.
	2 Sam. 8. 14.	Cp. 2 Sam. 8. 14.
	Obad. 18, 19, 20.	See Obad. 18–21.

The same three references are here given in both cases,

[1] The actual extent of the passage being given in each case (e.g. on 2 Chron. i. 7—"For verses 7–12, See 1 Kings iii. 5–14.").

[2] A similar but more elaborate plan of indications had been used by Dr. Scrivener, his rules being:

(*a*) In cases of exact parallel, no prefix to be used.
(*b*) . . . of less complete parallel, "So" to be prefixed.
(*c*) . . . where there was a still slighter resemblance or some seeming inconsistency, "Compare" or "Comp." to be prefixed.
(*d*) . . . of reference to a body of texts given elsewhere, "See" to be prefixed.
(*e*) . . . where the parallel extended to more than one verse, the name of the Book referred to to be in italics (e.g. on Exod xx. 1, to ver. 17, *Deut.* v. 6–21).
(*f*) . . . where the parallel was clear only in the original tongue, "(Heb.)" or "(Chald.)" or "(Gk.)" to be added.
(*g*) . . . where the resemblance was in the English Version only, "(Eng.)" to be added.
(*h*) . . . of questionable or peculiar references, "(?)" to be added. Of these (*f*) was ordered to be used sparingly in this new edition. Thus, on Job i. 11, *touch all that he hath*, the references given are ch. xix. 21, Isa. liii. 4 (Heb.). On Luke i. 4, *thou wast instructed*, references are given to Acts xviii. 25, Rom. ii. 18, 1 Cor. xiv. 19, Gal. vi. 6 (Gk.); the parallel in all these cases being more marked in the original.

but in R.V. the parallel prediction of "the elder serving the younger" is distinguished from the notice (prefaced by "Cp.") of its fulfilment, which is found in 2 Samuel viii. 14; and from the longer account of this in Obadiah, which has the prefix "See."

	A.V.	*R.V.*
On 2 Chr. 24. 19. "Yet he sent prophets to them," &c.	Ch. 36. 15. Jer. 7. 25, 26, & 25. 4.	Jer. 25. 4. Cp. Matt. 23. 34, & Luke 11. 49. See Ch. 36. 15.

Here the scanty list in A.V. is expanded, the N.T. references to these prophetical warnings, parallel in thought though not in actual words, being distinguished by "Cp.," while the reader is referred by "See" to ch. xxxvi. 15, where the "rising up early" to send these messengers is illustrated by Jeremiah vii. 13, 25 and other parallels.

	A.V.	*R.V.*
On Ps. 17. 8. "The shadow of thy wings."	Ruth 2. 12. Ps. 36. 7, & 57. 1, & 61. 4, & 63. 7, & 91. 1,4. Matt. 23. 37.	Ps. 36. 7, & 57. 1, & 63. 7, & 91. 4. Cp. Matt. 23. 37, & Luke 13. 34. See Ruth 2. 12.

In this case the two N.T. passages (only one of which is given in A.V.), where the figure of "the hen gathering her chickens" is found, are distinguished by "Cp." from the more exact parallels; and a reference introduced by "See" is given to Ruth ii. 12, where three passages are referred to, with *al.* added to indicate that others may be found.

	A.V.	*R.V.*
On Isa. 6. 9. "Hear ye indeed, but understand not," &c.	Ch. 43. 8. Matt. 13. 14. Mark 4. 12. Luke 8. 10. John 12. 40. Acts 28. 26. Rom. 11. 8.	Cited: Matt. 13. 14, 15, & Acts 28. 26, 27. Cp. Mark 4. 12, & Luke 8. 10, & Rom. 11. 8.

Here the almost exact quotations in *Matthew* and *Acts* are distinguished by "Cited" from the parallels in *Mark*, *Luke* and *Romans*, where the dulness is spoken of as the divine purpose, by "Cp." being prefixed to the latter. And John xii. 40 is given, with "Cited" prefixed to it, as a separate reference on the following verse, of which this Evangelist's words are an almost exact quotation.

	A.V.	*R.V.*
On Ecclus. 46. 7. "He and Caleb the son of Jephunne."	Num. 14. 6. 1 Macc. 2. 55, 56.	Cp. 1 Macc. 2. 55, 56. See Num. 14. 6–9.

Neither of the passages here referred to is an exact parallel. In that to which "Cp." is prefixed the same two men are spoken of as rewarded for their good deeds, while the longer passage introduced by "See" gives the history of those deeds.

	A.V.	*R.V.*
On Luke 22. 29. "I appoint unto you a kingdom."	Matt. 24. 47. Ch. 12. 32. 2 Cor. 1. 7. 2 Tim. 2. 12.	2 Tim. 2. 12. Cp. John 17. 18. See Matt. 25. 34, & 28. 18, & Acts 14. 22, & Rev. 1. 6.

The references here in A.V., which vary considerably as to the manner and amount of resemblance, are, as usual, undistinguished. In R.V. the passage from St. John's Gospel, which speaks of "sending into the world," is shown by "Cp." to be a less exact parallel than that from 2 *Timothy* about "reigning with Christ"; while the four references introduced by "See" provide us with a large and important list of passages relating to Christ's kingdom.

	A.V.	*R.V.*
On Jas. 1. 25, "The law of liberty."	Ch. 2. 12.	Ch. 2. 12. Cp. Gal. 2. 14, & 5. 1, 13, & 1 Pet. 2. 16, & 2 Pet. 2, 19. See John 8. 32.

The solitary reference in A.V. to the recurrence of the same phrase in *James* is followed in R.V. by passages introduced by "Cp.," which throw light on the nature of the liberty here spoken of; while on the passage to which "See" is prefixed a large number of illustrative references has been collected.

Another special feature of this edition is the entry of frequent references to or from alternative renderings, given originally in the margin of R.V., and now transferred to the foot of each page; or from one such rendering to another. Thus on Psalm xxvi. 1, where for "without wavering" is given in R.V., as an alternative rendering, "I shall not slide" (the rendering of A.V.), we find Cp. Ps. xviii. 36 (for mg.) and xxxvii. 31 (for mg.). So, on Hebrews ix. 4, where the marginal rendering for 'censer' is *altar of incense*, we have these references: Lev. xvi. 12, 13. Cp. Ex. xxx. 1 (for mg.) & 1 Kings vi. 22 (for mg.). On "catch men" in Luke v. 10, the alternative is given "Gr. *take alive*," with a reference to 2 Tim. ii. 26 (mg. for mg.).

A very important part of this edition is the illustration by parallel passages of readings or renderings adopted by the Revisers, which differ from those in the Authorised Version. These are either passages where a similar change has been made in R.V., or passages which explain or justify such alteration. The following are a few instances of these:

On Deuteronomy i. 1, where "in the plain over against the Red Sea" of A.V. has been altered to "in the Arabah over against Suph," we find references for "Arabah" to ch. iii. 17, Josh. iii. 16, & xi. 2, 16, & xii. 1, 3, 8, where the same change has been made, with *al.* to denote that it is also made elsewhere; and for "Suph" we have a reference (with "Cp.") given to "Suphah" in Num. xxi. 14.

On 2 Samuel xxi. 17, where we have "the lamp" (R.V.) instead of "the light" (A.V.), six references are given to passages where the same change is found.

On Isaiah x. 28, where "carriages" is changed to "baggage," we have references to a similar change in Judg. xviii. 21, 1 Sam. xvii. 22, and Acts xxi. 15, while an explanation of such change is furnished by ch. xlvi. 1 (introduced by "Cp."), where "carriages" is altered to "the things that ye carried about."

On the change from "hell" to "Hades" in Matthew xi. 23 four references to similar changes are given, with *al.* added.

On "ye died" (R.V.) for "ye are dead" (A.V.) in Colossians iii. 3 a reference is given to the same change in ch. ii. 20, and another (prefixed by "See") to Rom. vi. 2, where further passages explanatory of this act of dying to sin are referred to.

The account which has been given in this article will show how the Committee spared no effort to ensure that the work done should be as exact and clear and useful as possible. Probably no one, who has not himself attempted work of this kind in some form, is alive to the difficulty of attaining in it perfect accuracy of detail. It would be hard to find any book containing a number of references to other passages or authors which is not open to criticism. This edition may make no claim to perfection in this respect. Indeed one evidence of the wide interest felt in the work has been the dropping fire of suggestions made since its publication to the Press authorities and to the Editor from capable critics both at home and abroad, coupled with kindly and favourable expressions as to its general character. But it is hoped that these references may at least not be found inferior in accuracy to those of other compilers, and that the special features of the book which have just been described may add much to its utility.

It would be foreign to the purpose of this article to enter on any discussion of the relative merits of the Authorised and the Revised Versions. But it is noticeable that even adverse critics of the latter have commended the care and accuracy of this body of references attached to it. Reviewers have described this edition as "a standing monument of what is meant by a self-interpreting Bible," and as "an invaluable assistance to the study of the Bible." There may be reason therefore to hope that it will be of some use to all those who wisely seek to attain by such illustration from within a wider and truer knowledge of those Holy Scriptures, which were "written for our learning."

T. H. Stokoe.

TRANSLATIONS FROM THE PROPHETS.

VII.

Jeremiah xxii.–xxiii.

Jeremiah's Judgement on the Kings and Prophets of his Time.

1. Chap. xxii. 1–xxiii. 8. The Kings.

Exhortation to the King and Princes to do Justice in the Land (cf. 2 *Sam.* 8. 15, 1 *Kings* 10. 9), *if they desire its continued Prosperity.*

[1] Thus said Yahweh: Go down * to the house of the king of Judah, and speak there this word, [2] and say, Hear the word of Yahweh, O king of Judah, that sittest upon the

* Viz. from the Temple—which was on the top of 'Zion,' the Eastern [not, as is shewn incorrectly on many maps, the *Western*] hill of Jerusalem—to the palace, which was contiguous to it (Ez. 43. 8) on the South, and a little below it. Comp. 36. 12, 2 Kings 11. 19; and conversely 'go (or bring) *up* from the palace to the Temple, ch. 26. 10, 1 Kings 8. 1, 4.

throne of David, thou, and thy servants, and thy people, that enter in by these gates.

3 Thus saith Yahweh: Execute ye judgement and justice, and deliver the spoiled out of the hand of the oppressor: and do no wrong, do no violence, to the sojourner,* the fatherless, or the widow, neither shed innocent blood in this place. 4 For if ye do this thing indeed, then shall there enter in by the gates of this house kings sitting upon the throne of David,† riding in chariots and on horses, he, and his servants, and his people. 5 But if ye hear not these words, I swear by myself, saith Yahweh, that this house shall become a waste.‡

A Lament on the approaching Fall of the House of David.

6 For thus saith Yahweh concerning the house of the king of Judah:

A Gilead§ art thou unto me,
(and) the top of Lebanon:§
(Yet) surely I will make thee a wilderness,
cities which are not inhabited,
7 I will prepare|| destroyers against thee,
every one with his weapons;
And they shall cut down thy choice cedars,
and cast them on to the fire.

8 And many nations shall pass by this city, and they shall say every man to his neighbour, 'Wherefore hath Yahweh done thus unto this great city?' 9 And they shall answer, 'Because they forsook the covenant of Yahweh their God, and worshipped other gods, and served them.' ¶

* See on 7. 6.
† Heb. *for David upon his throne.*
‡ Cf. 7. 34.
§ Named as examples of finely-wooded regions.
|| Heb. *sanctify*: cf. 6. 4.
¶ Cf. 5. 19, 16. 10 f.; Deut. 29. 24 f.; 1 Kings 9. 8 f.

Jehoahaz (2 *Kings* 23. 31–35), *who succeeded Josiah, but after a reign of three months was taken captive by Pharaoh Neco, and carried into Egypt, where he died.*

[10] Weep ye not for the dead,* neither commiserate him: weep sore for him that goeth away; for he shall return no more, nor see his native country. [11] For thus saith Yahweh touching Shallum,† the son of Josiah, king of Judah, which reigned instead of Josiah his father, which went forth out of this place: He shall not return thither any more; [12] but in the place whither they have led him into exile, there shall he die; and he shall see this land no more.

Jehoiakim (2 *Kings* 23. 36-24. 7 : B.C. 609–597), *whose selfish and oppressive Luxury is contrasted bitterly with the just Rule of his Father Josiah.*

[13] Ah! he that buildeth his house by unrighteousness, and his roof-chambers ‡ by injustice; that useth his neighbour's service without wages, and giveth him not his hire; [14] that saith, 'I will build me a wide house and spacious roof-chambers,' and cutteth him out his windows, panelling § it with cedar, and painting it with vermilion. || [15] Shalt thou reign, because thou strivest to excel in cedar? ¶ did not

* I.e. Josiah, slain by Pharaoh Neco at the battle of Megiddo, B.C. 609 (2 Kings 23. 29).

† I.e. Jehoahaz. Comp. 1 Chr. 3. 15.

‡ A chamber erected on the flat roof of an eastern house, with latticed windows, giving free circulation to the air, secluded and cool (cf. Jud. 3. 20, R.V. marg., 1 Kings 17. 19, 2 Kings 1. 2, Dan. 6. 10): 'the most desirable, and generally the best fitted-up room in the house, and still given to guests who are to be treated with honour' (Thomson, *The Land and the Book*, in the 3 vol. ed., *Central Palestine*, p. 634, with illustration, p. 636; in the 1 vol. ed., 1898, etc., p. 160).

§ So, dividing two words differently, and changing the punctuation. The Heb. text cannot be intelligibly translated.

|| Jehoiakim enlarged and beautified his palace by the forced but unpaid labour of his subjects.

¶ I.e. Does building palaces of cedar make thee a king?

thy father eat and drink, and do judgement and justice? Then it was well with him. [16] He judged the cause of the poor and needy: then it was well. Is not that to know me? saith Yahweh. [17] For thine eyes and thine heart are (set) only upon thy dishonest gain, and upon innocent blood, for to shed it, and upon oppression and upon violence, for to do it.

[18] Therefore thus saith Yahweh concerning Jehoiakim, the son of Josiah, king of Judah: They shall not wail for him, (saying,) 'Ah my brother!' or, 'Ah sister!' they shall not wail for him, (saying,) 'Ah lord!' or, 'Ah his glory!'* [19] He shall be buried with the burial of an ass, dragged along and cast forth beyond the gates of Jerusalem.

Jehoiachin (2 *Kings* 24. 8–16; 25. 27–30), *who, after a Reign of three months, was carried captive to Babylon, with the Flower of the Nation, by Nebuchadrezzar* (B.C. 597).

[20] Go up (,O Jerusalem,†) to Lebanon, and cry; and in Bashan utter thy voice: and cry from the Abarim;‡ for all thy lovers § are destroyed.‖ [21] I spake unto thee in thy prosperity; but thou saidst, 'I will not hear.' This hath been thy way from thy youth, that thou hast not hearkened to my voice. [22] All thy shepherds ¶ the wind shall shepherd,** and thy lovers shall go into captivity: surely

* Neither relations nor subjects will bewail his loss. Comp. ch. 34. 5, 1 Kings 13. 30.

† Inserted for the reason stated on 7. 29. The pronouns, as far as *v.* 23 end, are all feminine, shewing that the community is addressed.

‡ The 'parts across'; a range of mountains E. of the Dead Sea is meant, the same as that from which Moses saw the Promised Land: see Num. 27. 12. Public wailing was usual on elevated spots: cf. 3. 21, 7. 29, Isa. 15. 2.

§ I.e. thy allies. Cf. 4. 30.

‖ Heb. *broken* (Ez. 30. 8).

¶ I.e. thy rulers, as 2. 8, etc.

** Ironically for, sweep away.

then shalt thou be put to shame and confounded because of all thy wickedness. [23] O inhabitress of Lebanon, that art nestled among the cedars,* how wilt thou groan † when pangs come upon thee, the pain as of a woman in travail! [24] As I live, saith Yahweh, though Coniah,‡ the son of Jehoiakim, king of Judah, were the signet upon my right hand, yet would I pluck thee thence; [25] and I will give thee into the hand of them that seek thy life, and into the hand of them of whom thou art in dread, even into the hand of Nebuchadrezzar, king of Babylon, and into the hand of the Chaldeans. [26] And I will hurl thee forth, and thy mother that bare thee, § into another land,‖ where ye were not born; and there shall ye die. [27] But to the land whereunto their soul longeth ¶ to return, thither shall they not return. [28] Is this man Coniah a despised broken image? ** is he a vessel wherein is no pleasure? †† wherefore are they hurled forth, he and his seed, and cast into the land that they know not? ‡‡ [29] O land, land, land, hear the word of Yahweh: [30] Thus saith Yahweh, Write ye this man childless,§§ a man that shall not prosper in his days: for no man of his seed shall prosper, sitting upon the throne of David, and ruling any more in Judah.

* I.e. Jerusalem, poetically pictured as nestled in the recesses of Lebanon, in order to depict its sense of security.

† So LXX, Pesh. Vulg.

‡ I.e. *Jehoiachin*, 2 Kings 24. 8, 12, 15, etc. Called *Jeconiah* in ch. 24. 1, 27. 20 *al.*; and *Coniah* also in ch. 37. 1.

§ I.e. Nehushta: cf. on 13. 18; and see 2 Kings 24. 12.

‖ So omitting a letter. The Heb. text has *the other land*. Cf. Deut. 29. 28.

¶ Heb. *they lift up their soul*: cf. 44. 14; Deut. 24. 15, and Hos. 4. 8, where 'setteth his heart' is literally 'lifteth up his soul.' The 'soul' is in Heb. psychology the seat of feeling, and especially of desire: see my *Parallel Psalter*, p. 459 f.

** 'Probably a broken terra-cotta figurine,' *Encycl. Bibl.* iii. 3818.

†† Cf. 48. 38; Hos. 8. 8.

‡‡ Cf. 16. 13.

§§ I.e. Register him so in the roll of citizens: cf. for the fig. use of the expression Isa. 4. 3, Ps. 87. 6.

A Denunciation of the unworthy Rulers of Judah, and Promise that Yahweh will raise up Faithful Rulers in their Place.

XXIII. [1] Ah! the shepherds that destroy and scatter the sheep of my pasture! saith Yahweh. [2] Therefore thus saith Yahweh, the God of Israel, against the shepherds that feed * my people: *Ye* have scattered my flock, and driven them away, and have not visited them: behold, I will visit upon you the evil of your doings, saith Yahweh. [3] And *I* will gather the remnant of my flock out of all the countries whither I have driven them, and will bring them back to their homestead; and they shall be fruitful and multiply. [4] And I will raise up shepherds over them, and they shall feed † them: and they shall fear no more, nor be dismayed, neither shall any be missing, saith Yahweh.

A Promise of the ideal King or 'Messiah.' ‡

[5] Behold, the days come, saith Yahweh, that I will raise up unto David a righteous shoot, and he shall reign as king and deal wisely,§ and shall execute judgement and justice in the land. [6] In his days Judah shall be saved, and Israel shall dwell safely: and this is his name whereby he shall be called, 'Yahweh is our righteousness.'‖

Those now in Exile will have a Share in these promised Blessings; and the Memory of their Deliverance will eclipse that of the Exodus from Egypt.

[7] Therefore, behold, the days come, saith Yahweh, that

* Heb. *that shepherd.*

† Heb. *shepherd.* Cf. 3. 15.

‡ The 'shepherds' of *v.* 4 are probably pictured by the prophet as princes, judges, etc. (cf Isa. 1. 26) ruling under the ideal king.

§ Or *prosper.*

‖ The king receives a name symbolizing the ideal character which the nation will then display (cf. Isa. 1. 26 'City of righteousness,' 61. 21 'Thy people shall be all righteous,' 61. 3 'terebinths of righteousness'), and its source in Yahweh. Observe that in 33. 16 exactly the same name is given to the ideal *Jerusalem* of the future.

they shall no more say, 'As Yahweh liveth, which brought up the children of Israel out of the land of Egypt'; [8]but, 'As Yahweh liveth, which brought up and which led the seed of the house of Israel out of the north country, and from all the countries whither I had driven them'; and they shall dwell in their own land.*

2. Chap. xxiii. 9–40. The Prophets.

The Judgement to come upon both Prophet and Priest.

[9]Concerning the prophets.

Mine heart within me is broken, all my bones give way†; I am become like a drunken man, and like a man whom wine hath overcome‡; because of Yahweh, and because of his holy words. [10]For the land is full of adulterers; [for because of the curse§ the land mourneth; the pastures of the wilderness are dried up;‖] and their course¶ is evil, and their might is not right.** [11]For both prophet and priest†† are profane; even in my house have I found their wickedness, saith Yahweh. [12]Therefore their way shall be unto them as slippery places in the darkness: they shall be thrust along‡‡ and fall therein: for I will bring evil upon them, even the year of their visitation, saith Yahweh.

* LXX has *whither he had driven them, and brought them back unto their own land*, cf. 16. 15.

† Heb. *are soft*.

‡ The prophet is deeply moved, and almost unstrung, by Yahweh's wrath for Israel's sins expressing itself in his words (cf. 6. 11, 15. 17*b*).

§ The curse falling on the land for its transgressions: cf. Isa. 24. 6; also Deut. 28. 15, 29. 27.

‖ The bracketed words interrupt the sequence of thought, and are perhaps a gloss.

¶ Heb. *their running*: see Isa. 59. 7, Prov. 6. 18.

** Cf. 9. 3.

†† Cf. 6. 13.

‡‡ Ps. 36. 12, Pr. 14. 32.

The Prophets of Jerusalem are worse than were formerly the Prophets of Samaria.

13 And in the prophets of Samaria I saw that which was unsavoury;* they prophesied by Baal, and caused my people Israel to err. 14 But in the prophets of Jerusalem have I seen an horrible thing: † they commit adultery, and walk in lies, and they strengthen the hands of evil-doers, that they return not ‡ every one from his wickedness: they are all of them become unto me as Sodom, and the inhabitants thereof as Gomorrah. 15 Therefore thus saith Yahweh of hosts concerning the prophets: Behold, I will feed them with wormwood, and make them drink the water of gall; § for from the prophets of Jerusalem is profaneness gone forth into all the land.

A Warning not to listen to their delusive Promises of Peace: Yahweh has not sent them.

16 Thus saith Yahweh of hosts: Hearken not unto the words of the prophets that prophesy unto you; they fill you with vain hopes: the vision of their own heart do they speak, and not out of the mouth of Yahweh.‖ 17 They say continually unto them that contemn the word of Yahweh,¶ 'Ye shall have peace'; and unto every one that walketh in the stubbornness of his own heart they say, 'No evil shall come upon you.'** 18 For who (of them) hath stood in the council of Yahweh, that he should

* Or *unpalatable*: cf. Job 6. 6 (where the cognate adj. is rendered 'that which hath no savour').

† Cf. 5. 30.

‡ So with a slight change. The Heb. text is not translatable.

§ Cf. 9. 15.

‖ Cf. 14. 14.

¶ So LXX, Pesh. (two words divided differently).

** Cf. 4. 10 (see above, p. 45), 6. 14, 14. 13.

perceive and hear his word? who (of them) hath listened to my* word, and heard it?†

19 Behold‡ the tempest of Yahweh, fury is gone forth and a whirling tempest: it shall whirl round upon the head of the wicked. 20 The anger of Yahweh will not return, until he have executed, and till he have performed, the intents of his heart: in the latter days ye shall understand it perfectly.§ 21 I have not sent the prophets, yet they ran: I have not spoken to them, yet they prophesied. 22 But if they stand in my council, then let them cause my people to hear my words, and let them turn them back from their evil way, and from the evil of their doings!‖

Yahweh sees and knows what these Prophets do; and will punish them accordingly.

23 Am I a God at hand, saith Yahweh, and not a God afar off? 24 Can a man hide himself in secret places and I not see him? saith Yahweh. Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith Yahweh. 25 I have heard what the prophets say, that prophesy lies in my name, saying, 'I have dreamed, I have dreamed.' 26 How long (shall this be)? Is [my word] in¶ the heart of the prophets that prophesy lies, and that prophesy** the deceit of their own heart?

* So Heb. text, and MSS. of LXX; Heb. marg., other MSS. of LXX, Pesh. Targ. Vulg. have *his*.

† The questions imply the answer, No one: none of these prophets has been really admitted into Yahweh's 'council' (*v.* 22, Job 15. 8 R.V. marg., Ps. 89. 7), and heard His word there.

‡ *Vv.* 19–20, if they are in their right place here (they recur in 30. 23–24), will be intended as an announcement of Yahweh's real purpose, as contrasted with those made by the false prophets, *v.* 17. *Vv.* 21-22 carry on the thought of *vv.* 16–18.

§ Heb. *with understanding*.

‖ Which, it is implied, they do not do (cf. *vv.* 11, 14).

¶ The Heb. text is not translatable. A word seems to have dropped out, either as suggested above, or perhaps (Giesebrecht), *How long will it be ere the heart of the prophets turn, that prophesy lies*, etc.

** So MSS. of LXX, Vulg. Targ. The Heb. text has *and of the prophets of*.

[27] which think to cause my people to forget my name by their dreams which they tell every man to his neighbour, as their fathers forgat my name through Baal. [28] The prophet with whom there is a dream, let him tell a dream; and he with whom is my word* let him speak my word faithfully. What hath the straw (to do) with the wheat? saith Yahweh. [29] Is not my word like as fire? saith Yahweh; and like a hammer that breaketh in pieces the rocks?

[30] Therefore, behold, I am against the prophets, saith Yahweh, that steal my words every one from his neighbour.† [31] Behold, I am against the prophets, saith Yahweh, that use their tongues, and say 'Saith (Yahweh).'‡ [32] Behold, I am against the prophets that prophesy§ lying dreams, saith Yahweh, and tell them, and cause my people to err by their lies, and by their reckless boasting: yet I sent them not, nor commanded them; neither do they profit this people at all, saith Yahweh.

The Word Massā ('Oracle,' 'Burden'), which was applied mockingly to the Prophecies of the true Prophets, to be no more used in Judah.

To understand the following paragraph, it is necessary to remember the double sense of the Heb. *massā*. *Massā* means something *lifted* or *taken up*, i.e. either literally a *burden*, or fig. something *taken up* upon the lips, a *solemn utterance*, or *oracle* (see R.V. marg. of 2 Kings 9. 26 [where *uttered* is lit. *took up*], Isa. 13. 1, 15. 1, etc). It seems that on account of Jeremiah's prophecies being so constantly of coming disaster, this term was applied to them derisively in the sense of *burden*, and hence it is forbidden to be in future used in Judah: people are not to ask a prophet, 'What *massā* have you?' but 'What hath Yahweh answered?' or 'What hath Yahweh said?' At the same time Yahweh retorts the people's word upon themselves by saying, 'Not my words, but you yourselves, are the 'burden'; and I will no longer be burdened with you: I will cast you from me!'

* See 27. 18, 2 Kings 3. 12.

† I.e. who have no prophetic inspiration of their own, and appropriate consequently the prophecies of the true prophets.

‡ A formula constantly used by the true prophets (e.g., in this chapter, *vv.* 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, 12, 23, 24, etc.).

§ So LXX, Vulg. (cf. *vv.* 30, 31). The Heb. text has *against them that prophesy*.

[33] And when this people, or the prophet, or a priest, shall ask thee, saying, 'What is Yahweh's oracle [*or* burden]?' then shalt thou say unto them, 'Ye are the burden!* and I will cast you off,' saith Yahweh. [34] And as for the prophet, and the priest, and the people, that shall say, 'Yahweh's oracle,' I will punish that man and his house. [35] Thus shall ye say every one to his neighbour, and every one to his brother, 'What hath Yahweh answered?' and, 'What hath Yahweh spoken?' [36] But Yahweh's 'oracle' ye shall mention† no more: for every man's own word is his oracle, and ye pervert the words of the living God, of Yahweh of hosts, our God. [37] Thus shalt thou say to the prophet, 'What hath Yahweh answered thee?' and 'What hath Yahweh spoken?'. [38] But if ye say, 'Yahweh's oracle,' therefore thus saith Yahweh: Because ye say this word, 'Yahweh's oracle,' and I have sent unto you, saying, Ye shall not say, 'Yahweh's oracle'; [39] therefore, behold, here I am, and I will surely take you up,‡ and cast you off, and the city that I gave you and your fathers, away from my presence: [40] and I will lay upon you everlasting reproach, and a perpetual confusion which shall not be forgotten.

Explanatory Notes.

XXII. 6–7. The verses are in the plaintive rhythm of the Hebrew elegy (or *kinâh*): see my *Introduction* (p. 429 f.; ed. 6 or 7, p. 457 f.), with the references.

14. *cieled* (A.V., R.V.). 'Cieled,' 'cieling,' in Old English meant *panelled*, *panelling*; and are to be so understood wherever they occur in A.V., R.V., e.g. 1 Kings 6. 15, Hag. 1. 4, 2 Chron. 3. 5 (Aldis Wright, *Bible Word-book*, s.v.). Unfortunately, however, no one now, except a specially educated minority, is aware of this meaning: so that, if the ordinary Bible reader is to understand the passage correctly, the word must be avoided.

* So LXX, Vulg., and nearly all moderns, dividing two words differently. The Heb. text is capable only of a most forced construction (see Keil).

† So LXX (with different vowels). The Heb. text has *remember*.

‡ So LXX, Vulg. Pesh. (with a play on *massâ*, something 'taken up'). Heb. text, *I will surely forget you* (the two words are very similar in Hebrew).

26. הארץ אחרת, even though justifiable in the abstract (Gen. 43. 14, 2 Chron. 32. 5; Davidson, § 32, Rem. 2 (1), König, iii. § 334 *w*), can scarcely be right here: we must read either ארץ אחרת (Deut. 29. 27), the art. having come in by a scribal error from *v.* 27 (Graf, Gie. Du.), or הארץ 'the land,' alone (LXX, Hitz.; cf. *v.* 28*b*, 16. 13).

XXIII. 5 צמח cannot mean 'branch':* as its other occurrences shew, it is a general term for what *sprouts* or *shoots* from the ground. See Gen. 19. 25, 'the *growth* of the ground' (where 'branch' would obviously be unsuitable); Ps. 65. 10 (Heb. 11), 'Thou blessest the *springing* (i.e. the young growth) thereof'; Isa. 4. 2 (where the 'growth' or 'shooting' of Yahweh means generally the produce of the soil, quickened and blessed by Yahweh in the blissful future which the prophet here looks forward to); 61. 11 (A.V., R.V., 'bud'; Cheyne, *sprouting*). The term, which in Isa. 4. 2 is general, is, however, here limited by the context so as to be a fig. designation of the Messiah, represented as a *sprout* or *shoot*; and in Zech. 3. 8, 6. 12 (see R.V. marg.) it is used actually as a title of the Messiah. Comp. the parallel passage, 33. 15, 'In those days will I cause to *shoot forth* unto David a *shoot* of righteousness, and he shall execute judgement and justice (righteousness) in the land'; and the fig. usé of the same verb in Ezekiel 29. 21; Ps. 132. 17. See also Skinner's note on Isa. 4. 2; and notice R.V. marg.

14. לבלתי שבו is as impossible in Hebrew as *ne redeunt* would be in Latin. Read either לִבלתי שׁוּב, or (cf. Exod. 20. 20, 2 Sam. 14. 14) לבלתי יָשֻׁבוּ. There is an exactly similar error in 27. 18.

16. Lit. *make you vain*: but neither this nor A.V., R.V., *teach you vanity*, suggests a correct idea of what is really meant.

17. *and unto*, etc. Of course, the grammatical construction is, *and every one that walketh* (=*whoso walketh*), etc., *they say* (sc. to him), etc.: the ptcp. absolute (G.-K. § 116 *w*).

18. *council*. The idea of the word is that of a body of men holding close or confidential conversation together, a private conclave of intimate friends. See my note on Amos 3. 8.

26. Lit. *How long? Is there in the heart of the prophets . . . ?* but the word 'is' is without a subject; for the insertion of 'this' is quite unauthorized. The aposiopesis is possible (Ps. 6. 4, 90. 13): but in the following clause there must be some fault in the text, though we cannot be sure what it is. Gie. would read עד מתי לא יָשׁוּב לֵב for עד מתי הֵישׁ בְּלֵב.

32. *reckless boasting* (פחזות). See Moore on Judges 9. 4 (p. 244). The corresponding participle is applied also to prophets in Zeph. 3. 4 (A.V., R.V., 'light,' i.e. empty, idle, worthless, following Ḳimchi.)

* The word in Isa. 11. 1 is different (נצר), and is correctly rendered 'branch.'

S. R. Driver.

THE FATHERHOOD OF GOD.

A STUDY IN SPIRITUAL EVOLUTION.

THOSE of us whose theological memory goes back fifty years probably grew up with the conviction that the primary motive, or rather the chief end of the Incarnation was atonement for human guilt; our children are taught that the fundamental purpose of the Incarnation was the revelation of the Divine Fatherhood. To read a volume of sermons by representative popular preachers respectively of the middle and close of the nineteenth century, would make this clear. The contrast thus afforded is doubtless an illustration of the familiar fact that different aspects and portions of the one body of truth appeal with varying force to different generations of men; but it means more than this. It surely implies a new vision of truth, such as Christ promised when He said, "I have yet many things to say unto you, but ye cannot bear them now" (John xvi. 12, and cp. *v.* 14, and xvii. 26). And so it has come to pass that no teacher gains to-day the ear of the educated world, who does not make the Divine Fatherhood the key-note of his message. To the religiously minded then of the present day the Fatherhood of God is a subject of supreme interest.

So much has been said, and so well said, upon this truth, that it may seem almost presumptuous on my part to say anything. My apology for so doing is that every individual looks at a subject from his own standpoint, and that, as a consequence, every one may contribute something, however small, to the fuller understanding of any great subject.

We approach the matter, it is hardly necessary to say, as believers in revelation,—moreover, in a progressive revelation culminating in the Incarnate Word of God. It

does not follow from this that we can give a complete account of the truth under consideration. Its germ and budding are in the dim and prehistoric past; nor, though the final word has been spoken by God, can we think that the final word has been spoken by the Church. The illuminating Spirit may have much yet to unfold from the Divine Word; and, in the knowledge of this truth, the Church of the future may be as much in advance of the Church of to-day as the Church of to-day is in advance of the Schoolmen and Reformers. Incomplete, however, as our knowledge is, we are able to trace, at least to some extent, the progressive realisation of the Divine Fatherhood in the religious consciousness of the world.

Our data for such an inquiry in its earliest stages are very scanty, for we know very little as to the religious condition of man in prehistoric times. Science and archæology have put it beyond question that man made his appearance upon earth far earlier than the traditional chronology of our Bible would lead us to suppose; nor do the records of Holy Scripture carry us far in our inquiries into the religious belief and practice of early man. Giving the amplest possible credit to those records, we gather that God left not Himself without a witness in those primeval days,—that in the darkest times there was an Enoch or a Noah who led a purer life, and held a truer faith than those around them,—that when polytheism had become universal, Abraham was called to a higher, purer belief, which was handed down, though somewhat precariously and tentatively, to the third and fourth generation; the story of Jacob and his sons showing how feebly the belief was held and what a narrow line of demarcation divided the posterity of Abraham from surrounding heathenism. Views, however, differ as to the historical value of the Book of Genesis, and many who accept its teaching as inspired cannot resist the impression that

those who compiled the Book read into the narrative some of their own thoughts and convictions, i.e. the thoughts and convictions of an age long subsequent to the events related. This being so, it would not be wise to draw confident conclusions from the Book of Genesis as to the religious belief and spiritual condition even of the patriarchs.[1] Still more hazardous is it to form definite opinions as to the religion of *primitive* man from the Bible, since the unhistorical character of the narrative before the call of Abraham is undisputed.

If we turn from the Bible to scientific and historical research for information, great as is the interest and importance of much that has been written on the origins and beginnings of worship and creed, it is with a sense of disappointment that we weigh the results of the inquiry. No well equipped student of the subject ventures to speak dogmatically. In dealing with primitive man we are in the region of conjecture, and the fundamental fallacy of many anthropologists has been the attempt to draw a portrait of primitive man from the modern savage.[2] The question of primitive religion belongs to history, but there is no history to solve it.[3] At best "primitive man is but a hypothesis reconstructed from the traces he has left."[4]

It may, however, be confidently said that the trend of thought at the present time is distinctly against those animistic conceptions of the origion of religion, which are

[1] This is not to be taken as implying that the patriarchs are the almost purely ideal, not to say fictitious, characters that many modern critics would make them.

[2] Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 6.

[3] "Where we cannot investigate, we must be content to speculate; and so all inquiries into the origin of early beliefs and institutions, however disguised in archæology or in history, are really philosophical. Our modern anthropologies are in heart and essence as speculative as mediæval scholasticism, or as any system of ancient metaphysics." Fairbairn, *The Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 204. See also *Making of Religion*, Andrew Lang, pp. 47, 58.

[4] Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 6.

pressed upon us in the writings of Mr. Herbert Spencer and other writers, whether representative of agnosticism or materialism. An increasing body of evidence is forthcoming in support of the view that there was present to the mind of primitive man the abstract conception of God, as a Supreme Being, a beneficent Creator and a moral Governor. If this was so, then there was from the first the germ, at least, of theism in the mind of man, and, apart from the Bible, neither Abraham nor any other early monotheist is the impossible anachronism that some writers have maintained.[1] This is as far as we can go, and it must be admitted that it is impossible to trace with confidence any of our religious conceptions from its earliest phase in human consciousness.[2]

When, however, we come to the history of Israel, the darkness to a great extent clears, and we are able to watch the evolution of spiritual truth. The many affinities of belief and ritual that connected Israel with neighbouring Semitic peoples may, in some degree, have been the result of syncretism,[3] but far more largely were the survivals of an earlier faith and practice. The historical books of the Old Testament make it clear that the mass of the

[1] As Professor Jevons and others remind us, "the progress of religion has depended on the intuitive powers of the few—inward intuition, direct perception of things not apprehended by the senses. We may explain this as due to revelation or to greater powers of spiritual insight, or in some other way; but religious progress moves wholly on one line, that of personality." Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 397.

[2] The history of religion has only to deal with man as a religious being. There may have been man upon earth from a scientific point of view long before the human race existed in a religious sense. This has been ably maintained by Mr. Hugh Capron in *The Conflict of Truth*. The difficulties, however, raised by the contention are very serious, especially as argued by Mr. Capron from the record of Scripture, and, like all attempts to lift the veil from the origin of things, it fails to carry conviction.

[3] Professor Jevons *suggests the possibility* of syncretism for the affinities collectively. *Introd. to the History of Religion*, p. 388 ff. Dr. A. B. Davidson, in his Article on *God* in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, appears somewhat to favour this view, but it is not the general one. See also *Making of Religion*, A. Lang, p. 281.

people were not far raised in their ethical and religious conceptions above the neighbouring heathen. The prophets of Israel had no easy task in planting among them those germ-thoughts which were to issue in such precious fruit; they were, it is evident, dealing with those who were much more at home with the idolatrous ritual of high places and hill altars than with the stately worship of the Temple.

All positive or founded religions, i.e. religions which, in their present form, can be traced to a personal teacher, work upon pre-existing beliefs and convictions. No positive religion starts with a *tabula rasa*.[1] Just as our Lord built upon a Jewish foundation, so did Moses upon a pre-existing Semitic basis, and the greater part of the Old Testament is occupied in showing the steps by which the people of Israel were led onward and upward from crude and rudimentary conceptions of God and worship to the noble and spiritual views which find expression in the prophetic literature. Thus, then, we find the Hebrew faith, preparatory though it was for the religion of the Incarnation, grafted upon a heathen stock. Scores of parallels might be named between the worship and cult of Israel and those of other Semitic tribes;[2] and their ritual being what it was in the earliest days of their history, nothing was more natural than that the Israelites should mingle themselves with the heathen. But, whilst there was much in common between the Hebrews and other branches of the Semite family, an ever-widening gulf in the providence of God was, in reality, separating the seed of Abraham into a peculiar people, for there was a purifying, transforming, elevating process at work in Israel which was absent from other Semitic centres. Under

[1] See Fairbairn's *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 260; also Robertson Smith's *Religion of the Semites*, p. 2.

[2] For points of contact and coincidence between heathen Semites and Israel, see Robertson Smith's *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 111, 138, 142, 143, 165, 171, 177, 207, 220, 314, 325, 387, 389, 428.

Divine guidance, the traditional heathen ritual, in the hands of Israel, threw off that which was gross and materialistic. The human sacrifice was abolished, the partaking of blood became an abomination, the idea that the deity participated in the material offering was repudiated, self-mutilation was left to the worshippers of Baal and Moloch.

But, in addition to this negative and prohibitive side of the Divine education, a far more important work of positive and evolutionary instruction was going on. We see the rude and childish tenets of savage society becoming instinct with moral and spiritual power. Contrast, for example, the heathen conception of the Divine jealousy with that which was fostered by the Jewish prophets: the heathen worshipper picturing his god as standing stiffly on a sense of personal dignity that could be satisfied with a strict observance of sacrifice and ritual; Jehovah's jealousy viewed by the prophets from a purely moral and spiritual standpoint, and constantly urged as an incentive to a purer and higher life. Or take the conception of holiness. To the ordinary Semite there was nothing ethical in it, and it is best interpreted by the well known practice of taboo.[1] What clearer proof can we have of a Divine education than the way in which the prophets of Israel took this low and ignorant conception, and made it the starting point of teaching which proclaimed a God who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity, and whose purpose it is that men should do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with their God? The same process of ethical and spiritual development is to be found in the doctrine of the atonement. The

[1] For instances of the survival of this conception amongst the Israelites, see Robertson Smith's *Religion of the Semites*, pp. 140–143, and Note C, Appendix, p. 428. Also Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, s.v. *Holiness in the O.T.*, vol. ii. p. 395. Professor Ives Curtiss assures us that holiness has no ethical meaning among the Semites of the present day. *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, pp. 66, 149.

subject is indeed a difficult one, because our knowledge is so slight and fragmentary, but the most recent study of modern Semitic religion leaves little doubt that the shedding of blood had a vicarious intention and significance among the ancient Semites.[1] And as we listen to the language and observe the customs of the Ismailiyeh and Aramæans of to-day we are carried back in thought more than three thousand years and stand with Moses beneath Mount Sinai, as he sprinkles first the altar and then the people with the blood of the sacrifice; or with the Israelites on the Passover night, as they stain the door-posts and lintels of their dwellings with the blood of the sacrificial lamb. From such beginnings we are permitted to trace the gradual realization of the need of a sacrifice essentially Divine, and to watch the growth of a sense of sin which finds its expression in the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah.

Nor is it otherwise with the truth of the Divine Fatherhood. Almost incredible as it may seem to us, the very basis of religious thought, outside the Bible, in the earliest times of which we have any definite knowledge, was the physical unity of the god and his worshippers.[2] The ancient heathen Semite accepted, without question, the traditional view that the god he worshipped was in a physical sense the father of his family or tribe.[3] Going back, as far as we can, to the origins of things, we gather that the relation of God to man was conceived as twofold, viz., that of father and king; the former relation expressing His relation to

[1] See *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, Prof. Ives Curtiss, pp. 174, 178, 214, 224, 227, etc.

[2] The flesh of the sacrifice was eaten with the view of reinforcing the physical bond, and was regarded as equally the food of God and man. In a gross and materialistic way, therefore, primitive religion was intensely sacramental. On the connexion of this crude sacramental conception with the mysteries of the Christian faith, see the striking words with which Professor Jevons closes his *Introduction to the History of Religion*, p. 414.

[3] The fatherhood of God, in a physical sense, is not alien to the mind of the modern Semite. *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*, Ives Curtiss, p. 112 ff.

the family, the latter His relation to the state. Such, so far as we can ascertain, were man's germinal conceptions of his relation to God, and if his conceptions were crude and imperfect, they were so only in the sense of being rudimentary.[1] From the first—the first, that is, of which we have any knowledge—man's religious ideas were bound up with a sense of the Divine Fatherhood and of responsibility to a Superior Being.[2] The study of history teaches us not to despise the day of small things, and, in the growth of Hebrew thought, we trace the advance, by a process of spiritual evolution, of these conceptions of sonship and responsibility towards their goal in the teaching of Christ, which centred in the kingdom and the family.

Turning from the ancient heathen Semite to the Hebrew people, we at once become aware of a remarkable change in teaching and belief. Jehovah is the Father of Israel, not of the individual Israelite primarily, but of the nation. From the very first the people collectively are taught to regard Jehovah as their Father, because treated with a Father's love. "Israel is My son, even My firstborn." Exod. iv. 22 (cp. Hos. xi. 1). By the prophets God is represented both as the Husband and Father of His people.

[1] "It would be hard to exaggerate the rudeness of the form which religion assumes in the lower stages of culture; but this ought not to conceal from us the fact that the process which produced it was, in its own order, if not as fine, yet as rational and real as that to which we owe the art, the poetry, and the philosophy of to-day, Man produced it because he was struggling to express or realize himself within a system that forced him to be rational in order that he might be man while the system remained Nature. And the real continuity of religion lies in the continued activity of the creative process, the thought which is ever refining the forms it has inherited, and seeking fitter vehicles for its richer and sublimer ideas." Fairbairn's *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 212.

[2] We can perhaps hardly say moral responsibility. There was no ideal of righteousness present to the mind of those of whom we speak, nor any code of personal morality. Their god was a clan-king, and the only divine sanction they recognized was that which enforced their tribal duties and made them faithful to the traditions and precedents handed down from the past. Robertson Smith's *Religion of the Semites*, p. 249.

Such a treatment of the subject would, of itself, close the door against the thought of physical descent. But independently of this, great care was taken to insist upon the fact that Israel had been made God's child by an act of redemption and a covenant of grace. "Is not He thy Father that hath bought thee?" Deut. xxxii. 6 (cp. iv. 20, 34; ix. 29; Exod. xx. 2; Ps. lxxiv. 2; Isa. xliii. 3).

It is the nation, then, rather than the individual, that claims the privilege of the Divine Fatherhood. Yet no one can read the Old Testament without seeing that the more spiritually minded amongst the Jews rose above the teaching of their times and grasped something of the sense in which the Fatherhood of God is understood by the Christian. In Psalm lxxiii. 15[1] the pious Israelite is distinctly accounted the child of God. In Psalm lxxxix. 26 the king says (no doubt officially and representatively), "Thou art my Father." This is in strict agreement with the word of the Lord concerning Solomon, "I will be his Father and he shall be My son" (2 Sam. vii. 14; 1 Chron. xxii. 10; cp. Ps. ii. 7). And when the Psalmist says, "Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear Him," he does something more than suggest the idea of individual fatherhood.[2] Moreover, the general trend of religious thought was in this direction. From the time of the Captivity onwards the Jew was familiar with the truths of moral freedom and personal responsibility, and men whose religious thought had been formed on the basis of Ezekiel's teaching[3] could not altogether fail to make personal application of language addressed by Hosea and Isaiah to the

[1] Cp. Deut. xiv. 1; Prov. xiv. 26.

[2] Dr. Sanday is surely justified in saying that there "has been a tendency to minimize too much the part which the conception of God as a Father plays in the O.T." See his article on *God in the N.T.*, in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, vol. ii. p. 208. And Dr. Watson is not justified in saying that the individual Fatherhood of God had not dawned upon the mind of the Jew in O.T. times. See EXPOSITOR, Series V. vol. i. p. 24.

[3] Ezekiel xviii., also iii. 16-21, xxxiii. 1-20; and cp. Jer. xxxi. 29-35.

nation at large; the sense of the Divine Fatherhood would, under favouring conditions of character and environment, become, at least in some measure, individualized. A defective sense of individual and personal right prevailed amongst the Hebrew as amongst other nations of antiquity, and this undeveloped sense of individualism would naturally manifest itself in an inability to realize, except very imperfectly and tentatively, the individual Fatherhood of God.[1] It would perhaps be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the view of life expressed and urged by Ezekiel in the 18th chapter and other parts of his prophecy in preparing the way for Him who made individual character the aim of His mission, and, at the same time, taught that true sonship consists in true character. In the same prophetic spirit did John the Baptist make ready the way of the Lord, by preaching personal repentance and pouring contempt upon the boast of descent from Abraham.[2]

Thus was the way prepared; but when we turn from the work of preparation to the teaching of the Gospels how marked a difference is seen! The teaching of the later prophets, which made personality a part of human thought and life, invested it with a religious significance and moral responsibility. Our Lord took this newly awakened religious sense, and, through it, brought into consciousness the sense of individual sonship. The New Testament presents no greater contrast to the Old than in its treatment

[1] I cannot remember to have seen this undeveloped sense of individualism, which was such a marked feature in the early world, brought forward in the discussion of the Fatherhood of God as presented in the O.T., but it surely touches the question very closely, and is essential to the right consideration of the subject. On undeveloped individualism, see Maine's *Ancient Law*, p. 122 ff.; Mozley, *Ruling Ideas in Early Ages*, p. 37 ff.

[2] The conception of the individual Fatherhood of God is not prominent in the apocryphal scriptures, but is by no means absent from them. See Wisdom xiv. 3; Ecclus. iv. 10, xxiii. 1, 4. 2 Esdras i. 28, cp. ii. 2, is believed to be from a Christian source. The growing belief in personality can be best traced in the apocryphal and apocalyptic scriptures by the increasing definiteness of conception as to final judgment.

of the Divine Fatherhood. Read the Sermon on the Mount, and set it side by side with the words of the most evangelical of the prophets, and how clearly is it seen that we have entered upon a new dispensation.[1] Not without pregnant purpose and meaning was it that the Divine Fatherhood should have been emphasized in the first recorded utterance of our Lord; and, to the Christian, easy and natural is the transition of thought from the words spoken in boyhood, "Wist ye not that I must be in My Father's house?" to those spoken after the Resurrection, "Go unto My brethren and say to them, I ascend unto My Father and your Father, and My God and your God."

From the very opening of his ministry our Lord speaks to His disciples as, individually, the children of God; their relation of sonship is constantly rising to the surface of His teaching. The Fatherhood of God is the basis of His appeal alike to the conscience and the heart. Dr. Sanday is doubtless right when he says that "in the uncertainty which attends the exact circumstances of His discourses it may be often doubtful as to how far the phrase ὁ πατὴρ ὑμῶν extends beyond these."[2] Yet, as one reads the Gospel narrative, one certainly gets the impression that the phrase was not so indiscriminately used as some writers would maintain.[3] Unquestionably, as I shall presently point out, the universal Fatherhood of God is both implied and

[1] On the whole subject of the Divine Fatherhood see Westcott's *Historic Faith*, p. 205 ff. On the broad distinctions between the O.T. and N.T. conception of Fatherhood, see pp. 206, 7; also Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*, "Children of God," s.v. *God*.

[2] Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, s.v. *God*, vol. ii. p. 209.

[3] As, e.g., Dr. Watson. "People with dogmatic ends to serve have striven to believe that Jesus reserved Father for His disciples; but an ingenuous person could hardly make the discovery in the Gospels. One searches in vain to find that Jesus had an esoteric word for His intimates and exoteric for the people." Expositor, Series V. vol. i. p. 26. But the only passage he adduces in support of his view is Matt. xxiii. 1, 9; he might have added some others, e.g. Matt. vii. 28, 29; Luke vii. 1. The same exaggeration is found in a remarkable book, anonymously published, *Pro Christo et Ecclesiâ*, p. 46 ff.

declared in the teaching of Christ. That He came to reconcile the children of disobedience to their Heavenly Father, that all men are regarded as, at least potentially, the sons of God, can hardly be disputed. But it is just as much beyond dispute that He never failed to impress upon His hearers the fact that the filial relation of man to God was of a moral and spiritual nature,—that the essence and reality of sonship consist in likeness to God. The teaching of our Lord indeed anticipated the statement of St. Paul, "As many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are sons of God."[1] The "sons of the kingdom" are the sons of His Father.[2] It is the "little flock" to whom it is their Father's good pleasure to give the kingdom.[3] It is the peacemakers who shall be called the "sons of God."[4] In strict accordance with such sayings are the words recorded by the three Synoptists, "Behold My mother and My brethren! For whosoever shall do the will of My Father which is in Heaven, he is My brother, and sister, and mother."[5] The relationship is one of likeness. And this is made the more clear by the startling contrast in which such language stands with that which was addressed to those whose eyes were blinded with pride and prejudice. "Ye," said our Lord, "are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father it is your will to do."[6] So, too, the tares in the field are the "sons of the evil one."[7] The Pharisees make their proselyte twofold more the "son of hell" than themselves.[8] With these sayings of our Lord, we may compare the following expressions in other parts of the New Testa-

[1] Rom. viii. 14. Our Lord always used *υἱός*, indicating the position and privilege of sonship, not *τέκνον*, which denotes community of nature, that which is *born*. On the use of *υἱός* and *τέκνον* in the N.T., see Westcott's Notes on John i. 12 and 1 John iii. 2; also Hastings' *Bible Dictionary* on "Children of God," s.v. *God*.

[2] Matt. xiii. 38, 43.

[3] Luke xii. 32.

[4] Matt. v. 9. cp. Luke vi. 35.

[5] Matt. xii. 49, 50.

[6] John viii. 44.

[7] Matt. xiii. 38.

[8] Matt. xxiii. 15.

ment; "son of the devil," [1] "sons of disobedience," [2] "children of wrath"; [3] also "children of the devil" [4] and "children of cursing." [5] If we examine the teaching of the New Testament as a whole, we find that this main thought runs right through it, viz.: that the filial relation to God is realized and expressed in likeness to God; or rather, likeness to Him, who, in a perfect human life, revealed the Divine character. "As many as received Him to them gave He the right to become children of God, even to them that believe on His Name, which were born . . . of God." [6] "In this the children of God are manifest and the children of the devil; whosoever doeth not righteousness is not of God." [7]

If we direct our attention for a moment to St. Paul's teaching on this subject, we shall find that it is in strict accordance with what we have seen to be the general tenor of our Lord's. St. Paul introduces the idea of *adoption*. The earliest use of this term is in Galatians iv. 5; but it is necessary to bear in mind that he is speaking "after the manner of men." He speaks in parables; he explains his meaning by analogies, he illustrates spiritual processes and relationships from the experiences of family and social life—the covenant, the legal disabilities of infancy and slavery, the guardian, the steward, the tutor. There can be no question that this conception of sonship was suggested by the Roman law of adoption, which included an act of fictitious sale (*mancipatio*), and what the Apostle intended to emphasize was the fact that sonship is the result of an act of Divine grace and redemption. St. Paul thus accentuates the redemptive rather than the creative aspect of sonship and carries into the Christian covenant

[1] Acts xiii. 10. [2] Eph. ii. 2, v. 6, Col. iii. 6. [3] Eph. ii. 3.
[4] 1 John iii. 10. [5] 2 Pet. ii. 14. [6] John i. 12, cp. iii. 3–8.
[7] 1 John iii. 10. "Life reveals the children of God." Westcott, *First Epistle of St. John*, p. 105.

the conception of the Hebrew prophets, who taught that Israel was God's child, not by creation, still less by physical descent, but by an act of grace.[1] It is in strict agreement with this Old Testament view that St. Paul uses this very term *adoption* of ancient Israel. (Rom. ix. 4.)[2]

And this sonship is regarded, throughout the New Testament, as a Divine gift to man in the Incarnate Son of God, and to be enjoyed only in union with Him. The explicit teaching of St. Paul is that membership in the Body of Christ carries with it adoption into the family of God. To be in Christ is to be a part of God's family. To become united by a living faith to the Only Begotten Son is to take one's place amongst the children of the living God. This truth might be proved and illustrated from every part of the New Testament; [3] it underlies and inspires the creeds of Christendom.

From what has been said, it will be seen that there is in the New Testament an uncompromising, not to say exclusive, attitude towards the unregenerate mass, the world that "lieth in the evil one." [4] On the other hand, it is equally undeniable that, at the back of all this emphatic teaching as to sonship, there is the vision and revelation of a love that embraces all. Words have come down to us from the lips of Christ and the pen of His apostles, which tell us it was a true instinct which bade the earliest

[1] St. Paul also associates the position of the Christian believer with that of faithful Abraham and his spiritual children. Gal. iii. 6-9.

[2] At the same time, by using the analogy of adoption, the apostle guards the unique sonship of Jesus Christ. "Adoptionem propterea dicit, ut distincte intelligamus unicum Dei filium." St. Augustine. See Lightfoot on *Gal. iv.* 5.

[3] John i. 12, iii. 16, 36, and *passim* in the Fourth Gospel. Cp Matt. xi. 27, Rom. vi. 23, James i. 17, 18, 1 Pet. i. 3, 21, 1 John v. 11, etc. Any attempt to correlate the sacrament of baptism with what is revealed to us of the Fatherhood of God would carry us far beyond the limits of our space, but it is important to note that the writers of the New Testament uniformly presuppose newness of life as well as of privilege in the case of the baptized.

[4] 1 John v. 19.

worshippers offer sacrifices to an unseen Father, and that, however crude and materialistic their thoughts of God, there was a living germ of truth in the hearts of those who spoke of Ζεὺς πατήρ and All-Father. Whatever other wealth of meaning the parable of the *Prodigal Son* may contain, the wanderer from home and father represents the nations that have gone out from the presence of God;[1] nor can any one read the Gospels and doubt that the heart and aim of Jesus embraced the world.[2] So, too, in various ways, and from varying points of view, the writers of the New Testament recognize the universal love and fatherly purpose of God. Adam is described by St. Luke as the son of God,[3] with no hint or suggestion that, by the Fall, he had altogether ceased to be a son. St. Paul quotes approvingly the words of a heathen poet which claim for all men a Divine Fatherhood (Acts xvii. 29).[4] St. John sees the whole human race as the object of redeeming love (John iii. 16; 1 John ii. 2). To the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews God is "the Father of spirits" (xii. 9);[5] to St. James He is the Father after whose similitude man, as man, is made (iii. 9). So we have witness after witness

[1] Cp. the parable of the *Two Sons*, Matt. xxi. 28 ff.

[2] See, e.g., Matt. viii. 11, xxi. 41; Luke iv. 25-27, xxiv. 47; John iv. 21–24, x. 16, xii. 24, 32. The universal Fatherhood of God is implicitly taught in Matt. v. 45, Luke vi. 35.

[3] iii. 38.

[4] The late Dr. Candlish, in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, vol. ii. p. 219, rather unduly depreciates the force of this endorsement on the part of the apostle. It is quite true that St. Paul does not use the term υἱός or τέκνον, but, when we compare his use of the word γένος in this passage with its use in Rev. xxii. 16, it is clear that the universal Fatherhood of God was in his mind when preaching at Athens. Further, in treating of divine sonship by adoption in Gal. iii., iv., St. Paul includes Gentiles with Jews in having undergone an elementary discipline. "The heir, in his non-age, represents the state of the world before the Gospel. In drawing out the comparison St. Paul seems to include Gentiles as well as Jews under this tutelage." "Potentially, indeed, men were sons before Christ's coming (iv. 1), but actually they were only slaves (iv. 3). His coming conferred upon them the privilege of sons." Lightfoot on *Galatians iv.*

[5] The writer somewhat modifies, but does not nullify, this conception by introducing the thought of bastardy in the preceding verse.

to the truth that all men are, at the least potentially, the sons of God.

Indeed, it is not too much to say that, in the logic of the heart, the universal Fatherhood of God is the corollary of the Incarnation, as the Incarnation is its true and eternal expression. "To conceive the typical Man as essentially Son was to be driven to think of humanity in the terms of sonship. If, by the very constitution of His being, God was a Father, man by the very fact of his creation in Christ was constituted a son. And if collective man was God's son, it followed that God was man's Father, and so there stepped into the place of tribal deity the universal Fatherhood."[1] At the same time it is easy to drift into an anthropomorphic presentment of the subject, and much popular teaching has erred in this respect. It must be obvious that the language of Scripture is an accommodation to our thought and experience. The Divine Fatherhood is but most imperfectly represented, shadowed forth rather than expressed, in the parental relation. It belongs to a different plane of thought and existence from that of earthly parentage. It is, therefore, at the most, analogy, not identity, that we look for, and all that we can claim is that earthly fatherhood is the analogue of a Divine Fatherhood, which with our present powers and attainments it is as impossible accurately to define as fully to experience. Nor must we lose sight of a further consideration; and here again how often has popular teaching misrepresented the truth! What God, in His condescension to our infirmity, describes as His Fatherhood is part of His essential Being. God is love. God does not become love. God does not become our Father. God is what He is (Jas. i. 17). Very clearly is this taught in the parable of the Prodigal Son.[2] The father is father from first to last. The

[1] Fairbairn's *Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 543.

[2] The term υἱός is applied to Jew and Gentile alike; so in Matt. xxi. 28 ff.

son might, indeed, leave the paternal home, and so lose the privilege and position of sonship, but the filial tie is represented as unbroken throughout the story. The son is in the far country wasting his substance in riotous living, but the father is in the old home waiting to receive, to pardon, to re-instate. In that parable the heart of man is represented as unsatisfied save by the realization of the Divine Fatherhood; and this was to declare that Fatherhood universal; for the love of God must be commensurate with the need of man; if the need is universal, the love that supplies it can be nothing less. And in thus declaring the truth of God's immutable love, our Lord anticipated the experience of man. Go where you will, this is the teaching that draws forth a thankful response from man's heart. The first and last word of the spiritual life is Abba, Father. "Father, I have sinned against heaven and in Thy sight." "Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit."

G. S. STREATFEILD.

THE CATHOLIC EPISTLES OF THEMISON: A STUDY IN 1 AND 2 PETER.

THE rise of Montanism is closely connected with the decay of Christian prophecy. The warnings uttered against false prophecy in the Shepherd of Hermas (*c.* 140 A.D.), and the *Didache* (*c.* 131–160) point to the reality of the danger in the middle of the second century. The opponents of Montanism, especially the anonymous author[1] of the anti-Montanist work dedicated to Avircius Marcellus (*c.* 193 A.D.) were careful to distinguish between the practice of the Montanist prophets and the prerogatives of those of the New Testament.[2] Notwithstanding this distinction, the danger seems to have led to a shrinking of the gift of pro-

[1] Eus. *H.E.* v. 162. [2] *Ibid.* v. 17, 3.

phecy within the Church, and to the gradual extinction of the order of Christian prophets.[1]

Harnack[2] and Ramsay[3] agree that the thirteen years of peace alluded to by the anonymous author[4] as throwing discredit upon the prophecy of Maximilla coincide with the reign of Commodus (180–192). The former infers from this statement two important dates in the history of Montanism; the death of Maximilla, in 179 A.D., and the composition of the anonymous work in 193 A.D.

The Crisis of 179 A.D. in the History of Montanism.

The death of Maximilla was a great crisis in the history of the movement: "After me will be no prophetess more, but the end."[5] The anonymous writer gives the era of the rise of Montanus as the proconsulate of Gratus. This date is however not known, but the sequence of events in the progress of the movement proves that it must have been considerably before the year 172 A.D. of the *Chronicon* of Eusebius. Maximilla herself was for a while the leader of the sect, supported by Themison, who was of sufficient importance to give his name to it. The opponents of the Catholic bishops, Zoticus of Cumana, and Julianus of Apameia, who endeavoured to win back the Montanists after the death of their founder, were called the followers of Themison.[6] Epiphanius, who was able to consult sources of Montanist literature which have since perished, says that Montanism took its rise in the nineteenth year of Antoninus Pius (156–157),[7] and Harnack accepts this as the era of Montanism. He concludes: "The date of Epiphanius is no longer threatened by Eusebius; Mon-

[1] McGiffert, *Eus.* p. 229.
[2] *Chronologie*, i. p. 365.
[3] *Cities and Bishoprics of Phrygia*, p. 710.
[4] Eus. *H.E.* v. 16, 19.
[5] Epiph. *Haer.* xlviii. 2.
[6] Eus. *H.E.* v. 16, 17.
[7] Epiph. *Haer.* xlviii. 1.

tanus began his work in 157 (156); Gratus was proconsul of Asia the same year; Apollonius wrote his treatise in the year 197 (196),"[1] i.e., forty years after the rise of the movement.[2]

Montanism was not only opposed by writers in Phrygia. It is said by the author of *Praedestinatus* that Soter, bishop of Rome (166–174), wrote against the Montanists, and that, in consequence of this, Tertullian prepared his treatise *De Ecstasi* as an apology for Montanism.[3] But Rome did not always look with disfavour on the prophetic movement in Phrygia. Tertullian speaks of a Bishop of Rome who had recognized the movement, and would have gone farther still in holding out the right hand of fellowship had it not been for the interference and false allegations of Praxeas. The passage is of great importance in the relation between Rome and Phrygia. "Nam iste primus ex Asia hoc genus perversitatis intulit Romam, homo et alias inquietus, insuper de jactatione martyrii inflatus ob solum et simplex et breve carceris taedium, quando, et si corpus suum tradidisset exurendum, nihil profecisset, dilectionem dei non habens, cujus charismata quoque expugnavit. Nam idem nunc episcopum Romanum, agnoscentem tam prophetias Montani, Priscae, Maximillae, et ex ea agnitione pacem ecclesiis Asiae et Phrygiae inferentem, falsa de ipsis prophetis et ecclesiis eorum adseverando et praecessorum ejus auctoritates defendendo coegit et litteras pacis revocare jam emissas et a proposito recipiendorum charismatum concessare. Ita duo negotia diaboli Praxeas Romae procuravit, prophetiam expulit et haeresim intulit."[4] Who was this Bishop of Rome who recognized the prophecies of the Montanists, and by this recognition would have brought peace to the Churches of Asia and Phrygia, whose letters

[1] Harn. *Chr.* i. p. 375.
[2] Eus. *H.E.* v. 18, 12.
[3] Oehler, *Tertullian*, vol. ii. p. 744.
[4] *Tert. adv. Prax.* i.

were only revoked by the misrepresentations of Praxeas, and the appeal to his predecessors in the See of Rome? On the authority of Pseudo-Tertullian he has been identified with Victor (A.D. 189–199): "Sed post hos omnes etiam Praxeas quidam haeresim introduxit, quam Victorinus ? Victor) corroborare curavit." [1] It is, however, not certain that the reference in this passage is to any joint action of Victor and Praxeas against the Montanists, and, as Harnack says,[2] it is difficult to think that Rome would have sent "letters of peace" so late in the century when Avircius Marcellus, Apollonius, and the anonymous writer had taken on behalf of the Church so definite a line against the movement. Harnack thinks that Tertullian is referring to the action of Eleutherus [3] (174–189), and that his predecessors, whose policy Praxeas appealed to as a precedent, were Anicetus (155–166), and Soter (166–174). There is no record of any interference by the former in the affairs of Montanus, but as the movement took its rise at the very beginning of the rule of Anicetus, it is quite possible that he may have pronounced against it. The attitude of Soter is known from the *De Ecstasi* of Tertullian.

There is also independent evidence that Eleutherus was called upon to give his judgment on the movement. The churches of Gaul, on the occasion of their great persecution (177–178), "set forth their own prudent and most orthodox judgment" on the Montanist prophets, and "sent it to the brethren throughout Asia and Phrygia, and also to Eleutherus, who was then bishop of Rome, negotiating for the peace of the churches." [4] This last phrase links the passage in with that of Tertullian's "letters of peace," and almost implies that the churches of Vienne and Lyons were pleading on behalf of their brethren among the Montanist churches of Phrygia. Eusebius's estimate of the letter of the Gallic

[1] *Ps.–Tert. adv. omn. haer.* viii.
[2] *Chron.* i. p. 375.
[3] *Chron.* i. p. 376.
[4] Eus. *H.E.* v. 3, 4.

martyrs as "prudent and most orthodox" has led Salmon and McGiffert[1] to hold that their object was the condemnation of the Montanists, but the internal evidence of the great "Letter of the Churches of Vienna and Lyons" seems almost to prove their sympathies were the other way, that indeed there were so many elements of Montanism among the martyrs of Gaul that it is difficult to believe that they would have counselled extreme measures against the movement in Phrygia.

The austerities of Alcibiades,[2] only recorded by Eusebius to show his readiness to submit to more orthodox practice, point him out as a sympathizer with, if not as a follower of the Montanists. Biblias, when accused of sharing in Thyestian banquets, replied: "How could those eat children who do not think it lawful to taste the blood of even irrational animals?"[3] It is also recorded of Vettius Epagathus, one of the brethren, a man filled with love for God and his neighbour, that when asked if he also were a Christian, "confessed with a loud voice, and was himself taken into the order of martyrs, being called the 'Paracletus' of the Christians, having the Paraclete in himself, the Spirit more abundantly than Zacharias."[4] It is a question whether the claims of Montanus were originally greater than this; in any case, the language shows very close affinity with Montanist thought. There is also a touch of prophetic enthusiasm in the attitude and action of Alexander, "a Phrygian by birth, a physician by profession." The name is common on the inscriptions of the Phrygian Pentapolis and the district of Akmonia.[5] "He was well known to all on account of his love to God, and boldness of speech (for he was not without a share of the apostolic charisma)."[6]

[1] McGiffert, *Eus.* p. 219.
[2] Eus. *H.E.* v. 3, 2.
[3] *Ibid.* v. 1, 26.
[4] *Ibid.* v. 1, 10.
[5] Ramsay, *Phrygia*, pp. 645, 652, 653, 699, 703.
[6] Eus. *H.E.* v. 1, 49.

This letter of the churches of Vienna and Lyons to the brethren throughout Asia and Phrygia was written *c.* 179 A.D., and would reach Phrygia about the time of the death of Maximilla. It was a most fitting occasion for bringing about peace between the Catholic and Montanist churches, and it is to this date therefore that the "letters of peace" which were sent by Eleutherus may be assigned.[1] He had been much impressed by the sufferings of the Christians in Gaul; Irenaeus had been commissioned by his brethren in Lyons to bring the sorrows of the Church before the Roman Bishop.[2] Eleutherus may have heard of the sufferings of the Montanist martyrs.[3] He would think it a fit opportunity to do his part to promote the peace of the churches.

The Eirenicon of Eleutherus.

Is there in early Christian literature any trace of his action, any trace of the "letters of peace" which he sent to the churches of Asia and Phrygia? There is one document which has received the "imprimatur" of St. Peter, whose history is intimately associated with the Churches of Asia, the First Epistle of St. Peter. The Epistle was already known in Asia. It is referred to in the Epistle of Polycarp to the Smyrnæans, written as a covering letter for the Epistles of Ignatius about 117 A.D. It is stated by Eusebius that Papias made use of it in his writings;[4] and these belong to the years 145–160. Polycarp did not recognize its Petrine authorship, neither did he quote from the latter portion of the Epistle. It was known also in Rome. There are faint traces of it in the First Epistle of Clement (93–95 A.D.);[5] and a verbal quotation in the Second Epistle of Clement (*c.* 166). These are the only witnesses before the time of Eleutherus.[6]

[1] Harnack, *Chron.* i. p. 316.
[2] Eus. *H.E.* v. 4, 1.
[3] Harn. *Chr.* i. p. 381.
[4] Eus. *H.E.* iii. 39, 17.
[5] Harn. *Chr.* i. p. 461; v. Soden, *Handcommentar*, p. 115.
[6] Harn. *Chr.* i. p. 461.

The First Epistle of St. Peter, apart from its opening and closing verses (i. 1–2, v. 12–14) has the character of a homily rather than a letter, and is on the whole Pauline in its character.[1] Ramsay dates it 80 A.D.[2] Harnack prefers the later date 83–93.[3] Its Petrine authorship is first recognized in the Second Epistle of St. Peter (iii. 1). It was afterwards recognized by Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Clement of Alexandria.[4] The character of the last verses has convinced Harnack that they belong to the period of the Second Epistle.[5]

There is evidence that the Church of Rome was in the habit, in the second century, of sending forth homilies and letters under its authority to other churches. Hermas is bidden to give one copy of his "Little Book" of visions to Clement, that he might send it "to the foreign cities, for this is his duty."[6] The so-called Second Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians is probably a homily of Soter, bishop of Rome,[7] and to be identified with the Epistle which, on the testimony of Dionysius of Corinth, was sent by him from Rome, and read in the public services of the Church of Corinth.[8] Dionysius also bears witness to the practice of making alterations and additions to his own letters. "As the brethren desired me to write Epistles, I wrote. And these Epistles the apostles of the devil have filled with tares, cutting out some things and adding others."[9] There is thus ample evidence of the free use made of letters and homilies at this period, in some cases legitimately, in others illegitimately.

If the Homily of Soter became known at Corinth under the name of St. Clement, there is nothing inconsistent in supposing that the Pauline Homily sent as an Eirenicon by

[1] Harn. *Chr.* i. pp. 451, 453.
[2] Ramsay, *Church in Rom. Emp.* p. 282.
[3] Harn. *Chr.* i. p. 455.
[4] *Ibid.* i. p. 459–60.
[5] *Ibid.* i. p. 470.
[6] Hermas, *Vis.* ii. 4.
[7] Harn. *Chr.* i. 461.
[8] Eus., *H.E.* iv. 23, 11.
[9] *Ibid.* iv. 23, 12.

Eleutherus may have become known in after years in Phrygia under the name of St. Peter. Is there any internal evidence in the First Epistle of St. Peter, that it was, as is here suggested, the Eirenicon of Eleutherus to the Churches of Asia and Phrygia in 179 A.D.?

It is not probable that the opening and closing verses, i. 1, 2, v. 12–14, are from the hand of Eleutherus. Soter did not assume the name of Clement when he sent his homily to Corinth. The Clementine authorship was ascribed late in the Church of Corinth. Again, if these verses had been written by Eleutherus, he would scarcely have omitted Phrygia from the list of provinces to which the letter was addressed. It is probable also that i. 10–12 belong to the author of the opening verses, who has been identified with the author of the Second Epistle. It has been said of these verses, and of the parallel thought in 2 Peter i. 19–21, that "in both there occurs a view of the Spirit which is unique in the New Testament."[1] This can scarcely be said of the greater portion of the First Epistle, which is rather Pauline than unique.

The original homily begins with 1 Peter i. 3. The doxology of iv. 11 forms its conclusion. There seems to be a slight difference in the style of iv. 12—v. 11. The language does not flow quite so smoothly as in the earlier portion of the Epistle. It is also noticeable that after dealing with the subject of persecution in iii. 13—iv. 6, it is taken up again in iv. 12–19. But there is a difference in the nature of the charge. In iii. 14 the suffering is endured for righteousness, sake, in iv. 14 it is for the name of Christ. The quotations in the Epistle of Polycarp to the Smyrnaeans are numerous and distributed over the greater part of the Epistle, but none are drawn from iv. 12—v. 11.

It is therefore suggested that the original Homily is represented by 1 Peter i. 3–9. 13—iv. 11, and that iv. 12—v. 11

[1] Falconer, Expos. July 1902, p. 54.

form the covering letter of Eleutherus. How far do these verses fit in with the circumstances and needs of the year 179? There was nothing to suggest to the writer that the reign of Commodus would be a period of peace to the churches. The prophecy of Maximilla was probably based upon a firm conviction, drawn from the signs of the times. She had prophesied wars and anarchy.[1] The confidence which her followers had in her foresight and judgment would therefore cast a shadow over their life. This shadow would be deepened by the letter of the churches of Gaul on the persecutions at Vienne and Lyons. The counsels of Eleutherus would be a message of peace and a word of consolation and encouragement in the deepening gloom.

Written almost on the morrow of these persecutions, and with the details of the martyrdoms before him, the words of 1 Peter iv. 12, 13, express the urgency as well as the sympathy with which he addresses the churches in Asia: "Beloved, think it not strange concerning the fiery trial among you, which cometh upon you to prove you, as though a strange thing happened unto you, but as ye are partakers of Christ's sufferings, rejoice, that at the revelation of his glory ye may rejoice with exceeding joy." The nature of the charge brought against the Christians is identical in the First Epistle of St. Peter and the Letter of the Churches of Vienne and Lyons. There is no question of any crime; they stand or fall in the name of Christ. This is the glory of their martyrdom, and they are to take care that no real crime shall mar the value of their witness. They may suffer and die for the name of Christian, and look for a blessing in their death. They will lose this blessing if they are guilty of crime; "If ye are reproached in the name of Christ, blessed are ye, because the Spirit of glory and of God resteth upon you. Let none of you suffer as a murderer, or thief, or evildoer, or as a

[1] Eus. *H.E.* v. 16, 18.

busybody; but if as a Christian, let him not be ashamed, but glorify God in this name "(1 Pet. iv. 14–16).

It is recorded of Vettius Epagathus, in the letter on the Gallic Martyrdoms, that he asked to be permitted to testify on behalf of his brethren. "'There is among us nothing ungodly or impious.' But those about the judgment seat cried out against him, for he was a man of distinction; and the governor refused to grant his just request, and merely asked if he also were a Christian."[1] Blandina found her comfort and relief from pain in exclaiming: "I am a Christian, and there is nothing vile done by us."[2] Sanctus "would not even tell his name, but answered in the Roman tongue to all their questions, 'I am a Christian.' Christ suffering in him, manifested his glory, delivering him from his adversary, and making him an example for the others, showing that nothing is fearful where the love of the Father is, and nothing painful where there is the glory of Christ."[3] The testimony of Sanctus is an important parallel to the revelation of Christ's glory in suffering, which is a characteristic feature in 1 Peter iv. 13–16. The glory of Christ is not associated with suffering in 1 Peter iii. 13–iv. 6.

"Biblias confessed herself a Christian, and was given a place in the order of martyrs."[4] "Those who confessed what they were, were imprisoned as Christians, no other accusation being brought against them. But the first were treated afterwards as murderers and defiled, and were punished twice as severely as others."[5] There is again a very close parallelism with 1 Peter iv. 15: "Let none of you suffer as a murderer or a thief or an evildoer."

Attalus was led round the amphitheatre, a tablet being carried before him, on which was written in the Roman language, "This is Attalus the Christian." When he was placed in the iron seat, and the fumes rose from his burning

[1] Eus. *H. E.* v. 1, 10. [2] *Ibid.* v. 1, 19. [3] *Ibid.* v. 1, 20–23.
[4] *Ibid.* v. 1, 26. [5] *Ibid.* v. 1, 33.

body, he said to the people, in the Roman language: "Lo! this which ye do is devouring men, but we do not do any wicked thing." [1] The same charge—the name of a Christian—is the ground of the martyrdom of Lucius, *c.* 150; [2] it is met with also in the *Passio SS. Epipodii et Alexandri, c.* 178,[3] in the *Passio S. Symphoriani*,[4] and in the *Acta Martyrum Scillitanorum*.[5] The close parallelism throughout these second-century Acts and the definite expressions of 1 Peter is at least noteworthy.

A new thought opens out in the following verses: "The time is come for judgment to begin from the house of God; and if first from us, what will be the end of them that obey not the Gospel of God?" (1 Pet. iv. 17). Persecution was serious enough when directed against the Church of God; what if the Churches themselves were to begin to persecute? "Let none of you suffer as ἀλλοτριεπίσκοπος" (1 Pet. iv. 15). Zeller explains it as meaning that Christians are not to expose themselves to inconvenience by mixing in matters which have nothing to do with the confession of their faith. He bases his interpretation on a passage in Epictetus. Epictetus (iii. 22, 97) is defending the Cynics in their claim to ἐπισκοπεῖν men, to overlook them as ἄγγελοι καὶ κατάσκοποι—messengers from Zeus to men. They were accused of mixing themselves thereby in affairs which do not concern them. The defence of Epictetus is expressed in these words: οὐ τὰ ἀλλότρια πολυπραγμονεῖ ὅτου τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἐπισκοπῃ, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἴδια.[6] This association of the Christians with Cynics by way of explanation gathers increased support from their association in the writings of the period. Aelius Aristides classes the Christians with the Cynics as belonging on the whole to the same type. They cut them-

[1] *Ibid.* v. 1, 44, 52.

[2] *Ibid.* iv. 17, 12. "Who is not an adulterer, nor a murderer, nor a thief."

[3] Rainart, *Acta Sincera*, p. 64. [4] *Ibid.* p. 69. [5] *Ibid.* p. 75.

[6] *Handcommentar*, von Soden, p. 163.

selves off from all Greek culture, from everything that was good and noble. They broke up family ties, and set brother against brother.[1] Ramsay proves from the inscriptions that this picture was much exaggerated. "He spoke only from superficial acquaintance with the extreme partisans and the prominent martyrs; but he had no knowledge of the mass of undistinguished and obscure Christians, whose very existence was probably unknown to him except by rumour. It is this unknown multitude of common persons that are revealed to us in the sepulchral inscriptions." "We cannot doubt that the shopkeeper or trader who was converted did not as a rule alter the outward appearance of his life. People might converse with him in the street or the forum and observed no reason to suspect him of Christianity. He lived in externals much as before; he observed the same laws of politeness in society; his house, his surroundings, continued much the same; he kept up the same family names, and when he died his grave, his tombstone, and his epitaph, were in the ordinary style."[2]

"The inscriptions of Eumeneia bring before us a picture of rich and generous development, of concession, of liberality, in which people of diverse thoughts were practically reconciled in a simple society. But they also show us Eumeneia as mainly a city of Christians. Nothing similar to this is known throughout the ancient world. Eumeneia stands before us as the earliest Christian city of which record remains, exemplifying the practical conciliation of two hostile religions in a peaceful and orderly city."[3] In such a society a busybody would rank as an evildoer. The warning of Eleutherus tended to check the very crime of which Aelius Aristides accused the Christians when he associated them with the Cynics.

The writer, addressing the presbyters, calls himself their

[1] Ramsay, *Phrygia*, p. 486. [2] *Ibid.* p. 487.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 503.

fellow-presbyter (1 Pet. v. 1), a word only found here in the New Testament. It is used also by the anonymous anti-Montanist writer[1] of Zoticus of Otrous, who from his prominence may have been bishop.[2] The expression "witness of the sufferings of Christ" (1 Pet. v. 1), taken with "fellowship with the sufferings of Christ" (iv. 12), may refer to the witness of Eleutherus to the persecutions in Gaul. The words "*τῶν κλήρων*" are illustrated by the letters of the Gallic Churches. Vettius Epagathus is taken *εἰς τὸν κλῆρον τῶν μαρτύρων*, and the same phrase is used of Biblias.[3]

The letter of Eleutherus, written as is here suggested in 179, was not only coloured by the martyrdoms of Vienne and Lyons, but by the martyrdoms which about this time are stated to have taken place at Apameia.[4] The anonymous writer records the names of Gaius and Alexander of Eumeneia—the names occur in the inscriptions of Eumeneia Nos. 353, 354, 355, 370.[5] It was sent therefore both as a letter of peace to the Churches and an encouragement in the midst of persecution.

How far the action of Eleutherus may be the cause of the councils held at this period to consider the Montanist question it is impossible to say. Zoticus of Otrous was present at a synod of Ancyra, at which there were prolonged discussions.[6] In addition to the synod of Ancyra "the faithful of Asia met often in many places throughout Asia to consider this matter."[7] The Libellus Synodicus states that one was held at Hierapolis, under Apollinarius, at which twenty-six bishops were present, and another at Anchialus, under Sotas, with twelve present. The authority of the Libellus is not high, though accepted by Hefele.[8]

[1] Eus. *H.E.* v. 16, 5. [2] Ramsay, *Phrygia*, p. 706.
[3] Eus. *H.E.* v. 1, 10, 26. [4] *Ibid.* v. 16, 22.
[5] Ramsay, *Phrygia*, pp. 514, 518, 526.
[6] Eus. *H.E.* v. 16, 4-5. [7] *Ibid.* v. 16, 10. [8] McGiffert, *Eus.* p. 232.

The Followers of Themison.

It is evident from the writings of the anonymous writer and of Apollonius that there was considerable opposition shown to the Montanists between 179 and 196. They would appear to have been known at this period, after the death of Maximilla, as the followers of Themison.[1]

The name was well known in Phrygian history. Themison, the first of the name, was a powerful favourite of Antiochus II., 261–248 B.C. He gave his name to Themisonion, a city on the south-western frontier of Phrygia, where he was deified as Heracles.[2] The name occurs on one of the inscriptions from Laodicea, No. 7.[3]

Themison seems to have taken an active part in defeating the counsels of Zoticus of Cumana and Julianus of Apameia, perhaps during the period of uncertainty and strife which followed on the death of Maximilla. His followers are said to have muzzled the Catholic bishops.[4] This is on the authority of the anonymous writer. Apollonius speaks of him as one of their confessors: "So also Themison, who was clothed with plausible covetousness, could not endure the life of confession, but threw aside bonds for the sake of possessions. Yet, though he should have been humble on this account, he desired to boast as a martyr, and, in imitation of the Apostle, he wrote a certain Catholic epistle to instruct those whose faith was better than his own, contending for words of empty sound, and blaspheming against the Lord and the apostles and the holy Church." [5]

It is evident from these references that Themison was a man of considerable influence and authority among the Montanists. He would not have written a Catholic epistle, investing it with apostolic authority, had he not held such a position. He was therefore, in all probability, the Mon-

[1] Eus. *H. E.* v. 16, 17. [2] Ramsay, *Phrygia*, pp. 252-3.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 74.
[4] Eus. *H. E.* v. 16, 17. [5] *Ibid.* 18, 5.

tanist bishop of Pepouza, a small Phrygian city which became the metropolis of the Montanists.

The character which is given by Apollonius is on a level with most of the statements of the anti-Montanist writers as recorded by Eusebius. It is difficult to think that the Montanists were as bad as they appear in these writings. There may have been excesses due to the fanaticism of some of their leaders and prophets, but asceticism rather than licence was the rule of their community. McGiffert comments on one passage of Apollonius in very severe language: "Knowing what we do of the asceticism and the severe morality of the Montanists, we can look upon the implications of this passage as nothing better than baseless slanders. That there might have been an individual here and there whose conduct justified this attack cannot be denied; but to bring such accusations against the Montanists in general was both unwarranted and absurd, and Apollonius cannot but have been aware of the fact. His language is rather that of a bully or braggadocio who knows the untruthfulness of his statements than of a man conscious of his own honesty and the reliability of his account."[1] If all the charges brought against the Montanists were true, it is as difficult to think that Tertullian could have joined them as it is to think that St. Martin would have pleaded for Priscillian if the charges brought against him had been substantiated. It is not unlikely that the polity and reforms of Montanus and Themison, like those of Priscillian, were against a growing worldliness in the Christian Church. It had been part of the office of the Christian prophet to protest against the sins of the world, such as those typified by the woman in the black garment in the Shepherd of Hermas.[2] The description of Christianity in Eumeneia implies this spirit of worldliness in like manner as the canons of Elvira reveal a similar spirit in Spain. It would almost appear to have

[1] McGiffert, *Eus.* p. 236 *n.*, 27. [2] Herm. Sim. ix. 15.

been a consequence of the rapid growth of Christianity, and the holding of civil affairs by members of the Christian community. "The Christians of Eumeneia continued to live in many respects as before; they were characterized by most of the habits and some or many even of the faults of their old life and of the society in which they lived." [1]

It was to be expected under such conditions that some would take a new departure, and lay down a stricter code of morality, supporting their reforming ideas by a claim to special inspiration. The Phrygian character suited such a protest. "The character of the Phrygians shows a singular mixture of wild enthusiasm and earnestness."[2] Their enthusiasm made them prone to every form of religious emotion and quickly responsive to new impressions: "O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you?" (Gal. iii. 1).

The enthusiasm of the Phrygians was probably due to the influence of the worship of the goddess-mother Leto. She had her chosen shrine at Hierapolis, north of Laodicea. This cult gave expression to the character of the Anatolian religion. "Its essence lies in the adoration of the life of Nature, that life subject apparently to death, yet never dying, but reproducing itself in new forms, different and yet the same. This perpetual self-identity under varying forms, this annihilation of death through the power of self-reproduction, was the object of an enthusiastic worship, characterized by remarkable self-abandonment and immersion in the divine, by a mixture of obscene symbolism and sublime truths." [3] This characteristic enthusiasm explains in part the rise of Montanism, and may account for some features in its movements which occasionally reverted to the primitive licentiousness. The sanctuary of Mother Leto was a cave in a deep gorge about six miles north-west of Hierapolis. Her son, Lairbenos,

[1] Ramsay, *Phrygia*, p. 485. [2] Harnack, *Mission*, p. 479.
[3] Ramsay, *Phrygia*, p. 87.

was also worshipped at Hierapolis, under the title of Apollo Archegetes. There was in connexion with his worship a brotherhood, known as the Semeiaphoroi of Apollo, whom Hogarth regards as a class of professional wonder-workers, like the dervishes of modern times, who cut themselves with knives and do other wonders under the influence of religious excitement. Ramsay however considers them merely as "bearers of the Sign." [1] The excesses of Montanist prophecy, the frenzy which the anti-Montanist writers charge against the prophets, may have had some affinity with these heathen rites. Montanus himself is said to have been a heathen priest before his conversion.

It seems probable, therefore, that this religious enthusiasm of the pagan cult of Phrygia had its influence upon the Montanist movement, and to some extent discredited it in the eyes of the Catholic bishops. Prophets and physicians were everywhere associated with the worship of Leto and Apollo. Although Montanus claimed descent for his prophetic gifts through the line of Christian Prophets,[2] the names of Quadratus and Ammia of Philadelphia being specially mentioned,[3] yet there were traces of ancient Anatolian practice in the ritual at Pepouza. Pepouza was the head-quarters of the Montanist movement. It was little more than twenty miles north-east from Hierapolis. There was a custom in the churches of Pepouza which illustrates the old tradition of enthusiasm which the movement inherited from the ancient worship. Frequently in their church there enter seven virgins bearing torches, robed in white, who come to prophesy to the people. These show forth some form of enthusiasm, and practise deceit on the laity who are present, weeping as if moved by repentance, shedding tears over the life of men.[4]

[1] Ramsay, *Phrygia*, p. 57.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 105.
[3] Eus. *H.E.* v. 17, 4.
[4] Epiph. *Haer.* xlix. 2.

There was also in the Akmonian district a Brotherhood of Hymnodoi connected with the cult of the local deities. This was another form of religious enthusiasm which found a response in the psalms and hymns and spiritual songs of the Christian Church (Eph. v. 18, 19). The oracle from the odes of Montanus may not be genuine, but the psalms of Montanus may have been known to the writer of the Muratorian Canon.[1]

The earnestness and moral severity of the movement is traceable to foreign influence. Ramsay distinguishes two types in the district immediately around the cradle of Montanism. The Phrygians and Carians tended more to the patriarchal type of social institutions, while the Lydians retained more of the matriarchal type, which seems to have been native to Asia Minor.[2] The religious and moral character of the people would be influenced in the same way. The enthusiasm was due to the traditions of the native matriarchal type, the earnestness to the patriarchal. "The Phrygians, as is now coming to be generally acknowledged, were a warrior tribe of conquerors who crossed the Hellespont from Europe and penetrated gradually into Asia Minor. Lydia was so strong under the sway of the Heracleid kings, closely allied with the Anatolian Empire, that had its centre at Pteria, as to resist and drive farther eastward the stream of conquest." "The conquering and ruling caste formed an aristocracy among the primitive population of Phrygia, but, as is always done in similar cases, it took wives from the subject caste and the older inhabitants."[3]

It is to this European strain that the earnest side of the Phrygian character may be traced. Socrates, writing of the Phrygians. (*c.* 489 A.D.) says: "The race of the Phrygians appear to be more temperate than other races;

[1] Harn. *Alt. Chr. Litt.* p. 238.
[2] Ramsay, *Phrygia*, p. 7. [3] *Ibid.* p. 7.

for they seldom swear. The Scythians and the Thracians are naturally of a very irritable disposition, while the inhabitants of the East are addicted to sensual pleasures. But the Paphlagonians and Phrygians are prone to neither of these vices; nor are the sports of the circus and the theatrical exhibitions desired now among them. And for this reason, it seems to me, these people so readily assented to the letters written by Novatus (Novatian). Fornication is regarded amongst them as the grossest crime."[1] Socrates is a high authority on the inner life of Novatianism, which in its sterner aspect had much that was common with Montanism, if indeed in Phrygia the Novatian and Montanist communities were not almost identical in his day. His testimony is therefore an indirect apology for the earnestness and moral tone of the Montanist movement.

But there may have been also another moulding influence in the Phrygian character in this district. There was a very large Jewish population. "They were far more numerous in Apameia and the cities connected with it than they were in the Laodicean group; and the evidence of the inscriptions fully confirm this. Akmonia, Sebaste, Eumeneia, Apameia, Dokimion, Iconium are the cities where we can identify Jewish inscriptions, legends, and names. We cannot doubt that this large Jewish population exercised a great influence in the development of the district and of the cities."[2] It is in the neighbourhood of these cities that the centres of the Montanist movement are found. Pepouza lies to the west of Eumeneia;[3] Hierapolis and Otrous lie to the north-east of Eumeneia, higher up the Glaucus river; Ardaban, the birthplace of Montanus, was in Phrygian Myria, and is identified by Ramsay with Kallataba, west of Pepouza.[4]

[1] Socrates, *H.E.* iv. 28.
[2] Ramsay, *Phrygia*, pp. 667–8.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 573.
[4] *Ib* p. 199.

There were some interesting points of contact with Judaism in the Montanist movement. Pepouza was the earthly centre of the true Church, the new Jerusalem.[1] A neighbouring village, Tymion, was united with it in this honour.[2] It was in Phrygia that St. Paul criticized the proneness of the Galatians to Judaizing influences. It is there that he speaks of St. Peter as entrusted with the Apostleship of the Circumcision (Gal. ii. 8). The Christian Jews of Phrygia would therefore be quick to recognize the apostolic authority of St. Peter, and the more, if, on other grounds, they were being treated as separatist churches.

The Jews in Apameia so far lost their nationality that they seem to have abandoned entirely the use of the Hebrew language and names. It is impossible to identify them from their names alone. The language and tone of certain inscriptions suggest that they are Jewish or Jewish-Christian.[3] The Talmud witnesses to the separation of the Phrygian Jews from their brethren. They lost connexion with their own land; they forgot their language; they did not adopt the philosophy and education of the Alexandrian Jews; they were readily converted to Christianity; and Ramsay considers it was this religious separation to which the Talmud refers. "The Phrygian Jews melted into the general population."[4]

But though lost to their brethren in Palestine and Egypt, does not the founding of the New Jerusalem at Pepouza point to a new religious movement among them? Does it not give grounds for thinking that Montanism was in part a Jewish-Christian reaction against the Gentile Christianity of the Church? Is not the earnestness and severity of the movement derived as much from the Jewish strain in their character as from their European affinities?

[1] Epiph. *Haer.* xlix. 1. [2] Eus. *H.E.* v. 18.
[3] Ramsay, *Phrygia*, p. 669. [4] *Ibid.* pp. 674–5.

Such were some of the influences at work in Phrygia at the time of the birth of Montanism. The inscriptions in the Pentapolis, the district especially affected by the movement, prove that Christianity was introduced very early, much earlier indeed than in the regions across the mountains to the east and north of the Pentapolis.[1] "The origin of Christianity in this district goes back to the Pauline circle. Avircius Marcellus bears witness to the Pauline authority in the Church when he speaks of Paul, and Paul alone, as his companion on his journeys. No. 657."[2]

l. 12: Παῦλον ἔχων ἑπόμην πίστις πάντη δὲ προῆγε.[3]

This inscription on the tomb of Avircius Marcellus, now in the Lateran Museum at Rome, was written by Avircius himself about the year 192.[4] "It was composed in the heat of the controversy against the Montanists by one of the anti-Montanist champions. He took the marked and bold course of inscribing on his tomb outside the south gate of the city (of Hierapolis) a declaration of his unalterable sentiments, and of the experience which showed him that alike in Rome and the extreme east his sentiments were those of the universal Church. The key to his intention is given by the word φανερῶς in l. 2. He intended this declaration, inscribed in a conspicuous position before the public eye, to be an imperishable record of his testimony and of the message which he had to deliver to mankind in favour of the one and indivisible Church catholic and against Montanism. He took care before his death that his testament, inscribed on his grave, should continue for ever to protest against the Montanists."[5]

Is there not in this important epitaph, taken in connexion with the Jewish-Christian character of the

[1] *Ibid.* pp. 571–16. [2] *Ibid.* p. 715. [3] *Ibid.* p. 723. [4] *Ibid.* p. 713.
[5] *Ibid.* p 710.

district, a clue to the history of the two Epistles associated with the provinces of Asia in the second half of the second century? Avircius Marcellus was the champion of the Church Catholic, and he led his followers under the banner of St. Paul. "'Avircius with Paul followed, while Faith everywhere led the way.' After careful study of what Zahn, Harnack, Lightfoot, and others say on this point my impression is deepened that these words prove Paul to have been the Apostle whom Avircius and οἱ νοοῦντες revered above all others, whom he had with him as an ideal before his mind, and as a teacher (by his writings) before his eyes and in his hands."[1]

Avircius rallied the forces of the Church under the banner of St. Paul. Themison was the champion of the Montanists, bishop—it may be—of the New Jerusalem at Pepouza. Is it not reasonable to think that, amidst a strong Jewish element in the population, he rallied his forces under the banner of St. Peter, the Apostle of the Circumcision, even to the extent of sending forth a Catholic Epistle in his name? It cannot be more than a suggestion, but it is one which fits in with the attitude of Avircius and with the Jewish ideas of the Montanist Church.

The good offices of Eleutherus had failed; the ten years between 180 and 190 were years of increasing antagonism between the rival churches. What was the attitude of Themison during this period? What action did he take? The letter of Eleutherus had made for peace; and though peace had given place to war, the letter still remained, and would be held in high esteem by those whom the writer had intended to encourage and to befriend. Rome held St. Peter in equal honour with St. Paul. Was it not fitting to send forth the letter of Eleutherus to the neighbouring churches of Asia Minor

[1] *Ibid.* p. 728.

under the imprimatur of St. Peter? If the Church of Corinth honoured the Epistle of Soter with the title of St. Clement, why should not the Church of Pepouza honour that of Eleutherus with the title of St. Peter?

T. Barns.

(To be continued.)

THE GOSPEL OF WORK.[1]

"THE latest gospel in this world is, Know thy work and do it," says Carlyle. It is also a pretty early gospel, which has driven man by necessity, assuring him that in the sweat of his brow he must eat his bread. The Christian faith has ever made much of the duty and even of the dignity of work, finding its highest plea for this dignity in the thought that God is the supreme Worker, and offering to man the thrilling motive to become a fellow-worker with God. The earthly activities are not despised, as in a religion like Buddhism, but are set forth as divinely appointed instruments of spiritual discipline and occasions for growth in grace, and are set forth also as the approved opportunities for service, the good fruits of the good tree of faith.

Christianity has as one of its ideals the consecration of the secular life, making daily duty subserve the best interests of character, and elevating the ordinary vocation into a sphere of service. It lifts the whole subject also into the plane of religion by taking account of the spirit in which all work is done rather than the particular tasks themselves, making the obligation of work universal and offering to each man in his own place and lot an ideal for himself. Even in the monastic system, which was specially designed for holiness, and which was at best a one-sided and mistaken attempt, this practical side was not neglected; and *labour* took its place beside *prayer* as an equally necessary implement for religious culture. The Christian standard of conduct is indeed set so high that the most plausible objection to it is that it is impracticable. In Christian ethics duty received a new meaning and point,

[1] The Murtle Lecture, delivered in Aberdeen University, Feb. 8, 1903.

and was enforced by the highest sanctions. Since life is a probation, the appeal for faithfulness even in the trivial routine comes home to the individual conscience. Thus the gospel of work is implied in the Gospel itself, and never has it found such a commanding motive as the Christian faith has given it. It has never been dignified with the name of a gospel in itself. It has rather been accepted as one of the facts of human life, and has been drawn into the service of the highest interests of men.

I might well spend the time of this lecture along an accustomed line showing how our religion deals with the secular life generally, and how it enforces nature's demand for labour by adding an inspiring motive, and how work is made a duty not only to self and to society but also a duty to God. I might touch on the blessings it brings and the moral ends it serves. There are plenty of useful and needful lessons in Christian ethics from this subject as to how work should be done, the faithfulness that should mark it throughout, and the rewards in character and capacity it assuredly brings. But the very phrase so common to-day, the "Gospel of Work" suggests that in some quarters the subject is not looked on from this Christian standpoint, but is made a substitute for religion itself. It is spoken of with something like religious enthusiasm. Christianity asserts that faith without works is dead, but here we seem to have works attempting to show life without faith at all. There is a modern preaching of a gospel of work which slights faith and arrogates to itself something like the supreme place of religion. "Properly speaking," says Carlyle, "all true work is religion; and whatsoever religion is not work may go and dwell among the Brahmins, Antinomians, Spinning Dervishes, or where it will; with me it shall have no harbour. Admirable is that of the old monks, *Laborare est orare*, work is worship." In many writers work is treated as if it were enough for man, or at least it is assumed

that it is all there is for man. He is called on to "fill and moralize the day," in the French phrase of which Matthew Arnold was so fond. The day is to be so filled and moralized by work, because the night cometh when no man can work. The pathos of life, with its uncertainty and brevity, gives a sort of passion to the preaching of the gospel of work.

We can see how this strenuous creed should appeal to an earnest man who realizes how short the time is. Indeed it is interesting to notice how often our Lord's phrase that the night cometh is made the basis for the new Stoicism. After all, the great fact of life to all men is that the night cometh when no man can work. However we look at it, whatever be our faith about the future, we are brought up to this termination. There may be, as Browning sang, "other heights in other lives, God willing"; but here there is a limit to any earthly height, and a swift descent into the dark. To the wise man and to the fool, as the preacher said in his irony, the selfsame end comes. However the day is spent, the night at last arrives. The active body, the thinking brain, the feeling heart, the aspiring soul cease from action and thought and feeling and aspiring on this plane where these powers have hitherto acted. Whether or not the kind of life we live conditions death and after-death, it cannot be denied that death conditions and limits life. All philosophy must take account of it. To leave it out in any system of thought that pretends to represent human life is like Hamlet with the part of the Prince of Denmark left out. Our practical ethics must be affected by our view of this dread subject. The whole contents of life, what it is in essence, what it is for, what it will become, are determined by this. We cannot always keep life and death in two distinct categories and arrange a handy little moral code for the one without reference to the other. We must ultimately co-ordinate our thinking

over the whole sphere of human existence, and take into account all the facts; and the greatest fact of life is death. The fact that the night cometh gives colour and urgency to the day. It fills it with meaning or turns it into a farce; touches it with pathos or with tragedy. A day with a night coming, scraping its heels as it follows, can never be as a day with no night. And what we mean by the term "night" will unfailingly influence our conception of what the day is. If the night be a sleeping to wake, or if it be a complete and absolute end of light, our view of the hours that fill up the day must be different. Or assume that another day will dawn and the shadows of night flee away, much in our conception of the value of life will depend on whether the succeeding day has intimate relation with the previous one or means the beginning of a bran-new existence. Creed and conduct in this all-important matter must react on each other. The Christian faith, which lights up the future with a great hope, by that also gives an immense motive power to ordinary life; and any form of materialism or even of agnosticism which denies immortality must inevitably alter the practical ethics of men. To put a meaning of despair into the words "the night cometh when no man can work" must consciously or unconsciously affect daily life and the standards and sanctions by which men live. To take away the authority of religion and the faith in the spiritual world around and above and beyond us is bound to create vast changes in the outlook of life and the practice of life. It is absurd to expect that faith can be eclipsed in our midst and yet leave us where we were.

Now it does not follow that the first and only effect of such eclipse of faith must be an immediate and universal relaxation of morality. It is indeed according to historical analogy in similar times, and according to experience of our own time, to predict that it need not be so. To many, if not to the mass, it is true, the natural result of the denial

of God and immortality can only mean the lowering of life all along the line. If we are as the beasts that perish and like them to-morrow we die, then we cannot wonder if the simple popular philosophy is accepted, "Let us eat and drink; let us snatch the day ere it flies, for the night cometh soon." We are expecting more of human nature than human nature has hitherto meant if we do not lay our account for such easy reasoning. Thoughtless enjoyment of the present becomes a feasible and even a rational plan of life. Duty cannot maintain her place of authority as the stern daughter of the voice of God. Can you ask men to deny themselves, to live for the future, to follow the gleam, to nurse high thought and noble effort, if you tell them that the ideal is only a malady of which men sicken and wear out? What is the use of struggling and striving if there be no end to reach and no standard of morality beyond tradition or custom or convenience? Why make a god of duty when every other god is dethroned? Why work to the highest and fullest of a short strenuous day, when there is nothing to add except that the night cometh when no man can work? Such argument cannot be answered except by an appeal to some sense of obligation, which is after all only a relic of religious sentiment or education. We can say nothing further to the man who draws out the bitter conclusion of the eclipse of faith, "All is vanity, and what profit hath a man of all his labour under the sun?"

At the same time it must be admitted that this is not the only alternative to one who accepts the full agnostic position. Even here there is a better part followed by the man who is earnest and serious. Such an one says that since the night cometh when no man can work he will therefore work while it is day and give himself to the best he can command. Matthew Arnold, who knew well the temptation to which men succumb when faith is loosened,

strikes this high note. In his fine poem, *The Better Part*, after stating the common argument of the man who has ceased to believe in Christ and in eternal life, he goes on—

> So answerest thou; but why not rather say:
> Hath man no second life? *Pitch this one high!*
> Sits there no Judge in Heaven, our sin to see?
>
> *More strictly then the inward judge obey!*
> Was Christ a man like us?—*Ah, let us try*
> *If we then too can be such men as he!*

Of course it is a consequence of the position to try to show that loss of faith does not necessarily mean the impoverishment of moral life; hence the attempt to string men's conscience up to this high pitch. But we must admit that the immediate result of unbelief may be to do so to the earnest-hearted. The modern Gospel of work, which has such a place in ethical writers, is to some extent a direct consequence of the weakening of faith. Because the night cometh when no man can work, with its tragedy of a broken life, let us shut our teeth and straighten our back and go through with it; let us work while it is day: there is nothing better than this, nothing more worthy of man than stern unflinching devotion to duty. Carlyle would not have been so insistent on his gospel of work if he had a richer gospel to declare. It is a new version of the old theological antinomy between faith and good works, this time for the sake of temporal instead of eternal salvation.

We can easily see how the tendency works out. In the waning of spiritual life the earnest soul turns to duty, seeks to slake the infinite thirst by labour. The noble-minded whose creed is a denial of the Divine can only look for peace by stern repression of human needs, and seek a gospel of work to dull the pain of what is really a gospel of despair. Huxley, both by precept and by example, sets forth this virile consequence of his unfaith. Just because the night

cometh when no man can work he was abundant in labour, and in his *Evolution and Ethics* he calls upon his hearers to play the man and to attempt some work of noble note. We remember the fine finish of that lecture with its plain preaching of the new Stoicism, summoning men to the great moral task to cherish the good and to bear the evil with stout hearts, striving ever to diminish it; calling us to be

> strong in will
> To strive, to seek, to find and not to yield.

Man who refuses any more to be lured on by hope is to be driven on by despair. There is a Christian gospel of work, as we have seen, in which the meanest details of duty are glorified by being done for love, and even drudgery is made divine, and all the discipline of daily work is used for the growth in grace and character which are yet to blossom out in fine flower under the smile of God. But here is a gospel of work, which takes no account of such motives, which bends to the tasks without being braced by the hope.

It is indeed a remarkable phenomenon, a new form of works without faith, of morality without religion. It is at best only a counsel of despair, making the best of a bad job, a poor enough substitute for what is lost, but we must do justice to the touch of nobility in it. Romanes has a passage which illustrates admirably some of the points insisted on, in his *A Candid Examination of Theism*, in which he took up a position of agnosticism and almost of materialism, a position which he left in after years to come back to his old faith in the gospel of Christ. The passage is interesting too because it lays stress on feelings of the heart rare enough in philosophical writings of the kind, and because it does not hide the poverty of the new position. "And forasmuch as I am far from being able to agree with those who affirm that the twilight doctrine of the 'new faith' is a desirable substitute for the waning splendour of 'the old,'

I am not ashamed to confess that with this virtual negation of God the universe to me has lost its soul of loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept 'to work while it is day' will doubtless gain an intensified force from the terribly intensified meaning of the words that 'the night cometh when no man can work,' yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of the appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed which once was mine and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it, at such times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature is susceptible. For whether it be due to my intelligence not being sufficiently advanced to meet the requirements of the age, or whether it be due to the memory of those sacred associations which to me at least were the sweetest that life has given, I cannot but feel that for me, and for others who think as I do, there is a dreadful truth in those words of Hamilton, philosophy having become a meditation not merely of death but of annihilation, the precept *know thyself* has become transformed into the terrific oracle of Oedipus—

Mayest thou ne'er know the truth of what thou art."

We have here again the gospel of work as a pitiful substitute for the fuller, richer gospel of the love of God. Out of all the wreckage of the stranded faith the only thing to him that can be called a moral gain is the sterner necessity to lay hold of present duty, the intensified force of the precept to work while it is day because of the lurid meaning of the night that cometh. Here also there is no attempt to deny that it is a poor asset to recover from such a tragic bankruptcy.

We must honour those who meet the eclipse of faith in such heroic mood, instead of weakly assenting to the softer creed, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die"; as in the decay of pagan faith we honour the Stoics who preached a similar doctrine of honour and duty as opposed to the

Epicurean alternative ; though from the premises the one is as logical as the other, and from some points of view is even more rational than the other. But will such a modern Stoicism last? Will such a gospel of work wear? Will it not be, as it was in Rome, a sort of luxury of a few strong and noble souls who cling to something stable when the foundation of life is removed? After all why should there be any *sacredness* in labour, which is one of Carlyle's phrases in praise of it? And why should he protest so vehemently against the gospel of happiness and against the gospel of liberty, which he thinks must ruin the best in life, when all he has to offer is a painful gospel of work? He thinks that the whole wretchedness and atheism of man's ways in these generations shadows itself for us in the pretension to be what we call happy. "Every pitifulest whipster that walks within a skin has his head filled with the notion that he is, shall be, or by all human and divine laws ought to be, happy." The strenuous answer he offers to this demand for happiness is, "'Happy' my brother? First of all, what difference is it whether thou art happy or not? To-day becomes yesterday so fast, all To-morrows become Yesterdays; and there is no question whatever of the 'happiness,' but quite another question." "It is, after all, the one unhappiness of a man, that he cannot work; that he cannot get his destiny as a man fulfilled. Behold the day is passing swiftly over, our life is passing swiftly over; and the night cometh wherein no man can work. The night once come, our happiness, our unhappiness—it is all abolished, vanished, clean gone: a thing that has been." We need the noble scorn of such words, as they are a strong moral tonic. But even the pitifulest whipster has the right to ask why work should be his destiny as a man; and if it makes no difference whether he is happy or not, he may ask what difference it makes whether he works or not when the everlasting night, with

her silences and veracities, is come? You may despise the man who chooses what appears to you the weaker and lower alternative, but it is difficult to see what grounds you have to condemn him.

Certain it is that work divorced from faith loses its great inspiring motive to drive life into the high regions. The true gospel of work, and the only one that can apply to all and be a force to every man that believes, is that which our Lord stated for Himself, "I must work the works of Him that sent me while it is day." It is the recognition that life has a divine purpose and meaning, and will have a divine judgement. The night cometh, the end of the day of opportunity and service comes; and so there is a note of urgency in it, not because that is all we have, but because if we have lost the great opportunity of the day of probation we have lost the opportunity of being and becoming and doing and serving, growing in grace, and performing the Father's Will. This faith in God, and in God's future for us, adds a glorious light to all service, however small and petty it looks; for it is not the work in itself that counts, but the spirit in which it is done, the manner of doing it, and the lessons learned in doing. The true ennobling of work is by flooding it with the light of eternity, and by colouring it with the glory of love. Work, like everything else in life, needs to be redeemed from vanity. Godless work is blasted by the same essential condemnation as Godless life. The night cometh for it. It is only "in the Lord" that labour is not in vain, done of faith and done for love. "Therefore, my beloved brethren, be ye steadfast, unmovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as ye know that your labour is not in vain in the Lord."

HUGH BLACK.

MISSIONARY METHODS IN THE TIMES OF THE APOSTLES.

II.

In the interim between the foundation of the Corinthian community and the composition of St. Paul's two Epistles to that body, teachers arrived there, who, backed by letters of commendation from foreign authorities of high position, managed to assume an importance which still more perplexed the members of that already restless community, and encouraged them in their insubordination to their founder. If we consider the allusions in the two Epistles to the Corinthians together, there can scarcely be any doubt that these Jewish Christians came from Palestine, and that they made much of their connection with St. Peter, who may have converted and baptized them. They went forth into the world as missionaries,[1] well provided with letters of commendation from St. Peter or St. James, which gave them an entry into all the communities and assured them hospitality in Christian houses. We learn from the keen irony with which St. Paul calls them "the chiefest Apostles," and then again in holy anger "false Apostles" (2 Cor. xi. 5, 13, xii. 11), that they had assumed the name of apostle in order to represent themselves as missionaries. This was not in itself arrogance, for in the apostolic and immediately succeeding generations the name apostle had not yet exclusively acquired that narrower

[1] I refer 1 Corinthians i. 12 to these followers of St. Peter; iii. 16–20 (a passage of which the reference is proved by the reappearance of the name Kephas iii. 22, whereas iii. 4–15, like all that precedes it from i. 17, is still influenced by the opposition to Paul and Apollos); further, xvi. 22 (where strangers who were then sojourning in Corinth, and whose mother tongue was the Aramaic language of the Jews in Palestine, are clearly distinguished from the community and are not included in the greetings addressed to it); so also 2 Cor. ii. 17–iii. 1, v. 12; xi. 1–23, xii. 11–18. Comp. my *Einl. in das N.T.* i. 204 ff.

meaning with which we are accustomed to connect it. Every one who, as commissioned by the Lord, preached the gospel to the unconverted from place to place was called an apostle.[1]

If this name, from the beginning, had been the exclusive title of the Twelve, St. Paul would have scarcely felt justified in assuming it, to say nothing of his uniting Silvanus and Timothy with himself under the same designation. As far as we know, the experience to which he dates back his Christian position and calling did not expressly put him on a par with the Twelve, or formally invest him with the title of "Apostle," and the statement that he was the twelfth or thirteenth Apostle is quite unhistorical. In himself he was simply one of the numerous Apostles or missionaries of that time; only he could prove from facts that he had not, like others, been called by men or through men; but just as directly as the Twelve he had received his commission from God and Christ, and was in the fullest sense of the word "called to be an Apostle." St. Paul would no more have grudged to those itinerant preachers from Palestine the name of "Apostles" than that of "servants of Christ," had they shown that honourable, open, and unselfish spirit with which, according to St. Paul, the

[1] The strongest proof of this wider use of the term is furnished by the fact that itinerant teachers like those in Corinth and elsewhere (Rev. ii. 2) fearlessly made their appearance, and, introducing themselves as Apostles, made themselves ridiculous at once and for ever. St. Luke unites Paul and Barnabas (Acts xiv. 4, 14). St. Paul unites Silvanus and Timotheus with himself under this title (1 Thess. ii. 6; comp. i. 1). The same mode of expression is suggested more or less clearly in Luke xi. 49 (where, however, people like the Seventy, Luke x. 1, must not be thought of as excluded, 1 Cor. iv. 9, ix. 5 f.). *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* is especially instructive for post-apostolic times, for in it very few noted itinerant preachers of their times are called "Apostles" (c. xi.), and the *Shepherd of Hermas* gives the numbers of the "apostles and teachers" on whose work the stability of the Church at that time depended as forty, without any suggestion that twelve or thirteen of these had a peculiar or even exclusive claim to the first of the two titles (*sim.* ix. 15, 4, xvi. 5, xvii. 1, xxv. 2; cf. *vis.* iii. 5, 1, and my remarks in the *Hirten des Hermas*, p. 94 f.

life-giving Spirit of the New Covenant inspires his followers. But he recognised by their fraudulent dealings that they were much more the servants of Satan, who knows how to clothe himself as an angel of light, and that their claim to be Apostles was but a borrowed mask. Instead of going forth earnestly to spread the gospel amongst the unconverted, they crept into the communities founded by St. Paul, and instead of his being able to regard their work there as only unskilful building on the foundations laid by him, he was obliged to describe them as devastators of the Temple of God at Corinth. It was true that they preached the "Word of God," but they did so in the spirit and with the low motives of the dishonourable pedlar who knows how to dispose of his wares by tricks and artifices to the ignorant purchaser (2 Cor. ii. 17). They made use of the right of hospitality which was lavished so freely by the Christians on their brethren when travelling in those days, and also of the special right of the itinerant preacher of being supported by those amongst whom he worked. St. Paul renounced all such claims, and especially in Corinth. This they laid to his charge as pride, as a sign of his want of trust in and love for the community, and even as a cunning device by means of which, maintaining his external independence of the community, he might all the more certainly domineer over them morally. They compared St. Paul to his disadvantage with the older Apostles, who had themselves seen the Lord, and had received their commission from Him (1 Cor. ix. 1–3). No sort of contempt and depreciation was too bad for them to use if they might undermine the reputation of the founder of the community, and gain influence for themselves where they had accomplished nothing (2 Cor. x. 15). St. Paul testified to these, his opponents at Corinth, as to the hostile preachers in Rome—and he did it in order to show the community how disgraceful it was to allow themselves to

be thus imposed upon—that no other Jesus and no other gospel could be preached to them, and no other gifts of the Spirit could be exhibited than those which the Corinthians had long ago received through him (2 Cor. xi. 4). Whether this was based on really doctrinal convictions or was only a temporary and prudent reserve on the part of these missionaries, they were, nevertheless, spiritually related to those identical Jews who, from the beginning of the independent missionary work of St. Paul, had dogged his steps and endeavoured to destroy his work, or sought, as they imagined, to correct it.

This Judaistic tendency, with which St. Paul had to fight all his life long, should be considered much more than is usually the case from a missionary point of view. The core of this Judaising party was composed of those who had once been Pharisees, and who, according to the judgment of St. Paul, had never been really penetrated by the emancipating power of the gospel, and who had no right to the Christian name of brethren.[1] In these Christian Pharisees might be found a goodly portion of that zeal for making proselytes (Matt. xxiii. 15) of which Jesus accused the Pharisees. They caricatured the truly missionary calling of Israel. They, like the former Pharisee, St. Paul, did not doubt that the gospel was intended for all nations; only they held that the Gentiles converted by it were to be incorporated into the Jewish people and placed under the laws of Moses. Therefore they saw with deep resentment a Gentile Church arise in Antioch, independent of the law, and that this Christianity, no longer dependent on Judaism, was successfully propagated in Asia Minor. If they were not prepared to give up their ideal for ever, they must grasp the wanderer's staff and establish themselves as missionary

[1] Gal. ii. 4; 2 Cor. xi. 26; Acts. xv. 5.

preachers wherever the opposite of their wishes began to take firm hold. They acted thus in Antioch immediately after the first missionary journey of St. Paul and Barnabas. After they had been disowned, according to the two existing accounts, by the leaders of Jewish Christianity at the Apostles' Council, they made similar attempts on their own account in the newly formed communities of Galatia; that is, as I and others understand it, in the communities which St. Paul and Barnabas had founded after their first journey together. They could scarcely introduce themselves there as anything but missionaries. St. Paul indeed judges of them as false Christians, who had crept into the overwhelmingly Gentile Christian communities like spies, in order to discover how they could best eliminate the evangelical freedom which reigned there. He would not allow that their preaching was the gospel, and saw in them only vain Jews, who prided themselves in making as many men like themselves as possible. They, however, looked upon themselves as representatives of the original gospel, and as St. Paul, according to their judgment, had mutilated it in order to gain speedy and brilliant missionary results, it appeared to them that it was truly a missionary task to bring to the misguided Gentile Christians the true and complete gospel. Neither was it probably very difficult for them to obtain an entrance into the communities as missionaries.

At that time every newly formed community was also a missionary station. It was their duty to add to the sphere of their influence by the conversion of the unconverted. St. Paul himself also, when he visited that neighbourhood a second time, had preached the gospel there, and had thus carried on missionary work (Gal. iv. 13). How welcome it must have been to the newly founded communities, whose founder was busy far away making new settlements, when experienced Christians, members of

the mother Church, from which in fact the gospel had spread to Gentile lands, visited them, and carried on missionary work in their midst. We learn from the Epistle to the Galatians how successful they were, and what an impression they made, what a spell was exercised by the sacred traditions and authorities to which they seemed rightly to appeal, and what means they used in order to make plain to the immature Gentile Christians that they must first become Jews in order to become true Christians. Here, too, the calumniators of St. Paul played an important part. Neither was it difficult to show that St. Paul's method of carrying on missions to the Gentiles roused to the uttermost the hatred of the unbelieving Jews against Christianity, and that, apart from this, the Christian communities were much safer from the attacks of the Gentile populations and authorities when they represented themselves as a species of the Jewish communities, which throughout the Empire enjoyed a very tolerable amount of freedom in the exercise of their religion, than when they made themselves known as a new sect, worshippers of a crucified Jew. Added to this these Judaistic missionaries certainly knew how to put into practice that forbearance which has inclined the masses to many a theory. It seems, also, that up to a certain point they knew how to appear as if possessed of liberal views, and by their own example to show ways and means by which all that was too burdensome in a complete observance of the law might be avoided (Gal. vi. 13). St. Paul had to bring to bear the whole weight of his personal influence and of his principles to make an end of these doings. In Galatia and elsewhere he was completely victorious. The Judaistic mission did not succeed in persuading any considerable number of Gentile Christians to assume the legal mode of life of the Jews and of Jewish Christians. But the facts already referred to, in the history of the

Corinthian community and of the Roman mission, show that the first great battles by no means ended the war.

Again and again in the large circles of Jewish Christianity discontent arose with the course which Gentile missions had taken, and hatred against St. Paul, who had been the chief cause of this development. When on their side they found that, come what might, they were obliged to accept the fact that the Gentile Church had victoriously asserted her freedom from the Jewish law and her external independence of Jerusalem, when they no longer dared to appear with the demand that the whole of Judaism must be accepted within the borders of the Gentile Church, they by no means, therefore, desisted from striving to exert secret or open influence in this domain in opposition to St. Paul. Beside that renegade from Judaism who, as it appeared, strove untiringly, without any reverence for all that was sacred to the nation or any pity for its misfortunes, to build up a great and independent Gentile Church, these Jewish Christians also, who looked upon themselves as more faithful sons of the holy nation, felt themselves called to be the leaders and guides of the blind heathen and of the Gentile Christians still under age. So they came to Corinth, to Rome, to Colossæ, and to other places, naturally not always the same people, and, by no means, the representatives everywhere of exactly the same principles and requirements, but, nevertheless, always Jewish Christians who were dissatisfied with the Apostle to the Gentiles, and who were thoroughly put out and wounded in their Jewish self-sufficiency by his success. Though the Christian world has condemned them because the maintenance of their nationality was of more importance to them than the results of the gospel, yet we must not forget, if we would judge them with justice and humanity, that they belonged to the nation of whom Jesus came "according to the flesh." But this Jewish mission

never accomplished anything salutary; in fact, its positive influence was very slight; no new communities amongst the Gentiles were founded, but much unrest and confusion were caused to communities that had been founded in a very different spirit.[1]

THEOD. ZAHN.

(*To be continued.*)

[1] According to *Epiphan. Hær.* 30, 16, 25; further, according to *Clem. Recogn.* i. 43–71, and *Epist. Petri ad Jac.* 2 (Clementine ed. Lagarde, pp. 3, 24).

THE ATONEMENT AND THE MODERN MIND.

I.

It will be admitted by most Christians that if the Atonement, quite apart from precise definitions of it, is anything to the mind, it is everything. It is the most profound of all truths, and the most recreative. It determines more than anything else our conceptions of God, of man, of history, and even of nature; it determines them, for we must bring them all in some way into accord with it. It is the inspiration of all thought, the impulse and the law of all action, the key, in the last resort, to all suffering. Whether we call it a fact or a truth, a power or a doctrine, it is that in which the *differentia* of Christianity, its peculiar and exclusive character, is specifically shown; it is the focus of revelation, the point at which we see deepest into the truth of God, and come most completely under its power. For those who recognize it at all it is Christianity in brief; it concentrates in itself, as in a germ of infinite potency, all that the wisdom, power and love of God mean in relation to sinful men.

Accordingly, when we speak of the Atonement and the modern mind, we are really speaking of the modern mind and the Christian religion. The relation between these two magnitudes may vary. The modern mind is no more than a modification of the human mind as it exists in all ages, and the relation of the modern mind to the Atonement is one phase—it may be a specially interesting or a specially well defined phase—of the perennial relation of the mind of man to the truth of God. There is always an affinity between the two, for God made man in His own image, and the mind can only rest in truth; but there is always at the same time an antipathy, for man is somehow

estranged from God, and resents Divine intrusion into his life. This is the situation at all times, and therefore in modern times; we only need to remark that when the Atonement is in question, the situation, so to speak, becomes acute. All the elements in it define themselves more sharply. If there is sympathy between the mind and the truth, it is a profound sympathy, which will carry the mind far; if there are lines of approach, through which the truth can find access to the mind, they are lines laid deep in the nature of things and of men, and the access which the truth finds by them is one from which it will not easily be dislodged. On the other hand, if it is antagonism which is roused in the mind by the Atonement, it is an antagonism which feels that everything is at stake. The Atonement is a reality of such a sort that it can make no compromise. The man who fights it knows that he is fighting for his life, and puts all his strength into the battle. To surrender is literally to give up himself, to cease to be the man he is, and to become another man. For the modern mind, therefore, as for the ancient, the attraction and the repulsion of Christianity are concentrated at the same point; the cross of Christ is man's only glory, or it is his final stumbling-block.

What I wish to do in these papers is so to present the facts as to mediate, if possible, between the mind of our time and the Atonement—so to exhibit the specific truth of Christianity as to bring out its affinity for what is deepest in the nature of man and in human experience—so to appreciate the modern mind itself, and the influences which have given it its constitution and temper, as to discredit what is false in it, and enlist on the side of the Atonement that which is profound and true. And if any one is disposed to marvel at the ambition or the conceit of such a programme, I would ask him to consider if it is not the programme prescribed to every Christian, or at least to every

Christian minister, who would do the work of an evangelist. To commend the eternal truth of God, as it is finally revealed in the Atonement, to the mind in which men around us live and move and have their being, is no doubt a difficult and perilous task; but if we approach it in a right spirit, it need not tempt us to any presumption; it cannot tempt us, as long as we feel that it is our duty. "*Who is sufficient for these things? . . . Our sufficiency is of God.*"

The Christian religion is a historical religion, and whatever we say about it must rest upon historical ground. We cannot define it from within, by reference merely to our individual experience. Of course it is equally impossible to define it apart from experience; the point is that such experience itself must be historically derived; it must come through something outside of our individual selves. What is true of the Christian religion as a whole is pre-eminently true of the Atonement in which it is concentrated. The experience which it brings to us, and the truth which we teach on the basis of it, are historically mediated. They rest ultimately on that testimony to Christ which we find in the Scriptures and especially in the New Testament. No one can tell what the Atonement is except on this basis. No one can consciously approach it—no one can be influenced by it to the full extent to which it is capable of influencing human nature—except through this medium. We may hold that just because it is Divine, it must be eternally true, omnipresent in its gracious power; but even granting this, it is not known as an abstract or eternal somewhat; it is historically, and not otherwise than historically, revealed. It is achieved by Christ, and the testimony to Christ, on the strength of which we accept it, is in the last resort the testimony of Scripture.

In saying so, I do not mean that the Atonement is merely a problem of exegesis, or that we have simply to

accept as authoritative the conclusions of scholars as to the meaning of New Testament texts. The modern mind here is ready with a radical objection. The writers of the New Testament, it argues, were men like ourselves; they had personal limitations and historical limitations; their forms of thought were those of a particular age and upbringing; the doctrines they preached may have had a relative validity, but we cannot benumb our minds to accept them without question. The intelligence which has learned to be a law to itself, criticizing, rejecting, appropriating, assimilating, cannot deny its nature and suspend its functions when it opens the New Testament. It cannot make itself the slave of men, not even though the men are Peter and Paul and John; no, not even though it were the Son of Man Himself. It resents dictation, not wilfully nor wantonly, but because it must; and it resents it all the more when it claims to be inspired. If, therefore, the Atonement can only be received by those who are prepared from the threshold to acknowledge the inspiration and the consequent authority of Scripture, it can never be received by modern men at all.

This line of remark is familiar inside the Church as well as outside. Often it is expressed in the demand for a historical as opposed to a dogmatic interpretation of the New Testament, a historical interpretation being one to which we can sit freely, because the result to which it leads us is the mind of a time which we have survived and presumably transcended; a dogmatic interpretation, on the other hand, being one which claims to reach an abiding truth, and therefore to have a present authority. A more popular and inconsistent expression of the same mood may be found among those who say petulant things about the rabbinizing of Paul, but profess the utmost devotion to the words of Jesus. Even in a day of overdone distinctions, one might point out that interpretations

are not properly to be classified as historical or dogmatic, but as true or false. If they are false, it does not matter whether they are called dogmatic or historical; and if they are true, they may quite well be both. But this by the way. For my own part, I prefer the objection in its most radical form, and indeed find nothing in it to which any Christian, however sincere or profound his reverence for the Bible, should hesitate to assent. Once the mind has come to know itself, there can be no such thing for it as blank authority. It cannot believe things—the things by which it has to live—simply on the word of Paul or John. It is not irreverent, it is simply the recognition of a fact, if we add that it can just as little believe them simply on the word of Jesus.[1] This is not the sin of the mind, but the nature and essence of mind, the being which it owes to God. If we are to speak of authority at all in this connexion, the authority must be conceived as belonging not to the speaker but to that which he says, not to the witness but to the truth. Truth, in short, is the only thing which has authority for the mind, and the only way in which truth finally evinces its authority is by taking possession of the mind for itself. It may be that any given truth can only be reached by testimony—that is, can only come to us by some historical channel; but if it is a truth of eternal import, if it is part of a revelation of God the reception of which is eternal life, then its authority lies in itself and in its power to win the mind, and not in any witness however trustworthy. Hence in speaking of the Atonement, whether in preaching or in theologizing, it is quite unnecessary to raise any question about the inspiration of Scripture, or to make any claim of "authority" either for the Apostles

[1] Of course this does not touch the fact that the whole "authority" of the Christian religion is in Jesus Himself—in His historical presence in the world, His words and works, His life and death and resurrection. He *is* the truth, the acceptance of which by man is life eternal.

or for the Lord. Belief in the inspiration of Scripture is neither the beginning of the Christian life nor the foundation of Christian theology; it is the last conclusion—a conclusion which becomes every day more sure—to which experience of the truth of Scripture leads. When we tell, therefore, what the Atonement is, we are telling it not on the authority of any person or persons whatever, but on the authority of the truth in it by which it has won its place in our minds and hearts. We find this truth in the Christian Scriptures undoubtedly, and therefore we prize them; but the truth does not derive its authority from the Scriptures, or from those who penned them. On the contrary, the Scriptures are prized by the Church because through them the soul is brought into contact with this truth. No doubt this leaves it open to any one who does not see in Scripture what we see, or who is not convinced as we are of its truth, to accuse us here of subjectivity, of having no standard of truth but what appeals to us individually, but I could never feel the charge a serious one. It is like urging that a man does not see at all, or does not see truly, because he only sees with his own eyes. This is the only authentic kind of seeing yet known to mankind. We do not judge at all those who do not see what we do. We do not know what hinders them, or whether they are at all to blame for it; we do not know how soon the hindrance is going to be put out of the way. To-day, as at the beginning, the light shines in the darkness, and the darkness comprehends it not. But that is the situation which calls for evangelists; not a situation in which the evangelist is called to renounce his experience and his vocation.

What, then, is the Atonement, as it is presented to us in the Scriptures, and vindicates for itself in our minds the character of truth, and indeed, as I have said already, the character of the ultimate truth of God?

The simplest expression that can be given to it in words

is: Christ died for our sins. Taken by itself, this is too brief to be intelligible; it implies many things which need to be made explicit both about Christ's relation to us and about the relation of sin and death. But the important thing, to begin with, is not to define those relations, but to look through the words to the broad reality which is interpreted in them. What they tell us, and tell us on the basis of an incontrovertible experience, is that the forgiveness of sins is for the Christian mediated through the death of Christ. In one respect, therefore, there is nothing singular in the forgiveness of sins: it is in the same position as every other blessing of which the New Testament speaks. It is the presence of a Mediator, as Westcott says in one of his letters, which makes the Christian religion what it is; and the forgiveness of sins is mediated to us through Christ, just as the knowledge of God as the Father is mediated, or the assurance of a life beyond death. But there is something *specific* about the mediation of forgiveness; the gift and the certainty of it come to us, not simply through Christ, but through the blood of His Cross. The sum of His relation to sin is that He died for it. God forgives, but this is the way in which His forgiveness comes. He forgives freely, but it is at this cost to Himself and to the Son of His love.

This, it seems to me, is the simplest possible statement of what the New Testament means by the Atonement, and probably there are few who would dispute its correctness. But it is possible to argue that there is a deep cleft in the New Testament itself, and that the teaching of Jesus on the subject of forgiveness is completely at variance with that which we find in the Epistles, and which is implied in this description of the Atonement. Indeed there are many who do so argue. But to follow them would be to forget the place which Jesus has in His own teaching. Even if we grant that the main subject of that teaching is the Kingdom of God, it is as clear as anything can be that the Kingdom

depends for its establishment on Jesus, or rather that in Him it is already established in principle; and that all participation in its blessings depends on some kind of relation to Him. All things have been delivered to Him by the Father, and it is by coming under obligation to Him, and by that alone, that men know the Father. It is by coming under obligation to Him that they know the pardoning love of the Father, as well as everything else that enters into Christian experience and constitutes the blessedness of life in the Kingdom of God. Nor is it open to any one to say that he knows this simply because Christ has told it. We are dealing here with things too great to be simply told. If they are ever to be known in their reality, they must be revealed by God, they must rise upon the mind of man in their awful and glorious truth, in ways more wonderful than words. They can be spoken about afterwards, but hardly beforehand. They can be celebrated and preached —that is, declared as the speaker's experience, delivered as his testimony—but not simply told. It was enough if Jesus made His disciples feel, as surely He did make them feel, not only in every word He spoke, but more emphatically still in His whole attitude toward them, that He was Himself the Mediator of the new covenant, and that all the blessings of the relation between God and man which we call Christianity were blessings due to Him. If men knew the Father, it was through Him. If they knew the Father's heart to the lost, it was through Him. Through Him, be it remembered, not merely through the words that He spoke. There was more in Christ than even His own wonderful words expressed, and all that He was and did and suffered, as well as what He said, entered into the convictions He inspired. But He knew this as well as His disciples, and for this very reason it is beside the mark to point to what He said, or rather to what He did not say, in confutation of their experience. For it is their experience

—the experience that the forgiveness of sins was mediated to them through His cross—that is expressed in the doctrine of Atonement : He died for our sins.

The objection which is here in view is most frequently pointed by reference to the parable of the prodigal son. There is no Atonement here, we are told, no mediation of forgiveness at all. There is love on the one side and penitence on the other, and it is treason to the pure truth of this teaching to cloud and confuse it with the thoughts of men whose Master was over their heads often, but most of all here. Such a statement of the case is plausible, and judging from the frequency with which it occurs must to some minds be very convincing, but nothing could be more superficial or unjust both to Jesus and the apostles. A parable is a comparison, and there is a point of comparison in it on which everything turns. The more perfect the parable is, the more conspicuous and dominating will the point of comparison be. The parable of the prodigal illustrates this. It brings out, through a human parallel, with incomparable force and beauty, the one truth of the freeness of forgiveness. God waits to be gracious. His pardoning love rushes out to welcome the penitent. But no one who speaks of the Atonement ever dreams of questioning this. The Atonement is concerned with a different point—not the freeness of pardon, about which all are agreed, but the cost of it ; not the spontaneity of God's love, which no one questions, but the necessity under which it lay to manifest itself in a particular way if God was to be true to Himself, and to win the heart of sinners for the holiness which they had offended. The Atonement is not the denial that God's love is free ; it is that specific manifestation or demonstration of God's free love which is demanded by the situation of men. One can hardly help wondering whether those who tell us so confidently that there is no Atonement in the parable of the prodigal have ever noticed that there

is no Christ in it either—no elder brother who goes out to seek and to save the lost son, and to give his life a ransom for him. Surely we are not to put the Good Shepherd out of the Christian religion. Yet if we leave Him His place, we cannot make the parable of the prodigal the measure of Christ's mind about the forgiveness of sins. One part of His teaching it certainly contains—one part of the truth about the relation of God the Father to His sinful children; but another part of the truth was present, though not on that occasion rendered in words, in the presence of the Speaker, when "all the publicans and sinners drew near to Him for to hear Him." The love of God to the sinful was apprehended in Christ Himself, and not in what He said as something apart from Himself; on the contrary, it was in the identity of the speaker and the word that the power of the word lay; God's love evinced itself to men as a reality in Him, in His presence in the world, and in His attitude to its sin; it so evinced itself, finally and supremely, in His death. It is not the idiosyncrasy of one apostle, it is the testimony of the Church, a testimony in keeping with the whole claim made by Christ in His teaching and life and death: "*in Him* we have our redemption, *through His blood*, even the forgiveness of our trespasses." And this is what the Atonement means: it means the mediation of forgiveness through Christ, and specifically through His death. Forgiveness, in the Christian sense of the term, is only realized as we believe in the Atonement: in other words, as we come to feel the cost at which alone the love of God could assert itself as Divine and holy love in the souls of sinful men. We may say, if we please, that forgiveness is bestowed freely upon repentance; but we must add, if we would do justice to the Christian position, that repentance in its ultimate character is the fruit of the Atonement. Repentance is not possible apart from the apprehension of the mercy of God *in Christ*. It is the experience of the

regenerate — *pœnitentiam interpretor regenerationem*, as Calvin says—and it is the atonement which regenerates.

This, then, in the broadest sense, is the truth which we wish to commend to the modern mind : the truth that there is forgiveness with God, and that this forgiveness comes to us only through Christ, and signally or specifically through His death. Unless it becomes true to us that *Christ died for our sins* we cannot appreciate forgiveness at its specifically Christian value. It cannot be for us that kind of reality, it cannot have for us that kind of inspiration, which it unquestionably is and has in the New Testament.

But what, we must now ask, is the modern mind to which this primary truth of Christianity has to be commended? Can we diagnose it in any general yet recognizable fashion, so as to find guidance in seeking access to it for the gospel of the Atonement? There may seem to be something presumptuous in the very idea, as though any one making the attempt assumed a superiority to the mind of his time, an exemption from its limitations and prejudices, a power to see over it and round about it. I hope it is not necessary to disclaim such assumption. Whoever has tried to preach the gospel, and to persuade men of truth as truth is in Jesus, and especially of the truth of God's forgiveness as it is in the death of Jesus for sin, knows that there is a state of mind which is somehow inaccessible to this truth, and to which the truth consequently appeals in vain. I do not speak of unambiguous moral antipathy to the ideas of forgiveness and atonement, although antipathy to these ideas in general, as distinct from any given presentation of them, cannot but have a moral character, just as a moral character always attaches to the refusal to acknowledge Christ or to become His debtor; but of something which, though vaguer and less determinate, puts the mind wrong, so to speak, with Christianity from the start. It is clear in all that has

been said about forgiveness, that certain relations are presupposed as subsisting between God and man, relations which make it possible for man to sin, and possible for God, not indeed to ignore his sin, but in the very act of recognizing it as all that it is to forgive it, to liberate man from it, and to restore him to Himself and righteousness. Now if the latent presuppositions of the modern mind are to any extent inconsistent with such relations, there will be something to overcome before the conceptions of forgiveness or atonement can get a hearing. These conceptions have their place in a certain view of the world as a whole, and if the mind is preoccupied with a different view, it will have an instinctive consciousness that it cannot accommodate them, and a disposition therefore to reject them *ab initio*. This is, in point of fact, the difficulty with which we have to deal. And let no one say that it is transparently absurd to suggest that we must get men to accept a true philosophy before we can begin to preach the gospel to them, as though that settled the matter or got over the difficulty. We have to take men as we find them; we have to preach the gospel to the mind which is around us; and if that mind is rooted in a view of the world which leaves no room for Christ and His work as Christian experience has realized them, then that view of the world must be recognized by the evangelist, it must be undermined at its weak places, its inadequacy to interpret all that is present even in the mind which has accepted it must be demonstrated; the attempt must be made to liberate the mind, so that it may be open to the impression of realities which under the conditions supposed it could only encounter with instinctive antipathy. It is necessary, therefore, at this point to advert to the various influences which have contributed to form the mind of our time, and to give it its instinctive bias in one direction or another. Powerful and legitimate as these influences have been,

they have nevertheless been in various ways partial, and because of their very partiality they have, when they absorbed the mind, as new modes of thought are apt to do, prejudiced it against the consideration of other, possibly of deeper and more far-reaching, truths.

First, there is the enormous development of physical science. This has engrossed human intelligence in our own times to an extent which can hardly be over-estimated. Far more mind has been employed in constructing the great fabric of knowledge, which we call science, than in any other pursuit of men. Far more mind has had its characteristic qualities and temper imparted to it by scientific study than by study in any other field. It is of science—which to all intents and purposes means physical science—of science and its methods and results that the modern mind is most confident, and speaks with the most natural and legitimate pride. Now science, even in this restricted sense, covers a great range of subjects ; it may be physics in the narrowest meaning of the word, or chemistry, or biological science. The characteristic of our own age has been the development of the last, and in particular its extension to man. It is impossible to dispute the legitimacy of this extension. Man has his place in nature ; the phenomena of life have one of their signal illustrations in him, and he is as proper a subject of biological study as any other living being. But the intense preoccupation of much of the most vigorous intelligence of our time with the biological study of man is not without effects upon the mind itself, which we need to consider. It tends to produce a habit of mind to which certain assumptions are natural and inevitable, certain other assumptions incredible from the first. This habit of mind is in some ways favourable to the acceptance of the Atonement. For example, the biologist's invincible conviction of the unity of life, and of the certainty and power with

which whatever touches it at one point touches it through and through, is in one way entirely favourable. Many of the most telling popular objections to the idea of atonement rest on an atomic conception of personality—a conception according to which every human being is a closed system, incapable in the last resort of helping or being helped, of injuring or being injured, by another. This conception has been finally discredited by biology, and so far the evangelist must be grateful. The Atonement presupposes the unity of human life, and its solidarity; it presupposes a common and universal responsibility. I believe it presupposes also such a conception of the unity of man and nature as biology proceeds upon; and in all these respects its physical presuppositions, if we may so express ourselves, are present to the mind of to-day, thanks to biology, as they were not even so lately as a hundred years ago.

But this is not all that we have to consider. The mind has been influenced by the movement of physical and even of biological science, not only in a way which is favourable, but in ways which are prejudicial to the acceptance of the Atonement. Every physical science seems to have a boundless ambition; it wants to reduce everything to its own level, to explain everything in the terms and by the categories with which it itself works. The higher has always to fight for its life against the lower. The physicist would like to reduce chemistry to physics; the chemist has an ambition to simplify biology into chemistry; the biologist in turn looks with suspicion on anything in man which cannot be interpreted biologically. He would like to give, and is sometimes ready to offer, a biological explanation of self-consciousness, of freedom, of religion, morality, sin. Now a biological explanation, when all is done, is a physical explanation, and a physical explanation of self-consciousness or the moral life is one in which

the very essence of the thing to be explained is either ignored or explained away. Man's life is certainly rooted in nature, and therefore a proper subject for biological study; but unless it somehow transcended nature, and so demanded other than physical categories for its complete interpretation, there could not be any study or any science at all. If there were nothing but matter, as M. Naville has said, there would be no materialism; and if there were nothing but life, there would be no biology. Now it is in the higher region of human experience, to which all physical categories are unequal, that we encounter those realities to which the Atonement is related, and in relation to which it is real; and we must insist upon these *higher* realities in their specific character, against a strong tendency in the scientifically trained modern mind, and still more in the general mind as influenced by it, to reduce them to the merely physical level.

Take, for instance, the consciousness of sin. Evidently the Atonement becomes incredible if the consciousness of sin is extinguished or explained away. There is nothing for the Atonement to do; there is nothing to relate it to; it is as unreal as a rock in the sky. But many minds at the present time, under the influence of current conceptions in biology, do explain it away. All life is one, they argue. It rises from the same spring, it runs the same course, it comes to the same end. The life of man is rooted in nature, and that which beats in my veins is an inheritance from an immeasurable past. It is absurd to speak of my responsibility for it, or of my guilt because it manifests itself in me, as it inevitably does, in such and such forms. There is no doubt that this mode of thought is widely prevalent, and that it is one of the most serious hindrances to the acceptance of the gospel, and especially of the Atonement. How are we to appreciate it? We must point out, I think, the consequence to which

it leads. If a man denies that he is responsible for the nature which he has inherited—denies responsibility for it on the ground that it *is* inherited—it is a fair question to ask him for what he *does* accept responsibility. When he has divested himself of the inherited nature, what is left? The real meaning of such disowning of responsibility is that a man asserts that his life is a part of the physical phenomena of the universe, and nothing else; and he forgets, in the very act of making the assertion, that if it were true, it could not be so much as made. The merely physical is transcended in every such assertion; and the man who has transcended it, rooted though his life be in nature, and one with the life of the whole and of all the past, must take the responsibility of living that life out on the high level of self-consciousness and morality which his very disclaimer involves. The sense of sin which wakes spontaneously with the perception that he is not what he ought to have been must not be explained away; at the level which life has reached in him, this is unscientific as well as immoral; his sin—for I do not know another word for it—must be realized as all that it is in the moral world if he is ever to be true to himself, not to say if he is ever to welcome the Atonement, and leave his sin behind. We have no need of words like sin and atonement—we could not have the experiences which they designate—unless we had a higher than merely natural life; and one of the tendencies of the modern mind which has to be counteracted by the evangelist is the tendency induced by physical and especially by biological science to explain the realities of personal experience by sub-personal categories. In conscience, in this sense of personal dignity, in the ultimate inability of man to deny the self which he is, we have always an appeal against such tendencies, which cannot fail; but it needs to be made resolutely when conscience

is lethargic and the whole bias of the mind is to the other side.

Passing from physical science, the modern mind has perhaps been influenced most by the great idealist movement in philosophy—the movement which in Germany began with Kant and culminated in Hegel. This idealism, just like physical science, gives a certain stamp to the mind; when it takes possession of intelligence it casts it, so to speak, into a certain mould; even more than physical science it dominates it so that it becomes incapable of self-criticism, and very difficult to teach. Its importance to the preacher of Christianity is that it assumes certain relations between the human and the divine, relations which foreclose the very questions which the Atonement compels us to raise. To be brief, it teaches the essential unity of God and man. God and man, to speak of them as distinct, are necessary to each other, but man is as necessary to God as God is to man. God is the truth of man, but man is the reality of God. God comes to consciousness of Himself in man, and man in being conscious of himself is at the same time conscious of God. Though many writers of this school make a copious use of Christian phraseology it seems to me obvious that it is not in an adequate Christian sense. Sin is not regarded as that which ought not to be, it is that which is to be transcended. It is as inevitable as anything in nature, and the sense of it, the bad conscience which accompanies it, is no more than the growing pains of the soul. On such a system there is no room for atonement in the sense of the mediation of God's forgiveness through Jesus Christ. We may consistently speak in it of a man being reconciled to himself, or even reconciled to his sins, but not, so far as I can understand, of his being reconciled to God, and still less, reconciled to God through the death of His Son. The penetration of Kant saw from the first all that could

be made of atonement on the basis of any such system. What it means to the speculative mind is that the new man bears the sin of the old. When the sinner repents and is converted, the weight of what he has done comes home to him; the new man in him—the Son of God in him—accepts the responsibility of the old man, and so he has peace with God. Many whose minds are under the influence of this mode of thought do not see clearly to what it leads, and resent criticism of it as if it were a sort of impiety. Their philosophy is to them a surrogate for religion, but they should not be allowed to suppose (if they do suppose) that it is the equivalent of Christianity. There can be no Christianity without Christ; it is the presence of the Mediator which makes Christianity what it is. But a unique Christ, without Whom our religion disappears, is frankly disavowed by the more candid and outspoken of our idealist philosophers. Christ, they tell us, was certainly a man who had an early and a magnificently strong faith in the unity of the human and the Divine; but it was faith in a fact which enters into the constitution of every human consciousness, and it is absurd to suppose that the recognition of the fact, or the realization of it, is essentially dependent on Him. He was not sinless—which is an expression without meaning, when we think of a human being which has to rise by conflict and self-suppression out of nature into the world of self-consciousness and right and wrong; He was not in any sense unique or exceptional; He was only what we all are in our degree; at best, He was only one among many great men who have contributed in their place and time to the spiritual elevation of the race. Such, I say, is the issue of this mode of thought as it is frankly avowed by some of its representative men; but the peculiarity of it, when it is obscurely fermenting as a leaven in the mind, is that it appeals to men as having special affinities

to Christianity. In our own country it is widely prevalent among those who have had a university education, and indeed in a much wider circle, and it is a serious question how we are to address our gospel to those who confront it in such a mental mood.

I have no wish to be unsympathetic, but I must frankly express my conviction that this philosophy only lives by ignoring the greatest reality of the spiritual world. There is something in that world—something with which we can come into intelligible and vital relations—something which can evince to our minds its truth and reality, for which this philosophy can make no room: Christ's consciousness of Himself. It is a theory of the universe which (on principle) cannot allow Christ to be anything else than an additional unit in the world's population; but if this were the truth about Him, no language could be strong enough to express the self-delusion in which He lived and died. That He was thus self-deluded is a hypothesis I do not feel called to discuss. One may be accused of subjectivity again, of course, though a subjective opinion which has the consent of the Christian centuries behind it need not tremble at hard names; but I venture to say that there is no reality in the world which more inevitably and uncompromisingly takes hold of the mind as a reality than our Lord's consciousness of Himself as it is attested to us in the Gospels. But when we have taken this reality for all that it is worth, the current idealism is shaken to the foundation. What seemed to us so profound a truth—the essential unity of the human and the divine—may even seem to us a formal and delusive platitude; in what we once regarded as the formula of the perfect religion—the divinity of man and the humanity of God—we may find quite as truly the formula of the first, not to say the final, sin. To see Christ not in the light of this speculative theorem, but in the light of His own words, is to realize not only our kinship to God, but

our remoteness from Him; it is to realize our incapacity for self-realization when we are left to ourselves; it is to realize the need of the Mediator if we would come to the Father; it is to realize, in principle, the need of the Atonement, the need, and eventually the fact. When the modern mind therefore presents itself to us in this mood of philosophical competence, judging Christ from the point of view of the whole, and showing Him His place, we can only insist that the place is unequal to His greatness, and that His greatness cannot be explained away. The mind which is closed to the fact of His unique claims, and the unique relation to God on which they rest, is closed inevitably to the mediation of God's forgiveness through His death.

There is one other modification of mind, characteristic of modern times, of which we have yet to take account—I mean that which is produced by devotion to historical study. History is, as much as science, one of the achievements of our age; and the historical temper is as characteristic of the men we meet as the philosophical or the scientific. The historical temper, too, is just as apt as these others, perhaps unconsciously, perhaps quite consciously, but under the engaging plea of modesty, to pronounce absolute sentences which strike at the life of the Christian religion, and especially, therefore, at the idea of the Atonement. Sometimes this is done broadly, so that every one sees what it means. If we are told, for example, that everything historical is relative, that it belongs of necessity to a time, and is conditioned in ways so intricate that no knowledge can ever completely trace them; if we are told further that for this very reason nothing historical can have absolute significance, or can condition the eternal life of man, it is obvious that the Christian religion is being cut at the root. It is no use speaking about the Atonement —about the mediation of God's forgiveness to the soul through a historical person and work—if this is true.

The only thing to be done is to raise the question whether it *is* true. It is no more for historical than for physical science to exalt itself into a theory of the universe, or to lay down the law with speculative absoluteness as to the significance and value which shall attach to facts. When we face the fact with which we are here concerned—the fact of Christ's consciousness of Himself and His vocation to which reference has already been made—are we not forced to the conclusion that here a new spiritual magnitude has appeared in history, the very *differentia* of which is that it *has* eternal significance, and that it is eternal life to know it? If we are to preach the Atonement, we cannot allow either history or philosophy to proceed on assumptions which ignore or degrade the fact of Christ. Only a person in whom the eternal has become historical can be the bearer of the Atonement, and it must be our first concern to show, against all assumptions whether made in the name of history or philosophy, that in point of fact there is such a person here.

This consideration requires to be kept in view even when we are dealing with the modern mind inside the Church. Nothing is commoner than to hear those who dissent from any given construction of the Atonement plead for a historical as opposed to a dogmatic interpretation of Christ. It is not always clear what is meant by this distinction, nor is it clear that those who use it are always conscious of what it would lead to if it were made absolute. Sometimes a dogmatic interpretation of the New Testament means an interpretation vitiated by dogmatic prejudice, an interpretation in which the sense of the writers is missed because the mind is blinded by prepossessions of its own: in this sense a dogmatic interpretation is a thing which no one would defend. Sometimes, however, a dogmatic interpretation is one which reveals or discovers in the New Testament truths of eternal and divine sig-

nificance, and to discredit such interpretation in the name of the historical is another matter. The distinction in this case, as has been already pointed out, is not absolute. It is analogous to the distinction between fact and theory, or between thing and meaning, or between efficient cause and final cause. None of these distinctions is absolute, and no intelligent mind would urge either side in them to the disparagement of the other. If we are to apprehend the whole reality presented to us, we must apprehend the theory as well as the fact, the meaning as well as the thing, the final as well as the efficient cause. This truth is frequently ignored. It is assumed, for example, that because Christ was put to death by His enemies, or because He died in the faithful discharge of His calling, therefore He did not die, in the sense of the Atonement, for our sins: the historical causes which brought about His death are supposed to preclude that interpretation of it according to which it mediates to us the divine forgiveness. But there is no incompatibility between the two things. To set aside an interpretation of Christ's death as dogmatic on the ground that there is another which is historical, is like setting aside the idea that a watch is made to measure time because you know it was made by a watchmaker. It was both made by a watchmaker and made to measure time. Similarly it may be quite true both that Christ was crucified and slain by wicked men, and that He died for our sins. But without entering into the questions which this raises as to the relation between the wisdom of God and the course of human history, it is enough to be conscious of the prejudice which the historical temper is apt to generate against the recognition of the eternal in time. Surely it is a significant fact that the New Testament contains a whole series of books—the Johannine books—which have as their very burden the eternal significance of the historical: eternal life in Jesus Christ, come in flesh, the

propitiation for the whole world. Surely also it is a significant fact of a different and even an ominous kind that we have at present a whole school of critics which is so far from appreciating the truth in this that it is hardly an exaggeration to say that it has devoted itself to a paltry and peddling criticism of these books in which the impression of the eternal is lost. But whether we are indebted to John's eyes, or to none but our own, if the eternal is not to be seen in Jesus, He can have no place in our religion; if the historical has no dogmatic content, it cannot be essential to eternal life. Hence if we believe and know that we have eternal life in Jesus, we must assert the truth which is implied in this against any conception of history which denies it. Nor is it really difficult to do so. With the experience of nineteen centuries behind us, we have only to confront this particular historical reality, Jesus Christ, without prejudice; in evangelizing we have only to confront others with Him; and we shall find it still possible to see God in Him, the Holy Father who through the Passion of His Son ministers to sinners the forgiveness of their sins.

In what has been said thus far by way of explaining the modern mind, emphasis may seem to have fallen mainly on those characteristics which make it less accessible than it might be to Christian truth, and especially to the Atonement. I have tried to point out the assailable side of its prepossessions, and to indicate the fundamental truths which must be asserted if our intellectual world is to be one in which the Gospel may find room. But the modern mind has other characteristics. Some of these may have been exhibited hitherto mainly in criticizing current representations of the Atonement; but in themselves they are entirely legitimate, and the claims they put forward are such as we cannot disown. Before proceeding to a further statement of the Atonement, I shall briefly refer to

one or two of them: a doctrine of Atonement which did not satisfy them would undoubtedly stand condemned.

(1) The modern mind requires that everything shall be based on experience. Nothing is true or real to it which cannot be experimentally verified. This we shall all concede. But there is an inference sometimes drawn from it at which we may look with caution. It is this, that because everything must be based on experience therefore no appeal to Scripture has any authority. I have already explained in what sense it is possible to speak of the authority of Scripture, and here it is only necessary to make the simple remark that there is no proper contrast between Scripture and experience. Scripture, so far as it concerns us here, is a record of experience or an interpretation of it. It was the Church's experience that it had its redemption in Christ; it was the interpretation of that experience that Christ died for our sins. Yet in emphasizing experience the modern mind is right, and Scripture would lose its authority if the experience it describes were not perpetually verified anew.

(2) The modern mind desires to have everything in religion ethically construed. As a general principle this must command our unreserved assent. Anything which violates ethical standards, anything which is immoral or less than moral, must be excluded from religion. It may be, indeed, that ethical has sometimes been too narrowly defined. Ideas have been objected to as unethical which are really at variance not with a true perception of the constitution of humanity, and of the laws which regulate moral life, but with an atomic theory of personality under which moral life would be impossible. Persons are not atoms; in a sense they interpenetrate, though individuality has been called the true impenetrability. The world has been so constituted that we do not stand absolutely outside

of each other; we can do things for each other. We can bear each other's burdens, and it is not unethical to say so, but the reverse. And again, it need not be unethical, though it transcends the ordinary sphere and range of ethical action, if we say that God in Christ is able to do for us what we cannot do for one another. With reference to the Atonement, the demand for ethical treatment is usually expressed in two ways. (*a*) There is the demand for analogies to it in human life. The demand is justifiable, in so far as God has made man in His own image ; but, as has just been suggested, it has a limit, in so far as God is God and not man, and must have relations to the human race which its members do not and cannot have to each other. (*b*) There is the demand that the Atonement shall be exhibited in vital relation to a new life in which sin is overcome. This demand also is entirely legitimate, and it touches a weak point in the traditional Protestant doctrine. Dr. Chalmers tells us that he was brought up—such was the effect of the current orthodoxy upon him—in a certain distrust of good works. Some were certainly wanted, but not as being themselves salvation ; only, as he puts it, as tokens of justification. It was a distinct stage in his religious progress when he realized that true justification sanctifies, and that the soul can and ought to abandon itself spontaneously and joyfully to do the good that it delights in. The modern mind assumes what Dr. Chalmers painfully discovered. An Atonement that does not regenerate, it truly holds, is not an atonement in which men can be asked to believe. Such then, in its prejudices good and bad, is the mind to which the great truth of the Christian religion has to be presented.

JAMES DENNEY.

THE LIFE OF CHRIST ACCORDING TO ST. MARK.

Preface.

The object of these studies is to present the impression of Christ which would be derived from St. Mark's Gospel by a reader who had no other source of information; a reader who knew nothing of the other Gospels, or of Christian theology. Such an impression would be inadequate both from the point of view of history, and from that of Christian doctrine; nevertheless, it would reveal some features of our Lord's character and work more clearly than a picture which sought to combine in one harmonious whole the information given by the Four Gospels and the doctrines of the Christian creeds and confessions.

I. Introduction, I. 1–8.

"The beginning of the good news of Jesus Christ," therefore, as far as the knowledge and judgment of St. Mark were concerned, nothing before the coming of John the Baptist was an essential part of the Good News. The Good News, as we gather from the contents of our book, was partly about Jesus, and partly proclaimed by Jesus; it is unfolded in the following chapters. Thus the subject and the preacher are one, "Jesus Christ the Son of God." The reader would understand from the term "Christ" that Jesus was a Jewish leader and teacher, who was believed to be the Messiah or Saviour-King whom the Jews expected. He would suppose that the man who was called "Christ, the Son of God" was a teacher with extraordinary gifts; but he would easily learn that both the terms "Christ" and "Son of God" were used in many different meanings; and he would look to the book itself to explain exactly what they meant when they were applied to Jesus of Nazareth.

The Good News about Jesus, the Jewish Messiah, natur-

ally begins with a quotation from the Jewish Scriptures. The title and the quotation show that the work and teaching of Jesus spring out of the religion of Israel. The quotation speaks of a messenger or herald who was to appear in the desert, and prepare the way of his Lord by going before Him, and with loud shouts proclaiming His approach. This then was to be a token of the Messiah; He would be preceded by a prophet who would announce His speedy coming. St. Mark goes on to tell us that this token had been given in the case of Jesus. There had appeared in the wilderness a certain John the Baptizer, who preached repentance and promised forgiveness, and made his disciples undergo a baptism or ceremonial washing, as a sign, no doubt, that their sins were washed away. This John had been an ascetic, wearing coarse clothing and eating simple food, and he had brought about a great religious revival; crowds had flocked to him in the wilderness, "the whole district of Judea and all the men of Jerusalem," and had accepted his baptism. At the very zenith of his fame and influence, John proclaimed the coming of One greater than himself, One so great that John was not fit to untie His shoe-strings. John had baptized with water, the One who was yet to come would baptize with the Holy Spirit. John could only wash the body as a symbol of spiritual cleansing, the Coming One could wash the very souls of men with the Spirit of God.

The token, therefore, had been given; there had come a great prophet who had declared that he was the Forerunner of some one far greater than himself; this Greater One, therefore, according to the Old Testament prediction, was the Lord, the Messiah. It is clear from the context that the "Greater One" is Jesus.

The circumstance was remarkable apart from any question as to the authority of the Jewish Scriptures. There have been many prophets; some of them in their declining

years have nominated successors—Moses committed his office to Joshua; the mantle of Elijah was assumed by Elisha—but where else do we read of a great preacher who had drawn a whole people after him declaring in the full tide of his success that he was the mere herald of One greater than himself? The reader would expect much from the Teacher to whom such testimony had been borne.

II. The Baptism, I. 9–11.

While the crowds kept on gathering round John to hear him and to receive his baptism, Jesus came amongst the rest from Nazareth of Galilee. Simply "Jesus . . . from Nazareth," no other description, nothing about His family. Have we not read that He was "Son of God"? He could derive no additional dignity from the most splendid ancestry. Nothing about His age or His personal appearance, or his social position, or His occupation. On the last point we shall learn something incidentally further on. The silence as to age suggests that He was in middle life, so that men were not struck by his age, and did not think of Him as either old or young. He came from Nazareth of Galilee, a busy provincial town in a district where many peoples met—Jews, Phœnicians, Syrians, Arabs, Greeks, sometimes even Romans and men of the far East and the far West. A reader might reflect that in such surroundings the smouldering embers of Jewish faith might be kindled afresh into flame at the touch of the free breath of a wider and more vigorous life. This Jesus, therefore, came to John and was baptized; John invited men to repent and offered them forgiveness, and Jesus accepted the invitation. Yet the reader who remembered that He was Christ, the Son of God, the Coming One who was greater than John, would not think of Him as driven from Galilee to the Jordan by the pangs of a guilty conscience. Now and then, but rarely, very rarely, there arises a prophet so

pure and perfect that he does not need to guard his virtue by separating himself from ordinary men. Rather he is possessed by a sense of fellowship with that life of humanity of which his own life is a part; he repents on behalf of the impenitent, and seeks forgiveness for those who are yet hardened in sin. So it came about that Jesus took His seat on the "penitent form" of His days; but the casual spectator saw no difference between Him and the sinners crowding to be baptized; it seemed to be His "conversion" as well as theirs.

And indeed the Baptism was the occasion of a spiritual crisis, one of those personal experiences of God which make men into prophets. "Forthwith," says St. Mark,—we may pause for a moment over the word, because we shall meet with it again and again; nearly everything happens "forthwith." The brief career of Jesus was an hour of crowded life in which one critical event after another presented itself with startling suddenness. The Evangelist tells his story in a somewhat breathless fashion; the mingled awe, excitement, and fascination of those marvellous days still stir within him.

"Forthwith as He came up out of the water" in which He had been baptized "He saw the heavens part asunder, and the Spirit descending on Him like a dove, and a voice came from heaven, Thou art My beloved Son, in Thee I am well pleased." He had made Himself one of a crowd of obscure penitents, feeling in His pitiful sympathy and generous chivalry as if their sin were His; and in that very moment heaven opened before His dazzled eyes, and a Spirit came forth from the Eternal Presence, and saluted Him as the Beloved Son. He had laid Himself and His life at the feet of the Righteous Judge; and Infinite Holiness had set upon Him the seal of its approval, "In Thee I am well pleased": He had humbled Himself under the mighty hand of God, and had been lifted up.

III. The Temptation, I. 12, 13.

"And forthwith the Spirit driveth Him into the wilderness; and He was in the wilderness forty days." Jesus would interpret what had befallen Him by what he had heard of the ancient prophets; the spirit of God had taken possession of Him. But to what end? What were to be His mission and His message? He must be alone to think it all out; He must wrestle with the Spirit that had come upon Him, as Jacob had wrestled with the angel through the night by the Jabbok. Not even John could help Him.

He separated Himself from the crowd, and went out into the wilderness that He might become better acquainted with the Spirit of God; and He found Satan the Tempter. The inevitable reaction followed on the moments of inspired exaltation. After all He was a man, no mere visionary ascetic. His brain was alive with a sense of penetrating insight; His nerves were tingling with the consciousness of power. Life beckoned to Him with inviting hands, and called Him with seductive voices. The greatest careers lay open before Him.

Then with a violent revulsion, a horror as of thick darkness settled down upon His soul at the thought that visions of earthly pleasure, power, and fame had occupied even for a moment the mind of Him who was the Beloved Son of God, in whom God was well pleased.

For a while, perhaps throughout the forty days, the struggle went on between spiritual exaltation and spiritual depression, till at last the tide of feeling was spent; human nature asserted itself; the preoccupation with the inner life vanished, and Jesus awoke to see things in the light of common day. He found Himself alone in the wilderness, His only companions the wild animals of the desert. He seemed to Himself an ordinary man, lonely, faint and hungry; the spiritual exaltation and the spiritual depression seemed passing moods that had no permanent meaning for

His life; the Divine Spirit and the Tempting Devil seemed mere phantasms of a dream.

But "the angels ministered unto Him": help came to the weary body and the over-wrought spirit: food, rest, wise and loving counsel. Jesus was once more master of Himself: He knew that the experiences of the Baptism were real, that the vision and the voice had brought a true message of God to His soul; that the other earthly visions were such as might well stir a man's ambition; but that He was called with a higher calling.

IV. The Beginning of the Ministry, I. 14, 15.

We do not read of any immediate sequel to the Baptism and the Temptation. Jesus waited, we do not know how long, or where, or with whom. He did not go home; He could not go back and live the old life as if nothing had happened; neither could He appear again amongst His brothers and sisters and say, "I have had a revelation that I am the Beloved Son of God." It was hopeless to try and make them understand His experience; as yet He Himself only partly understood it. Perhaps He went back to John, and became for the time being his disciple.

Then John was "delivered up," betrayed, and thrown into prison; a natural answer to the call to repentance, the "ethical demand" as we should say in modern times. His disciples scattered, and Jesus returned to His native province, preaching the Good News of God. He had seen in the imprisonment of John a call to begin His ministry. The message concerning repentance and forgiveness had hitherto been delivered by a "voice crying in the wilderness"; men had to leave their homes and make a journey to hear it. The voice was silenced, but the new Teacher brought the message into the towns and villages. Men could stand at their house-doors and listen; they could hear it at the Sabbath service of the synagogue. It was still

the same call, "Repent"; but it had become more than a mere call to repentance and offer of forgiveness. Jesus proclaimed the Good News of God, the appointed time had come and the Kingdom of God was at hand. Such words in the mouth of a Jew speaking to Jews could mean only one thing. "The appointed time" was that spoken of by the prophets, the time when God would deliver Israel; the "Kingdom of God" was the new dispensation of righteousness and prosperity. The Hope of Israel took many forms; usually the Messiah, the Saviour, Conqueror and King was a prominent figure; but the preaching of Jesus, so far, said nothing about the Messiah; the watch-word of the Good News was the Kingdom of God, following the teaching of those who hoped that God Himself would intervene directly to redeem His people, and to establish the new order. How had the assurance come to Jesus that the Kingdom of God was at hand? All Jewry had been stirred by the preaching of John; Jesus had felt Himself possessed and moved by the Spirit to some great end; and He had seen the apparent triumph of evil in the imprisonment of the preacher of righteousness. In some moment of inspiration like that which followed His Baptism, the conviction seized and held Him that these were the signs of the coming of the Kingdom. He knew now to what mission He had been called; He was to preach the Kingdom of God. One article of the preaching was faith, men were to believe the Good News.

V. The Calling of the First Disciples, I. 16–20.

He had come into Galilee, but He still avoided Nazareth, and made His way to the Sea of Galilee, and there, walking by the lake, He saw fishermen fishing or mending their nets. He bade them follow Him, and He would make them fishers of men. He reveals Himself as a born leader of men, conscious of the right and power to

command; instinctively He strikes the note of authority. And, as mostly happens when that note is struck by the born leader, the men obeyed.

Probably He had known them before in a familiarity which had not bred contempt. Thus from His friends we learn His social standing. These men, Simon and Andrew, James and John, belonged to the lower middle-class. They were working owners of fishing-boats; James and John had a father living who still worked at the fishing, and employed men to help him. It was an occupation which gave full play to many qualities of body and mind —courage, industry, intelligence, and so forth. These masters of fishing-smacks had to contend with the treacherous moods of the inland sea in order to win their fish; and when they came to sell them they had to match themselves against the wily Greek or Syrian trader.

They were called that they might become fishers of men. The new Leader, it seems, had the gift of holy epigram; He could speak truths that went home to the hearers' hearts in half-a-dozen words such as

> Men remember,
> Till they forget themselves.

The new disciples understood once for all that the energy, persistence, and dexterity which had swept fish into their nets by hundreds were to be used to gather multitudes into the Kingdom.

VI. The Preaching in Capernaum, I. 21–28.

Then the Man of Nazareth and His four fishermen went into the nearest town to inaugurate the new dispensation. The sentence might have been written then by a scribe of the Pharisees in contemptuous sarcasm; and it is the greatest marvel in the world's history that the words can be used now as a simple statement of actual fact. The town was

Capernaum on the north-west shore of the Sea of Galilee, a busy place where there were great shoals of human fish. The Sabbath came—perhaps it began the very evening on which Jesus arrived—and He went to the service at the synagogue. There, as He knew, He would have an opportunity of delivering His message. Judaism did not try to limit the Spirit by silencing all except an official class of preachers; but any one who had a word of exhortation for the people was invited to speak. Jesus, therefore, delivered His message. We are not told what He said; the message probably did not specially interest the audience. It is one of the troubles of the true prophet that his hearers think about the man and not about the message; they are taken up with the delivery, the anecdotes, and the illustrations, and care little about the teaching. The one thing that men remembered about this sermon was the air of authority with which Jesus spoke, the contrast between Him and the scribes. If a scribe had preached about the coming of the Kingdom, he would have quoted the dictum of Rabbi A, who had made a calculation based on the figures in *Daniel*, and compared it with Rabbi B's explanation of the seventy years of *Jeremiah*; the scribe would further have given the comments on these views which Rabbi C said he had heard from Rabbi D in the name of Rabbi E; and so on through a whole alphabet of learned authorities. Jesus said simply, as of His own certain knowledge, that the appointed time had come, and the Kingdom was at hand. He seemed quite sure about it, and made His hearers feel as if He really knew, and the audience were astonished.

Then there came an interruption; there was present a man with an unclean spirit. Probably he was harmless and inoffensive under ordinary circumstances, the commonplace routine of the synagogue service made no impression

on him. But the new authoritative voice excited the demoniac, and brought on a crisis of his malady. The speaker and congregation were startled by a wild cry, "Why dost Thou meddle with us, Jesus of Nazareth? Didst Thou come to destroy us? I know Thee; thou art the Holy One of God!" Again the impression which was made and remembered had to do with the man and not with the teaching. Here was another challenge from the Powers of Darkness; the Temptation had followed the Baptism, then John had been imprisoned, and now Satan confronted Jesus at the outset of His ministry. "Let the Saint of God talk with His fellow-saints about the Kingdom of God, but let Him not meddle with lost souls possessed by evil spirits; these belonged to the Kingdom of Satan." There would be a pause in the address, a hush of expectation in the audience. Then Jesus rebuked him, "Hold thy peace, and come out of him." Torn asunder by the contending forces the victim writhed and shrieked in his convulsions. At last peace came with exhaustion; the devil had departed, and the man was in his right mind. Even before this, Jesus' manner of speech in His teaching had revealed His personality; now, for the moment at any rate, this victory over the demon seemed a full confirmation of His authority. An excited throng streamed out of the synagogue, eagerly comparing notes about the "new teaching" with its unaccustomed note of "authority"; and before the Sabbath was over all Capernaum had heard of Jesus the prophet and worker of miracles, and the news began to spread to the neighbouring towns and villages.

W. H. Bennett.

THE TEACHING OF CHRIST.

IV.

It has been calculated that out of a total of 1,149 verses the Gospel of St. Luke has 499 which are peculiar to itself, consisting of matter not to be found in St. Matthew or St. Mark.[1] Of these peculiarly Lucan verses, 261, or rather more than half, contain sayings of our Lord. It is needless, for our present purpose, to inquire what proportion of the Lucan sayings came from the document which was also at the disposal of St. Matthew, or to what other sources St. Luke had access, especially in that great section of his Gospel[2] which is almost wholly independent of the other Synoptists, and to which nearly three-fourths of his sayings belong. In any case we are indebted to this Evangelist for a large and most important contribution to our knowledge of the teaching of Christ.

1. The Lucan tradition, like the Marcan, contains no great sermon or prolonged instruction. On one occasion St. Luke seems to be on the point of reporting a synagogue address delivered at Nazareth,[3] but whether from lack of information or for other reasons he contents himself with the opening and closing words. The most characteristic feature of the teaching which he records is its wealth of parable. No fewer than fifteen, or, if we include minor similitudes, eighteen,[4] of the Synoptic parables are due to St. Luke, and they occupy more than a twelfth part of his Gospel. The importance of this contribution becomes still more evident when we remember that it includes such parables as the Good Samaritan, the Great Supper, the Prodigal Son, the Rich Man and Lazarus, the Pharisee

[1] Sir J. C. Hawkins, *Horæ Synopticæ*, p. 23.
[2] Chh. ix. 51–xviii. 14.
[3] Luke iv. 21 ff.
[4] Plummer, *St. Luke*, p. xli.

and the Publican. Not only are these stories full of a beauty which has fascinated all who have ever listened to them; they add a new element to the teaching of our Lord, and possess a character which readily distinguishes them from the parables of St. Matthew and St. Mark.

The Marcan and nearly all the Matthean parables form part of Christ's public teaching, and are designed to illustrate the origin, growth, and consummation of the Kingdom of God. The parables which are peculiar to St. Luke belong to another type. Not one of them opens with the formula *ὁμοία ἐστιν ἡ βασιλεία τῶν οὐρανῶν* or *τοῦ θεοῦ*; few if any of them belong to the public ministry. They are taken, as it seems, from recollections of His private conversation with the Twelve or with others who were about Him, and they deal with the subjects of religious interest upon which the conversation happened to turn. Thus the parable of the Good Samaritan is an answer to the casual question, "And who is my neighbour?"; [1] the parable of the Rich Fool arises out of a request which revealed the worldly-mindedness of one of his audience; [2] the parable of the Great Supper out of the inopportune remark, "Happy is he who shall eat bread in the Kingdom of God." [3] The three parables of chapter xv. appear to be a reply to the muttered complaint of the Pharisees that the Lord received sinners and ate with them; [4] the Pharisee and Publican was elicited by the self-satisfied uncharitableness of certain pretenders to sanctity who had crossed our Lord's path; [5] the Widow and Judge was intended to sustain the flagging zeal of some who were growing weary of unanswered prayer. [6] The surroundings were not less various. Two of the Lucan parables were spoken at suppers where Jesus was an invited guest; [7] others, probably the greater

[1] Luke x. 29, cp. 30, *ὑπολαβὼν ὁ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν.* [2] xii. 13. [3] xiv. 15.
[4] xv. 2. [5] xviii. 9. [6] xviii. 1. [7] vii. 36 ff., xiv. 15 ff.

number, while He walked along the high road with His disciples, or stood for a while in a village street surrounded by a crowd. Under these circumstances the parable was turned to a purpose distinct from that which it served in the preaching of the Kingdom; it became the vehicle of religious conversation, enriching and illuminating the ordinary intercourse of life. This fact not only illustrates the boundless fecundity of the mind which was capable of pouring out such treasures without premeditation, but it also explains the wider scope and the greater human interest which belong to the parables of the Third Gospel.

The teaching of the Lucan parables, as their origin and purpose would have led us to expect, chiefly concerns the individual life. It is not the world or the Church which is in view so much as the individual soul, with its separate needs and responsibilities. The lost sheep is one of a flock, the lost coin one of a purseful; the angels rejoice over one sinner that repents. In almost every parable there is a hero whose individuality arrests the attention—the lone traveller on the Jericho road, the beggar who lies sore and starving on the rich man's doorstep, the widow who cries till she is avenged, the publican who stands far off with downcast eyes; and the parable is applied to the personal life—"thou fool, this night thy soul shall be required of thee": "go and do thou likewise": "he that humbleth himself shall be exalted."

What, then, are the salient points in this teaching of Christ upon the subject of personal religion which gives to St. Luke's parables their distinctive character? In the first place it emphasizes the need of spiritual restoration which is the *raison d'être* of our Lord's mission. The sheep, the coin, the son, lost but capable of being found again, represent in three different aspects the human soul estranged from God by sin; while the Divine grace which brings it back is seen in the threefold image of the

Shepherd, the Woman, and the Father. This great trilogy of parables is a treasury upon which preachers and guides of souls will draw as long as the world lasts; and with it may be classed the Great Supper, which foretells the catholicity of the Church's mission, and the Two Debtors, which shews the response elicited by the love of God when it is believed. Taken together, these five parables cover the whole history of human salvation and anticipate the soteriology of St. Paul and St. John.

A second group illuminates the mystery of Prayer. Two of the three parables which deal with Prayer, the Midnight Visitor[1] and the Importunate Widow,[2] set forth a condition of successful prayer to which Christ evidently attached supreme importance, the spirit of absolute conviction and resolute determination[3] to gain the desired end. The Lord Himself brings out the point of this pair of parables: if importunity conquered the selfishness of the sleeping householder, and the indifference of the unscrupulous judge, how much more surely will it avail with One Whose delays are due only to the *μακροθυμία* of an infinite life and a prescient love![4] The third parable on Prayer[5] calls attention to another condition which is no less essential. To the persistence of the importunate suppliant there must be added the Publican's sense of personal unworthiness. The claim which Prayer makes upon God is that of utter need, not of justice or right; consciousness of sin and the need of mercy must supplement and chasten the importunity which proceeds from faith in the Divine love and power.

A third series of parables relates to Service. A fig-tree planted within the fenced enclosure of a vineyard,[6] if it fails to respond to its opportunities and bears no fruit from year

[1] Luke xi. 5–8. [2] xviii. 1–8.
[3] xi. 8, *διὰ τὴν ἀναιδίαν αὐτοῦ ἐγερθεὶς δώσει.* xviii. 5, *διά γε τὸ παρέχειν μοι κόπον ἐκδικήσω αὐτήν.* [4] xi. 13, xviii. 6-8. [5] xviii. 9–14.
[6] Luke xiii. 6–9; cf. Mark xii. 1.

to year, must ultimately be cut down; it wastes (*καταργεῖ*) good ground which might have been occupied by the vine. So the spiritual opportunities of a nation or an individual are forfeited by continued neglect of service, though not until every effort of the great *ἀμπελουργός* has been in vain. Another parable [1] represents the servants of Christ (*δούλους ἑαυτοῦ*) as entrusted with a *mina* each, their use of this relatively small sum [2] determining their eventual position in His Kingdom. Here the relations between present service and the future life comes into sight, and light is thrown upon the famous *agraphon* which the late Bishop of Durham took for the motto of more than one of his earlier works, *Γίνεσθε τραπεζῖται δόκιμοι*, "prove yourselves good bankers." Lastly, lest the inference should be drawn that the reward is not *κατὰ χάριν* but *κατὰ ὀφείλημα*,[3] the disciple of St. Paul is careful to add a third parable which teaches that when all has been done the servants of God are "unprofitable" to Him.[4] God could have dispensed with their service and have been no poorer; if He accepts and requires it, He does so for their sake, because service is the necessary condition of true blessedness.

The four remaining parables peculiar to St. Luke set forth the responsibilities and temptations of social life, more especially those which arise in connexion with wealth. The first of this series reproves the folly of "making haste to be rich" at the cost of the highest interests of human nature. In the little story of the Rich Fool [5] Jesus condemns not the acquisition of wealth in itself, but the neglect of divine riches [6] to which it often leads. No multiplication

[1] Luke xix. 12–27.

[2] The "talent" of the similar parable in Matt. xxv. 14 ff. was equivalent to sixty *minæ*.

[3] Rom. iv. 4.

[4] Luke xvii. 10, *δοῦλοι ἀχρεῖοί ἐσμεν*.

[5] xii. 16–21.

[6] xii. 21: *μὴ εἰς θεὸν πλουτῶν*.

of material possessions can convert them into the essence of life;[1] at best they are but accidental accretions, which may or may not be a true enrichment of its powers. The parable of the Dishonest Steward exposes another danger which attends the commercial spirit—the fraudulence that under the name of business creeps into the relations of men of the world. But its chief purpose is to claim for the service of God the best side of the worldly wisdom so often displayed in transactions of this kind, its *φρονιμότης*, the intelligence and quickness of observation, the good sense and promptness in action which it manifests. Our Lord would isolate this property, in itself a valuable one, from unworthy surroundings, and recommend it to His servants for their use in the stewardship of God's gifts. Scrupulous conscientiousness need not be divorced, as it too frequently is, from ordinary prudence and knowledge of the world; the sons of light should not be less shrewd or well equipped than those who have no higher end than to promote their own selfish ends. Quite another view of the subject is presented by the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, which follows the Rich Fool, and was perhaps spoken on the same occasion.[2] Here it is not the unscrupulous money-grubber who is delineated, but the man who is already in possession of riches inherited or acquired, and spends them upon himself without a thought of the brother who is suffering and starving at his gate. He is seen in two strongly contrasted positions, clad in purple and fine linen and faring sumptuously day by day, and a little after, stripped to the soul, and tormented in the only flame that naked souls can feel. "Father Abraham" (for the man is a Jew) is appealed to in vain; the exchange of the rich man's and the beggar's lots belongs to the justice of things, with which the righteous patriarch would not have inter-

[1] xii. 15: *οὐκ ἐν τῷ περισσεύειν τινὶ ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῦ ἐστιν ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτῷ.*

[2] Luke xvi. 19-31.

fered if he could. The picture may seem to favour the agitator who advocates the spoliation of the rich, or at least may be construed into a denunciation of the greater inequalities of life. But in fact it does not touch any social question; the reversal of social *status* to which it refers takes effect in the future life and not in this. Moreover, the parable does not teach that at death the very rich are necessarily plunged into helpless misery, and the very poor raised to Paradise. The Rich Man suffers because money was his only god, and having lost it he has lost all.[1] Thus the story is not aimed at wealth, or even at the abuse of wealth, but at the selfish thoughtlessness which is one of its chief dangers; it does not help the destructive views of the socialist, though it may well give pause to owners of property who use their money merely for the advancement of personal comfort or display. One more parable may be classed with this group, and it is perhaps the gem of the whole collection. The Good Samaritan,[2] as it seems, is not a rich man; he travels without retinue, and has no beast but the one he rides; the two small silver coins[3] which he pulls out of his girdle and leaves with the host do not suggest a well filled purse. But whatever he has, his money, his beast, his time, is placed at the service of a wounded Jew, who has no claim on his charity beyond the fact that he is a brother-man in need. Thus the Good Samaritan is the exact opposite of the Rich Man who, with abundant means and daily opportunities, passed through life without lifting a finger to relieve distress. Perhaps the old Christian tradition—older than Origen[4]—which saw in the Good Samaritan the Supreme Example of Charity, is not altogether baseless; it is to Himself that the Lord seems

[1] xvi. 23: *ἀπέλαβες τὰ ἀγαθά σου.* Cf. vi. 24: *οὐαὶ ὑμῖν τοῖς πλουσίοις, ὅτι ἀπέχετε τὴν παράκλησιν ὑμῶν.*

[2] Luke x. 30–37.

[3] *v.* 35: *ἐκβαλὼν δύο δηνάρια.*

[4] Cf. Orig. *Hom. in Luc.* 34.

in fact to point each of us when He says, "Go and do thou likewise." But the mystical interpretation must not be suffered to eclipse the primary reference of the parable, or its plain lesson as to the duty and privilege of rendering service to suffering humanity, irrespective of kindred or creed.

2. After the parables of St. Luke's Gospel, the reader's attention is arrested by its abundance of epigrammatic sayings, chiefly reminiscences of our Lord's conversation with individuals or small groups of followers. These Lucan sayings, like the Lucan parables, have to do with the mystery of the personal life.

First there are those which throw light upon the workings of our Lord's own mind and soul. It is noteworthy that we owe to St. Luke the one recorded saying of Christ's childhood, and what was probably the last word spoken on the Cross. There is a close affinity between the two: "I must be in my Father's house"[1] reveals His early consciousness of a divine Sonship, and the attraction which the Father's Presence possessed for Him even during the immaturity of His manhood; "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit"[2] testifies to the victory of filial trust and the consummation of filial obedience at the moment of His departure from the world. Other words dropped in the intervening years reflect the progress of the struggle by which He was perfected. "I beheld Satan fallen as lightning from heaven."[3] "I have a baptism to be baptized with, and how am I straitened till it be finished."[4] "I cast out demons and perform cures to-day and to-morrow, and the third day I am perfected; howbeit I must go on my way to-day and to-morrow and the day following, for it

[1] Luke ii. 49.

[2] xxiii. 46. On the rendering of ἐν τοῖς πατρός μου, see F. Field, *Notes on the Translation of the N.T.* p. 50 f.

[3] x. 18.

[4] xii. 50. With ἕως ὅτου τελεσθῇ comp. the final τετέλεσται (John xix. 30).

cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem." [1] "With desire I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer; for I say unto you, I will not eat it until it be fulfilled in the Kingdom of God." [2] "That which concerneth Me hath fulfilment." [3] In this catena of Lucan sayings the whole course of the Great Sacrifice can be traced, and what a wealth of spiritual teaching there is here, notwithstanding the obscurity in which the profound thought is partly wrapped, the Christian heart will readily discover for itself.

Only less interesting than these glimpses into the inner life of Christ are the sayings which light up the character or the destiny of His followers. We learn for instance from a group of answers [4] to candidates for discipleship the exacting standard which He raised before the eyes of those who would follow Him: "The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests, but the Son of man hath not where to lay His head"—this to one who had just made an unlimited offer of service; "leave the dead to bury their own dead"—this to another who asked for time to pay the last offices of filial duty to his father; "no man having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the Kingdom of God"—this to a third, who desired, like Elisha, to bid farewell to his kindred before he embarked on his new calling. In each case the individual character was read, and a test applied which, it cannot be doubted, drew forth its weakness or its strength. The enthusiasm of a woman who felicitated the mother of so great a Prophet is directed to a more practical end by the answer: "yea rather, blessed are they that hear the word of God and keep it." [5] Simon

[1] xiii. 32 f. [2] xxii. 15 f.

[3] xxii. 37 (R.V.); see Field, *ad loc.* If τὸ περὶ ἐμοῦ be taken to mean "My work and life" (cf. xxiv. 27), we may keep the rendering of A.V. "hath an end," the more obvious sense of τέλος ἔχει.

[4] Luke ix. 57 ff. [5] xi. 28.

Peter's early shrinking from the awful Presence of One whose mere word filled the nets that a night's toil had left empty, is met by the inspiring call to confidence and to a higher service, "Fear not, from henceforth thou shalt catch men";[1] while the same Apostle's later excess of confidence is corrected by the plain warning that nothing but the Master's intercession had saved him from the danger which awaited all the disciples of falling like chaff through Satan's sieve and being lost.[2] Other sayings shew how clearly Jesus recognized the elements of the higher life under the most unpromising exterior. In the woman that was a sinner He saw one who "loved much,"[3] and whose sins had been forgiven;[4] in Zacchæus, the rich and well hated chief of the Jericho toll-collectors, He discovered a true son of Abraham, to whose house salvation had come on the day that he welcomed the Lord;[5] in the robber who repented upon the cross, one who that very day would be "in Paradise"—not merely in Abraham's bosom, but in the company of the Christ.[6] Perhaps the most delicate of all these appreciations of character is that which is revealed in the story of Martha and Mary.[7] "Jesus loved Martha and her sister";[8] and His love was returned by both the sisters, but each of them welcomed Him in her own way. Martha, perhaps the responsible hostess, was "distracted about much waiting" at table; Mary took her seat at His feet, listening to His discourse. Perhaps no reference would have been made by the Lord to this characteristic difference had not Martha invited it by appealing to Him to bid Mary help her. Then came the verdict: "Martha, Martha, thou art anxious and disturbed

[1] v. 10.
[2] xxii. 31: Ὁ Σατανᾶς ἐξῃτήσατο ὑμᾶς τοῦ σινιάσαι ὡς τὸν σῖτον· ἐγὼ δὲ ἐδεήθην περὶ σοῦ.
[3] vii. 47. [4] *Ibid.* 48 (ἀφέωνται). [5] xix. 2, 9.
[6] Luke xxiii. 43: μετ' ἐμοῦ ἔσῃ ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ, cf. xvi. 22 f.
[7] x. 38–42. [8] John xi. 5.

about many things, but there is need of few, or of but one;[1] for the good portion is that which Mary hath chosen, and it shall not be taken from her." Both women were serving Him according to their lights, but Mary had judged best what service would possess the greatest value in His eyes. Anxiety about external details, even in the cause of Christ, tends to distract and divide the soul; He asks but for one thing, an undivided heart, possessed by the single desire to know and do His will.[2]

Another group of sayings deals with whole classes of men, but still in reference to life and character. Sometimes the Lord seems to recognize but two types of human character and two issues of life, as when in hearing the report of Pilate's outrage on certain Galileans He exclaimed, "Except ye repent, ye shall all in like manner perish."[3] Sometimes, on the other hand, there is in His judgements a nice balancing of varying responsibilities and performances, as when we read of the many stripes or the few which await those who neglect to do the will of the Master, according as they "knew" or "knew not" what was expected from them.[4] Much of this teaching is directed against the moral insensibility of an age which was letting slip the greatest opportunity that any generation had enjoyed. "Ye know how to interpret the face of the earth and the heaven; but how is it that ye know not how to interpret this time"?[5] "Were not the ten cleansed? but where are the nine"?[6] "Remember Lot's wife."[7] "If thou hadst known in this day, even thou, the things which belong unto peace! but now they are hid from thine

[1] Reading with ℵ B L ὀλίγων δέ ἐστιν χρεία ἢ ἑνός.

[2] See the interesting sermons of Augustine on this passage (civ., cv.), especially civ. 5: "Bona sunt ministeria circa pauperes . . . exhortamur ad haec . . . melius est tamen quod elegit Maria . . . a te auferetur aliquando onus necessitatis; aeterna est dulcedo veritatis."

[3] Luke xiii. 1-3. [4] xii. 47 f.

[5] xii. 56. [6] xvii. 17. [7] *Ibid.* 32.

eyes." [1] "Daughters of Jerusalem, weep not for me, but weep for yourselves and for your children; for if they do these things in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?" [2] With these words of stern warning or sad forboding we may contrast the note of hope or triumph now and again sounded when loyal disciples are in view. "Lift up your heads, because your redemption draweth nigh." [3] "I appoint unto you a kingdom, even as my Father appointed unto me." [4] Or again, the gentleness and love of the assurance to St. Peter, "I made supplication for thee that thy faith fail not"; [5] or the prayer for the crucifiers, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." [6] Such words, apart from their original reference, hold teaching and inspiration for all generations of mankind.

It remains to consider what special aspects of Christ's teaching are revealed by the Lucan parables and sayings.

Perhaps the most prominent feature of the Lucan teaching may be best described in a phrase used by St. Luke himself. He represents the people of Nazareth as marvelling at the "words of grace" [7] which came out of the mouth of Jesus. It is the *graciousness* of Christ's utterances in this Gospel which at once impresses every thoughtful reader. The Evangelist has been well called by Dante "scriba mansuetudinis Christi." [8] "À peine est-il une anecdote, une parabole propre à Luc, qui ne respire cet esprit de miséricorde et d'appel aux pécheurs . . . L'Évangile de Luc est par excellence l'Évangile du pardon." [9] So writes Ernest Renan, adding, "On voit la

[1] Luke xix. 42. [2] xxiii. 28 ff. [3] xxi. 28.
[4] xxii. 29. [5] xxii. 32.
[6] xxiii. 34. If not a part of St. Luke's original Gospel, this prayer is in perfect keeping with the Lucan sayings.
[7] iv. 22, *ἐθαύμαζον ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις τῆς χάριτος* κτλ. Cf. Ps. xliv. (xlv.) 2 cited by Plummer from Origen: *ἐξεχύθη ἡ χάρις ἐν χείλεσίν σου.*
[8] Cited by Plummer, p. xlii.
[9] *Les Évangiles*, p. 266 f.

parfaite conformité de ces vues avec celles de Paul." [1] The affinity of the Third Gospel to the Epistles of St. Paul was noticed in early times, and Irenæus even regards the Gospel as a record of that which was preached by the Apostle.[2] But St. Paul's Gospel, if we may trust his own account of it,[3] was a simple record of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ; nor can we conceive of him as repeating narratives and sayings of which he could have had but a second-hand knowledge. Still less can the exquisite parables and utterances of the Gospel according to St. Luke have proceeded from the imagination of St. Paul; his genius lay in other directions; he was master of close argument and passionate appeal, and no one could paint an ideal in more glowing colours, but for a creation such as the parable of the Good Samaritan he shews no capacity. So far as Paulinism is to be found in the Lucan teaching, it may be claimed as an original element in Christianity, due to the Master Himself. It is Christ and not St. Paul who speaks to us in the Third Gospel; and if the words often seem to savour of Pauline doctrine, it is because St. Paul above all other men of his time assimilated that side of our Lord's teaching which this Gospel has specially preserved. It is perhaps too much to say with Harnack that Paul was "the one who understood the Master, and continued His work"; [4] but at any rate it was given to him in an especial degree to emphasize the element in the Master's teaching which sets forth the mystery of the Divine Grace. And it is the Divine Grace which is the keynote of the Lucan teaching. Not that in the teaching of Christ, as St. Luke records it, there is any formal doctrine

[1] *Ibid.* p. 269.

[2] Iren. iii. 1. 1, καὶ Λουκᾶς δὲ, ὁ ἀκόλουθος Παύλου, τὸ ὑπ' ἐκείνου κηρυσσόμενον εὐαγγέλιον ἐν βιβλίῳ κατέθετο.

[3] 1 Cor. xv. 1 ff.

[4] *Das Wesen des Christentums*, p. 110 (E. Tr. p. 176).

of Grace, any discussion or dogmatic statement such as find a place in the Epistles of St. Paul. In the Gospel the teaching upon this subject is concrete; it is brought into line with the facts of life, exemplified in the experience of man. "To-day hath this Scripture been fulfilled in your ears";[1] "her sins, which are many, are forgiven, for she loved much";[2] "this man went down to his house justified rather than the other";[3] "to-day is salvation come to this house, forasmuch as he also is a Son of Abraham."[4] These are examples of the personal form which the Lord's teaching upon the subject of Grace always takes. He is the Physician dispensing remedies, and not the professor teaching their use. His purpose is not to expound their nature or the laws by which they operate, or to defend their use, but to heal and save by their means. Consequently the Gospel of St. Luke touches thousands to whom the Pauline Epistles are a sealed book. The words of the Master are a text which he that runs may read; the writings of the disciple are commentary upon the text, and not the primary source.

The graciousness of the Lucan teaching is not untempered by a just severity. The sermon at Nazareth which began with "words of grace" ended with a reproof which filled the synagogue with indignation.[5] The Sermon on the Mount in St. Matthew begins with beatitudes only; in St. Luke the beatitudes are balanced by woes.[6] It is St. Luke only who recalls the double warning against impenitence,[7] the doom of the barren fig-tree,[8] the hopeless misery which follows neglect of the opportunities of life,[9] the fate of those who will not have their true King to reign over them,[10] the terrors of the coming end.[11]

[1] Luke iv. 21. [2] vii. 47. [3] xviii. 14. [4] xix. 9.
[5] iv. 23 ff. [6] vi. 24–26. [7] xiii. 3 and 5. [8] xiii. 9.
[9] xvi. 24 ff. [10] xix. 27. [11] xxiii. 29–31.

There is a sternness even toward disciples which marks this Gospel: witness the rebuke administered to James and John;[1] the discouraging words addressed to the three who purposed to become disciples;[2] the uncompromising demand for vigilance and service made upon those who had already enlisted;[3] the charge of folly and unbelief laid against the two who were overtaken by the risen Lord on the way to Emmaus.[4] In all this we see tokens of a love which is unsparing because it is just and true, an *ἀποτομία* which is consistent with the highest *χρηστότης*.[5] Of the easy good nature that shrinks from the pain of rebuking sin or warning against failure there is no trace. The "grace of our Lord Jesus Christ," as it is set forth in this Gospel, does not exclude but rather implies a "wrath of the Lamb" which is the complement of His mercy.

Neither of these features of Christ's teaching is wholly absent from the other Synoptic Gospels, but in St. Luke both are prominent, and the first may be said to be the prevalent note of the Lucan teaching. If in St. Mark our Lord appears in the character of the Evangelist of the Kingdom of God, and in St. Matthew as the Legislator of the Kingdom, in St. Luke He reveals Himself as the Physician, the Redeemer, and the supreme Master of mankind.

H. B. Swete.

DID ALEXANDRIA INFLUENCE THE NAUTICAL LANGUAGE OF ST. LUKE?

A STUDY OF ACTS XXVIII. 12 IN THE LIGHT OF GREEK PAPYRI.

Among the contemporary accounts of ancient voyages one of the fullest and most graphic is the narrative preserved in Acts of Paul's voyage to Italy. Embarking upon a ship of

[1] Luke ix. 55. [2] ix. 57 ff. [3] xii. 35–48, xxi. 34–36.
[4] xxiv. 25. [5] Rom. xi. 22.

Hadramyntum, the Apostle and his companions touched at Sidon, coasted Cyprus, and reached Myrra in Lycia. There the centurion transferred his charges to an Alexandrian ship bound for Italy, and in this they reached Kaloi Limenes—Fair Havens—on the southern coast of Crete, near the city Lasea. Here Paul favoured wintering; but the centurion and the officers of the ship preferred to make for Phoenix, another Cretan haven, which was deemed a more favourable port for wintering, as it looked *κατὰ λίβα καὶ κατὰ χῶρον* (Acts xxvii. 12). The natural meaning of *βλέποντα κατὰ* in such a context would seem to be looking toward the winds mentioned, but no such harbour on the southern coast of Crete is known, nor would such a harbour be at all commodious for wintering, but rather the very reverse. Constrained by this consideration, James Smith and other commentators after him have rendered *κατὰ λίβα* "down the south-west wind," or with Dr. Howson have resorted to the heroic expedient of assuming that as sailors view everything subjectively, that is, from the standpoint of a man at sea, not of a man on land, the sailors who told Paul and his companions of this harbour meant that from a ship lying in it one looked landward *κατὰ λίβα καὶ κατὰ χῶρον*. In a situation so desperate it is perhaps not superfluous to look a little more closely than has hitherto been done into the meaning of one at least of the words involved.

Gellius truly says that Homer recognized but four winds, *Βορέης, Εὖρος*,[1] *Νότος, Ζέφυρος*. *Ἄρκτος* does indeed occur in the Homeric poems, but only in the sense of the constellation of the Bear. The Ionic mind had not yet risen to the abstract notion of direction. *Ἔσπερος* and *ἑσπέριος* meant evening (adj.), and only in the *Odyssey* does the former begin to denote the direction of the evening star

[1] But Homer's translators sometimes treat *Εὖρος* as the south-east wind, e.g. Butcher and Lang, *Odyssey*, 19. 206; cf. Keep, *Autenrieth's Homeric Dictionary*, *s.v.*

(*Odyssey*, 9. 29), as Ἠώς, dawn, was coming to mean the east (*Odyssey*, 9. 26). Λίψ does not appear in literature until the time of Herodotus. In speaking of evaporation and kindred processes in Libya, he remarks that νότος and λίψ which blow from that country are naturally much the rainiest of all winds (2. 25). Here his standpoint is Egyptian, and by Libya Herodotus, like Homer (*Odyssey*), means Northern Africa west of Egypt. Whether λίψ means there the south-west wind or the west wind is thus left uncertain; the geographical considerations perhaps rather favouring the latter. Herodotus' use of ἄρκτος is an advance upon Homer's, as e.g. in his description of the course of the Arabian mountains as φέρον ἀπ' ἄρκτου πρὸς μεσεμβρίης τε καὶ νότου (2. 8), and ἑσπέρη appears in his writings in its more developed significance in ῥέει δὲ [ὁ Νεῖλος] ἀπὸ ἑσπέρης τε καὶ ἡλίου δυσμέων. Λίψ does not appear in Thucydides or Sophocles, and I find no occurrence of it in Xenophon or Plato registered. Thucydides employs ἡλίου δύσις in two senses: (1) the hour (3. 78), and (2) the direction (2. 96) of sunset. Μεσημβρία he uses only in its temporal sense, midday (2. 28), south being conveyed by νότος (2. 15, 2. 101, 3. 6).

The force of λίψ in classical usage is more explicitly indicated in a passage of Aristotle, Περὶ κόσμου (chap. 6). In it λίψ is classed among the west winds, and is more particularly defined as blowing from the winter setting of the sun. This makes λίψ the south-west wind. Aristotle further speaks of it as ὑγρός—ὢν ὑγρὸς φύσει (Προβλημάτων 2, 6),—says that such winds prevail in autumn—λίβες περὶ τὴν μετοπωρινὴν μάλιστα πνέουσιν (μβ. 6. 364^{b} 2), and explains its name as derived from Libya—ὄνομα ἔχει ἀπὸ Λιβύης (σ. 973^{b} 11), and again . . . λίψ καὶ οὗτος τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ Λιβύης ὅθεν πνεῖ (Fragment—Περὶ Σημείων[1]).

[1] Similarly Boeckh, *Erklärung einer Agyptischen Urkunde in griechischer Wissenschaft*, etc., in *Abhandl. der K. Academie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin*, 1820–21, p. 4.

Of writers of the second century we may cite Polybius, who uses ἄνεμος λίψ in describing an Iberian harbour and town. The bay which forms the harbour lies, he says, *νεύοντι πρὸς ἄνεμον λίβα*, and an island at its mouth renders it almost landlocked, leaving a passage on each side for ships, which find shelter here from all winds. The only drawback is the occasional roughness of the passages caused by *οἱ λίβες*, which here probably means the south-west winds (Polybius, 10. 10). Still clearer is a passage in 9. 27, where, in describing the city of Acrages in Sicily, Polybius says that along the southern (*νότιον*) side of it flows a river of the same name as the city, and along the side towards the west (*δύσεις*) and south-west (*λίβα*) flows the river called Hypsas.

The continuity of the Greek usage of λίψ in the sense of the south-west wind is attested by a bit of epigraphical evidence familiar to all who have visited Athens. On the eight sides of the striking ancient building known as the Tower of the Winds, or more exactly the Horologion of Andronicus Cyrrhestes, a structure erected to accommodate a water clock, sundial, and weather vane, are carved in low relief the figures of eight winds with their names above them, *ζέφυρος σκίρων βορέας καικίας ἀπηλιώτης εὖρος νότος* λίψ (C.I.G.I. 518). *Λίψ* occupies the side between *νότος* and *ζέφυρος*, facing the south-west. The tower dates from the first century B.C., and introduces us to Roman times.

Gellius tells us that once at the table of his instructor Favorinus, as they were reading a Latin ode, the word Iapyx came up and suggested as a topic for conversation the names and quarters of the several winds. Favorinus, in the course of his remarks, mentioned three western winds: Caurus, called in Greek *ἀργέστης*: Favonius, the Greek *ζέφυρος*: and Africus, the Greek λίψ (*Noct. Att.* 2. 22. 10, 11, 12). Gellius adds the remark that some make twelve winds instead of eight, inserting a third four in the middle places about south and north on the same plan on which the second four

were inserted between the two cardinal ones at east and west.[1] This remark receives interesting corroboration from the archaeological side. On the Belvedere balcony of the Vatican stands a twelve-sided base for a weather vane, which was found in 1779 on the Palatine, and on which the names of twelve winds are carved in Greek and Latin. This interesting monument is said to date from imperial times. The twelve-sided arrangement leaves no room for a south-west wind proper, and instead the two faces between west and south have λίψ—Africus on the west-south-west, and λιβόνοτος, Austroafricus, on the south-south-west. The same vane base has ζέφυρος, Favonius, on the west, ἰάπυξ, Chorus, on the west-north-west, and θρακίας, Circius, on the north-north-west. This evidence, taken together with the remark of Gellius, clearly shows that λίψ was veering two points towards the west.

To the combined evidence of Gellius and the Vatican inscription must be added a statement of the elder Pliny. In describing the eight winds, Pliny identifies the Greek λίψ with the Latin *Africus* as blowing from the winter setting, and the Greek ἀργέστης with the Latin *Corus* as blowing from the solstitial setting. He goes on to say (2. 47): "Numerosior ratio . . . interiecerat . . . item inter liba et noton compositum ex utroque medium inter meridiem et hibernum occidentem libonoton." If by this fuller scheme of winds is meant a compass of twelve points equally spaced, we have precisely such an arrangement as the Vatican weather-vane base presents, and λίψ, Africus, is shifted to the west-south-west.

We have traced the Graeco-Latin use of λίψ through without digression, because it seems a continuous tradition

[1] Partim autem sunt qui pro octo duodecim faciant, tertios quatuor in media loca inserentes circum meridiem et septentriones eadem ratione qua secundi quatuor intersiti sunt inter primores duos apud orientem occidentemque. *Noct. Att.* 2. 22. 18.

in the pursuit of which the introduction of Egyptian evidence would have proved an interruption. That evidence is much too important and suggestive, however, to be passed over as lightly as has hitherto been done, and it is to secure a fresh and fuller hearing for it that this paper has been written. It may be most conveniently taken up under two heads: first the Septuagint, and second the papyri.

Λίψ occurs in the Septuagint nearly fifty times, and as the representative of four Hebrew words. Once it stands for דָּרוֹם south, three times for מַעֲרָב or מַעֲרָבָה west, four times for combinations of נֶגֶב south and תֵּימָן south, seven times for תֵּימָן south, and thirty-one times for נֶגֶב south. That is, out of forty-six occurrences, forty-three mean south and three west. But in fifteen of these passages the Alexandrian manuscript has *νότος* instead of *λίψ*.[1]

Aquila seems to have rendered תֵּימָן by *λίψ* in Isaiah xxx. 6, and Symmachus employs *λίψ* in translating a word for south in Ezekiel xx. 46, where all three words, נֶגֶב, תֵּימָן, דָּרוֹם, occur, and in translating דָּרוֹם south in Ezekiel xl. 24. *Λίψ* is used in one version of Habakkuk iii. 3, in translating תֵּימָן, which is simply transferred in R.V. of this passage.[2]

The translators of the Old Testament are thus seen to understand by *λίψ* generally south, rarely west, and as far as one can judge never south-west. Prof. Edward Robinson must

[1] Deissmann, in his note on *λίψ*, *Bible Studies*, p. 145, in recognizing three of the four forces of the word, says that the LXX.—except in three passages, 2 Chron. xxxii. 30, xxxiii. 14, Dan. viii. 5, where the Egyptian meaning *west* is given—"use *λίψ* quite accurately for *south*." But this is in no sense an *accurate* use; "uniformly" would have been the better word.

[2] The only occurrence of *λίψ* I remember to have seen in the Apostolic Fathers is in a LXX. quotation 1 Clem. Rom. x. 4 (Gen. xiii. 14), *πρὸς βορρᾶν καὶ λίβα καὶ ἀνατολὰς καὶ θάλασσαν*, and means south. As to Josephus' usage, I can refer only to *Antt.* 15. 9. 6, where the coast towns between Joppa and Dora are *δύσορμα διὰ τὰς κατὰ λίβα προσβολάς αἳ τὰς ἐκ τοῦ πόντου θίνας ἐπὶ τὴν ᾐόνα σύρουσαι καταγωγὴν οὐ μειλίχιον διδόασιν*, in which the translators of Josephus (Whiston, Shilleto) most improbably understand *λίψ* to mean south wind.

have been under the Septuagint influence when in his Lexicon (ed. 1850) he rendered λίψ the south or south-west wind, referring to Polybius 10. 10. 1 and Herodotus 2. 25, and specifically prescribed for the passage in Acts the translation south. As Prof. Robinson's article on χῶρος recognizes only the meaning north-west, or north-west wind, he would seem to make the harbour Phoenix face north-west and south, which is sufficiently strange.

The evidence of the papyri is less puzzling, inasmuch as it is entirely unequivocal. We are fortunate here in having at our command a series of documents from the three periods of the Greek residence in Egypt, Ptolemaic, Roman, and Byzantine, in which land leased or sold is described much as in a modern deed by its boundaries on north, south, east and west. Such evidence is peculiarly free from ambiguity, and has especial claims to being considered decisive within its own province. The words employed in these documents are invariably βορρᾶς north. νότος south, ἀπηλιώτης east, and λίψ west. Without having at hand full sets of published papyri, this usage cannot be traced with completeness; but from the papyri published by Drs. Grenfell and Hunt and Mahaffy numerous examples may be collected. The earliest of these are in the will of a Lybian,[1] where one piece of land is bounded on [ἀπηλιώτου] νότου, λιβός, βορρᾶ (*ll.* 9–11), and another on ἀπηλιώτου, νότου, λιβός, βορρᾶ (*ll.* 15–18). Like all the Petrie papyri, this will came from Gurob in the Fayûm. Drs. Grenfell and Hunt have published a series of Ptolemaic papyri from the Thebaid, which illustrate the same use. In a sale of land dated 139 B.C. the property is described as having as ὅρια καὶ | γείτονε[ς τ]ῆς ὅλης γῆς νότου καὶ ἀπηλιώτου νῆσος Ἀφροδίτης | τῆς ἐν Π[αθύ]ρει καὶ νῆσος Λητοῦ, βορρᾶ νῆσος Ἀφροδίτης | τῆς ἐμ [Παθύ]ρει λιβὸς ποταμός.[2] Similar land

[1] Mahaffy, *Flinders Petrie Papyri*, No. 21.
[2] Grenfell and Hunt, *Greek Papyri*, series ii. No. 15.

descriptions occur in the same volumes[1] from the years 109 (i. 27), 107 (ii. 23), 103 (ii. 28), 103–2 (i. 33)—in this papyrus six times—101 (ii. 32), and 98 (ii. 35) B.C., all from the Thebaid. For the Roman period it is enough to cite a registration of mortgage written at Oxyrhynchus in 79 A.D., giving the dimensions of two pieces of land measured from north to south, *βορρᾶ ἐπὶ νότον*, and from west to east, *λιβὸς ἐπ' ἀπηλιότην*. In each of the Oxyrhynchus volumes *λίψ* occurs several times, especially in the phrase *ἡ πρὸς λίβα τοπαρχία*, the western toparchy, which occurs in papyri from the years A.D. 23 (No. 287), 26 (No. 245), 80 (No. 248), 88 (No. 345), 95 (No. 273), etc. (No. 47).[2] The middle and eastern toparchies are also referred to in Oxyrhynchus papyri, and the meaning western for *πρὸς λίβα* is thus as fully certified as in the deeds quoted above.

For the persistence of this usage in the Byzantine period two instances may be cited. In an unpublished deed of sale found at Ashmunên, now in the Cairo Museum, and dated in the year 341 A.D., the property involved is described as having as *γίτονες νότου | καὶ ἀπηλιώτου σου τοῦ ὠνουμένου, βορρᾶ καὶ λιβὸς δημόσιαι ῥύμαι*. Again in Dr. Grenfell's *Greek Papyri*, a document from Edfu, dated A.D. 581, describes a courtyard *ἧς γείτονες ὅλης τῆς αὐτῆς αὐλῆς | νότου [. . . ἀπηλιώ]του καὶ λιβὸς καὶ βορρᾶ ῥύμαι δημόσιαι*. This is one of the latest in date of the Byzantine papyri as yet published, and the will of the Libyan with which we began the evidence of the papyri is one of the very earliest Ptolemaic papyri known, so that we are exceedingly fortunate in the distribution of our witnesses in time.

We have seen that *λίψ* first came into Greek literature in connexion with Libya, and that Aristotle did not hesi-

[1] Grenfell, *Greek Papyri*, and Grenfell and Hunt, *Greek Papyri*, series ii.

[2] The numbers are those of the papyri in Grenfell and Hunt, *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, i. and ii.

tate to explain it etymologically as derived from Libya whence it blew.[1] Its use in Egypt, if we except the phenomena of the LXX., has been shown to be uniform through eight centuries and from the Fayûm to Edfu, in the sense of west, the direction of Libya; and whether we accept Aristotle's etymology or not, it seems at least probable that from meaning south-west λίψ was, in the speech of Greeks in Egypt, attracted into the sense of west because west was the Libyan direction.[2]

The various forces of λίψ are now before us. In classical Greek it means the south-west wind, or by metonymy the south-west; in Latin writers it wavers between this force and the west-south-west wind or direction. In the LXX. it generally means south, but rarely west; and in all Greek papyri from Egypt it means west. Did Luke mean to use the word in the strict classical sense? But in that case why did he select χῶρος for north-west? Aristotle gives three names for the north-west wind, and χῶρος is not one of them. They are: ἀργέστης, ὀλυμπίας, and σκίρων. Χῶρος is properly a Latin word, and its occurrence here in Acts is the first recorded instance of it in Greek literature. Indeed it is almost the sole instance, for only John of Lydia, A.D. 527, has been quoted as an additional witness for the word, and his form of it is κῶρος. So utterly lacking is Greek precedent for the word that one is almost tempted to disregard the analogy of κατὰ λίβα, and understand χῶρον as the ordinary Greek word for place,

[1] Boeckh (*op. cit.*), quoted by Deissmann, *Bible Studies*, p. 142, remarks, "λίψ means *south-west* in Hellas, *Africus*, because Libya lies south-west from the Hellenes—whence its name: Libya lies directly west from the Egyptians; hence λίψ is for them the west itself, as we learn here." A more probable etymology connects the word with λείβω and the notion of moisture, and this is favoured by the rainy character of the wind, attested by Herodotus. Boeckh does not attempt to extend his explanation to the LXX. and Italian uses of λίψ, and it is difficult to see how it could be applied to them.

[2] The editors of the *Thesaurus* noted the meaning west for λίψ in Turin papyri, but quoted no decisive instance.

land, country. Or, again, shall we suppose that Luke is here following LXX. usage, and by λίψ means south? This, too, splits on χῶρον, for he would hardly use a LXX. word in one phrase and in its fellow resort to a Latin word, not only quite unknown to the LXX., but never before, as far as we know, employed by a Greek writer. Besides, a harbour facing south and north-west would seem in itself highly improbable. But may not Luke have had in mind that distinctly western (Italian) use of λίψ of which we have found traces in Gellius and the elder Pliny and explicit evidence in the Vatican inscription? The half Latin character of Εὐρακύλων in xxvii. 14 and the pure Latin character of χῶρος (Caurus, but Chorus on the Vatican vane base) perhaps favour this solution, and the position of Lutro cannot be said seriously to disagree.

In approaching the question raised by the papyri, we may remember one fact. Paul and his biographer seem never to have seen Phoenix. They heard about it at Fair Havens, probably from the officers of the ship they were on. That ship was an Alexandrian ship and plied between that port and Rome, being, if Professor Ramsay is right, one of the imperial fleet of corn transports. The Greek of the officers would be the Greek of Alexandria, and they would be just such persons as wrote the business documents of Roman Egypt that have come down to us. This easy chain of connexion seems to give the evidence of the papyri especial value in precisely this passage. But does not it, too, go to pieces on χῶρος? Perhaps so; but it seems at least possible to understand Luke's whole use of names of winds as having come to him through men whose speech was a hybrid of Greek and Latin. Such men, officers, and crew of a ship plying between Alexandria and Ostia or Portus would surely be. Some would be Alexandrians and speak Egyptian Greek; others Italians and speak Latin. The languages would blend on the ship if not in port, and such half Greek, half Latin

phrases as *κατὰ λίβα καὶ κατὰ χῶρον* would be a natural result. If this be thought visionary, one may point to Luke's *Εὐρακύλων* (Eurus-Aquilo) two verses below the mention of Phoenix. This word is unknown apart from this passage, and the Greek lexicographers can only cite as analogy *Εὐρόνοτος*, which being composed of two *Greek* words fails of being analogous at the vital point. Euraquilo is simply the Greek east wind combined with the Latin north-east (more exactly east-north-east) wind; such words occur in later Latin (e.g. Euroauster, but not even in the *Latin* of this period.

Tested with this possibility in mind, the interpretation of *βλέποντα κατὰ λίβα καὶ κατὰ χῶρον* as looking west and north-west does not seem wholly improbable. If now we are to take the view of Dr. Howson and Mr. James Smith, followed by Professor Ramsay and a host of commentators, that a harbour looking *down* these winds is meant—a view for which the use of *κατὰ* in Josephus' *τὰς κατὰ λίβα προσβυλάς* affords some confirmation. Lutro, already clearly pointed to by Ptolemy[1] and Strabo,[2] by the fact of its incomparable security as a haven, seems from an examination of Mr. Smith's map more than ever appropriately described by the modification of *λίψ* from south-west to west.[3] The harbour does indeed look down the west and north-west winds.

[1] *φοινικοῦς*, Ptolemy 3. 17. [2] *φοίνικα τὸν λάμπεων*, Strabo, 10. p. 475.

[3] One objection may be urged. The writer of Luke and Acts has a word for west. He uses *ἑσπέρα* three times (Luke xxiv. 29; Acts iv. 3, xxviii. 23), but always in the sense of evening. But he has another word for west, *δυσμαί*, and while its occurrence in one passage (Luke xiii. 29, *καὶ ἥξουσιν ἀπὸ ἀνατολῶν καὶ δυσμῶν καὶ ἀπὸ βορρᾶ καὶ νότου*), may be dismissed as due to quotation, either from the LXX. (Isa. lix. 19; Mal. i. 11), or more properly from a Gospel discourse source common to Matt. and Luke (query: the Perean document?), in the other (Luke xii. 54, *ὅταν ἴδητε νεφέλην ἀνατέλλουσαν ἐπὶ δυσμῶν*) the word seems ascribable only to the author of the book. It is generally accepted however that the chapters dealing with this journey are in a peculiar sense the work of the writer of the book. But were this not the case, the writer's language about a place he had never seen may well reflect the language of his informants and exhibit a use of words somewhat different from his usual one.

One wonders what light the Western text might have thrown upon this passage, but Codex Bezae unfortunately breaks off in chapter xxii. Tischendorf's apparatus records no substantial variation from the current text, save that one or two versions (Syr. Arab.) omit *καὶ κατὰ χῶρον*. Here again, as so often, an old Syriac text of Acts is a desideratum.

Edgar J. Goodspeed.

THE VALUE-JUDGEMENTS OF RELIGION.

I.

Expository and Historical.

(1) A twofold interest attaches to the theory of value-judgements, and affords a double reason for our consideration of this subject at this time. *Firstly*, this theory holds a prominent place and plays a decisive part in the Ritschlian Theology, and on the truth of the theory the worth of the theology largely depends. As the Ritschlian is the dominant theological tendency in Germany, and as the school of Ritschl has begun to attract considerable attention, and to excite general interest among students of theology in this country, an endeavour to understand one of its most distinctive features may not be altogether profitless. *Secondly*, the theory is an attempt to solve a problem of even wider significance and greater importance than any theological tendency or school can be, namely, what is the relation of religious knowledge to science and philosophy? On the one hand the man to whom religion is the chief good cannot but claim that in his knowledge of God and the soul he has the highest truth; and on the other science declares by the mouth of *Comte* that the theological stage of human thought has been superseded by the metaphysical, and that the metaphysical has abdicated in favour of the scientific or positive, or by the mouth of *Spencer* that in religion man expresses his reverence for the *Unknowable*; and philosophy asserts, with the voice of *Kant*, that Christian doctrine must be translated into the terms of the pure reason; or, with the voice of *Hegel*, that religion possesses only the *image* while philosophy alone has the *idea*. It may be an advantage to us, therefore, if we can form a more distinct conception of the nature, conditions, limitations, and relations of religious knowledge.

(2) The first of these two essays is intended to be expository and historical, and the second critical and constructive, In the *first* essay I shall endeavour to give an account of the theory of value-judgements as it is presented by *Ritschl*, *Herrmann*, and *Kaftan*. As their treatment leaves not a few obscurities and difficulties, I shall also try to give a summary of the books on this subject which have been written by *Otto Ritschl*, *Reischle*, and *Scheibe*. In the *second* essay I shall deal with some of the criticisms of the theory which have been put forward by English writers on the subject, and indicate my own position in regard to it. We should then be able to pass to the wider and greater problem of religious knowledge, and its relation to science and philosophy. As a result of the discussion it is to be hoped that we may not only gain a better understanding of the theory of value-judgements, but also a clearer insight into, a firmer assurance regarding, the truth and worth of our faith in the gospel of God's grace in Jesus Christ.

I. Ritschl, Herrmann, and Kaftan on Value-Judgements.

In dealing with the theory of value-judgements as presented by the Ritschlian school it will not be necessary to have any preliminary discussion of the views of religion held by its members; for while the material content of religious knowledge is affected by the conception formed of religion, yet the formal character of this knowledge is independent of these differences of opinion regarding the nature of religion, a proof of which is that while Ritschl, Herrmann, and Kaftan all agree in holding the theory, Herrmann emphasizes the consciousness of subjection to an absolute moral law as giving man his sense of personal worth, as Ritschl does not, and Kaftan not only seriously differs from, but even severely criticizes both in his treatment of religion. As we shall have quite sufficient matter for consideration in the theory of value-judgements as defining the formal char-

acter of religious knowledge, we shall not discuss its material content as determined by the conception of religion.

(1) *Ritschl* presents the theory of value-judgements in his great work on *Justification and Reconciliation* (vol. iii. sec. 28, pp. 193–201, Eng. Tr. pp. 203–211). In the first edition of this work Ritschl found the solution of the problem of the relation of religious knowledge to science and philosophy in a separation of sphere. Science and philosophy, whatever may be their intentions, have not at their disposal the material or the method for forming a valid conception of the world as an intelligible unity. Religion alone can represent the world as a whole; and science and philosophy, when they attempt this task, follow an obscure religious impulse. So long as they confine themselves to their proper province, the observation and explanation of the world in its parts, there can be no collision between their results and the contents of religious knowledge. In the third edition this treaty of peace is denounced. It is now admitted that while "philosophy fixes the special and universal laws of nature and spirit," it also "with this task combines the ambition to comprehend the universe under one supreme law," nay "even the thought of God, which belongs to religion, is employed in some shape or other by every non-materialistic philosophy." This concession, however, having served its purpose as a proof that separate spheres cannot be assigned to religious knowledge and science and philosophy, but that these kinds of mental activity must be otherwise distinguished, is again withdrawn, and, as before, it is declared that religious knowledge and philosophy can come into conflict only when "the latter claims to produce in its own fashion a unified view of the world. This, however," he continues, "betrays rather an impulse religious in its nature, which philosophers ought to have distinguished from the cognitive methods they follow."

His criticism of materialism and pantheism further shows that he admits theoretically the possibility of such collision, but practically denies its reality. But it is not necessary to dwell on this inconsistency. For our immediate purpose we must return to the question. How does Ritschl propose to distinguish religious knowledge from science and philosophy? As the difference cannot be found in the object, it must lie in the subject of knowledge. The mind appropriates the sensations aroused in it in a twofold manner. "Either they are determined, according to their value for the Ego, by the feeling of pleasure or pain," or they are through an idea "judged in respect of their cause, the nature of the latter, and its connexion with other causes." We may feel, or we may know, and although we cannot altogether separate the two functions, as they always go together, yet sometimes the one and at other times the other is the more prominent, and as it were gives its distinctive character to the complex mental fact. With the knowing function of the subject the theoretical judgements are connected, the value-judgements belong to its feeling function. As even science, however, is not altogether disinterested—for even the student of nature has a pleasure in his pursuit—"we have to distinguish *concomitant* and *independent* value-judgements." To the latter class belong "all perceptions of moral ends or moral hindrances, in so far as they excite moral pleasure or pain, or, it may be, set in motion the will to appropriate what is good or repel the opposite." In the class of value-judgements must also be included religious knowledge, but moral and religious value-judgements must be distinguished, as in some of its forms religion has no direct relation to morality; and even in Christianity, where the moral end and the religious good are identical, "we can distinguish between the religious functions which relate to our attitude towards God and the world, and the moral functions, which point directly to men, and only in-

directly to God." Accordingly the religious value-judgements "relate to man's attitude to the world, and call forth feelings of pleasure or pain, in which man either enjoys the dominion over the world vouchsafed him by God or feels grievously the lack of God's help to that end." The contrast between the two most prominent and potent mental forces of the age, science and Christianity, is this: "Scientific knowledge is accompanied or guided by a judgement affirming the worth of impartial knowledge gained by observation. In Christianity, religious knowledge consists in independent value-judgements, inasmuch as it deals with the relation between the blessedness which is assured by God and sought by man, and the whole of the world which God has created and rules in harmony with His final end." Among value-judgements Ritschl mentions man's consciousness that "the worth of his spiritual personality transcends that of the whole system of nature," the believer's assurance that God secures to him the dominion over the world through participation in His kingdom, the Church's confession of the divinity of Christ on the ground of what He has effected for man's salvation, the Christian estimate of moral evil as sin, because due to "indifference towards God as the Benefactor and Governor of human life." This restriction of religious knowledge to value-judgements involves, on Ritschl's part, the rejection of the theistic proofs, as they do not yield the Christian idea of God, the exclusion from theology of the metaphysics, which does not recognize the difference in worth of nature and spirit, and the refusal to extend the range of theology beyond what God is for us to what God is in Himself. Although Ritschl has not expressly dealt with the topic of Christian apologetics, yet the evidence of the value-judgements of the Christian religion which he assumes is the historical person of Jesus, and the testimony of the Christian Church.

(2) *Herrmann* treats the theory of value-judgements in

his book on *Religion in Relation to Knowledge of the World and Morality*. In an earlier work on *Metaphysics in Theology*, his object was to show " that the values valid in the Christian community are not more deeply recognized, but lose their original meaning, when by means of metaphysics one seeks to make them objects of our knowledge of the world." He seeks in this later work to carry out " the fundamental idea that the objects of Christian faith do not fall into the province of the knowledge of the world." Here the same note is struck as by Ritschl; religious knowledge must be distinguished from science and philosophy. He bases his account of this distinction on the difference of " that activity of the representing consciousness " which is uninfluenced by " that content of the human soul which is active in feeling and willing," from that attitude of the knowing subject to its object, in which it meets them as not merely a representing being, but as a being " which in its feelings experiences values, and in its will believes that it possesses the ability to realize represented values." " The subject has in the feeling of pleasure and pain a means of establishing an order of values, which means something quite different from the order of representations in the consciousness. While those are fixed in value-judgements, the inner relations in such a value-judgement and the means of theoretical knowledge are altogether incommensurable." Even in the scientific knowledge of nature there are conceptions, such as the unity and intelligibility of nature, which " are formed and posited for their value for the practical purposes of the subject "; there are value-judgements, in which " man and the nature which surrounds him are compared with one another, and the latter is determined as a means for the former as the valuable end." Even in metaphysics no impartial view of the actual world is attempted, but the effort is made to interpret the world by ideas, " the content of which has no other ground

of validity than its worth for us." Value-judgements are distinctive of religion, for "the interest of religion does not attach itself to the representation of the actually-given existence of the world as a connected intelligible unity," which is the aim of science and philosophy; but "rather the concern of religion is to regard the multiplicity of the world as the orderly whole of means, by which the highest value of the pious man, which is experienced in feeling, is realized." It is as the subject of an unconditional moral law that a man knows himself to have an absolute value, and it is this consciousness which is his warrant for assigning a value to objects, as they further or hinder his self-realization, for it gives him the assurance that "the inmost essence of the world is in harmony with his own demand for self-preservation." This process of valuation is, therefore, no merely arbitrary subjective exercise of man's mental functions; but has an objective basis in the very nature of things. Accordingly the practical explanation of the world given in religious knowledge may claim to be absolute truth, although it may differ altogether from the theoretical explanation given by metaphysics. "When I seek to represent a world-whole, because I wish to comprehend the multiplicity of things in a never failing context of law, then I go in the way of metaphysics. When I seek to represent a world-whole, because I do not wish to lose myself as a person conscious of my highest good in the multiplicity of things, then I receive the impulse to religious faith." These two ways do not lead to one reality, but "even the meaning of the word 'reality' is in both cases different." For science and philosophy the reality of things means "standing in relations"; the real means the explicable. In religious knowledge the real is that which can be enjoyed by the self-consciousness, that which can be experienced as valuable for the ends of the self. Religion can afford to be quite indifferent to "the order established by the scientific explan-

ation of the world," for the extention of science in metaphysics involves an abandonment of strictly scientific procedure, and results in a " vain sport of fancy," to which religion can confidently oppose its value-judgements, as alone meeting the demand for a satisfying explanation of the world, which metaphysics may profess, but is incompetent to afford. The distinction of religious knowledge from all other knowledge is this. " It serves to complete the moral personality in itself, and to elevate it as final purpose over the world." This characteristic is possessed by Christian truth ; for " the religious judgements of Christianity do not profess to be any more than the exposition of the *one certainty* that blessedness is the meaning of all actuality." What alone belongs to the religious consciousness is what has value for the moral personality in furthering, and not hindering, the fulfilment of its purpose, to which the whole world is but a means. Reality is affirmed of what is thus valuable on the ground of its value, and the warrant for this affirmation is found in the certainty of the absolute worth of the moral personality. But this reality has another meaning than the reality which is affirmed by theoretical judgements, which rest on perception and inference. The certainty of the former is not less than that of the latter, but its value is greater.

(3) *Kaftan* deals with the theory of value-judgements in his book *The Essence of Christianity* (chap. i. pp. 37–50). He distinguishes two mental functions—representation, which gives us " the picture of another," and feeling, which makes " us aware of ourselves as living beings." These functions express the double relation which we have to the world, as on the one hand seeking to know it, and as on the other pleasurably or painfully affected by it. Consequently " all our simple judgements are of a double kind. Either they express a state of fact, which we represent, or they express a relation which we as human

beings assume to the represented. The theoretical judgements express a fact; the value-judgements give expression to our attitude to the same. A more accurate consideration shows at once that the theoretical propositions of religious faith are of another kind than the usual theoretical judgements. They are distinguished from these just in this: that they are the result not of an objective comprehension of the events and changes in the world, and just as little of an intelligent manipulation of the judgements so gained, but rather that value-judgements are their basis." Religious knowledge then, according to Kaftan, does not consist of value-judgements, as Ritschl affirms, but of theoretical propositions based on value-judgements. "Nowhere have I affirmed," he says, "that the religious judgements *are* value-judgements; but I hold this expression itself at least open to misunderstanding; nay, value-judgements are their basis, but they themselves *are* theoretical propositions." The difference between Ritschl's and Kaftan's position may be thus expressed. According to Ritschl religious knowledge consists of personal convictions, of which the person holding them is sure that they are true, but does not claim that others should recognize their truth. According to Kaftan, while religious knowledge has its origin in personal conviction, it must advance the claim to be accepted by all as valid. But to return to Kaftan's exposition of the theory, he recognizes three kinds of value-judgements: *natural*, concerned with weal or woe; *moral*, dealing with the good or the bad; and *aesthetic*, which distinguish things as beautiful or ugly. It is the first kind, the natural, which affords a basis for the theoretical proposition of religion, for it is not concerned with ethical ideals, but with good or with a highest good. "A good means, for man, what satisfies his demand for life, or advances him in the satisfaction of the same, or even holds in prospect for the

future such a satisfaction." Religion is never the result of knowledge of the world, but is always due to the attitude our personal interests lead us to assume to the world; it is a practical concern of the human spirit, belonging to "that side of our spiritual life where values and not facts ultimately decide." Religious knowledge must be distinguished from science or philosophy, for its propositions "historically arise in another way, the conviction of their truth is grounded otherwise subjectively, objectively they have also another measure of truth. And when we investigate this, their peculiarity, then we find it based on this, that they do not issue from observation of, and reflexion on facts, but that value-judgements are their basis." But these propositions of faith claim to be valid objectively as well as valuable subjectively; they profess to state not only the effects on us of the objects of faith, but also their nature in itself as shown in these effects. Man could derive no help or comfort from a belief which he suspected of being illusive, and of the truth of which he was not sure. "That we call the Christian knowledge true, means that the facts believed are real, and so constituted irrespective of our faith." For "truth is truth. It never means anything else, than that our judgements correspond to the objective state of matters, which is given regardless of us and our opinion. We cannot speak of a double truth." But both the way in which the truth is reached and the way in which it can be tested are different in religious and in scientific knowledge. In religion the conviction of truth cannot be forced by appeal to sound powers of perception or reasoning, but must be freely accepted in recognizing the same values. The test of truth in religion is not correspondence with facts, but "whether a religion is true depends primarily on this, whether it really gives the good which it promises, or commands to be striven for, that is, whether it rests on revelation."

In his companion-work on *The Truth of the Christian Religion*, Kaftan accordingly seeks to show that Christianity in the idea of the Kingdom of God meets man's demand for a chief good. These two kinds of knowledge do not come into conflict, for the highest truth cannot be reached by the way of scientific knowledge, as the world as a whole cannot be known by the exercise of strictly scientific method, and a metaphysics which claims to know the world in this way is an empty pretension. "Values, and not facts, are finally decisive in all questions of knowledge," which is but "a member which serves in the process of life, out of which, as a whole, religious faith arises." Such, in brief outline, is the presentation of the theory of value-judgements in Ritschl, Herrmann and Kaftan. Reserving all criticism meanwhile, we pass to consider some later and fuller developments of the theory in the writings of Otto Ritschl, Reischle and Scheibe in the hope that they may cast light on some dark, and may make smooth some rough, places.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

(To be continued.)

SOME RECENT FOREIGN LITERATURE ON THE NEW TESTAMENT.

1. *Die Reichsgotteshoffnung in den ältesten christlichen Dokumenten und bei Jesus*; by Paul Wernle. Tübingen and Leipzig, J. C. B. Mohr, 1903.

This short acute study is devoted to the dual conception of God's kingdom prevalent in primitive Christianity. As the eschatological aspect and the contemporary lie side by side throughout the literature, the problem for the historian is to determine (i) whether both are genuinely derived from Jesus; (ii) if so, how far they are developed, or altered, in the subsequent tradition; and (iii) finally, how they are to be correlated? Wernle, it must be confessed, leaves things pretty much where he found them. At the same time his discussion is better than his decisions, and in the course of his stimulating argument he contrives to throw some useful rays of light upon one or two points in regard to the genesis of these beliefs, and to dispel some lingering shadows of misconception. For example, it is all to the good that he has no hesitation whatever in ascribing both of these aspects of the kingdom to our Lord. Deny the eschatological hope to Christ, he declares, and you turn the history of early Christian thought into a riddle; yet the conception of God's kingdom as here and now present among men in some sense, is in all likelihood (pp. 51, 52) to be ascribed also to Jesus. Then did He abandon the latter after the disillusioning experience of Israel's obstinacy and in view of His death? Did He project then the advent of God's kingdom to a future age? Such psychological constructions Wernle properly rejects on the ground that the gospels, for one thing, afford no adequate evidence for this change of feeling. The only reasonable resort, he pleads, is to fall back on the ultimate fact that this duality of conception contains an antinomy hitherto unsolved. His own sug-

gestion towards a solution is that Jesus believed in a present kingdom or reign of God in a sort of dramatic, supernatural sense, as if its manifestation consisted chiefly, perhaps entirely, of miraculous powers by which Satan's demonic reign was challenged and its complete overthrow presaged. That is, in order to bring the two aspects, or hopes, into line, he reads the " present " hope in the light of the eschatological, until the ethical contact of the former is almost wholly subordinated to the dramatic or supernatural. This reading of the Gospels is partially forced. To do a little right in one direction, Wernle has come to do a great wrong in another. No doubt the contest with demons formed a vital part of Christ's work; as Harnack has shown afresh in his recent *Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums* (pp. 92 f.), it lay nearer the pulsing centre of early Christianity's life and faith than we are usually apt to realize. But it is by no means a satisfactory or complete explanation, e.g. of the "kingdom"-parables in Matthew xiii. (pp. 13 f., 22 f.) and Mark iv. (pp. 36, 47), to say that they mean little or nothing more than that, despite small beginnings, the kingdom is sure to come (p. 53) to ultimate triumph by its inherent power; and it is really a *tour de force* to assert (p. 54) that brotherly love and purity of heart, according to Jesus, merely qualify a man for participation in the future kingdom. They certainly were in Christ's mind an evidence that God's reign had come in such persons. It is, on all counts, impossible to imagine that Paul (e.g. in Rom. xiv. 17) represented an advance in spirituality and inwardness at this point upon the teaching of our Lord. The theory which involves such a conclusion is plainly convicted of extravagance somewhere. It is exposed to the sound objections just urged by Karl Luhr in his instructive study (*Protestantische Monatshefte*, 1903, pp. 64 f.) on "das Bild Jesu bei den eschatologen."

As the title indicates, Wernle follows the scientific method of investigating the gospels as compositions of the apostolic age before he proceeds to employ them as evidence for the original conceptions of Jesus. This prior study of the documents, including Paul and the Apocalypse, shows the dual view of the Kingdom present in varying degrees and stages of development throughout the early church. It is right to call attention to the identification of the present *βασιλεία* with the Church in Col. i. 13 (pp. 4, 5), the Church being the sphere and medium of God's royal influence on earth. But Wernle overestimates the similar conception in the Apocalypse; for, as verse 11 shows, xii. 10 is proleptic (cp. xi. 15), and in spite of allusions like i. 6 and v. 10 (when the present tense is read, a point Wernle does not notice), the present aspect of the Kingdom is thrown quite into the background by the eschatological categories and traditions with which the prophet operates. The survey of the gospels is also open here and there to serious question. In discussing Matt. xi. 12, 13 (pp. 14–16), Wernle prefers the Lucan (xvi. 16) version of the logion as more original, and attempts rather unconvincingly to distinguish two Matthean reasons for belief in God's kingdom as a present force: (*a*) because (chap. viii.–xii.) by miracles it breaks the reign of Satan, and (*b*) because the Church is the *regnum Christi* (xiii. 33, cp. xii. 5–12). The predominating interest of Luke's gospel in the eschatological aspect is obvious; but, even if xvii. 20 be in its original position, it is slightly precarious to use the context (*vv.* 22 f.) in order to prove that the logion simply refers to the suddenness of the Kingdom's approach (pp. 29–31). Mark, too, is mainly concerned with the future Kingdom, although the real topic of the gospel is not God's reign but God's Son (which accounts, perhaps, for the strange omission of the logion preserved in Matt. xii. 28, Luke xi. 20). As for the Logia (pp. 41 f.), their triple evidence in favour

of a belief in the present kingdom (Matt. xi. 11 = Luke vii. 28; Matt. xi. 12 = Luke xvi. 16: Matt. xii. 28 = Luke xi. 20: Matt. xiii. 31 f. = Luke xiii. 18 f.; Matt. xiii. 33 = Luke xiii. 21) is interpreted by Wernle in the light of a too catastrophic theory of God's reign; but he is thoroughly right in arguing (pp. 51, 52) that, like the kingdom-parables, such sayings are far too original to have been produced by the early church. The point where he fails to carry entire conviction is the interpretation of these passages. No doubt God's kingdom, in the teaching of Jesus, was to be realized by an act of God to which men's hearts and hopes were steadily directed, and there is a danger of "modern" minds failing to do justice to this belief. But, as decisively, Jesus taught the presence of the kingdom in principle and germ among His contemporaries, and that in a more spiritual form than Wernle, who is obsessed with the eschatological aspect, seems inclined occasionally to allow. Tenable or not, a single allusion like Rom. i. 4 shows that there may be something to be said on behalf of such a theory of the kingdom (present "in weakness" and coming "in power") as John Weiss applies to the obscure and difficult saying in Mark ix. 1.

2. *Das Urchristentum*, by Dr. C. F. Georg Heinrici, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1902.

The main defect in this succinct, suggestive essay is the deliberate and almost entire exclusion of those early Christian writings which lie outside the New Testament. Heinrici's estimate of the latter is justly high (pp. v.–vi., 141). But a sense of its religious uniqueness need not divert a historian from the occasional use of writings like the epistles of Barnabas and Clemens Romanus, nor does Heinrici's apt exploitation of Hellenic ideas entirely compensate for this depreciation of material which lay nearer at hand.

In the opening section (pp. 4–35) on "the work of Jesus or the Gospel," which contains little or nothing that is new, *βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ* (pp. 12, 13) is taken in the double sense of God's kingdom and God's reign. The former connotation alludes to the future conceived as the line of Old Testament prophecy. The latter is to be adopted when the context (as in Luke xvii. 20 f., Matt. xii. 28) indicates not an eschatological but a present state; whilst the collocation of God's righteousness and reign (in Matt. vi. 33) shows that the steady maintenance of the former by men is equivalent to God's rule, that is, to "the life of God in man, and the life of man for God." There are some good remarks (pp. 31, 32) on the Christian idea of reward, *à propos* of the talent-parables, but it is curious that the death of Christ is only brought forward at a later stage in connexion with Paul's interpretation of it (pp. 93 f.), instead of in relation to Christ's own sayings upon the subject.

In the second section (pp. 36–62) upon early Jewish Christianity, Heinrici lays stress on the fact that the name "Christians" upon heathen lips (Acts xi. 26) stamped adherents of the new faith as believers in a divine Messiah —a feature which could not distinguish them so long as they were living quietly inside a Judaism which also had its Messianic hope. The third section (pp. 63–101) upon "Gentile Christianity and the Apostle Paul" has a few rapid pages of particular excellence describing the salient features of contemporary ethics and religion. But the climax and cream of the essay may be fairly said to lie in the closing pages (pp. 120–139) of the last section, where Heinrici gives a handful of paragraphs which, for their size, are as healthy and sensible an outline of the signal features in the Johannine problem as has appeared for some time. Despite their resemblances, he rightly pronounces the Apocalypse of John and the Fourth Gospel works of different authors, who

were probably contemporaries and members of the same school of thought. The Gospel goes back to reminiscences of the Apostle John, and may have been partly dictated by him; at any rate he is responsible for its tradition. The Apocalypse, on the other hand, is to be referred to the prophet John mentioned by Papias. Both of these Johns, Heinrici argues, lived side by side in Asia Minor at the close of the first century, the prophet, with his Jewish-Christian individuality, sharing all the essential principles of the great apostle who had survived to carry on Paul's work at Ephesus. The pivot of this reading of history seem almost beyond the reach of legitimate attack. The Johannine question is obscure enough as it is, without the gratuitous introduction of fresh uncertainty, and surely nothing can be more explicit than the statement of Papias that a prophet named John had been known to his circle side by side with that other John whom we term "the apostle." Whether the subsequent traditions of Polycarp and Irenaeus are unhesitatingly to be accepted and referred to the apostle, is another matter. Good stories and bad history (to use Dr. Selwyn's phrase), they do not affect this prior fact, although it is possible that by a natural and not unexampled process of confusion the early Christian tradition may have transferred to the apostle certain genuine traits and stories originally pertaining to his less famous contemporary and namesake, just as we know the Church uncritically and almost unanimously deprived the latter of his credit as an author and indeed practically ignored or forgot him. But nothing is to be gained by attempting to prove that the one is a *doppelgänger* of the other. The prophet and the apostle are two separate stars. The witness of Papias stands fast, and one can only wonder that so many scholars seem to find a difficulty in believing that two great authorities of the same name (and that a common Jewish name) could live about the same time and

place. Common sense obstinately and pertinently asks, why not? and backed by the evidence of Papias, which resists any melting hypothesis, the question really admits of no answer. It is a merit of Heinrici's essay to have recognized with some precision that in this duality of Johns lies one clue to the solution of the Johannine problem; whatever may be thought of his literary conclusions, his grasp of the historical situation will commend itself to investigators who believe that the alternative to a blind acceptance of early Christian tradition is not to be found in an arbitrary scepticism. Of course, such a re-distribution of the Johannine literature as this involves leaves the actual authorship of the Fourth Gospel and first Epistle an enigma; for, whatever apostolic tradition and spirit of a school may underlie them, they are the product of a single genius. But such anonymity is due to the facts of the case, not to the theory. And it must be recollected that, apart from the great personality of Paul, the primitive Christian literature is in a large degree anonymous. Just as in the hey-day of the earlier Venetian republic, the military achievements of the State threw individual prestige into the shadow, till the names of her captains soon slipped into oblivion, so in the early Christian Church, up to the second century, the idea and habit of literary authorship especially outside epistolary writing, was almost entirely subordinate to the ends of general edification, with the result that detailed trustworthy information upon literary subjects was not always likely to be forthcoming in its churches.

Heinrici's general attitude to his sources is that assumed by advocates of a moderate, sensible criticism. He accepts the miraculous element in the Gospels as substantially historical, although the narratives are occasionally legendary and symbolical (p. 23). Acts, even in its earlier sections, is treated with some respect and confidence, despite the legendary traits and idealizing tendencies (pp. 40–41, 54)

which are patent, e.g. in the story of Pentecost (pp. 43, 45), and in chapters v. and xii. Paul's release and second imprisonment are pronounced unsupported by historical evidence (p. 99), and Heinrici evidently does not share the recent tendency of some English scholars to deny that the apostle is attacked as Simon Magus in the Clementine Recognitions (p. 111). Except Ephesians (pp. 86, 100), Titus, and 1 Timothy (pp. 100, 116), the Pauline letters are all attributed to the apostle. The Epistle of James is reckoned post-Pauline (pp. 106–107), addressed (like 1 Peter, pp. 104, 56–57), previous to 70 A.D., to believing Jews of the diaspora. Hebrews also (pp. 102, 105) is dated previous to 70 A.D., and its audience is taken to be Jewish Christians; whilst Jude and 2 Peter again (pp. 112–113), which draw independently upon a common Jewish or Jewish Christian "preaching of punishment," reflect Jewish Christianity after the fall of Jerusalem as it developed upon lines of prophecy not untinged by apocryphal and apocalyptic tradition. During this epoch, the expectation of the advent of Christ, temporarily disappointed by the result of Jerusalem's fall, acquired fresh colour and spirit from the eschatology of Daniel upon which it fell back as the Roman Empire, early Christianity's Babylon, began to press upon the saints. The classic example of this movement is the Apocalypse of the prophet John, which Heinrici naturally (for this is no longer a matter of serious debate) places towards the close of the first century as an outburst of Asiatic Christianity in presence of the threatening Imperial cultus and the persecution of Domitian.

JAMES MOFFATT.

THE ATONEMENT AND THE MODERN MIND.

II.

We have now seen in a general way what is meant by the Atonement, and what are the characteristics of the mind to which the Atonement has to make its appeal. In that mind there is, as I believe, much which falls in with the Atonement, and prepares a welcome for it; but much also which creates prejudice against it, and makes it as possible still as in the first century to speak of the offence of the cross. No doubt the Atonement has sometimes been presented in forms which provoke antagonism, which challenge by an ostentation of unreason, or by a defiance of morality, the reason and conscience of man; but this alone does not explain the resentment which it often encounters. There is such a thing to be found in the world as the man who will have nothing to do with Christ on any terms, and who will least of all have anything to do with Him when Christ presents Himself in the character which makes man his debtor for ever. All men, as St. Paul says, have not faith: it is a melancholy fact, whether we can make anything of it or not. Discounting, however, this irrational or inexplicable opposition, which is not expressed in the mind but in the will, how are we to present the Atonement so that it shall excite the least prejudice, and find the most unimpeded access to the mind of our own generation? This is the question to which we have now to address ourselves.

To conceive the Atonement, that is, the fact that forgiveness is mediated to us through Christ, and specifically through His death, as clearly and truly as possible, it is necessary for us to realize the situation to which it is

related. We cannot think of it except as related to a given situation. It is determined or conditioned by certain relations subsisting between God and man, as these relations have been affected by sin. What we must do, therefore, in the first instance, is to make clear to ourselves what these relations are, and how sin affects them.

To begin with, they are personal relations ; they are relations the truth of which cannot be expressed except by the use of personal pronouns. We need not ask whether the personality of God can be proved antecedent to religion, or as a basis for a religion yet to be established ; in the only sense in which we can be concerned with it, religion is an experience of the personality of God, and of our own personality in relation to it. "O Lord, *Thou* hast searched *me* and known *me*." "*I* am continually with *Thee*." No human experience can be more vital or more normal than that which is expressed in these words, and no argument, be it ever so subtle or so baffling, can weigh a feather's weight against such experience. The same conception of the relations of God and man which they express is expressed again as unmistakably in every word of Jesus about the Father and the Son and the nature of their communion with each other. It is only in such personal relations that the kind of situation can emerge, and the kind of experience be had, with which the Atonement deals ; and antecedent to such experience, or in independence of it, the Atonement must remain an incredible because an unrealizable thing.

But to say that the relations of God and man are personal is not enough. They are not only personal, but universal. *Personal* is habitually used in a certain contrast with *legal*, and it is very easy to lapse into the idea that personal relations, because distinct from legal ones, are independent of law; but to say the least of it, that is an ambiguous and misleading way of describing the facts. The relations

of God and man are not lawless, they are not capricious, incalculable, incapable of moral meaning; they are personal, but determined by something of universal import; in other words, they are not merely personal but ethical. That is ethical which is at once personal and universal. Perhaps the simplest way to make this evident is to notice that the relations of man to God are the relations to God not of atoms, or of self-contained individuals, each of which is a world in itself, but of individuals which are essentially related to each other, and bound up in the unity of a race. The relations of God to man, therefore, are not capricious though they are personal: they are reflected or expressed in a moral constitution to which all personal beings are equally bound, a moral constitution of eternal and universal validity, which neither God nor man can ultimately treat as anything else than what it is.

This is a point at which some prejudice has been raised against the Atonement by theologians, and more, perhaps, by persons protesting against what they supposed theologians to mean. If one may be excused a personal reference, few things have astonished me more than to be charged with teaching a "forensic" or "legal" or "judicial" doctrine of Atonement, resting, as such a doctrine must do, on a "forensic" or "legal" or "judicial" conception of man's relation to God. It is all the more astonishing when the charge is combined with what one can only decline as in the circumstances totally unmerited compliments to the clearness with which he has expressed himself. There is nothing which I desire to reprobate more whole-heartedly than the conception which is expressed by these words. To say that the relations of God and man are forensic is to say that they are regulated by statute—that sin is a breach of statute—that the sinner is a criminal—and that God adjudicates on him by interpreting the statute in its application to his case. Every-

body knows that this is a travesty of the truth, and it is surprising that any one should be charged with teaching it, or that any one should applaud himself, as though he were in the foremost files of time, for not believing it. It is superfluously apparent that the relations of God and man are not those of a magistrate on the bench pronouncing according to the act on the criminal at the bar. To say this, however, does not make these relations more intelligible. In particular, to say that they are personal, as opposed to forensic, does not make them more intelligible. If they are to be rational, if they are to be moral, if they are to be relations in which an ethical life can be lived, and ethical responsibilities realized, they must be not only personal, but universal; they must be relations that in some sense are determined by law. Even to say that they are the relations, not of judge and criminal, but of Father and child, does not get us past this point. The relations of father and child are undoubtedly more adequate to the truth than those of judge and criminal; they are more adequate, but so far as our experience of them goes, they are not equal to it. If the sinner is not a criminal before his judge, neither is he a naughty child before a parent whose own weakness or affinity to evil introduces an incalculable element into his dealing with his child's fault. I should not think of saying that it is the desire to escape from the inexorableness of law to a God capable of indulgent human tenderness that inspires the violent protests so often heard against "forensic" and "legal" ideas: but that is the impression which one sometimes involuntarily receives from them. It ought to be apparent to every one that even the relation of parent and child, if it is to be a moral relation, must be determined in a way which has universal and final validity. It must be a relation in which—ethically speaking—some things are for ever obligatory, and some things for

ever impossible; in other words, it must be a relation determined by law, and law which cannot deny itself. But law in this sense is not "legal." It is not "judicial," or "forensic," or "statutory." None the less it is real and vital, and the whole moral value of the relation depends upon it. When a man says—as some one has said—"There are many to whom the conception of forgiveness resting on a judicial transaction does not appeal at all," I entirely agree with him; it does not appeal at all to me. But what would be the value of a forgiveness which did not recognize in its eternal truth and worth that universal law in which the relations of God and man are constituted? Without the recognition of that law—that moral order or constitution in which we have our life in relation to God and each other—righteousness and sin, atonement and forgiveness, would all alike be words without meaning.

In connexion with this, reference may be made to an important point in the interpretation of the New Testament. The responsibility for what is called the forensic conception of the Atonement is often traced to St. Paul, and the greatest of all the ministers of grace is not infrequently spoken of as though he had deliberately laid the most insuperable of stumbling-blocks in the way to the gospel. Most people, of course, are conscious that they do not look well talking down to St. Paul, and occasionally one can detect a note of misgiving in the brave words in which his doctrine is renounced, a note of misgiving which suggests that the charitable course is to hear such protests in silence, and to let those who utter them think over the matter again. But there is what claims to be a scientific way of expressing dissent from the apostle, a way which, equally with the petulant one, rests, I am convinced, on misapprehension of his teaching. This it would not be fair to ignore. It interprets what the apostle says about law solely by

reference to the great question at issue between the Jewish and the Christian religions, making the word law mean the statutory system under which the Jews lived, and nothing else. No one will deny that Paul does use the word in this sense; the law often means for him specifically the law of Moses. The law of Moses, however, never means for him anything less than the law of God; it is one specific form in which the universal relations subsisting between God and man, and making religion and morality possible, have found historical expression. But Paul's mind does not rest in this one historical expression. He generalizes it. He has the conception of a universal law, to which he can appeal in Gentile as well as in Jew—a law in the presence of which sin is revealed, and by the reaction of which sin is judged—a law which God could not deny without denying Himself, and to which justice is done (in other words, which is maintained in its integrity), when God justifies the ungodly. Paul preached the same gospel to the Gentiles as he did to the Jews; he preached in it the same relation of the Atonement and of Christ's death to divine law. But he did not do this by extending to all mankind a Pharisaic, legal, forensic relation to God: he did it by rising above such conceptions, even though as a Pharisee he may have had to start from them, to the conception of a relation of all men to God expressing itself in a moral constitution —or, as he would have said, but in an entirely unforensic way, in a law—of divine and unchanging validity. The maintenance of this law, or of this moral constitution, in its inviolable integrity was the signature of the forgiveness Paul preached. The Atonement meant to him that forgiveness was mediated through One in whose life and death the most signal homage was paid to this law: the very glory of the Atonement was that it manifested the righteousness of God; it demonstrated God's consistency with His

own character which would have been violated alike by indifference to sinners and by indifference to that universal moral order—that law of God—in which alone eternal life is possible. It is a mistake to say—though this also has been said—that 'Paul's problem was not that of the possibility of forgiveness; it was the Jewish law, the Old Testament dispensation: how to justify his breach with it, how to demonstrate that the old order had been annulled and a new order inaugurated.' There is a false contrast in all such propositions. Paul's problem was that of the Jewish law, and it was also that of the possibility of forgiveness; it was that of the Jewish law, and it was also that of a revelation of grace, in which God should justify the ungodly, Jew or Gentile, and yet maintain inviolate those universal moral relations between Himself and man for which law is the compendious expression. It does not matter whether we suppose him to start from the concrete instance of the Jewish law, and generalize on the basis of it; or to start from the universal conception of law, and recognize in existing Jewish institutions the most available and definite illustration of it: in either case, the only Paul whose mind is known to us has completely transcended the forensic point of view. The same false contrast is repeated in such a sentence as, "That doctrine (Paul's 'juristic doctrine') had its origin, not so much in his religious experience, as in apologetic necessities." The only apologetic necessities which give rise to fundamental doctrines are those created by religious experience. The apologetic of any religious experience is just the definition of it as real in relation to other acknowledged realities. Paul had undoubtedly an apologetic of forgiveness—namely, his doctrine of atonement. But the acknowledged reality in relation to which he defined forgiveness—the reality with which, by means of his doctrine of atonement, he showed forgiveness to be consistent—was not the law of the

Jews (though that was included in it, or might be pointed to in illustration of it): it was the law of God, the universal and inviolable order in which alone eternal life is possible, and in which all men, and not the Jews only, live and move and have their being. It was the perception of this which made Paul an apostle to the Gentiles, and it is this very thing itself, which some would degrade into an awkward, unintelligent, and outworn rag of Pharisaic apologetic, which is the very heart and soul of Paul's Gentile gospel. Paul himself was perfectly conscious of this; he could not have preached to the Gentiles at all unless he had been. But there is nothing in it which can be characterized as "legal," "judicial," or "forensic"; and of this also, I have no doubt, the apostle was well aware. Of course he occupied a certain historical position, had certain historical questions to answer, was subject to historical limitations of different kinds; but I have not the courage to treat him, nor do his words entitle any one to do so, as a man who in the region of ideas could not put two and two together.

But to return to the point from which this digression on St. Paul started. We have seen that the relations of God and man are personal, and also that they are universal, that is, there is a law of them, or, if we like to say so, a law in them, on the maintenance of which their whole ethical value depends. The next point to be noticed is that these relations are deranged or disordered by sin. Sin is, in fact, nothing else than this derangement or disturbance: it is that in which wrong is done to the moral constitution under which we live. And let no one say that in such an expression we are turning our back on the personal world, and lapsing, or incurring the risk of lapsing, into mere legalism again. It cannot be too often repeated that if the universal element, or law, be eliminated from personal relations, there is nothing intelligible left: no reason, no

morality, no religion, no sin or righteousness or forgiveness, nothing to appeal to mind or conscience. In the widest sense of the word, sin, as a disturbance of the personal relations between God and man, is a violence done to the constitution under which God and man form one moral community, share, as we may reverently express it, one life, have in view the same moral ends.

It is no more necessary in connexion with the Atonement than in any other connexion that we should have a doctrine of the origin of sin. We do not know its origin, we only know that it is here. We cannot observe the genesis of the bad conscience any more than we can observe the genesis of consciousness in general. We see that consciousness does stand in relief against the background of natural life; but though we believe that, as it exists in us, it has emerged from that background, we cannot see it emerge; it is an ultimate fact, and is assumed in all that we can ever regard as its physical antecedents and presuppositions. In the same way, the moral consciousness is an ultimate fact, and irreducible. The physical theory of evolution must not be allowed to mislead us here, and in particular it must not be allowed to discredit the conception of moral responsibility for sin which is embodied in the story of the Fall. Each of us individually has risen into moral life from a mode of being which was purely natural; in other words, each of us, individually, has been a subject of evolution; but each of us also has fallen—fallen, presumably, in ways determined by his natural constitution, yet certainly, as conscience assures us, in ways for which we are morally answerable, and to which, in the moral constitution of the world, consequences attach which we must recognize as our due. They are not only results of our action, but results which that action has merited, and there is no moral hope for us unless we accept them as such. Now what is true of any, or rather of all, of us, without

compromise of the moral consciousness, may be true of the race, or of the first man, if there was a first man. Evolution and the Fall cannot be inconsistent, for both enter into every moral experience of which we know anything ; and no opinion we hold about the origin of sin can make it anything else than it is in conscience, or give its results any character other than that which they have to conscience. Of course when any one tries to interpret sin outside of conscience, as though it were purely physical, and did not have its being in personality, consciousness, and will, it disappears ; and the laborious sophistries of such interpretations must be left to themselves. The point for us is that no matter how sin originated, in the moral consciousness in which it has its being it is recognized as a derangement of the vital relations of man, a violation of that universal order outside of which he has no true good.

In what way, now, let us ask, does the reality of sin come home to the sinner? How does he recognize it as what it is ? What is the reaction against the sinner, in the moral order under which he lives, which reveals to him the meaning of his sinful act or state?

In the first place, there is that instantaneous but abiding reaction which is called the bad conscience—the sense of guilt, of being answerable to God for sin. The sin may be an act which is committed in a moment, but in this aspect of it, at least, it does not fade into the past. An animal may have a past, for anything we can tell, and naturalistic interpreters of sin may believe that sin dies a natural death with time, and need not trouble us permanently ; but this is not the voice of conscience, in which alone sin exists, and which alone can tell us the truth about it. The truth is that the spiritual being has no past. Just as he is continually with God, his sin is continually with him. He cannot escape it by not thinking. When he keeps silence,

as the Psalmist says—and that is always his first resource, as though, if he were to say nothing about it, God might say nothing about it, and the whole thing blow over—it devours him like a fever within: his bones wax old with his moaning all day long. This sense of being wrong with God, under His displeasure, excluded from His fellowship, afraid to meet Him yet bound to meet Him, is the sense of guilt. Conscience confesses in it its liability to God, a liability which in the very nature of the case it can do nothing to meet, and which therefore is nearly akin to despair.

But the bad conscience, real as it is, may be too abstractly interpreted. Man is not a pure spirit, but a spiritual being whose roots strike to the very depths of nature, and who is connected by the most intimate and vital relations not only with his fellow-creatures of the same species, but with the whole system of nature in which he lives. The moral constitution in which he has his being comprehends, if we may say so, nature in itself: the God who has established the moral order in which man lives, has established the natural order also as part of the same whole with it. In some profound way the two are one. We distinguish in man, legitimately enough, between the spiritual and the physical, but man is one, and the universe in which he lives is one, and in man's relation to God the distinction of physical and spiritual must ultimately disappear. The sin which introduces disorder into man's relations to God produces reactions affecting man as a whole—not reactions that, as we sometimes say, are purely spiritual, but reactions as broad as man's being and as the whole divinely constituted environment in which it lives. I am well aware of the difficulty of giving expression to this truth, and of the hopelessness of trying to give expression to it by means of those very distinctions which it is its nature to transcend. The distinctions are easy and obvious; what we have to

learn is that they are not final. It seems so conclusive to say, as some one has done in criticizing the idea of atonement, that spiritual transgressing brings spiritual penalty, and physical brings physical; it seems so conclusive, and it is in truth so completely beside the mark. We cannot divide either man or the universe in this fashion into two parts which move on different planes and have no vital relations; we cannot, to apply this truth to the subject before us, limit the divine reaction against sin, or the experiences through which, in any case whatever, sin is brought home to man as what it is, to the purely spiritual sphere. Every sin is a sin of the indivisible human being, and the divine reaction against it expresses itself to conscience through the indivisible frame of that world, at once natural and spiritual, in which man lives. We cannot distribute evils into the two classes of physical and moral, and subsequently investigate the relation between them: if we could, it would be of no service here. What we have to understand is that when a man sins he does something in which his whole being participates, and that the reaction of God against his sin is a reaction in which he is conscious, or might be conscious, that the whole system of things is in arms against him.

There are those, no doubt, to whom this will seem fantastic, but it is a truth, I am convinced, which is presupposed in the Christian doctrine of Atonement, as the mediation of forgiveness through the suffering and death of Christ: and it is a truth also, if I am not much mistaken, to which all the highest poetry, which is also the deepest vision of the human mind, bears witness. We may distinguish natural law and moral law as sharply as we please, and it is as necessary sometimes as it is easy to make these sharp and absolute distinctions; but there is a unity in experience which makes itself felt deeper than all the antitheses of logic, and in that unity nature and spirit

are no more defined by contrast with each other: on the contrary, they interpenetrate and support each other; they are aspects of the same whole. When we read in the prophet Amos, "Lo, He that formeth the mountains, and createth the wind, and declareth unto man what is His thought, that maketh the morning darkness and treadeth upon the high places of the earth, the Lord, the God of hosts, is His name," this is the truth which is expressed. The power which reveals itself in conscience—telling us all things that ever we did, declaring unto us what is our thought—is the same which reveals itself in nature, establishing the everlasting hills, creating the winds which sweep over them, turning the shadow of death into the morning and making the day dark with night, calling for the waters of the sea, and pouring them out on the face of the earth. Conscience speaks in a still small voice, but it is no impotent voice; it can summon the thunder to give it resonance; the power which we sometimes speak of as if it were purely spiritual is a power which clothes itself spontaneously and of right in all the majesty and omnipotence of nature. It is the same truth, again, in another aspect of it, which is expressed in Wordsworth's sublime lines to Duty:

> "Thou dost preserve the Stars from wrong,
> And the most ancient Heavens through Thee are fresh and strong."

When the mind sees deepest, it is conscious that it needs more than physical astronomy, more than spectrum analysis, to tell us everything even about the stars. There is a moral constitution, it assures us, even of the physical world; and though it is impossible for us to work it out in detail, the assumption of it is the only assumption on which we can understand the life of a being related as man is related both to the natural and the spiritual. I do not pretend to prove that there is articulate or conscious re-

flection on this in either the Old Testament or the New; I take it for granted, as self-evident, that this sense of the ultimate unity of the natural and the spiritual—which is, indeed, but one form of belief in God—pervades the Bible from beginning to end. It knows nothing of our abstract and absolute distinctions ; to come to the matter in hand, it knows nothing of a sin which has merely spiritual penalties. Sin is the act or the state of man, and the reaction against it is the reaction of the whole order, at once natural and spiritual, in which man lives.

Now the great difficulty which the modern mind has with the Atonement, or with the representation of it in the New Testament, is that it assumes some kind of connexion between sin and death. Forgiveness is mediated through Christ, but specifically through His death. He died for our sins ; if we can be put right with God apart from this, then, St. Paul tells us, He died for nothing. One is almost ashamed to repeat that this is not Paulinism, but the Christianity of the whole Apostolic Church. What St. Paul made the basis of his preaching, that Christ died for our sins, according to the Scriptures, he had on his own showing received as the common Christian tradition. But is there anything in it? Can we receive it simply on the authority of the primitive Church? Can we realize any such connexion between death and sin as makes it a truth to us, an intelligible, impressive, overpowering thought, that Christ died for our sins?

I venture to say that a great part of the difficulty which is felt at this point is due to the false abstraction just referred to. Sin is put into one world—the moral ; death is put into another world—the natural ; and there is no connexion between them. This is very convincing if we find it possible to believe that we live in two unconnected worlds. But if we find it impossible to believe this—and surely the impossibility is patent—its plausibility is

gone. It is a shining example of this false abstraction when we are told, as though it were a conclusive objection to all that the New Testament has to say about the relation of sin and death, that "the specific penalty of sin is not a fact of the natural life, but of the moral life." What right has any one, in speaking of the ultimate realities in human life, of those experiences in which man becomes conscious of all that is involved in his relations to God and their disturbance by sin, to split that human life into "natural" and "moral," and fix an impassable gulf between? The distinction is legitimate, as has already been remarked, within limits, but it is not final; and what the New Testament teaches, or rather assumes, about the relation of sin and death, is one of the ways in which we are made sensible that it is not final. Sin and death do not belong to unrelated worlds. As far as man is concerned the two worlds, to use an inadequate figure, intersect; and at one point in the line of their intersection sin and death meet and interpenetrate. In the indivisible experience of man he is conscious that they are parts or aspects of the same thing.

That this is what Scripture means when it assumes the connexion of death and sin is not to be refuted by pointing either to the third chapter of Genesis or to the fifth of Romans. It does not, for example, do justice either to Genesis or to St. Paul to say, as has been said, that according to their representation, "Death—not spiritual, but natural death—is the direct consequence of sin and its specific penalty." In such a dictum, the distinctions again mislead. To read the third chapter of Genesis in this sense would mean that what we had to find in it was a mythological explanation of the origin of physical death. But does any one believe that any Bible writer was ever curious about this question? or does any one believe that a mythological solution of the problem, how death originated

—a solution which *ex hypothesi* has not a particle of truth or even of meaning in it—could have furnished the presupposition for the fundamental doctrine of the Christian religion, that Christ died for our sins, and that in Him we have our forgiveness through His blood? A truth which has appealed so powerfully to man cannot be sustained on a falsehood. That the third chapter of Genesis is mythological in form, no one who knows what mythology is will deny; but even mythology is not made out of nothing, and in this chapter every atom is "stuff o' the conscience." What we see in it is conscience, projecting as it were in a picture on a screen its own invincible, dear-bought, despairing conviction that sin and death are indissolubly united—that from death the sinful race can never get away—that it is part of the indivisible reality of sin that the shadow of death darkens the path of the sinner, and at last swallows him up. It is this also which is in the mind of St. Paul when he says that by one man sin entered into the world and death by sin. It is not the origin of death he is interested in, nor the origin of sin either, but the fact that sin and death hang together. And just because sin is sin, this is not a fact of natural history, or a fact which natural history can discredit. Scripture has no interest in natural history, nor does such an interest help us to understand it. It is no doubt perfectly true that to the biologist death is part of the indispensable machinery of nature; it is a piece of the mechanism without which the movement of the whole would be arrested; to put it so, death to the biologist is part of the same whole as life, or life and death are for him aspects of one thing. One can admit this frankly without compromising, because without touching, the other and deeper truth which is so interesting and indeed so vital alike in the opening pages of revelation and in its consummation in the Atonement. The biologist, when he deals with man, and with his life and death, deliberately deals with them

in abstraction as merely physical phenomena; to him man is a piece of nature, and he is nothing more. But the Biblical writers deal with man in the integrity of his being, and in his relations to God; they transcend the distinction of natural and moral, because for God it is not final: they are sensible of the unity in things which the every-day mind, for practical purposes, finds it convenient to keep apart. It is one great instance of this that they are sensible of the unity of sin and death. We may call sin a spiritual thing, but the man who has never felt the shadow of death fall upon it does not know what that spiritual thing is; and we may call death a natural thing, but the man who has not felt its natural pathos deepen into tragedy as he faced it with the sense of sin upon him does not know what that natural thing is. We are here, in short, at the vanishing point of this distinction—God is present, and nature and spirit interpenetrate in His presence. We hear much in other connexions of the sacramental principle, and its importance for the religious interpretation of nature. It is a sombre illustration of this principle if we say that death is a kind of sacrament of sin. It is in death, ultimately, that the whole meaning of sin comes home to the sinner; he has not sounded it to its depths till he has discovered that this comes into it at last. And we must not suppose that when Paul read the third chapter of Genesis he read it as a mythological explanation of the origin of physical death, and accepted it as such on the authority of inspiration. With all his reverence for the Old Testament, Paul accepted nothing from it that did not speak to his conscience, and waken echoes there: and what so spoke to him from the third chapter of Genesis was not a mythical story of how death invaded Paradise, but the profound experience of the human race expressed in the story, an experience in which sin and death interpenetrate, interpret, and in a sense constitute each other. To us they are what they are only in relation

to each other, and when we deny the relation we see the reality of neither. This is the truth, as I apprehend it, of all we are taught either in the Old Testament or in the New about the relation of sin and death. It is part of the greater truth that what we call the physical and the spiritual worlds are ultimately one, being constituted with a view to each other; and most of the objections which are raised against it are special cases of the objections which are raised against the recognition of this ultimate unity. So far as they are such, it is not necessary to discuss them further, and so far as the ultimate unity of the natural and the spiritual is a truth rather to be experienced than demonstrated it is not probable that much can be done by argument to gain acceptance for the idea that sin and death have essential relations to each other. But there are particular objections to this idea to which it may be worth while to refer.

There is, to begin with, the undoubted fact that many people live and die without, consciously at least, recognizing this relation. The thought of death may have had a very small place in their lives, and when death itself comes it may for various reasons be a very insignificant experience to them. It may come in a moment, suddenly, and give no time for feeling; or it may come as the last step in a natural process of decay, and arrest life almost unconsciously; or it may come through a weakness in which the mind wanders to familiar scenes of the past, living these over again, and in a manner escaping by so doing the awful experience of death itself; or it may come in childhood before the moral consciousness is fully awakened, and moral reflection and experience possible. This last case, properly speaking, does not concern us; we do not know how to define sin in relation to those in whom the moral consciousness is as yet undeveloped; we only know that somehow or other they are involved in the

moral as well as in the natural unity of the race. But leaving them out of account, is there any real difficulty in the others? any real objection to the Biblical idea that sin and death in humanity are essentially related to each other? I do not think there is. To say that many people are unconscious of the connexion is only another way of saying that many people fail to realize in full and tragic reality what is meant by death and sin. They think very little about either the one or the other. The third chapter of Genesis could never have been written out of their conscience. Sin is not for them all one with despair; they are not, through fear of death, all their lifetime subject to bondage. Scripture, of course, has no difficulty in admitting this; it depicts, on the amplest scale, and in the most vivid colours, the very kind of life and death which are here supposed. But it does not consider that such a life and death are *ipso facto* a refutation of the truth it teaches about the essential relations of death and sin. On the contrary, it considers them a striking demonstration of that moral dulness and insensibility in man which must be overcome if he is ever to see and feel his sin as what it is to God, or welcome the Atonement as that in which God's forgiveness of sin is mediated through the tremendous experience of death. I know there are those who will call this arrogant or even insolent, as though I were passing a moral sentence on those who do not accept a theorem of mine; but I hope I do not need here to disclaim any such unchristian temper. Only, it is necessary to insist that the connexion of sin and death in Scripture is neither a fantastic piece of mythology, explaining, as mythology does, the origin of a physical law, nor, on the other hand, a piece of supernaturally revealed history, to be accepted on the authority of Him who has revealed it; in such revelations no one believes any longer; it is a profound conviction and experience of the human conscience, and all

that is of interest is to show that such a conviction and experience can never be set aside by the protest of those who aver that they know nothing about it. One must insist on this, however it may expose him to the charge of judging. Can we utter any moral truth at all, which is not universally acknowledged, without seeming to judge?

Sometimes, apart from the general denial of any connexion between death and sin, it is pointed out that death has another and a totally different character. Death in any given case may be so far from coming as a judgment of God, that it actually comes as a gracious gift from Him; it may even be an answer to prayer, a merciful deliverance from pain, an event welcomed by suffering human nature, and by all who sympathize with it. This is quite true, but again, one must point out, rests on the false abstraction so often referred to. Man is regarded in all this simply in the character of a sufferer, and death as that which brings suffering to an end; but that is not all the truth about man, nor all the truth about death. Physical pain may be so terrible that consciousness is absorbed and exhausted in it, sometimes even extinguished, but it is not to such abnormal conditions we should appeal to discover the deepest truths in the moral consciousness of man. If the waves of pain subsided, and the whole nature collected its forces again, and conscience was once more audible, death too would be seen in a different light. It might not indeed be apprehended at once, as Scripture apprehends it, but it would not be regarded simply as a welcome relief from pain. It would become possible to see in it something through which God spoke to the conscience, and eventually to realize its intimate relation to sin.

The objections we have just considered are not very serious, because they practically mean that death has no moral character at all; they reduce it to a natural phenomenon, and do not bring it into any relation to the con-

science. It is a more respectable, and perhaps a more formidable, objection when death is brought into the moral world, and it is urged that so far from being God's judgment upon sin, it may be itself a high moral achievement. A man may die greatly; his death may be a triumph; nothing in his life may become him like the leaving it. Is not this inconsistent with the idea that there is any peculiar connexion between death and sin? From the Biblical point of view the answer must again be in the negative. There is no such triumph over death as makes death itself a noble ethical achievement, which is not at the same time a triumph over sin. Man vanquishes the one only as in the grace of God he is able to vanquish the other. The doom that is in death passes away only as the sin to which it is related is transcended. But there is more than this to be said. Death cannot be so completely an action that it ceases to be a passion; it cannot be so completely achieved that it ceases to be accepted or endured. And in this last aspect of it the original character which it bore in relation to sin still makes itself felt. Transfigure it, as it may be transfigured, by courage, by devotion, by voluntary abandonment of life for a higher good, and it remains nevertheless the last enemy. There is something in it monstrous and alien to the spirit, something which baffles the moral intelligence, till the truth dawns upon us that for all our race sin and death are aspects of one thing. If we separate them, we understand neither; nor do we understand the solemn greatness of martyrdom itself if we regard it as a triumph only, and eliminate from the death which martyrs die all sense of the universal relation in humanity of death and sin. No one knew the spirit of the martyr more thoroughly than St. Paul. No one could speak more confidently and triumphantly of death than he. No one knew better how to turn the passion into action, the endurance into a great

spiritual achievement. But also, no one knew better than he, in consistency with all this, that sin and death are needed for the interpretation of each other, and that fundamentally, in the experience of the race, they constitute one whole. Even when he cried, "O death, where is thy sting?" he was conscious that "the sting of death is sin." Each, so to speak, had its reality in the other. No one could vanquish death who had not vanquished sin. No one could know what sin meant without tasting death. These were not mythological fancies in St. Paul's mind, but the conviction in which the Christian conscience experimentally lived, and moved, and had its being. And these convictions, I repeat, furnish the point of view from which we must appreciate the Atonement, i.e. the truth that forgiveness, as Christianity preaches it, is specifically mediated through Christ's death.

JAMES DENNEY.

THE VALUE-JUDGEMENTS OF RELIGION.

II.

EXPOSITORY AND HISTORICAL (*continued*).

II. Otto Ritschl, Reischle and Scheibe on Value-Judgements.

(1) *Otto Ritschl*, the son of the founder of the school, claims that in his pamphlet *Concerning Value-judgements*, he stands for the position held by his father, which he, "although in a still in some measure undeveloped form, rather assumed than illumined and made distinct on its varied sides." (*a*) He begins with a *historical survey*, in which he traces the idea of value-judgements to *Luther*, but the name to *Kant*. In *Luther's* view what distinguished religious from all other knowledge was the incomparable

interest of the objects of faith for the religious subject. "It is not enough," says Luther, "that a man believes that God is, that Christ suffered, and suchlike; but he must steadfastly believe that God is God for His blessedness, that Christ suffered for him, died, was crucified, rose again, that He bore his sins for him." *Kant* made a distinction between "relative value, that is, a price" and "inner value, that is, worthiness." In comparison with talent which has a commercial, and temperament which has an emotional price, character has "an inner worth, and is raised above all price," for "any man calls agreeable what delights him; beautiful what simply pleases him; good what is esteemed, approved, that is, in which he places an objective value." On account of his insistence on the simplicity of the psychological process of moral judgement, his refusal to recognize any admixture of feeling in it, he was prevented using the term value-judgement, although he brought into use one very similar to it, namely, *taste-judgement*. *Herbart* contrasted "theoretical representations, the subject of which is regarded as an indifferent one," and "aesthetic judgements," which express a "spontaneous involuntary preference or rejection," and affirm that the subject "is to be preferred or rejected." He, too, insisted that to be morally effective religion must make an aesthetic as well as a moral impression. *De Wette*, in developing the ideas of Kant, recognized this process of valuation as a motive to action, distinguished different stages of it from the sensuous to the spiritual, and, practically, identified religious faith with "the highest and purest feeling of value." But even he, although coming so near, does not yet hit on the term value-judgements. *Lotze* has rendered the greatest service in the development of the theory. He affirms that the value or valuelessness cannot belong to things in themselves, but exists only in the form of a feeling of pleasure or pain, experienced by a spirit

capable of feeling; that in this capacity of valuation by the feelings of the subject has "as authoritative a revelation of the purpose of the world," as the laws of reasoning afford an indispensible instrument of experience; that the world of forms is to be distinguished from the world of values, which may be identified with the world of ends. The use made of these ideas and even the term value-judgements in more recent philosophical literature has affected theological thought so slightly, if at all, that Otto Ritschl does not deem it necessary to pursue the historical inquiry further, but proceeds to discuss his father's, Herrmann's and Kaftan's views, a discussion into which we need not follow him, but may at once deal with his own contribution to the subject.

(*b*) *First* of all he gives us a *psychological analysis* of value-judgement generally, in which he calls attention to the following facts:—(1) The soul is one, and, therefore, none of its functions of thinking, feeling or willing is exercised apart from the others. (2) Few men are fitted for purely intellectual pursuits, that is, the exercise of thought without emotion or volition. (3) The judgements of childhood express, to begin with, pleasure or pain, that is, the value of objects to the feeling self. (4) As we become more familiar with objects, our feelings regarding them become less lively, and customary judgements take the place of value-judgements. (5) A further process of abstraction, in which the other functions are suppressed as far as possible in order that the powers of the mind may be exercised on the object without distraction from them, results in *theoretical judgements*, in which we are concerned about the nature, cause and relations of the object, irrespective of its effect on ourselves. (6) The emotional loss in this process is compensated for by a moral gain, as we learn self-control as well as acquire knowledge. (*c*) The results of this psychological inquiry are next applied to the treatment of

the nature of religious knowledge. Briefly, to state his conclusions: we exercise faith in God because we expect help from God, and we value our faith because by it we gain this confidence that God can and will help us. All further developments of the religious life have this confidence in God as their basis, and, therefore, in the last resort are dependent on the value to us of our faith. As in childhood, the capacity for forming value-judgements is greatest, and lessens as the power of abstract thinking is developed, the childlike spirit is characteristic of religion, and religious impressions are less easily received if the intellectual faculties have been developed at the expense of the emotional and the volitional. It is natural, therefore that religious knowledge should assume the form of value-judgements, as religion is so closely related to the emotional and volitional functions of human personality, and so adversely affected by the exclusive exercise of the intellect. (*d*) A common objection needs to be met. To affirm that religious knowledge consists of value-judgments seems to some equivalent to denying them all objective validity. Otto Ritschl boldly meets this objection. "To set in opposition to one another value-judgements and so-called 'existence-judgements,' and then to identify the theoretical judgements with the so-called 'existence-judgements,' as if the value-judgements expressed a non-existence, is a quite senseless misrepresentation of the mental process which really takes place," for "all human beings regard as also genuine and real the objects they perceive, which they in fact first recognized in value-judgements," inasmuch as these objects meet all the practical tests of reality. In value-judgements we assume the reality of the subjects to which we assign predicates as much as in theoretical judgements; they are both existence-judgements, only in the one case the predicates express the relation of the subject to ourselves as realized in our feelings, and in the other case their

nature as discovered by observation. What gives us pleasure or pain is as real to us as what we know. The exercise of religious faith, and the accompanying affirmation of the reality of its objects is a necessity for man, and science is quite incapable of denying that reality, for these objects as supersensuous lie altogether beyond its proper province. Faith does not need any demonstration of that reality, such as science offers of the objects which it deals with; for in Christian experience the evidence of that reality, expressed in value-judgements, is being ever verified and vitalized. For this reason Otto Ritschl refuses to separate, as Kaftan proposes, the contents of religious knowledge as expressed in theoretical propositions, from its evidences, as given in value-judgements, as it is in the one contact with supersensuous reality that we recognize the contents and receive the evidences of our religious knowledge. Our religious knowledge not only begins, but also continues, as personal conviction, in our being personally affected in our emotions by the objects of our faith. Accordingly he admits that religious knowledge cannot claim the universal validity of scientific knowledge, because only those who feel the value can also believe in the reality of these objects, while all that science deals with can be known by all whose perceptive and reasoning powers are sound. But as there are certain religious values given in history, we may by means of them get a step nearer to the objectivity we seek. (*e*) The testimony of history is that the highest spiritual value attaches to religion, and that that religion will assert its supremacy, in which "the objects of faith will of necessity prove themselves as the only genuine and real ones." Christians anticipate that triumph for their faith not only because in their experience it has proved its power and truth, but also because the hope of its victory is essential to it. It is in the Christian life as displayed in human history that the proof of the truth of

Christianity lies, and if that proof were more convincing there would be less demand for any theoretical proof. (*f*) A second objection to the theory of value-judgements is dealt with in the last section of the pamphlet. It has been urged that this distinction of theoretical and value-judgements involves a double truth. The answer is this. If science, which is expressed in theoretical judgements, and religion, the knowledge of which consists of value-judgements, confine themselves to their respective spheres they cannot come into conflict. Different religions may be competing rivals, but not science and religion, which, on the contrary, may be helpful allies, as religion may inspire the moral qualities which the pursuit of science demands, and science may furnish that knowledge and skill which a man needs to fulfil his vocation.

(2) *Max Reischle* has been led by the theological controversies which have raged in Germany around this subject to make the attempt by a more thorough investigation to lay the storm, and bring a calm. (*a*) Without here considering the review of this controversy with which he begins his book, we may at once address ourselves to the subject of his second chapter, an *Analysis of the Conceptions "Value" and "Value-judgement" in their simplest Application.* "I assign value," he says, "to an object of which, *on reflection*, I am sure that *its reality* affords, or would afford, *satisfaction to my whole self*, and indeed a higher satisfaction than its non-existence. . . . The feeling of value becomes clearer, surer, and steadier when it rests on a fixed *value-judgement*, which is "a judgement in which to any object a predicate of value is assigned." As we may be in error regarding ourselves or the object, or both, these judgements may be false; if our knowledge is accurate they are likely to be true. (*b*) There are several classes of these value-judgements, and they may be so arranged as to form an order, approaching more closely to

universal validity. The lowest class is the *hedonistic*, "which are grounded on man's natural capacity for pleasure, and grow out of it under natural conditions by natural necessity." These may be *individual*, or *collective*, where a number of persons share common interests; or *general*, where, with or without qualifications, we have a right to assume common susceptibilities. To all these judgements we have experience only to justify our assigning a wider or narrower universality. Only when a norm or standard is recognized as authoritative for all, can we affirm universal validity. That is, can we say, not only that these objects have value, but also that they ought to have value for all. We then pass from *hedonistic* to *ideal* value-judgements, which are *aesthetic*, concerned with beauty, or *intellectual*, affirming the worth of truth to man; or *ethical*, recognizing an unconditional ought for conduct and character; or *religious*, which as *legislative* define what is, or is not piety, and as *applied* express approval or condemnation of religions or persons. "The ideal value-judgements," he says, "are the expression of a personal deed, the inner recognition of the ideas of beauty, truth, morality, religion, in the last resort, of freedom"; and "we must recognize these ideas if we do not want to renounce our personal rational existence," to which we must assign an unconditional value. To these two classes there may be added a third—*legal* value-judgements, the norm of which is law or custom, and these are intermediate between the other classes. (*c*) Value-judgements may be determined as such from several points of view. "If a relation of value is assigned to an object as a predicate," we have a value-judgement from the *verbal* standpoint. When a judgement is due to, or results in, a personal valuation, the *psychological* is the standpoint. When, not the compulsion of perception and reasoning, but the attitude of the personal subject to the object is determina-

tive in a judgement, then we have a value-judgement from the *epistemological* standpoint. Whether these latter judgements have universal validity or not depends on "the teleological necessity" of the relation of the subject to the object; what is essential to man's personal existence has this warrant. (*d*) Among these classes of value-judgements, from these different standpoints, it is necessary to assign to the propositions of faith their proper place. It is seldom that they are merely value-judgements from the verbal standpoint. They often affirm a fact, and not only assert a worth, yet it would be a mistake to call them *existence-judgements* or *theoretical judgements on the basis of value-judgements*, for this would breed confusion with regard to the origin of the two kinds of judgement. In so far as the propositions imply personal conviction, that is, are held with more or less feeling, they are *value-judgements* from the psychological standpoint. Epistemologically they are value-judgements, or, as Reischle proposes to call value-judgements from the epistemological standpoint, *thymetic* judgements of an "ideal, personal, morally conditioned religious" kind. But they are not postulates assuming the existence of their objects simply on the ground of the value of these to the religious subject, but they are "*judgements of trust* directed to the normative divine revelation." (*e*) The last question in relation to value-judgements dealt with is that of their universal validity. Reischle denies the charge made by some of the opponents of the Ritschlian school, that the theory of value-judgements is intended to be a pretext for evading the problem altogether. "None of the more distinguished followers of Ritschl," he declares, "has fallen into this delusion; but they have occupied themselves in the most lively way with the problem whether and how the truth of the Christian faith can be proved." He holds that such a proof must be attempted, if "Christianity is not to renounce the claim to be the

absolute religion, and if the power of Christian missions is not to be broken." Although the theoretical reason cannot prove either the truth or falsehood of the propositions of faith, yet a proof for their truth can be drawn from the practical considerations that the only sufficient help in man's moral conflict is found in Christianity, and that the faith which accepts Christ as a divine revelation finds its own justification. There is not, however, any dualism in knowledge, because the theoretical and practical reason belong to the same personality, the activity of each is the complement of the other; and, as by the growing accord of the one with the other the unity of the spiritual life is attained, the Christian gains the assurance that what has worth for him will prove itself truth to all, and that among all his spiritual activities religion claims the sovereignty.

(3) *Max Scheibe*, in his pamphlet on the *Significance of the Value-judgements for Religious Knowledge*, also begins with a brief historical introduction, and next discusses at some length the views of Ritschl, Herrmann, and Kaftan. Against their statements of the theory he mentions two objections which enjoy general currency. From the side of religion it is objected that although all the theologians of this school intend to assert the reality of the objects of faith, that is, the truth of religious knowledge, yet they give no adequate justification of this assertion, and even themselves cast doubt on it by denying that the objects of faith are accessible to theoretical knowledge, or at least by Herrmann's talk about two kinds of reality and truth, or Kaftan's claim that purpose is the highest category even for science. In the interests of science it is objected that by this theory religious knowledge is relieved of all obligation to be intelligible or rational. (*a*) Before dealing with the subject of religious knowledge with reference to these objections, Scheibe offers some remarks on the meaning of "value" and "value-judgements." Value-judgements are

those in which an object is measured by a standard. This standard does not lie in the object, but in ourselves, who have the faculty of setting up norms, not as beings who simply know, but as beings who feel pleasure or pain. Value-judgements do not express what the object is in itself, but what it is for us who have such standards by our faculty of feeling bound up with our personality. These judgements are of three kinds—*hedonistic*, *aesthetic*, and *moral*. Even the moral judgements are determined by norms which lie in our feelings, for moral distinctions, independent as they are of our own wishes, rise in our consciousness as feelings of approval or detestation. The moral values are not determined by individual wilfulness, but are expressions of "the universal spirit in us, the will of God." Although it is by our individual feelings, yet it is an universal necessity that we become aware of in our moral value-judgements. The aesthetic as well as the moral judgements are easily obscured by individual inclinations, and no rational demonstration can secure the recognition of these values, but they must be personally experienced, that is, the certainty of their truth is more closely bound up with the personality than is logical necessity, although that, too, is an inner experience. (*b*) According to Scheibe religion is "the consciousness of humble dependence on God, and of loving communion with Him." Religious knowledge is concerned with the means and the ways of meeting this need of God. (i.) The object to which religious knowledge is directed is not the states of the religious subject, but "an existence which is for consciousness transcendent." The religious judgements do not affirm merely certain effects within us, but also the causes of these without us, the qualities in the divine action which explain our experiences. As the religious judgements affirm transcendent reality, they appear as theoretical or existence-judgements. Ritschl's statement that "religious knowledge

consists of value-judgements is, therefore, misleading and inappropriate," although he means only to affirm that the contents of religious knowledge have the highest value for man, and by no means to deny that these objects really exist. Although we cannot know God in Himself apart from the effects of His action in us, yet "the proper object of faith is not the operation we experience, but the cause in the self-existent nature of God, which we must assume to be assured of the truth of this operation." What is religiously valuable would at once lose its value if it were assumed not to exist really. We must believe that God really helps those who trust Him, if our confidence in His help is to have any value for us. Both kinds of judgement affirm reality: their difference lies in their *mode of origin.* (ii.) Scientific knowledge is gained by observation, and by reasoning on the observed facts. It demands the exclusion as far as possible of all personal interests which might prevent impartial observation and reasoning. The value of the object known to the subject knowing is to be rigorously excluded from all scientific judgements. But with religious knowledge it is entirely different. Man gets his religious knowledge as he gets his religion. The practical need to affirm his personality with its ideals drives him to religion—leads him, therefore, to recognize the existence of God. "Religion *demands* with confidence the existence of God, *because* it needs Him, and *as* it needs Him." Not only the evidence for God's existence is thus practically conditioned, but even the contents of the conception. While in science personal interest disturbs knowledge, "in religion it is essential to knowledge." Faith is a confidence that that is which ought to "be to meet man's religious needs." "The judgement 'God is love' is not a value-judgement, but it is *based* on the value-judgement and the religious value-judgement, 'The love of God is religiously valuable.'" "The judgements of religious

knowledge are not value-judgements, but they are postulates on the basis of value-judgements." But these postulates are not individual wishes, they are universal necessities. (iii.) As the origin of the two kinds of judgements is different, so is their *certainty*. While in both cases the certainty is subjective, in scientific knowledge the certainty has nothing to do with our personal condition, our feelings of pleasure or pain, our sense of weal or woe, but is altogether determined by the necessity of the case, the nature of the object; but in religious knowledge the certainty depends on our personal choice and experience. Christian truths are not understood by every man who thinks, their meaning is disclosed only to him who has a sense of their worth to himself personally and individually in relation to his own salvation. (iv.) Nevertheless the objects of religious faith are not imaginations, inventions, illusions, but realities; and accordingly, "however different the origin and the certainty" of religious and scientific knowledge, "they both belong to *the same province*." The possibility of conflict must be recognized, and, therefore, the necessity of a reconciliation and harmony of both must be asserted. *Herrmann's* solution of the problem that in each case *reality* and *truth* have another meaning cannot be accepted, as reality can never mean anything else than actual existence irrespective of our ideas or desires, and truth than the correspondence of our knowledge with this reality. "There are not two realities and two truths, but only two ways to the knowledge of the one reality and the one truth." Are the results of both methods of knowing capable of a combination? *Ritschl* declares that the results of metaphysics and of the Christian world-view mutually exclude each other, because metaphysics is indifferent to the contrast of nature and spirit; while for religion the recognition of the difference is essential. But it is only a materialistic metaphysics which denies the

difference and seeks to explain the spiritual by the physical, and that can be disproved as a metaphysics. So, too, the metaphysical conception of the absolute is not, as Ritschl holds, irreconcilable with the Christian idea of God, but is even necessary to it. The *causal* and *teleological* interpretations of the world, when they recognize their respective limits, do not contradict one another. The causal interpretation cannot yield a complete world-view, for it cannot do justice to the aesthetic, moral, and religious consciousness; it must be supplemented by a teleological, in which these elements of the total reality to be interpreted can alone come to their own. In the teleological interpretation, even the distinctively religious, the categories of the causal must be employed, such as substance, cause, mutual action, change, time, and space. "As for the representation of our religious knowledge, we employ the same categories as in our theoretical thought, all our religious judgements, although practically conditioned, are also theoretical judgements." Theology must accordingly take into account the meaning which metaphysics assigns to the categories employed in giving to the objects of faith an intelligible form, and on this side religious knowledge cannot claim to be independent of theoretical knowledge. For instance, theoretical knowledge has a right to investigate the conception of the physical filial relation of Jesus to God as regards its intelligibility, but on his worth for religion as the source of new spiritual life it can pronounce no judgement. "A scientific proof for the truth of religious knowledge there is not, and cannot be." Its truth can be proved only as its worth is experienced. All science can do for religion is to show that there is no necessary conflict between them, and that "a particular religion is best suited to fill up the gaps left by science, and thus also to satisfy the demands of the understanding, which it cannot meet by its own means and powers."

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

GOD AS SPIRIT.

"God is a Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth."—*St. John* iv. 24.

THESE words are often quoted as if they were simple and easy to interpret. They are, in fact, quite the reverse. They introduce us to a subject at once the most difficult and the most important that can be offered for our consideration. For the subject is the nature of God, and that is the most difficult of themes. One need not be a theologian to understand that man's limited powers are not equal to the task of comprehending the Infinite and Eternal Being who is the source and spring of all created life. When we have said all that we know about God, we have not said half that ought to be said; we are fortunate, indeed, if we say nothing that ought to be left unsaid. No one who has tried to express to others his best thoughts about God is likely to claim that his words were satisfactory even to himself. This is the most difficult subject in the whole field of speculation.

And, as it is the most difficult, so it is also the most important subject in all the world. For upon a man's answer to the question, What is God? will depend not only his theories about life but a good deal of his practice. And the refusal to consider the question leads at last to the mental temper which the Psalmist describes as that of the fool who says in his heart, *There is no God*[1]—the fool who believes whatever it gives him least trouble to believe.

I will consider first the implications of that definition or description of God which our Lord gave when He said "God is Spirit." It is hardly a definition; perhaps a definition of the Infinite is something of a contradiction

[1] Ps xiv. 1.

in terms. We must not expect to reach an exact or adequate definition. But at any rate the words of Christ suggest certain deep truths about the Divine Existence, which are always necessary for us to remember.

God is Spirit. We can only interpret such a saying through what we know of finite spirits, of the spirit of man, of our own selves. In truth we do not know a great deal even about this. What we call personality in man is something which psychologists find it increasingly difficult to define. Not to speak of abnormal cases in which the man seems to be possessed of a dual personality —or perhaps we ought to say in which two persons seem to inhabit the same body by turns—every one who has studied the ordinary phenomena of personal consciousness knows that the relation of spirit to body is hardly more clearly understood now than it was in the infancy of science. It is a secret which eludes and baffles the most patient inquiry. But the broad fact which forces itself upon our attention is that the spirit of man manifests itself in and through his material body, which we may call its home or its prisonhouse as we will, but which is, in any case, its ordinary habitation. Man's spirit resides, for the present at least, in a body which is its appropriate channel of communication with the outer world, while it is at the same time no merely passive resident, responsive inevitably to the interaction of organ and organ. In other words man's spirit, as we know it most familiarly, dwells in an environment to which it is superior. It transcends the physical order which yet is the medium through which its energy displays itself.

Now when we examine the Old Testament revelation about God, we find that stress is laid upon exactly these two aspects of Infinite Spirit. On the one hand we find it everywhere implied that the Spirit of God dwells in nature which is the sphere of His activity. *Whither shall*

I go from Thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from Thy presence? asks the Psalmist. *If I ascend up into heaven, Thou art there; if I make my bed in Sheol, behold Thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall Thy hand lead me.*[1] *The whole earth is full of His glory*[2] is the prophet's cry, amplified by Christian devotion in the great words of the *Te Deum*, which declare not only earth but heaven to be full of the majesty of God's glory. And, on the other hand, it is taught again and again in Scripture that God transcends the universe which He has made, that we are not to think of Him solely as the Life or the soul of the world—though these be true thoughts—but also as the Author and Ruler of all, controlling every operation of Nature, although we see not His hand. *His way is in the sea, and His path in the great waters* though *His footsteps be not known.*[3] Our conception of the Supreme is neither reasonable nor Biblical unless we think of Him as Spirit who is at once *in* and *above* Nature, who dwells in the nature which He rules. As Spirit, God pervades and vivifies and consecrates the visible order of things.

To say then that *God is Spirit* implies a great deal more than that He is not to be identified with the material forces of the universe. We might almost say that if this were all that these words mean they would convey no very deep lesson. There may, indeed, be races of men so low in the scale of intelligence that they do not perceive the impiety of giving the awful title "God" to any material object. Fetish worshippers *may* perhaps be found who are ready to adore sticks and stones as Deity, who actually identify God with the image they have made of Him. But the dwellers in Western Europe are unlikely to have much to do with beliefs of that sort. Every

[1] Ps. cxxxix. 7. [2] Isa. vi. 3. [3] Ps. lxxvii. 19.

educated and intelligent man recognizes that whatever else we are to believe about God we *must* believe Him to be a Spiritual Being. Spirit is the highest category we know, and we are forced by a paramount necessity of reason to think of God as Spirit. But it is of real importance that we should understand the implications of this grave truth, and that we should not overlook the way in which it is presented throughout the Bible.

In the case of the human spirit, as has been said already, we know that it operates in and through a physical organism, the connexion between the two being so close and intimate that it is beyond our powers of imagination to conceive what the manner of existence of a disembodied spirit could be. Experience itself would teach us that the contrast between body and spirit is not of a nature which hinders their interaction. And what experience suggests is confirmed by the deepest philosophy which we have yet reached. The lofty idealism of a Berkeley or a Hegel does not deny the practical significance of what is called *matter*. It seeks, indeed, to express it in terms of spirit, but it does not suppose that thereby reality is denied to the external world in which we find ourselves. Nor, again, however we express the relation between spirit and matter, is it a maxim of idealist philosophy that matter is necessarily evil, or that its laws are hostile to the revelation of the Infinite Spirit whose life it interprets to us. There is no room in modern speculation for a dualism which sets matter over against spirit, or which finds, as the Gnostics believed, that the claims of both cannot be adjusted. When we say, then, that *God is Spirit*, we do not mean, nor does Scripture anywhere suggest, that matter is an evil thing, that God is hostile to, or that He keeps aloof from, the works of His own hands. For everything that He created *in the beginning* He found to be *very good*. It was the Spirit of God that brooded

on the face of the waters in the days before the making of man.

The suggestions of experience—the inferences of philosophy, the teaching of the Old Testament—all alike find themselves confirmed and explained by the revelation which is the centre of the Christian faith, that *the Word became flesh*, that the Eternal Spirit entered into union with the universe which was His own. *God is Spirit*; but the Incarnation of the Son of God has made it certain that the spiritual may reveal itself through the material. Of the Eternal Spirit it is said, "The womb of a Virgin did He not abhor." Man's body, as well as his soul, is a sacred thing, for it has been the temple of the Highest. What God has cleansed we dare not call common. Within our experience it is through the earthly that the heavenly is revealed and received. We need to remember that any philosophy—whether it call itself Gnostic or Spiritualist or Puritan—which seeks to divorce spirit from matter is not the philosophy of the Christian religion. And this has practical no less than theoretical consequences.

God is Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth. That is sometimes repeated as if it meant that any act of worship in which man's body takes part as well as his soul is necessarily unspiritual. But nothing could be further from the meaning of the words. The warning, indeed, is always needed that no worship in which man's spirit does not join can be true or acceptable worship. We do not express our inmost selves by mere outward acts unless our wills co-operate with our gestures and our words. There can be no communion of man with man unless there is an interaction of mind with mind; mere bodily proximity is of no avail. And this which is true of the communications of finite spirits, the one with the other, is true also of the com-

munication of the spirit of man with the Spirit of God. There must be *personal* contact for an act of worship. But to suppose that the outpouring of the spirit must necessarily be less real or less sincere if it is accompanied by bodily acts is as unreasonable as to suppose that the affection we feel for our friends is rendered less genuine by the expression of it in words. Rather is it true that, as the body is the soul's appropriate organ and instrument, so the soul's instincts towards God are encouraged and stimulated by the effort, however imperfect, to express them by outward act or word. What calls itself worship is not worship at all, unless it be the outpouring of the spirit, but it is none the less worship if it manifest itself, as all deep emotions do, in outward guise. That we may mistake the outward sign for the inward grace is sadly true, but that does not justify us in denying the presence or the efficacy of the inward grace merely because it is accompanied by an outward sign. And too often has it happened that the neglect of outward religious observances has led to the abandonment of all inward strivings of the spirit after God.

We have, then, reached this point. The revelation of God as Spirit, which is now an inherited conviction of the immense majority of the human race, does not supply us with any justification for making little of the material medium through which it has pleased God to reveal Himself—in creation, in history, in the individual experience of men, most chiefly in the life of the Son of man. We do very ill if we think to approach God more nearly by despising that which He has not despised. Worship must be in spirit if it is to be in truth, but that does not exclude the expression of worship in material and outward form.

God is Spirit, and therefore He reveals Himself as the Transcendent One, Immense, Eternal, Infinite, the Lord

of Nature, the Master of human life. And so we say in awe and adoration, "I believe in God the Father Almighty."

God is Spirit, and yet that does not place an impassable barrier between Him and the creatures whom He has made. It is easier to grasp the revelation that we, the sons of men, are made in that awful Image when we remember that the Son of God became the Son of man. And so we say in thankfulness: "I believe in Jesus Christ, His only Son, our Lord."

God is Spirit, ever present in the world which He *upholds by the word of His power,*[1] ready to bless and to guide the poorest human soul which flings itself on His protection. And so we dare to say in reverence and in hope: "I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord, and Giver of Life."

J. H. Bernard.

[1] Heb. i. 3.

JAMES MARTINEAU AND FREDERIC ROBERTSON.

A STUDY OF INFLUENCE.

In his biography of Robertson of Brighton the Rev. Stopford Brooke writes: "He read James Martineau's books with pleasure and profit. The influence of *The Endeavours after a Christian Life* can be traced through many of his sermons." That is the text of this article.

I purpose to show that there was a relationship of teacher and pupil between the two preachers. Robertson, we are told, was "the child of no theological father." True; but "he easily received impressions. Some of his highest and best thoughts were kindled by sparks which fell from the minds of his friends. He took their ideas . . . and used them as his own; but they were always made more practical and better for the use." One from whom he borrowed says of him, "It was not that he appropriated what belonged to others, but that he made it his own by the same tenure as property is first held by the worth he gave it." (*Life and Letters*, p. 47.) With a mind of his order it was inevitable that acquaintance with and use of sermons like Martineau's should go hand in hand. He had not only a sensitive and sympathetic temperament, but also a wonderfully retentive memory. Books read became a part of himself. Unconsciously ideas absorbed long before were reproduced, sometimes with but slight alteration in their setting. Possessed, moreover, of a rare poetic spirit, a deep love for Nature, and a keen insight into her beauty and meaning, coupled with devotional fervour and spiritual vision, he was irresistibly drawn by a preacher of like characteristics. Further, his revolt from Evangelicalism led him to a position identical in one important respect with Martineau's. Both loved to "linger

near the common springs of all human piety and hope"; and to Robertson the beautiful thoughts, which stud every page of the *Endeavours*, would be veritable wells of consolation in his own needs and fountains of inspiration in his work of satisfying the needs of others.

His use of Martineau's writings affords valuable lessons to preachers. The question often arises, "To what extent and in what manner is it lawful to borrow sermonic materials?" With young preachers especially the question is of moment. Susceptible through their very youth to the influence of master minds, and occasionally overborne by the pressure of pulpit duties, they run the risk of delivering sermons which are mainly mosaics of borrowed materials. The charge of absolute plagiarism may be avoided by conscientious acknowledgment of indebtedness; but the danger is to neglect such acknowledgment. In the manuscript the quotation marks appear; but in preaching the conventional phrases indicating indebtedness prove so embarrassing, that at last they are omitted, and the preacher becomes a plagiarist, literally as well as morally. Especially is danger encountered by the extemporaneous speaker, who reads widely and remembers accurately. In the rush of utterance favourite passages may be reproduced, almost verbatim, without acknowledgment, although perhaps without clear consciousness of theft. On the other hand, the over-conscientious take infinite pains to clothe borrowed thoughts in garments which fit them badly, in the belief that thus plagiarism is avoided, or they eliminate passages, the essence of which was legitimately their own, because they seem reminiscent of another's work.

In these respects Robertson's use of the *Endeavours* is a valuable object lesson. Large parts of Martineau's sermons reappear in his own, sometimes on the same, sometimes on a cognate text. He does not shrink from using freely both thoughts and expressions, ideas and images. Recognizing

that even a genius is largely the product of heredity and environment, and that originality often consists in the apt use of existing material, he does not hesitate to borrow, nor is he harassed by fears such as beset weaker minds. But his method of borrowing is *not* that of the plagiarist. The thread of thought is woven into the texture of his intellectual being; it becomes a part of himself. The product of the loom is not Martineau, but Robertson. He solves the problem, how to use copiously, yet honestly, the work of another's intellect. And this is so because he does not read in order to borrow, but borrows because he has read and assimilated.

To the psychologist his methods are full of interest. The thoughts of one great mind are thrown into solution, precipitated and crystallized into new forms by the subtle forces of another mind, equally great in different fashion. Characteristics peculiar to the Master disappear, and others emerge distinctive of the pupil. Such variations indicate not only differences of natural constitution but also modifications by education and environment. Had Robertson's sermons been preserved verbatim, there would doubtless have been a still wider field for interesting research.

Examination reveals traces of the influence of 37 out of the 43 sermons in the *Endeavours* upon at least 62 of the 125 published sermons of Robertson. These 62 may be thus divided:—(1) Seven, which could not have been what they are had the *Endeavours* not been written. (2) Twenty-five, in which there is either strong general resemblance, or debt incurred either in one long or several shorter passages. (3) Thirty, where the resemblance, though slight, is distinct, or where there is at least one short passage, the inspiration of which is undoubted.

About 10 of the 30 lectures on Genesis, and 11 of the 55 on Corinthians come also under the second and third heads.

Further, in several of Robertson's letters, and in one at least of his public addresses, reminiscent passages are found.

The first series of the *Endeavours* was published in the summer of 1843. Robertson had then completed the first year of his curacy at Cheltenham. He was still what he had been at the University and during his first curacy at Winchester, an upright, faithful follower of Evangelicalism. But during the next year "doubts and questionings began to stir in his mind" through his reading and widening experience. Possibly the *Endeavours* formed a part of that reading. What is practically a description of his own mental conflict at this time (*Addresses and Literary Remains*, pp. 49, 50) might almost have been penned by the author of "The Strength of the Lonely." This conflict lasted throughout his Cheltenham ministry. It is at least a curious coincidence that, immediately before his revolt from Evangelicalism began, the first series of the *Endeavours* was published, whilst the second appeared in the autumn of 1847, just as the new incumbent of Trinity left behind him the "traditional" faith, and with "the surges still below him, and the last cloud drifted from the sky above, stood upon the rock at last."

The earliest suggestion of influence is in "The Christian's Hope and Destiny Hereafter" (*Human Race*, p. 46), preached on June 20, 1847. Three weeks later "The Kingdom of Heaven" was indebted to Martineau's two sermons on "The Kingdom of God within us." The texts are different; but preachers will see significance in the fact that Martineau's central thought is the heart of Robertson's text, whilst very early Robertson quotes Martineau's.

I find no other trace of influence in the seven sermons preserved of the pre-Brighton Ministry. Of the nine Brighton sermons of 1847–8, the earliest, "Elijah on

Mount Carmel," shows knowledge of "The Strength of the Lonely" (*Endeavours*, p. 159, cf. *Human Race*, p. 87). But, with one exception, the rest are barren. The time was scarcely favourable. The year 1848 was marked by revolution in Europe and unrest in England. On the burning questions of the day no man of Robertson's character and convictions could be silent. But these would take him away from the spiritual serenity of the *Endeavours*.

The ministry of 1849 is more prolific, 14 of the 22 sermons of the year being affected. "In 1849 Robertson's genius was most productive and most clear." Great public questions were still to the fore, but, especially towards the close of the year, he turned to the inner sanctities lying behind the controversial. There he walked the path trodden by the author of the *Endeavours*, breathed air laden with the fragrance of the flowers of his thought, heard the soul-music which still echoed along the way.

The fine discourse on "Jacob's Wrestling" was delivered on June 10, after an early Communion with a large number of young people just after Confirmation. The occasion touched Robertson deeply, and it is significant to note whither he turned for inspiration. The picture of the soul face to face with a great crisis (*Sermons*, I. p. 38, cf. p. 51) is painted with Martineau's own colours. In speaking of the moments which "strip off the hollowness of our outside show," he uses a favourite image of his teacher's in a connexion not unlike that in which it occurs in "Silence and Meditation" (*Endeavours*, p. 187), although it was immediately derived from "Where is thy God?" (*Ibid.* p. 252). Part of this latter sermon is the seed of a beautiful growth in the passages dealing with the words in the text, "Tell me, I pray thee, thy name," and "Wherefore dost thou ask after my name?"

MARTINEAU.

"To a wise man there is no surer mark of decline in the spirit of people than the corruption of their language, and the loss of meaning from their highest and most sacred words. Observe the lowered meaning of the word 'Religion'" (*Endeavours*, p. 251).

ROBERTSON.

"Words had lost their meaning. . . . The period in which every keen and wise observer knows that the decay of national religious feeling has begun. That decay in the meaning of words, that lowering of the standard of the ideas for which they stand, is a certain mark of this. . . . The name of God shares this fate" (*Sermons*, I. p. 43).

When Robertson declares that "Names have a strange power of hiding God," he is paraphrasing Martineau's "Words cannot encroach upon the sphere of silence without banishing the presence of God," and drawing upon another sermon, "The Sphere of Silence, Man's." Elsewhere we find indebtedness to "Where is thy God?" Note the contrast in the following:—

"In answer to the earnest cry of society, 'What shall we do to be saved from all our miseries and sins?' there are countless fragmentary answers. 'Give us more bread,' says one" (*Endeavours*, p. 263).

"What is the cry that comes from the most real part of his nature? Is it the cry for daily bread? Is it even this, to be forgiven our sins?" (*Sermons*, I. p. 45).

Especially worthy of attention is the embodiment of the central thought of Martineau's sermon in the peroration of Robertson's:—

"If you ask in these days what a man's religion is, you are told of his habits and opinions, his conventional professions. But you have obtained no insight into what he is. Yet . . . if we knew his religion in the true and ancient sense, we should see him as God alone can. This is the master key . . . what does a man secretly admire and worship?

"What is the name of your God? Not in the sense of this age, but in the sense of Jacob's age? What is the *name* of the Deity of your worship? . . . What do you adore in your heart of hearts? What is the name oftenest on your lips in your unfettered, spontaneous moments? If we overheard your secret thoughts, who and

What should we hear in the soliloquies of his unguarded mind? This in the truth of things constitutes his religion, determines his precise place in the spiritual ranks. Every man's highest, nameless though it be, is his living God. . . . The classifications produced by this principle are not what you will meet with in any 'sketch of all religions' . . . Many a man's chief aim is to obtain ease, or wealth, or dignity . . . himself easy . . . rich . . . grand . . . famous. . . . This is Atheism. . . . Beyond this stage Idolatry" . . . (pp. 251–257).

what is it which is to you the greatest and the best that you would desire to realize? The character of the rich man, or the successful, or the admired? In the classification of earth, which separates men into Jews, Christians, Mahometans, you may rank as a worshipper of the Christian's God. But in the nomenclature of Heaven, where names cannot stand for things, God sees you as an Idolater; your highest is not His Highest" (pp. 51, 52).

Altogether at least seven of the *Endeavours* would appear to have been consulted in the preparation of this sermon, one of Robertson's finest utterances.

What inferences are to be drawn? These:—that the emotions excited by the Confirmation and Communion Services were akin to those inspiring the *Endeavours*, and experienced by Robertson himself when first he read the book; that thus, at first perhaps unconsciously, he worked along Martineau's lines; that eventually reference was made to the book itself, and, drawn by its wonderful spell, he read and re-read, as he prepared for the pulpit, until he was dominated by the master spirit. Originally consulting "Where is thy God?" he was led on to other sermons, as his eye caught striking passages, or memories of former reading revived. Living for the time in the very presence of the genius of the book he laid it under contribution, both consciously and unconsciously. Yet his own individuality so asserted itself, that, imbued though the sermon is with the colours of the *Endeavours*, "Jacob's Wrestling" remains as original as it is strong and tender.

The month of December was marked by a wonderful productiveness, and increased obligations to Martineau. Four sermons were drawn on in "Realizing the Second Advent," December 2. And on the last day of the year a most striking example was afforded by "The Loneliness of Christ."

For months Robertson had felt a growing sense of isolation, owing to widespread hostility to his views. Letters written during 1850 express the feeling, but it haunted him much earlier. Even these letters are reminiscent of Martineau. His morbidly sensitive nature (the expressions are Stopford Brooke's) was so quick to receive, so firm to retain impressions, that private letters, as well as public utterances, were influenced by his favourite authors. In his loneliness he turned, as so many preachers have done, to those "springs of human piety and hope," which well forth in the *Endeavours*. The re-action from the high pressure of the Advent season was upon him. The saddening thoughts brought by the dying year, and the brooding sense —unfounded, morbid, yet to him fearfully real—of failure, held him. The fingers of an awful solitude clutched his very heart. "The Loneliness of Christ," writes Stopford Brooke, "was an unconscious but vivid portrait of his own career and life; it was written with the blood of his own heart." But in his solitude Robertson turned to a kindred spirit, and his words were inspired by Martineau's tender and profoundly spiritual discourse on that pathetic cry of Jesus, which gave the text to both preachers.

To understand the influence at work, especially in its more subtle forms, careful comparison of the two sermons is essential. A few extracts will indicate some of the more obvious points of resemblance:—

"There are persons . . . who reflect and plan and feel in secret . . . He who is independent of sym-

"There are two kinds of men that feel this solitude in different ways. The first are the men of

pathy waits for no man's support . . . scorns concession . . . and whatever opposition may beat on him . . . does but serve to harden (his convictions) to rock." A "kind of distant respect" is won by him (*Endeavours*, pp. 160, 161).

"There is a species of dependence upon others . . . implying no incapacity of thought, no imbecility of judgment . . . its root in the sensitive, not in the intellectual part of our nature, and grows not from the shallowness of the reason, but from the depth of the affection . . . It is the dependence of an affectionate mind, capable, it may be, of manifesting great power, but trembling to feel itself alone . . . a mind that has a natural affinity for sympathy. . . . It cares not for numbers nor for praise; it deprecates nothing but perfect solitude. . . . Place it near some one approving and fraternal heart, and . . . it can stand up against a multitude. Lay to rest the trembling spirit of humanity within; and the diviner impulses of the soul will start to their supremacy" (*Endeavours*, pp. 159, 160).

self-reliance, self-dependent, who ask no counsel, and crave no sympathy—who act and resolve alone—who can go sternly through duty, and scarcely shrink, let what will be crushed in them. Such men command respect. The dreadful conviction of being alone manifests itself with a rending of the heart of rock. . . . There is another class who live in sympathy; affectionate minds which tremble at the thought of being alone: not from want of courage, nor from weakness of intellect comes their dependence upon others, but from the intensity of their affections. It is the trembling spirit of humanity in them. They want not aid, not even countenance, but only sympathy. And the trial comes to them in the shape of dull and utter loneliness, when they are called upon to perform a duty on which the world looks coldly, or to embrace a truth which has not found lodgment yet in the breasts of others" (*Sermons*, I. pp. 221, 223).

The extracts from Robertson's sermon are portions of the introduction, which, as a whole, embodies the gist of the first half of "The Strength of the Lonely." The body of the sermon is in two divisions:—(1) "The Loneliness of Christ." (2) "The Temper of His Solitude." Under the first division, the second and third subdivisions—concerned with solitude in trial (the word is synonymous with "temptation" as used by Martineau), and in dying—are

essentially identical with the last two sections of Martineau's discourse.

In the second division of Robertson's sermon, the likeness is more in spirit than in form. Nevertheless there are scarcely two consecutive paragraphs which are not more or less inspired by "The Strength of the Lonely."

Several of the sermons of the earlier part of 1850 were controversial. But even in theological discussions Robertson fell back from the battlefield to the solitudes, where dwell "the thoughts and aspirations which look direct to God." Controversy itself is ultimately settled by resort to the deepest affections. Thus, especially when most moved, he came again under Martineau's influence.

In the second *Sermon* on "Baptism," on March 17, occur two very characteristic passages :—

"The gliding heavens are less awful at midnight than the ticking clock" (*Endeavours*, p. 394).

"The eagle of the Roman legion, the Cross in the battles of the Crusades, reared its head above the hosts upon the field . . . it drew to it the wave of flight and swayed the living mass, content to be mowed down themselves, if it alone were saved. It was an emblem of things most powerful with their hearts . . . force . . . internal . . . ideal" (p. 369).

"The gliding heavens, and the seasons, and the ticking clock, what is time to us without them?" (*Sermons*, II. p. 67).

"It is in virtue of this necessity on man for an outward symbol to realize an invisible idea, that a bit of torn and blackened rag . . . is a kind of life to iron-hearted men. Why is it that in the heat of battle there is one spot where . . . men and officers close in most densely, and all are gathered round one man, round whose body that tattered silk is wound, and held with the tenacity of a death struggle? . . . It is only a symbol. Are symbols nothing?" (pp. 67–68).

The connexion of the two sentences in the first pair of extracts is different; the suggestion of one by the other is undoubted. So in the second pair. Robertson's version

is that of a modern soldier, which he himself had desired to become; Martineau's is that of the historian. But the latter suggested the former.

"The Conviction of Sin in the Mind of Peter," November 10, is on the text of Martineau's "Christ's Treatment of Guilt." Used already in the Advent lectures of 1849, this fine discourse was again drawn upon, as was also "The Christian Doctrine of Merit." The reference to Simeon's words to Mary concerning the infant Jesus; the illustrations of Zaccheus, the Woman at the Feast, and the Roman Confessional; the emphasis laid on the fact that not only by Christ's "personal ministry," but also by the preaching of Christianity, the "sense of imperfection never felt before" is produced; the discussion of the principles which guide the lives of different classes of men (three such being indicated by each preacher); all these, with other points, Robertson has derived from his study of Martineau (*Endeavours*, pp. 147, 149, 400, 402, 409; cf. *Human Race*, pp. 129–132). It may be noted further, that the beautiful introduction to this particular sermon of Robertson's, embodying the idea that Christ is "the very poetry of God" and "all the highest truth is poetry," finds its source in "The Sphere of Silence; God's," and the preface to the second series of the *Endeavours*.

In 1850, out of the 26 sermons, 15 are affected; in 1851, 18 out of 25; in 1852–3, 10 out of 30. In 1851, larger use of the *Endeavours* is made than even in 1849. Lack of space forbids detailed illustration. I select only two examples.

On March 2 was given the famous sermon on "Obedience the Organ of Spiritual Knowledge," preached again at the Lewes Assizes, July, 1852. In a letter written in that month, Robertson says:—"My sermon was from John vii. *v.* 17, not the one I had intended to take, as I meant to preach from John xviii. *v.* 38, "What is truth?"

but I did not feel up to it. I therefore took the old one and considerably improved it as a composition, leaving the main features unaltered, and it forms a very good sequence to the sermon at the first Assizes" (*Life and Letters*, p. 264). This is a very natural touch, which will appeal to all preachers. Even great public orators are not always "in the spirit." But I quote it as showing that the subject was a favourite with Robertson, and that the "old" sermon was deemed worthy of repetition on so important an occasion. It is no slight testimony to Martineau's influence that a preacher of Robertson's ability should thus choose from his old stock the sermon most deeply coloured by the *Endeavours*.

The central idea of the sermon is found repeatedly in other sermons and in letters. Its setting and development in this special case are derived from "The Unclouded Heart." The texts are different, Martineau taking John v. *v.* 30, Robertson, John vii. *v.* 17; but in Robertson's sermon the former words play an important part. The introduction to the latter discourse is traceable to the portion immediately after Martineau's introduction, whilst Martineau's opening paragraph inspires what follows. In this first main division Robertson selects "three departments of 'doctrine,' in which the principle of the text will be found true." These are:—speculative truth, practical truths, and a third, the treatment of which is left over for a subsequent sermon. Martineau applies the same principle, contained also in his own text, to "speculative research," "questions of practical morals," the "judgment of human character," and "changes in society." Between the introduction and first division of Robertson's sermon and fully two-thirds of Martineau's, there is thus a marked likeness. The detailed proof of this would require the quotation of that proportion of each sermon. I content myself with a few extracts:—

"While auditors asked, 'How knoweth He letters having never learned?' Jesus led them to a different explanation of His wisdom. 'My judgment is just, because I seek not my own will, but the will of the Father who hath sent me.' And He instructed others how to gain a like discernment. 'If any will do His will he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself.' The words express a universal truth" (*Endeavours*, pp. 330, 331).

"For the training of goodness the ancient reliance was on the right discipline of habit and affection. The modern is rather an illumination of the understanding. The notion extensively prevails that vice . . . is a blunder of the intellect; a defective or erroneous view of things . . . to be cured by use of the most approved instruments for seeing clearly . . . If you banish folly, you extinguish sin" (p. 328).

"To him it could not but be clear . . . that pure sympathies make a clear intellect" (p. 330).

"A pure-hearted will be a right-minded man" (p. 331).

(Paul—1 Cor. 1. *v.* 25—quoted.)

"Interest and fear and ambition . . . all the great hindrances to impartiality in the quest of truth, have obviously their seat in some class of selfish feelings . . . to one set of opinions emolument and honour, and to their opposite poverty and disgrace . . . eagerness about reputation . . . partisanship" (pp. 331–2).

"On questions of practical

"The Jews marvelled at His spiritual wisdom . . . 'How knoweth this man letters never having learned?' They had no conception of any source of wisdom beyond learning. He Himself gave a different account of the matter.

"'My doctrine is not mine, but His that sent me.' And how He came possessed of it, speaking humanly, He taught. 'My judgment is just, etc.' That principle He extends to all. 'If any man will do His will, he shall know,' etc." (*Sermons*, II. p. 94).

"Two opinions respecting the origin of spiritual knowledge:—1. The popular one of the Jews, relying on a cultivated understanding. 2. The principle of Christ, which relied on trained affections and habits of obedience . . . (Many) rely solely on a cultivated understanding . . . Enlighten, they say, and sin will disappear . . . Sin is an error of the understanding . . . Illuminate the understanding, show men that sin is folly, and sin will disappear" (p. 95).

"Christ said not that clear intellect will give you a right heart, but that a right heart and a pure life will clarify the intellect" (p. 97).

(Paul—1 Cor. 1. *v.* 21—quoted).

"Wilfulness and selfishness hinder impartiality . . . Fear, interest, vanity, the desire of being reckoned sound and judicious, or party spirit, bias them. Personal prospects, personal antipathies: these deter-

morals, yet more emphatically . . . pure sympathies produce a clear intellect . . . The moral tastes and habits of men form their opinions much more frequently than their opinions form their habits, so that their theoretical sentiments are little more than a systematic self-defence after the act. The positions . . . having been taken up first, the reasons for maintaining them are discovered afterwards" (pp. 333–334).

"He satisfied himself by the same argument which sophists use in defence of slavery" (p. 336).

"How often will a child, by mere force of unconsciousness and simplicity, penetrate to the centre of some great truth with a startling, ease and directness" (p. 331).

"It is delightful to see (a pure-hearted man) stand up before the ambitious sophist, and dart on his ingenuities a clear ray of conscience that scatters them like mist" (p. 331).

mine most men's creed" (p. 98).

(Both preachers indicate seeking God's will, removing self-will, as the only remedy.)

"In practical truths the principle is true. It is more true to say that our opinions depend upon our lives and habits than to say that our lives depend upon our opinions . . . Men think in a certain mode, because their life is of a certain character, and their opinions are only invented afterwards as a defence for their life" (p. 98).

"Slavery is defended philosophically by some" (p. 99).

"How a child, simple and near to God, cuts asunder a web of sophistry with a single direct question" (p. 100).

"How a believing Christian scatters the forces of scepticism as a morning ray, touching the mist on the mountain-side, makes it vanish into thin air . . . Few more glorious moments . . . than those in which Faith does battle . . . when the heart . . . annihilates the sophistries of logic" (p. 100).

As with other sermons, the second division presents little direct resemblance. The thoughts are branches from the parent stem, but they have a distinct character of their own. The connexion is, however, evident in the section dealing with the universality of the law; whilst the spirit of "The Strength of the Lonely" breathes through the beautiful conclusion, lending a deeper meaning to the appeal to be true to the duty which is known, with which both preachers close the sermons compared.

As indicating how the influence of "The Unclouded

Heart" remained with Robertson, it may be noted that on March 9 and 16, in two sermons on "Wisdom Justified of Her Children," and on March 23, in "The Wisdom of Christ and the Wisdom of Solomon," the theme of the great sermon of the 2nd is elaborated and supplemented. Not only "The Unclouded Heart," but others of the *Endeavours* were evidently consulted (cf. *Endeavours*, pp. 337, 340, 418, 420; *Human Race*, pp. 183, 189, 196).

The second example in 1851 is the sermon on the last Sunday of the year, "The Transitoriness of Life." Attention has been already called to the fact that the emotions excited by the season were such as especially brought Robertson into harmony with the spirit of the *Endeavours*. This sermon affords fresh and striking illustration. As was the case two years earlier, "The Strength of the Lonely" is one source of inspiration:—

"The vigils of sickness . . . are solitary. . . . Those midnight hours, claimed by time, when we listen to the tolling clock,—by Eternity when we hear that moaning breath" (*Endeavours*, p. 165).

"No man ever watched in a sick-room when time was measured by the sufferer's breathing, or the intolerable ticking of the clock, without a firmer grasp on the realities of Life and Time" (*Sermons*, IV. p. 53).

From the last sermon in the first series of the *Endeavours*, preached on the last day of 1841, much more is derived. The aspect which life assumes in retrospect is discussed:—

"A few years of conscious gain, followed by a long process of conscious loss. . . . After dreaming that all things were given to us, we find them only lent. . . . Henceforth we lose constantly. Standing on the shore which binds the ocean of the past, we see treasure after treasure . . . thrown into that

"Moses is looking back, and his feeling is loss. Such is life. At first all seems given . . . And after that all is loss. . . . Every day, every year, this year, like all others. Into that flood have fallen treasures. . . . Intimacies. . . . Affections. . . . We stand upon the shore of that illimitable sea which never restores what has

insatiable waste. . . . Into that deep year after year has sunk, no less rich than this . . . our first friendships . . . new affections . . . have vanished there" (pp. 240, 241).

once fallen into it" (pp. 54, 55).

These extracts are from the first division of Robertson's sermon. The second, treating of "the right use of their sad suggestions," touches first on "the Eternity of God" in a way strongly reminiscent of "The Besetting God," and next on "the permanence of results," the latter subdivision being a characteristic rendering of "Nothing Human ever Dies." The enumeration of the things that are permanent, with not a little of the detailed exposition of each, is a free version of Martineau's sermon— "Our Past Seasons" (*Sermons*, p. 59, cf. *Endeavours*, p. 250); "Lost Affections" (*ibid.* cf. *Endeavours*, pp. 247, 248); "Our Own Selves" (*ibid.* pp. 59, 60, cf. *Endeavours*, pp. 244, 245); and "Work" (*ibid.* p. 60, cf. *Endeavours*, pp. 242, 243). It is a beautiful illustration of the power of the teaching of the master mind that, ten years after it had fallen into "the ocean of the past," the pupil should use it, and, by so doing, help to demonstrate that "God suffers nothing that is excellent to die," and that "thoughts, truths, emotions, exist as truly, and perform their duty as actively," when years have rolled by, "as on the day of their birth."

Many striking points of resemblance occur in subsequent sermons; but these need not detain us. What has been given already sufficiently indicates not only the fact of Martineau's continuous influence, but also the periods when it was strongest, the occasions which gave it the best openings to work, and the kind of pulpit utterance which it most often inspired. It was in the great crises of his life and ministry, when his nature was most deeply stirred and the heaviest demands were made upon it, when

especially he required the consolation, the uplift, the inspirations of the divinest thought, that he turned to the teacher who, next to the great Master Himself, most fully satisfied the cravings of his soul.

Fifty years ago this year Robertson was laid to rest. Three years ago the venerable Martineau, eleven years his senior, also passed away. Five years earlier he wrote—"My friends try to assure me, as they gather round me at the close of my last decade, that the labour of so many seasons has not been all in vain. If to some few souls the meaning of life has indeed become clearer, its possibilities nobler, its sanctities deeper, its immortalities surer, through the simple report of my own experience, I thank the Father of Light for thus joining me in love, be it only to two or three brethren in spirit and children of His." What Dr. Martineau's influence on the world at large may have been we cannot tell. I venture to assert that no preacher and teacher of the last century did more to inspire the modern pulpit, and, through that, the thought of the Church as a whole. Of preachers influenced by him none has moved Christendom more than Robertson. With the exception of Beecher's and Spurgeon's, no sermons have been more widely and appreciatively read than his. Facts like these suggest the vast direct and indirect influence of the *Endeavours*. How far that work affected Robertson's ministry I have tried to show. Doubtless Dr. Martineau long since noticed the fact. To him it must have been the source of joy that so fine a mind, so eloquent a preacher, so beautiful a spirit, learnt so much from himself. In one of the grandest passages in the *Endeavours*, in a sermon dear to Robertson, it is suggested that in the life yet to dawn upon us a Pascal, a Shakespeare, a Paul, an Isaiah may be preparing new thoughts to fill us with the glow of a diviner fire. May we indulge the fancy that there the pupil has already greeted the master with utterances

deeper, more serene, more beautiful than any which earth heard from his lip—utterances which, after all, would be but the developed results of that inspiration which moved in the earthly ministry, and which death simply freed from all earthly restraints? May not such a greeting have been part of the master's own reward?

JOHN HOATSON.

A NOTE ON ST. JOHN VII. 52. A PROPHET OR THE PROPHET.

WHEN the Revised Version of the New Testament was first issued, one of the passages, to which scholars must have turned with eagerness, was the verse which forms the subject of this note, and which, as rendered by the Authorised Version and interpreted by a catena of commentators, had long been an acknowledged difficulty.

But the Revised Version afforded no help, and even in one respect seems to have still further obscured what appears to the writer of this paper to be the true meaning of the words.

In the original edition of 1611 the Authorised Version renders the second clause of the verse in question: "Search and look, for out of Galilee ariseth no Prophet."[1] In the Revised Version the same words are rendered: "Search and see that out of Galilee ariseth no prophet." *Marg.*, "see, for out of Galilee," etc.

The one divergence between the two versions which bears on the present inquiry is the spelling of the word Prophet with a capital initial in the version of 1611 as

[1] So Mr. Waller, Assistant Secretary to the Syndics of the Cambridge University Press, kindly informs me. It is so printed in the Cambridge Parallel N.T., but with a small initial "p" in the Cambridge Paragraph Bible.

distinct from the small "p" of the R.V., an indication that the reference is not to the Messiah Prophet of Deuteronomy xviii. 15–19 but to any prophet in general. And it must be admitted that the Revised Version is supported in this interpretation by a long line of commentators.

St. Cyril, cited in Cramer's Catena, merely points out the inconsequence of the Pharisees' reply to Nicodemus, who had not himself raised the question whether Jesus were the Christ, or the Prophet, but only asked: "Doth our law judge a man except it first hear from himself and know what he doeth?"[1] This is a true remark, and shews that it was not the actual question of Nicodemus, but his supposed concession to the popular surmising expressed in *v.* 40—"This is of a truth the Prophet"—that roused the indignation of the Pharisees. No note is added on any further difficulty in the verse.

Poole in his synopsis of interpretation writes on the passage: "We must take the words to refer not to one prophet in particular but to any. What the Pharisees assert is that no Galilean has ever been gifted with the prophetic spirit"; and again, "They infer the present from the past,"[2] i.e. because no prophet hath arisen, therefore no prophet shall arise. The instances of Nahum and Jonah are then cited in refutation of the statement that no prophet hath arisen out of Galilee.

Other Commentators follow to the same effect. Maldonatus, for instance, a Roman Catholic writer, uses almost the same language as the Protestant interpreters quoted

[1] *τί γὰρ εἶπεν ὁ ἄνθρωπος; ὅτι προφήτης ἐστίν; εἶπεν ὅτι ἄκριτον ἀναιρεθῆναι οὐ δεῖ.* Cramer's Catena, *ad loc.*

[2] *Quod Propheta nullus.* Non de uno sed de quovis Propheta accipe . . . nullus aiunt Galilæus unquam a Deo donatus est spiritu prophetico . . . colligunt ex præteritis præsentia. *Poli Synopsis ad loc.* In spite of these remarks the Greek text cited by Poole has *ὁ προφήτης*, a reading justified indeed by no authority, and yet pointing to the interpretation upheld in this note.

in *Poli Synopsis*. "From past example they make conjecture as to the future, not only that the Christ or Messiah, but that not even any prophet could come from Galilee. They argue, No Galilean has been a prophet, Jesus is a Galilean, therefore He is not a prophet." [1]

Bengel ignores the difficulty. In more modern times Wordsworth,[2] after noting the fact that Jonah and Nahum, and perhaps Elijah, were Galilean prophets, adds: "So they prove themselves ignorant of their own history while they condemn Christ." Alford[2] says προφήτης cannot mean *the* Prophet or the Messiah. It was not historically true; for two prophets at least had arisen from Galilee, Jonah of Gath-hepher and the greatest of the prophets, Elijah of Thisbe, and perhaps also Nahum and Hoshea. Godet has a note to the same effect. Westcott[3] paraphrases, "Galilee is not the true country of the prophets; we cannot look then for Messiah to come thence. The words have that semblance of general truth which makes them quite natural in this connexion, though Jonah, Hoshea, Nahum, and perhaps Elijah, Elisha and Amos were of Galilee." Archdeacon Watkins[4] writes: "Their generalization includes an historical error which cannot be explained away. . . . The Sanhedrin, in their zeal to press their foregone conclusion that Jesus is not a prophet, are not bound to strict accuracy," etc. The last Commentator whom we shall cite is Dr. Plummer,[5] who says: "Either their temper makes them forgetful or in the heat of controversy they prefer a sweeping statement to a qualified one. . . . Any-

[1] Ex præteritis enim exemplis de futuro conjecturam faciunt, non solum Christum Messiam, sed ne prophetam quidem esse posse, cum Galilæus sit; quasi argumententur: Nullus unquam ex Galilæa propheta extitit; ergo iste, qui Galilæus est, propheta non est. Ineptum prorsus argumenti genus. Maldonatus, *ad loc.*

[2] Greek Test., *ad loc.*

[3] *Speaker's Commentary.*

[4] St. John in Ellicott's *Commentary for English Readers.*

[5] *The Cambridge Bible for Schools.*

how their statement is only a very natural exaggeration. Judging from the past Galilee was not very likely to produce a prophet much less the Messiah."

What strikes one in reviewing this remarkable consensus of interpretation is, that, except St. Cyril, not one of the Commentators notes the important fact that the words of the Pharisees are not a direct reply to Nicodemus. The reference in their answer is to what was no doubt in the mind of Nicodemus, and the "officers" (*v.* 45) and of the people generally (*v.* 40).

The question had not arisen whether Jesus was *a* prophet, but a far more awful and important one, whether He was *the* Prophet or Messiah (*v.* 40, and comp. chap. i. 20, 25).

All the remarks therefore about the Galilean prophets, Jonah, Nahum, Hoshea, are beside the mark. Each Commentator has seen in turn that if the reference is to these it was absolutely unhistorical, and absolutely futile as an argument. For even if no prophet had arisen out of Galilee how could it be adduced that it should be so in the future?[1] It was false history and bad logic; and it is difficult to believe that even in the heat of disputation these learned members of the Sanhedrin should have thrown out such an ill-founded and foolish argument to a well instructed Rabbi like Nicodemus. They could not have been so ignorant of their own history as Dr. Wordsworth would have us believe, nor so illogical as Maldonatus represents them to be; nor, with Dr. Plummer, can we consider it "a very natural exaggeration." We agree with Archdeacon Watkins that if the Pharisees meant what they are interpreted to mean "their generalization includes an historical error which cannot be explained away." The fact is that the interpreters have failed through not considering the passage as a whole. The key

[1] Potest Deus præter consuetum morem agere. *Poli Synopsis, ad loc.*

to the explanation of *v.* 52 lies in its close connexion with *v.* 40. There we read: "Some of the multitude therefore, when they heard these words, said, This is of a truth the prophet; others then said, This is the Christ."

The prophet and the Christ are here equivalent terms. In popular expectation they stood on the same level. And in Acts iii. 22 St. Peter clearly identifies the Christ with the Prophet. Comp. also St. John i. 20, 25, where the Prophet is distinguished from Elias, who was also expected, but only as a forerunner of the Messiah.[1]

Some among the multitude, instructed probably by the Pharisees, set themselves to refute these thoughts and surmisings, and first they addressed the unlearned multitude, "the people of the earth," and, by what seemed to them a crushing argument, showed the impossibility of Jesus being the Christ: "What, doth the Christ come out of Galilee? Hath not the Scripture said that the Christ cometh of the seed of David, and from Bethlehem, the village where David was?"

The scene is then changed. The officers commissioned to apprehend Jesus return to the Pharisees without their prisoner. They excuse their failure by saying, "Never man so spake." Never, that is, was there prophet like this. This time the rulers try the plan of "employing authority to stifle truth." "Hath any of the rulers believed on Him, or of the Pharisees?" adding: "This

[1] For the Rabbinical teaching about the prophetical side of the Messiah's work see Schöttgen, *Hor. Hebr.*, ii. 664 foll. Messiam esse Prophetam clarissimum est. Quamvis enim nomen Propheta ipsi in scriptis Judæorum non sæpe tribuitur, tamen res ipsa ab iisdem docetur, Messiam scilicet doctorem esse et Pastorem qui ea quæ divinitus acceperat populum docuit totamque Dei voluntatem nobis revelavit. It is noticeable that the false Messiah, Theudas, claimed to be a (or the) prophet (προφήτης ἔλεγεν εἶναι, Joseph. *Ant.* xx. 5, 1). So also the Egyptian named Acts xxi. 38 (προφήτης εἶναι λέγων, Joseph. *Ant.* xx. 8–6). It was a title familiar enough to attract attention and to stir enthusiasm.

multitude which knoweth not the law are accursed." Then a more formidable questioner comes forward not to oppose, but to urge the claims of reason—"Doth our law judge a man except it first hear from himself and know what he doeth?" As we have seen, the form of the question is quite ignored, but the underlying thought of it is angrily refuted—"Search, and see that out of Galilee Prophet ariseth not." Now the only prophet to whom the Pharisees could possibly allude must be the Prophet of popular expectation named in *v.* 40, together with the Christ suggested by the excuse of "the officers" and involved in the question of Nicodemus. The only objection that can be taken to this is a grammatical one founded on the absence of the article before προφήτης.

We believe, however, that this absence may be justified (*a*) on general grammatical principles, and (*b*) still more convincingly by Greek Testament usage in the case of χριστός and ὁ χριστός which we have shown to be synonymous with προφήτης and ὁ προφήτης.

(*a*) First, then, the article is omitted with proper names, or with names which have come to be used as proper names, such as "father," "mother," "king," especially the Persian King (βασιλεύς), υἱός, παῖδες, θεός, ἄνθρωπος (Jelf, § 447, obs. 1; Clyde, p. 11 § 5, obs. 2 and 3). Under this rule would come χριστός and κύριος. In 1 Cor. xv. 58 κύριος occurs first with, and then without the article (Clyde, *loc. cit.*).

The article, again, is omitted before nouns denoting objects of which there is only one in existence, as ἥλιος (sun), γῆ (earth). It is omitted before πόλις, ἄστυ, ἄγρος, where the context leaves no room for doubt as to the particular town, field, etc., intended (Winer, 148). Also when the word is sufficiently definite by itself from familiar reference, so that it does not need the article (Thompson, *Greek Syntax*, p. 31), somewhat in the same way as is

done by the Greek orators as to the name of the adversary in a lawsuit (Blass, § 46, 10, 11).

All these seem to be more or less analogous cases as to the omission of the article before προφήτης, a name that had so completely established itself in Messianic language as to have become a quasi-proper name. The form of the sentence (*v.* 52 *b*) is brief and passionate with the imperious aorists ἐρεύνησον καὶ ἴδε, 'search and see,' not the calm imperfect, as in chap. v. 39, ἐρευνᾶτε τὰς γραφάς—'search continuously the Scriptures.' Here, if anywhere, it would be natural to omit the article. Even the object of the verbs 'search and see' is omitted.

(*b*) But by far the strongest justification for the view here taken—that by προφήτης (*v.* 52) is meant the Prophet predicted by Moses and referred to in *v.* 40 of this chapter—lies in the analogous usage of χριστός sometimes with the article and sometimes without.

As seen from this and other passages ὁ χριστός and ὁ προφήτης were equally in the mouths of men. That they should therefore have the same grammatical experience is reasonable to suppose. If therefore we substitute "Christ" for "prophet" in this passage, it will help to illustrate our contention. If we were to read, "Search and see that Christ ariseth not out of Galilee," it would be seen that there is no need of the definite article. But of this anarthrous use of χριστός there are abundant examples, especially in the Pauline Epistles. A few instances will suffice: τέλος γὰρ νόμου χριστός, Rom. x. 4 (note that νόμου, the Mosaic law, is also without the article). ἀπέστειλέν με χριστός, 1 Cor. i. 17 (ὁ χριστός being found a few verses before i. 13). χριστὸς δὲ παραγενόμενος ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν μελλόντων ἀγαθῶν . . . εἰσῆλθεν ἐφάπαξ εἰς τὰ ἅγια, Heb. ix. 11, 12. χριστὸς ἔπαθεν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, 1 Pet. ii. 21.

It may also be taken into consideration that in the famous prophecy of Moses (Deut. xviii. 15–19) the Hebrew

נָבִיא and the προφήτην of the LXX. version are without the article. There is probably a mental reference to this determining passage in the words of the Pharisees, which makes their answer equivalent to a quotation.

A word may be added about the reading. R.V. rightly restores ἐγείρεται. The perfect ἐγήγερται which appears in some of the later codices was introduced under the impression that these words contained a reference to the past, and that the impossibility of our prophet arising out of Galilee could be inferred from that fact.

The interpretation proposed in this note vindicates the true reading. ἐγείρεται is used here precisely as γεννᾶται is used in Matt. ii. 4. Herod "inquired where the Christ should be born," R.V., i.e. where your books say He is born. A nearer and therefore a still more illustrative instance is found in the verse which gives the key to the words we are discussing (*supra* v. 41): Μὴ γὰρ ἐκ τῆς Γαλιλαίας ὁ χριστὸς ἔρχεται; "What, doth the Christ come out of Galilee?"

ARTHUR CARR.

MISSIONARY METHODS IN THE TIMES OF THE APOSTLES.

III.

In addition to the dexterity with which these Christianized Jews succeeded in suiting themselves to circumstances, in remodelling their doctrine, and in now raising and then lowering their demands, the tenacity especially arouses our wonder with which, in spite of all their failures, they again and again renewed their attempts to make the course of Church History go backwards. We get a very lively impression of this tenacity if we glance at the Apocryphal literature connected with the name of Clement of Rome. The various versions, in which we possess this romance with a purpose, can hardly have appeared before the middle of the third century, while the other writings of the same Judaistic and also Gnostic tendency of which we possess some information, partly from their insertion in the Clementine romance and partly from other sources, must all belong to the period between 130–230. It is astonishing how tenaciously certain Jewish Christian circles clung to their hatred of St. Paul and to their claim of supreme authority in the mission field. They would not even allow that St. Paul was a Jew by birth, but a Greek from Tarsus both on the father's and mother's side. Having come to Jerusalem, he is said to have fallen in love with the daughter of the High Priest, and, in order to attain the goal of his desire, he submitted to circumcision. As, in spite of this, his hope was unfulfilled, hatred of the law and of Judaism took possession of his heart.[1] Outwardly still a follower of Judaism, he prevented the Jewish nation as a people from accepting the Christian faith. The testimony of the twelve Apostles and of the Bishop, St.

[1] According to *Epiphan. Hær.* 30, 16, 25; further, according to *Clem. Recogn.* i. 43–71, and *Epist. Petri ad Jac.* 2 (Clementine ed. Lagarde, pp. 3, 24).

James, had succeeded in making the people of Jerusalem and even Caiaphas ready to accept baptism, when this pestilent fellow lit up Jewish fanaticism and brought about the first persecution of Christian Israel from Jerusalem to Damascus. But St. Paul ever remained "this pestilent fellow," even after he had accepted the Christian confession and had given the Gentiles teaching which was contrary to the law. The name of St. Paul is avoided in writings intended for distribution outside the party; and, in one version of the Clementine romance, he is introduced in the guise of Simon Magus in order, amongst other things, to conceal his name the more carefully. At the same time this artifice gave shape to a very fantastic representation of the history of missions. Just as Simon Magus, by his teaching and arts, had deluded the people of Samaria, before Simon Peter gained the victory there for the true faith and restored the connexion with the Church at Jerusalem, so had it always been, and so must it ever be according to the prophecy of Jesus, throughout the whole extent of missions. First a false teacher must spread a lying gospel in the world; then only will the true gospel follow, like light after darkness, healing after sickness, and it must take place indeed by means of the prudent distribution of secret writings by hidden ways.[1] In order to trace back this anti-Pauline mission, which, according to the supposed prophecy of Jesus, was really only to begin after the destruction of Jerusalem, to the earliest apostolic times, and thus to base it on the authority of St. Peter and more especially of St. James, it was necessary to become involved in the most extraordinary contradictions. St. James, own brother to Jesus, was not only the Bishop of Jerusalem and of the Church of the Hebrews, but at the same time the chief of all bishops, the Archbishop of the whole

[1] *Clem. Hom.* ii. 17; *Recogn.* iii. 61; *Epist. Petri ad Jac.* and *Diamartyria Jacobi.*

Church, and not least the head of all missions to the Gentiles; for it was the task of missions to make the original monotheistic religion, which, in spite of manifold corruptions, had been inherited by the Hebrews, established by law, and brought to perfection by Jesus, the universal religion. But it was from St. James that even the Apostles received the commission as to where they were to carry on this work, and to St. James they had to give yearly an account of their preaching and of its success amongst the heathen. All the threads of missionary and Church government were gathered up in the hands of this Pope of Jerusalem.[1]

These were dreams of a comparatively late period. One scarcely knows whether most to marvel at the audacity with which they dared to pour them forth when all possibility of their fulfilment was precluded, or at the want of judgment with which Catholic Christians read these things and translated them into Latin and Syriac, as though they were harmless legends, or even narratives worthy of belief. But still they were magnificent dreams, and they reflect the wishes and aspirations of a tendency which called itself Christian, and which showed great activity in the domain of missions in apostolic times. If missions had been conducted according to the hearts' desire of many Jewish Christians in the earliest times, it would have been on the lines imagined in the second and third centuries. They did not fail in effort; their actions show plenty of system and method; the wisdom of the serpent was certainly not wanting, but how much more was lacking the harmlessness of the dove!

This is an unpleasant picture, but it belongs to the first classical period of the history of missions, when founda-

[1] Compare the beginnings of the *Epist. Petri ad Jac.*, and *Clementis ad Jac.*; further *Clem. Hom.* i. 20, xi. 35; *Recogn.* i. 43, 66, 68 (*episcoporum princeps* in contrast to Caiaphas as *sacerdotum princeps*), 72, iv. 35, ix. 29.

tions were laid; and in their further course we often stumble on doubtful, or suspicious, and even absolutely repulsive forms. With regard to this or that appearance, we are doubtful whether, like St. Paul, we should overcome rightful indignation and say "that Christ only may be preached," or whether, with the same St. Paul, we must describe men who are looked upon by others as "chief Apostles" as the "servants of Satan." There is some consolation in the thought that, even in apostolic times, the light of the gospel was not only borne through the world by the children of light. In other anxieties we may draw a nobler consolation from the fact that the sincere souls who in those days helped in the gigantic work of founding the Church in the Roman Empire with blessing and success, were by no means all of them "chosen vessels."

III.

The missionaries whose mode of work I have hitherto attempted to describe were Jewish missionaries. Some of them were true Israelites without guile; others were true Israelites, but afflicted with many of the unpleasing qualities which mark the Jews of the present day, and who had either withdrawn themselves from the quickening power of the gospel, or had not fully accepted it. But he, too, was a Jew who could say of himself, without boasting, that he had laboured more abundantly than any other missionary of his own time (1 Cor. xv. 10). This fact, which is also revealed by the caricature which was drawn of St. Paul by Jewish hatred, should induce us, before all things, to examine his missionary work, in order to see whether, and by what means it realized the ideal set up by Jesus. Added to this we have sufficient knowledge of his missionary work, though not of that of the older Apostles, to understand his methods in some measure. The methods of the other Apostles lose themselves in darkness in which

there is only here and there a glimmer of light, and which even then is only faintly illuminated by the *ignis fatuus* of tradition. Neither have we any trustworthy knowledge of such men as Barnabas, Mark, Silvanus, and others, who worked for a time with St. Paul, apart from their connection with him. The church of the next generation, which, besides the Gospels, found the chief source of her edification in the Epistles of St. Paul, was accustomed to call him simply "the Apostle." He was "the missionary" unequalled by any, because, in his mode of working, he united the wisdom of the serpent with the harmlessness of the dove.

It is true, indeed, that in the life of St. Paul we do not fail to see the immediate interposition of the supernatural and his unconditional surrender to the impulses thus roused in him. He became a Christian, and at the same time a missionary by an experience which had as powerful and enduring an effect as many years of intercourse with Jesus had exercised on the other Apostles. Immediately after his conversion, and without premeditation and definite plans, he witnessed to his new faith in the synagogue of Damascus, to which he had been led by very different intentions.[1] When he returned to Jerusalem, three years later, he supposed that, because of his past history, he was especially called to preach there to his former companions in the faith, and this he began to do. The opposition he experienced and the danger which threatened him did not suffice to restrain him. By means of a vision in the temple he was directed to go far away to distant heathen lands.[2] Dates make it very probable that it was not only the

[1] Acts ix. 19–22, xxvi. 20. Also in 2 Cor. xi. 32 Damascus would not have been mentioned if that which was experienced there had not been connected with the work of St. Paul's calling, for from v. 23 his sufferings in his work are treated of. On the other hand (Gal. i. 17) we can leave Arabia out of consideration.

[2] Acts xxii. 17–21, ix. 26–29, xxvi. 20; Rom. xv. 19.

summons of Barnabas that induced him, many years later, to give up the quiet life he had been leading at Tarsus and to make his appearance as a Christian teacher at Antioch, but that it was a vision, pictured by him in such vivid terms fourteen years later, that made him take the decisive step.[1] When he journeyed to Jerusalem with Barnabas to the so-called Apostles' Council, it was not the requests of those who were around him, but a revelation, that overcame his reluctance to take a step so open to misconception. Prophetic voices arose in his own soul, or in those of his companions, on his second missionary journey, and prevented his following his self-chosen way. A vision in a dream at Troas directed him to Europe. Later a vision in the night kept him longer at Corinth than he would have deemed advisable had he followed his own inclination. The prophetic voices, which set imprisonment and suffering before him on his last journey to Jerusalem, were not despised by him, although he did not conclude from them that it was the will of God that he should give up his own plans. When all that the prophets had prophesied, on the way came to pass in Jerusalem, a vision in the night assured him that, in spite of all, his own instinct had guided him aright, and that he should yet bear witness for Jesus in Rome. And when, during the stormy sea voyage to Rome, the ship's crew lost all heart and hope, he, reassured by the appearance of an angel in the night, was firmly convinced that he and all his travelling companions would reach the end of their journey in safety. His whole missionary life was interwoven with visions and revelations, as with signs and wonders, according to the narrative in the Acts of the Apostles, and according to St. Paul's own assertions; and he saw the

[1] I combine 2 Cor. xii. 1–5, on chronological grounds, as already hinted at above, with Acts xi. 25. In what follows I hold to Gal. ii. 1, with which I think Acts xv. 2 may well be united.

hand of God, not only in such extraordinary events, but also in unforeseen events of lesser importance which intervened, and to have kept to his own plans in opposition to that guidance would have seemed to him human defiance, which was quite unlawful.[1] He would not be wise in his own conceit, and he allowed himself to be led through life like a child, believing in wonders. But, in spite of all this, we see him carrying out the work of his calling on such a grand scale, with such far-reaching consideration as to means and objects, and with such distinctly impressed methods that we cannot help seeing in them causes which materially helped to bring about great results.

We see St. Paul, on the first missionary journey which he took with Barnabas, already carrying out some of the principles which he formulated and which he constantly applied. They must have been decided on from the first, and, indeed, even then St. Paul appeared completely equipped. He had had time in which to arm himself. Six years at least must have been spent by St. Paul at Tarsus after his conversion before Barnabas sought him out and drew him into work at Antioch, and even then he was working as a teacher in Antioch for a considerable time before he journeyed as a missionary to Cyprus and Asia Minor. The years spent at Tarsus must be looked upon as chiefly a time of preparation. Although St. Paul may have used any opportunities that offered themselves to tell others of his faith, he did not carry on any missionary work worth mentioning. He remained in his native town, though from the first the goal had been fixed far away for him. He must have been waiting for the more definite guidance of which the prospect had been held out to view by the voice in the Temple: "I will send thee far hence to the Gentiles." He felt but little the need of being taught by

[1] Comp. 2 Cor. i. 15–17 with 1 Cor. xvi. 5–8; or 2 Cor. ii. 5–11 with 1 Cor. v. 3–5.

men, but he felt most certainly the need of learning. As a scholar by profession, he would naturally apply himself to study during that time of waiting. That new world which faith in Jesus Christ had opened out to him must be thoroughly investigated by the methods which he had learnt to apply at the feet of Gamaliel. The old and the new must be thoroughly analysed, and, as far as possible, welded together. If he had already, even then, become convinced that heathen lands, and not Palestine, were to be the field of his labours, there can be no doubt that he must have prepared himself for this his special task. The Rabbinical education he had received in Jerusalem had been clothed in Hebrew; the speech and culture of Gentile civilized lands were overwhelmingly Greek. The exact knowledge of the Greek translation of the Old Testament shown by the letters of St. Paul, the traces also of acquaintance with Greek literature and popular philosophy which we find in them, are most easily accounted for as the result of studies carried on by St. Paul during those quiet years at Tarsus. He must also have pondered over the ways and means by which the gospel might best be brought nigh to all nations.

St. Paul's first rule, which he followed from the beginning wherever he found a Jewish community, was to appear first in the synagogue as a travelling Rabbi and to use the opportunity thus afforded him to preach at the Sabbath service in connexion with the reading of the Parāshas and Hephtāras. The result was always the same, though sometimes it followed slowly, sometimes quickly. His words found an echo in the hearts of some of the Jews, and in some of the Gentiles who attended the service in the synagogue. He was then obliged to depart out of the synagogue, with his Christian preaching, and to gather together, by the side of the Jewish community, another community, formed chiefly of Gentiles, to hear the Word.

The accounts in the Acts of the Apostles have been often questioned. It has been thought intolerable that St. Paul should have acted in the manner described with his clear knowledge of his call to mission work amongst the Gentiles. It is true St. Paul recognized that the distinctive object of his call and conversion was the preaching of the gospel to the Gentiles, and as a matter of fact it formed the distinctive feature of his apostolic labours.[1] But he looked upon his task as Apostle to the Gentiles as only a special side of his apostolic calling, to which there was also another.[2] When necessary, he could describe his apostolic calling, which he, like many others, had received, in its fullest universality, and for which he was as fully qualified as the Twelve; he always kept the conversion of Israel before his eyes as the final object of all his work among the Gentiles. When he spoke of the renunciations he had made in the interest of his calling for the saving of souls, he always spoke first of the Jews. He showed himself a Jew that he might gain the Jews, and then only did he turn to the Gentiles, without law, on whose account he had renounced the mode of life, natural to him as a law-abiding Jew, in order that he might win the Gentiles (1 Cor. ix. 19–21). In face of his oft-expressed conviction of the historic and religious precedence of Israel, and his intense longing for the conversion of his fellow-countrymen, it would have been absolutely incomprehensible had he given up making any attempt, whenever he came across any Jewish community, to win it for that gospel with which it

[1] Gal. i. 16; Rom. xv. 15–18; Eph. iii. 1–12; Col. i. 24–27; 1 Tim. ii. 7.

[2] Rom. xi. 13 ff. On the other hand, in Rom. i. 5 St. Paul is no more speaking of himself alone, when he makes use of the plural, than he is anywhere else; but, as there is no indication of a limitation to a narrower circle, he includes all with himself who, like him, had received grace and apostleship, and, therefore, first of all the twelve Apostles, as Chrysostom had already recognized; and, in accordance with this, he therefore designates the whole of mankind divided into nations as the common field of his own labours and of all the other Apostles. Matt. xxviii. 19; Acts i. 8.

had not previously been brought into close contact. In the history of religion, as St. Paul understood it, it was considered a sacred duty that the gospel should be first preached everywhere to the Jews. What could have prevented him from fulfilling this duty? Certainly not an aversion for his people; for he loved them in spite of his knowledge of their deeply-rooted prejudices, and in spite of all his bitter experiences. Neither would the fact that the majority of the Jewish people in the mother country, headed by the magistrates, had rejected Christ, and had steadily repudiated the witness of the older Apostles. Surely St. Paul saw the hand of God in this, and was confirmed in his conviction by the experiences that everywhere were his. But yet it was not a destiny which made impossible the conversion of individual Jews, such as he himself was, and which set aside the duty of missions to the Jews, or that shut out all hope of success therein, either in the Dispersion or in the mother country. Neither was there anything in the mode and circumstances of his own conversion, which pledged him from the first to give himself up entirely to missionary work among the Gentiles.[1] The message to Ananias refers, it is true, to Gentiles and to kings, but also to the sons of Israel, before whom St. Paul should bear witness to the Name of Christ, and it was not till three years later that he learned from the vision in the temple that he was to be sent to the far-distant Gentile peoples instead of remaining any longer in Jerusalem. But there were also Jews to be found everywhere whose decision for or against their Messiah had yet to be brought about. The agreement of St. Paul and Barnabas with the older Apostles, on the occasion of the Apostles' Council, according to which the former should work amongst the Gentiles and the latter amongst the Israelites, was no

[1] Acts ix. 15, xxii. 15, 21, xxvi. 16 f., 20. The short period of preaching in Jerusalem remained of importance to him (Rom. xv. 19).

hindrance to his turning everywhere and first of all to the Jews (Gal. ii. 7–10). For, in the first place, this had not been decided on by an appeal to a Divine commission, by means of which the spheres of work had been fixed in the first instance, but on the ground of the well known and accomplished fact that God had given success to St. Peter principally among the circumcised and to St. Paul principally among the Gentiles. So it came to pass in accordance with this fact. In acting thus St. Peter no more repented of his journey to Cornelius as an infringement of his trust, or bound himself unsympathetically to pass by any Gentiles who might come in his way, than St. Paul bound himself to avoid for the future the synagogues of the Dispersion. The meaning of the agreement cannot surely have been that in one and the same place, e.g. in towns such as Ephesus and Corinth, the older Apostles were to preach to the Jews and St. Paul to the Gentiles. Apart from the fact that events did not take this course, the main object of the agreement would have been absolutely missed thereby ; for it was made in order to avoid disturbances, such as had been caused by the intrusion of missionaries from Palestine into the community at Antioch. In the best sense of the word each was to go his own way without crossing the other's path. It was not by external co-operation, but by the consciousness of oneness in the faith, and by the manifestation of love that the unity of the Church and the fruitful progress of missions was to be preserved. The division of labour, therefore, was only beneficial in marking out the boundary lines of the field of labour geographically, and not ethnographically or statistically. At the same time also it was understood as only a temporary arrangement. While St. Paul carried on missions to the Gentiles with the idea that he might yet live to see their wholesome reaction on Israel, the older Apostles did not forget that their Master had assigned the

whole world to them as their mission field. And the hour came when the leaders amongst them, who were still living, crossed the borders of the Holy Land for ever.

St. Paul would also have proved himself to be a very unpractical thinker, that is, possessed of very limited powers and a very unskilful missionary, had he resigned the advantages which were offered by the existence of a Jewish Dispersion. These Jewish communities, scattered all over the Roman Empire, had already done missionary work, and were still going on with it, so that to have refused to link his work on to theirs would have been unpardonable folly. It was a grand thing that in almost all the important towns from Persia to Spain there were places where the law and the prophets were read aloud and expounded, and that, before the first beginnings of Christian missions, many thousands of those who were not Jews were listening devoutly to this Jewish preaching, and were inclined towards the Jewish faith in the one living God of Creation and Revelation, and were ready to accept Jewish customs. To the missionary to the Gentiles the synagogue formed a natural bridge to that portion of the heathen population which was open to religious impressions. St. Paul found an audience in the synagogue itself which was composed of Gentiles, who, as well as the Jews by birth and the actual proselytes, had been under the educational influence of the synagogue, though not formally and fully incorporated into the Jewish community; those God-fearing men who are so often mentioned as amongst the first hearers of St. Paul's sermons.[1] Where was the missionary to the Gentiles more likely to come across Gentiles looking for salvation than in the synagogue? He might also have stood at the corners of the streets and in the market place, and he might have entered into conversation with Gentiles passing

[1] Acts xiii. 16–26, 43–50, xiv. 1, xvi. 14, xvii. 4, 17, xviii. 4-7; comp. x. 2–22.

by. Analogies would not have been wanting in the life of those times. Not only jugglers and soothsayers, but philosophers also were wont thus to carry on their work. Neither is this mode entirely absent from the history of St. Paul. He appears to have preached to the people in Lystra in the public place. He seems from the first, in Athens, not only to have preached in the synagogue on the Sabbaths, but also to have entered daily into conversation in the market place with every one. He proved how hazardous it was on both occasions. It caused an outbreak of superstition among the people, in Lystra, which was only quelled with difficulty. In Athens it resulted in law-proceedings, not seriously meant, in the time-honoured Areopagus, between men satiated with Academic culture, and the Jewish preacher of the gospel of Jesus and the Resurrection. The right words were not lacking to the Apostle in this dubious position. But the success of his work in Athens must have been very slight. When he afterwards arrived in Corinth in a very depressed state of mind, and limited himself more strictly than ever to preaching in the synagogue, and then only on the central truths of the gospel,[1] it was evidently the result of the experiences he had gone through in Athens. These experiences taught the Apostle that direct missionary work amongst the Gentiles, when quite unprepared, promised little success, and strengthened him in a method which in itself corresponded to his inmost convictions.

The bridge between Israel and the Gentiles, with which the synagogue provided him, was not only passable, but often proved fairly strong and safe for the Christian missionary. Months passed by in Ephesus and Corinth before St. Paul found himself obliged to leave it, and to gain for ever a firm footing in Gentile quarters. He succeeded everywhere in bringing over some Jews with himself, often lead-

[1] Cor. ii. 1–5; Acts xviii. 1–8.

ing members, and always the best elements of the Jewish community. These, united with the God-fearing Hellenists, who had first joined the Jewish synagogue and then had accepted the Christian teaching, formed the nucleus of the newly founded Christian communities. This in itself was great gain. The Jewish root of the overwhelming Gentile Christian communities was in itself an element of good order, training, and custom. St. Paul always held firmly the doctrine that man could never attain to righteousness and blessedness by keeping the law, and he always fought courageously for the freedom of his communities in the main from the Mosaic law, but he was also convinced that the moral ideas and customs of those who had grown up in heathenism were incompatible with the life of a Christian. He felt that the Gentile Christians must accept not only the faith, but also a new moral order of individual and social life from the missionaries and the members of the communities who had been grown up in Judaism.

THEOD. ZAHN.

(To be continued.)

THE ATONEMENT AND THE MODERN MIND.

III.

What has now been said about the relations subsisting between God and man, about the manner in which these relations are affected by sin, and particularly about the Scripture doctrine of the connexion between sin and death, must determine, to a great extent, our attitude to the Atonement. The Atonement, as the New Testament presents it, assumes the connexion of sin and death. Apart from some sense and recognition of such connexion, the mediation of forgiveness through the death of Christ can only appear an arbitrary, irrational, unacceptable idea. But leaving the Atonement meanwhile out of sight, and looking only at the situation created by sin, the question inevitably arises, What can be done with it? Is it possible to remedy or to reverse it? It is an abnormal and unnatural condition; can it be annulled, and the relations of God and man put upon an ideal footing? Can God forgive sin and restore the soul? Can we claim that He shall? And if it is possible for Him to do so, can we tell how or on what conditions it is possible?

When the human mind is left to itself, there are only two answers which it can give to these questions. Perhaps they are not specially characteristic of the modern mind, but the modern mind in various moods has given passionate expression to both of them. The first says roundly that forgiveness is impossible. Sin is, and it abides. The sinner can never escape from the past. His future is mortgaged

to it, and it cannot be redeemed. He can never get back the years which the locust has eaten. His leprous flesh can never come again like the flesh of a little child. Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap, and reap for ever and ever. It is not eternal punishment which is incredible; nothing else has credibility. Let there be no illusion about this: forgiveness is a violation, a reversal, of law, and no such thing is conceivable in a world in which law reigns.

The answer to this is, that sin and its consequences are here conceived as though they belonged to a purely physical world, whereas, if there were only a physical world, there could be no such thing as sin. As soon as we realize that sin belongs to a world in which freedom is real—a world in which reality means the personal relations subsisting between man and God, and the experiences realized in these relations—the question assumes a different aspect. It is not one of logic or of physical law, but of personality, of character, of freedom. There is at least a possibility that the sinner's relation to his sin and God's relation to the sinner should change, and that out of these changed relations a regenerative power should spring, making the sinner, after all, a new creature. The question, of course, is not decided in this sense, but it is not foreclosed.

At the opposite extreme from those who pronounce forgiveness impossible stand those who give the second answer to the great question, and calmly assure us that forgiveness may be taken for granted. They emphasize what the others overlooked—the personal character of the relations of God and man. God is a loving Father; man is His weak and unhappy child; and of course God forgives. As Heine put it, *c'est son métier*, it is what He is for. But the conscience which is really burdened by sin does not easily find satisfaction in this cheap pardon. There is something in conscience which will not allow it to believe that God can simply condone sin: to take forgiveness for granted, when you realize what

you are doing, seems to a live conscience impious and profane. In reality, the tendency to take forgiveness for granted is the tendency of those who, while they properly emphasize the personal character of the relations of God and man, overlook their universal character—that is, exclude from them that element of law without which personal relations cease to be ethical. But a forgiveness which ignores this stands in no relation to the needs of the soul or the character of God.

What the Christian religion holds to be the truth about forgiveness—a truth embodied in the Atonement—is something quite distinct from both the propositions which have just been considered. The New Testament does not teach, with the naturalistic or the legal mind, that forgiveness is impossible; neither does it teach, with the sentimental or lawless mind, that it may be taken for granted. It teaches that forgiveness is mediated to sinners through Christ, and specifically through His death: in other words, that it is possible for God to forgive, but possible to God only through a supreme revelation of His love, made at infinite cost, and doing justice to the uttermost to those inviolable relations in which alone, as I have already said, man can participate in eternal life, the life of God Himself—doing justice to them as relations in which there is an inexorable divine reaction against sin, finally expressing itself in death. It is possible on these terms, and it becomes actual as sinful men open their hearts in penitence and faith to this marvellous revelation, and abandon their sinful life unreservedly to the love of God in Christ who died for them.

From this point of view it seems to me possible to present in a convincing and persuasive light some of the truths involved in the Atonement to which the modern mind is supposed to be specially averse.

Thus it becomes credible—we say so not *à priori*, but after experience—that there is a *divine necessity* for it; in other words, there is no forgiveness possible to God with-

out it; if He forgives at all, it must be in this way and in no other. To say so beforehand would be inconceivably presumptuous, but it is quite another thing to say so after the event. What it really means is that in the very act of forgiving sin—or, to use the daring word of St. Paul, in the very act of justifying the ungodly—God must act in consistency with His whole character. He must demonstrate Himself to be what He is in relation to sin, a God with whom evil cannot dwell, a God who maintains inviolate the moral constitution of the world, taking sin as all that it is in the very process through which He mediates His forgiveness to men. It is the recognition of this divine necessity—not to forgive, but to forgive in a way which shows that God is irreconcilable to evil, and can never treat it as other or less than it is—it is the recognition of this divine necessity, or the failure to recognize it, which ultimately divides interpreters of Christianity into evangelical and non-evangelical, those who are true to the New Testament and those who cannot digest it. No doubt the forms in which this truth is expressed are not always adequate to the idea they are meant to convey, and if we are only acquainted with them at second hand they will probably appear even less adequate than they are. When Athanasius, e.g., speaks of God's *truth* in this connexion, and then reduces God's truth to the idea that God must keep His word—the word which made death the penalty of sin—we may feel that the form only too easily loses contact with the substance. Yet Athanasius is dealing with the essential fact of the case, that God must be true to Himself, and to the moral order in which men live, in all His dealings with sin for man's deliverance from it; and that He has been thus true to Himself in sending His Son to live our life and to die our death for our salvation. Or again, when Anselm in the *Cur Deus Homo* speaks of the satisfaction which is rendered to God for the infringement of His honour by sin

—a satisfaction apart from which there can be no forgiveness—we may feel again, and even more strongly, that the form of the thought is inadequate to the substance. But what Anselm means is that sin makes a real difference to God, and that even in forgiving God treats that difference *as* real, and cannot do otherwise. He cannot ignore it, or regard it as other or less than it is; if He did so, He would not be more gracious than He is in the Atonement, He would cease to be God. It is Anselm's profound grasp of this truth which, in spite of all its inadequacy in form, and of all the criticism to which its inadequacy has exposed it, makes the *Cur Deus Homo* the truest and greatest book on the Atonement that has ever been written. It is the same truth of a divine necessity for the Atonement which is emphasized by St. Paul in the third chapter of Romans, where he speaks of Christ's death as a demonstration of God's righteousness. Christ's death, we may paraphrase his meaning, is an act in which (so far as it is ordered in God's providence) God does justice to Himself. He does justice to His character as a gracious God, undoubtedly, who is moved with compassion for sinners: if He did not act in a way which displayed His compassion for sinners, He would *not* do justice to Himself; there would be no ἔνδειξις of His δικαιοσύνη: it would be in abeyance: He would do Himself an injustice, or be untrue to Himself. It is with this in view that we can appreciate the arguments of writers like Diestel and Ritschl, that God's righteousness is synonymous with His grace. Such arguments are true to this extent, that God's righteousness includes His grace. He could not demonstrate it, He could not be true to Himself, if His grace remained hidden. We must not, however, conceive of this as if it constituted on our side a claim upon grace or upon forgiveness, which would be a contradiction in terms. All that God does in Christ He does in free love, moved with compassion for the misery and doom of men.

But though God's righteousness as demonstrated in Christ's death—in other words, His action in consistency with His character—includes, and, if we choose to interpret the term properly, even necessitates, the revelation of His love, it is not this only—I do not believe it is this primarily—which St. Paul has in mind. God, no doubt, would not do justice to Himself if He did not show His compassion for sinners; but, on the other hand—and here is what the apostle is emphasizing—He would not do justice to Himself if He displayed His compassion for sinners in a way which made light of sin, which ignored its tragic reality, or took it for less than it is. In this case He would again be doing Himself injustice; there would be no demonstration that He was true to Himself as the author and guardian of the moral constitution under which men live; as Anselm put it, He would have ceased to be God. The apostle combines the two sides. In Christ set forth a propitiation in His blood—in other words, in the Atonement in which the sinless Son of God enters into the bitter realization of all that sin means for man, yet loves man under and through it all with an everlasting love—there is an ἔνδειξις of God's righteousness, a demonstration of His self-consistency, in virtue of which we can see how He is at the same time just Himself and the justifier of him who believes on Jesus, a God who is irreconcilable to sin yet devises means that His banished be not expelled from Him. We may say reverently that this was the only way in which God could forgive. He cannot deny Himself, means at the same time He cannot deny His grace to the sinful, and He cannot deny the moral order in which alone He can live in fellowship with men; and we see the inviolableness of both asserted in the death of Jesus. Nothing else in the world demonstrates how real is God's love to the sinful, and how real the sin of the world is to God. And the love which comes to us through such an expression, bearing sin in all its reality, yet loving

us through and beyond it, is the only love which at once forgives and regenerates the soul.

It becomes credible also that there is a *human necessity* for the Atonement: in other words, that apart from it the conditions of being forgiven could no more be fulfilled by man than forgiveness could be bestowed by God. There are different tendencies in the modern mind with regard to this point. On the one hand, there are those who frankly admit the truth here asserted. Yes, they say, the Atonement is necessary for us. If we are to be saved from our sins, if our hearts are to be touched and won by the love of God, if we are to be emancipated from distrust and reconciled to the Father whose love we have injured, there must be a demonstration of that love so wonderful and overpowering that all pride, alienation and fear shall be overcome by it; and this is what we have in the death of Christ. It is a demonstration of love powerful enough to evoke penitence and faith in man, and it is through penitence and faith alone that man is separated from his sins and reconciled to God. A demonstration of love, too, must be given in act: it is not enough to be told that God loves: the reality of love lies in another region than that of words. In Christ on His cross the very thing itself is present, beyond all hope of telling wonderful, and without its irresistible appeal our hearts could never have been melted to penitence, and won for God. On the other hand, there are those who reject the Atonement on the very ground that for pardon and reconciliation nothing is required but repentance, the assumption being that repentance is something which man can and must produce out of his own resources. On these divergent tendencies in the modern mind I should wish to make the following remarks. First, the idea that man can repent as he ought, and whenever he will, without coming under any obligation to God for his repentance, but rather (it might almost be imagined) putting God under

obligation by it, is one to which experience lends no support. Repentance is an adequate sense not of our folly, nor of our misery, but of our sin: as the New Testament puts it, it is repentance *toward God*. It is the consciousness of what our sin is to Him: of the wrong it does to His holiness, of the wound which it inflicts on His love. Now such a consciousness it is not in the power of the sinner to produce at will. The more deeply he has sinned, the more (so to speak) repentance is needed, the less is it in his power. It is the very nature of sin to darken the mind and harden the heart, to take away the knowledge of God alike in His holiness and in His love. Hence it is only through a revelation of God, and especially of what God is in relation to sin, that repentance can be evoked in the soul. Of all terms in the vocabulary of religion, repentance is probably the one which is most frequently misused. It is habitually applied to experiences which are not even remotely akin to true penitence. The self-centred regret which a man feels when his sin has found him out—the wish, compounded of pride, shame, and anger at his own inconceivable folly, that he had not done it: these are spoken of as repentance. But they are not repentance at all. They have no relation to God. They constitute no fitness for a new relation to Him. They are no opening of the heart in the direction of His reconciling love. It is the simple truth that that sorrow of heart, that healing and sanctifying pain in which sin is really put away, is not ours in independence of God: it is a saving grace which is begotten in the soul under that impression of sin which it owes to the revelation of God in Christ. A man can no more repent than he can do anything else without a motive, and the motive which makes repentance possible does not enter into his world till he sees God as God makes Himself known in the death of Christ. All true penitents are children of the cross. Their penitence is not their own creation: it is the reaction

toward God produced in their souls by this demonstration of what sin is to Him, and of what His love does to reach and win the sinful.

The other remark I wish to make refers to those who admit the death of Christ to be necessary *for us*—necessary, in the way I have just described, to evoke penitence and trust in God—but who on this very ground deny it to be *divinely* necessary. It had to be, because the hard hearts of men could not be touched by anything less moving; but that is all. This, I feel sure, is another instance of those false abstractions to which reference has already been made. There is no incompatibility between a *divine* necessity and a necessity *for us*. It may very well be the case that nothing less than the death of Christ could win the trust of sinful men for God, and at the same time that nothing else than the death of Christ could fully reveal the character of God in relation at once to sinners and to sin. For my own part I am persuaded, not only that there is no incompatibility between the two things, but that they are essentially related, and that only the acknowledgment of the divine necessity in Christ's death enables us to conceive in any rational way the power which it exercises over sinners in inducing repentance and faith. It would not evoke a reaction God-ward unless God were really present in it, that is, unless it were a real revelation of His being and will; but in a real revelation of God's being and will there can be nothing arbitrary, nothing which is determined only from without, nothing, in other words, that is not divinely necessary. The demonstration of what God is, which is made in the death of Christ, is no doubt a demonstration singularly suited to call forth penitence and faith in man, but the necessity of it does not lie simply in the desire to call forth penitence and faith. It lies in the divine nature itself. God could not do justice to Himself, in relation to man and sin, in any way less awful than this; and it is the

fact that He does not shrink even from this—that in the Person of His Son He enters, if we may say so, into the whole responsibility of the situation created by sin—it is this which constitutes the death of Jesus a demonstration of divine love, compelling penitence and faith. Nothing less would have been sufficient to touch sinful hearts to their depths—in that sense the Atonement is humanly necessary; but neither would anything else be a sufficient revelation of what God is in relation to sin and to sinful men—in that sense it is divinely necessary. And the divine necessity is the fundamental one. The power exercised over us by the revelation of God at the Cross is dependent on the fact that the revelation is true—in other words, that it exhibits the real relation of God to sinners and to sin. It is not by calculating what will win us, but by acting in consistency with Himself, that God irresistibly appeals to men. We dare not say that He must be gracious, as though grace could cease to be free; but we may say that He must be Himself, and that it is because He is what we see Him to be in the death of Christ, understood as the New Testament understands it, that sinners are moved to repentance and to trust in Him. That which the eternal being of God made necessary to Him in the presence of sin is the very thing which is necessary also to win the hearts of sinners. Nothing but what is divinely necessary could have met the necessities of sinful men.

When we admit this twofold necessity for the Atonement we can tell ourselves more clearly how we are to conceive Christ in it, in relation to God on the one hand and to man on the other. The Atonement is God's work. It is God who makes the Atonement in Christ. It is God who mediates His forgiveness of sins to us in this way. This is one aspect of the matter, and probably the one about which there is least dispute among Christians. But

there is another aspect of it. The Mediator between God and man is Himself man, Christ Jesus. What is the relation of the man Christ Jesus to those for whom the Atonement is made? What is the proper term to designate, in this atoning work, what He is in relation to them? The doctrine of a onement current in the Church in the generation preceding our own answered frankly that in His atoning work Christ is our substitute. He comes in our nature, and He comes into our place. He enters into all the responsibilities that sin has created for us, and He does justice to them in His death. He does not deny any of them; He does not take sin as anything less or else than it is to God; in perfect sinlessness He consents even to die, to submit to that awful experience in which the final reaction of God's holiness against sin is expressed. Death was not *His* due; it was something alien to One who had done nothing amiss; but it was our due, and because it was ours He made it His. It was thus that He made Atonement. *He* bore *our* sins. He took to Himself all that they meant, all in which they had involved the world. He died for them, and in so doing acknowledged the sanctity of that order in which sin and death are indissolubly united. In other words, He did what the human race could not do for itself, yet what had to be done if sinners were to be saved: for how could men be saved if there were not made in humanity an acknowledgment of all that sin is to God, and of the justice of all that is entailed by sin under God's constitution of the world? Such an acknowledgment, as we have just seen, is divinely necessary, and necessary, too, for man, if sin is to be forgiven.

This was the basis of fact on which the substitutionary character of Christ's sufferings and death in the Atonement was asserted. It may be admitted at once that when the term substitute is interpreted without reference to this

basis of fact it lends itself very easily to misconstruction. It falls in with, if it does not suggest the idea of, a transference of merit and demerit, the sin of the world being carried over to Christ's account, and the merit of Christ to the world's account, as if the reconciliation of God and man, or the forgiveness of sins and the regeneration of souls, could be explained without the use of higher categories than are employed in book-keeping. It is surely not necessary at this time of day to disclaim an interpretation of personal relations which makes use only of sub-personal categories. Merit and demerit cannot be mechanically transferred like sums in an account. The credit, so to speak, of one person in the moral sphere cannot become that of another, apart from moral conditions. It is the same truth, in other words, if we say that the figure of paying a debt is not in every respect adequate to describe what Christ does in making the Atonement. The figure, I believe, covers the truth; if it did not, we should not have the kind of language which frequently occurs in Scripture; but it is misread into falsehood and immorality whenever it is pressed as if it were exactly equivalent to the truth. But granting these drawbacks which attach to the word, is there not something in the work of Christ, as mediating the forgiveness of sins, which no other word can express? No matter on what subsequent conditions its virtue for us depends, what Christ did had to be done, or we should never have had forgiveness: we should never have known God, and His nature and will in relation to sin; we should never have had the motive which alone could beget real repentance; we should never have had the spirit which welcomes pardon and is capable of receiving it. We could not procure these things for ourselves, we could not produce them out of our own resources: but He by entering into our nature and lot, by taking on Him our responsibilities and dying our death, has

so revealed God to us as to put them within our reach. We owe them to Him; in particular, and in the last resort, we owe them to the fact that He bore our sins in His own body to the tree. If we are not to say that the Atonement, as a work carried through in the sufferings and death of Christ, sufferings and death determined by our sin, is vicarious or substitutionary, what are we to call it?

The only answer which has been given to this question, by those who continue to speak of atonement at all, is that we must conceive Christ not as the substitute but as the representative of sinners. I venture to think that, with some advantages, the drawbacks of this word are quite as serious as those which attach to substitute. It makes it less easy, indeed, to think of the work of Christ as a finished work which benefits the sinner *ipso facto*, and apart from any relation between him and the Saviour: but what kind of relation does it suggest? It suggests that the sinners who are to be saved by Christ put Christ forward in their name: they are not in the utterly hopeless case that has hitherto been supposed; they can present themselves to God in the person and work of One on whom God cannot but look with approval. The boldest expression of this I have ever seen occurs in some remarks by a writer in the *Primitive Methodist Quarterly Review* on the doctrine of St. Paul. He is far from saying that a writer who finds a substitutionary doctrine throughout the New Testament is altogether wrong. He goes so far as to say that "if we look at the matter from what may be called an external point of view, no doubt we may speak of the death of Christ as in a certain sense substitutionary." But no one, he tells us, can do justice to Paul who fails to recognize that the death of Christ was a racial act; and "if we place ourselves at Paul's point of view, we shall see that to the eye of God the death of Christ presents itself less as an act which Christ does for the race than as an act which the

race does in Christ." In plain English, Paul teaches not that Christ died for the ungodly, but that the ungodly in Christ died for themselves. This is presented to us as something profound, a recognition of the mystical depths in Paul's teaching: I frankly confess that I cannot take it seriously. Nevertheless, it brings out the logic of what representative means when representative is opposed to substitute. The representative is ours, we are in Him, and we are supposed to get over all the moral difficulties raised by the idea of substitution just because He is ours, and because we are one with Him. But the fundamental fact of the situation is that, to begin with, Christ is *not* ours, and that, to begin with, we are *not* one with Him. In the apostle's view, and in point of fact, we are "without Christ" (*χωρὶς Χριστοῦ*). It is not we who have put Him there. It is not to us that His presence and His work in the world are due. If we had produced Him and put Him forward, we might call Him our representative in the sense suggested by the sentences just quoted; we might say it is not so much He who dies for us, as we who die in Him; but a representative not produced by us, but given to us—not chosen by us, but the elect of God—is not a representative at all, but in that place a substitute. He stands in our stead, facing all our responsibilities for us as God would have them faced; and it is what He does for us, and not the effect which this produces in us, still less the fantastic abstraction of a "racial act," which is the Atonement in the sense of the New Testament. To speak of Christ as our representative, in the sense that His death is to God less an act which He does for the race than an act which the race does in Him, is in principle to deny the whole grace of the gospel, and to rob it of every particle of its motive power.

To do justice to the truth here, both on its religious and its ethical side, it is necessary to put in their proper relation

to one another the aspects of reality which the terms substitute and representative respectively suggest. The first is fundamental. Christ is God's gift to humanity. He stands in the midst of us, the pledge of God's love, accepting our responsibilities as God would have them accepted, offering to God, under the pressure of the world's sin and all its consequences, that perfect recognition of God's holiness in so visiting sin which men should have offered but could not; and in so doing He makes Atonement for us. In so doing, also, He is our substitute, not yet our representative. But the Atonement thus made is not a spectacle, it is a motive. It is not a transaction in business, or in book-keeping, which is complete in itself; in view of the relations of God and man, it belongs to its very nature to be a moral appeal. It is a divine challenge to men, which is designed to win their hearts. And when men are won—when that which Christ in His love has done for them comes home to their souls—when they are constrained by His infinite grace to the self-surrender of faith, then we may say He becomes their representative. They begin to feel that what He has done for them must not remain outside of them, but be reproduced somehow in their own life. The mind of Christ in relation to God and sin, as He bore their sins in His own body to the tree, must become their mind; this and nothing else is the Christian salvation. The power to work this change in them is found in the death of Christ itself; the more its meaning is realized as something there, in the world, outside of us, the more completely does it take effect within us. In proportion as we see and feel that out of pure love to us He stands in our place—our substitute—bearing our burden—in that same proportion are we drawn into the relation to Him that makes Him our representative. But we should be careful here not to lose ourselves in soaring words. The New Testament has much to say about union with Christ, but I

could almost be thankful that it has no such expression as mystical union. The only union it knows is a moral one—a union due to the moral power of Christ's death, operating morally as a constraining motive on the human will, and begetting in believers the mind of Christ in relation to sin; but this moral union remains the problem and the task, as well as the reality and the truth, of the Christian life. Even when we think of Christ as our representative, and have the courage to say we died with Him, we have still to *reckon* ourselves to be dead to sin, and to put to death our members which are upon the earth; and to go past this, and speak of a mystical union with Christ in which we are lifted above the region of reflection and motive, of gratitude and moral responsibility, into some kind of metaphysical identity with the Lord, does not promote intelligibility, to say the least. If the Atonement were not, to begin with, outside of us—if it were not in that sense objective, a finished work in which God in Christ makes a final revelation of Himself in relation to sinners and sin—in other words, if Christ could not be conceived in it as our substitute, given by God to do in our place what we could not do for ourselves, there would be no way of recognizing or preaching or receiving it as a motive; while, on the other hand, if it did not operate as a motive, if it did not appeal to sinful men in such a way as to draw them into a moral fellowship with Christ—in other words, if Christ did not under it become representative of us, our surety to God that we should yet be even as He in relation to God and to sin, we could only say that it had all been vain. Union with Christ, in short, is not a presupposition of Christ's work, which enables us to escape all the moral problems raised by the idea of a substitutionary Atonement; it is not a presupposition of Christ's work, it is its fruit. To see that it is its fruit is to have the final answer to the objection that substitution is immoral. If substitution, in the sense in which we must assert it of Christ,

is the greatest moral force in the world—if the truth which it covers, when it enters into the mind of man, enters with divine power to assimilate him to the Saviour, uniting him to the Lord in a death to sin and a life to God—obviously, to call it immoral is an abuse of language. The love which can literally go out of itself and make the burden of others its own is the radical principle of all the genuine and victorious morality in the world. And to say that love cannot do any such thing, that the whole formula of morality is every man shall bear his own burden, is to deny the plainest facts of the moral life.

Yet this is a point at which difficulty is felt by many in trying to grasp the Atonement. On the one hand, there do seem to be analogies to it, and points of attachment for it, in experience. No sin that has become real to conscience is ever outlived and overcome without expiation. There are consequences involved in it that go far beyond our perception at the moment, but they work themselves inexorably out, and our sin ceases to be a burden on conscience, and a fetter on will, only as we "accept the punishment of our iniquity," and become conscious of the holy love of God behind it. But the consequences of sin are never limited to the sinner. They spread beyond him in the organism of humanity, and when they strike visibly upon the innocent, the sense of guilt is deepened. We see that we have done we know not what, something deeply and mysteriously bad beyond all our reckoning, something that only a power and goodness transcending our own avail to check. It is one of the startling truths of the moral life that such consequences of sin, striking visibly upon the innocent, have in certain circumstances a peculiar power to redeem the sinful. When they are accepted, as they sometimes are accepted, without repining or complaint—when they are borne, as they sometimes are borne, freely and lovingly by the innocent, because to the innocent the guilty

are dear—then something is appealed to in the guilty which is deeper than guilt, something may be touched which is deeper than sin, a new hope and faith may be born in them to take hold of love so wonderful, and by attaching themselves to it to transcend the evil past. The suffering of such love (they are dimly aware), or rather the power of such love persisting through all the suffering brought on it by sin, opens the gate of righteousness to the sinful in spite of all that has been; sin is outweighed by it, it is annulled, exhausted, transcended in it. The great Atonement of Christ is somehow in line with this, and we do not need to shrink from the analogy. "If there were no witness," as Dr. Robertson Nicoll puts it, "in the world's deeper literature"—if there were no witness, that is, in the universal experience of man—"to the fact of an Atonement, the Atonement would be useless, since the formula expressing it would be unintelligible." It is the analogy of such experiences which makes the Atonement credible, yet it must always in some way transcend them. There is something in it which is ultimately incomparable. When we speak of others as innocent, the term is used only in a relative sense; there is no human conscience pure to God. When we speak of the sin of others coming in its consequences on the innocent, we speak of something in which the innocent are purely passive; or if there is moral response on their part, the situation is not due to moral initiative of theirs. But with Christ it is different. He knew *no* sin, and He entered *freely*, deliberately, and as the very work of His calling, into all that sin meant for God and brought on man. Something that I experience in a particular relation, in which another has borne my sin and loved me through it, may help to open my eyes to the meaning of Christ's love; but when they are opened, what I see is the propitiation for the whole world. There is no guilt of the human race, there is no consequence in which

sin has involved it, to which the holiness and love made manifest in Christ are unequal. He reveals to all sinful men the whole relation of God to them and to their sins—a sanctity which is inexorable to sin, and cannot take it as other than it is in all its consequences, and a love which through all these consequences and under the weight of them all, will not let the sinful go. It is in this revelation of the character of God and of His relation to the sin of the world that the forgiveness of sins is revealed. It is not intimated in the air; it is preached, as St. Paul says, "in this man"; it is mediated to the world through Him and specifically through His death, because it is through Him, and specifically through His death, that we get the knowledge of God's character which evokes penitence and faith, and brings the assurance of His pardon to the heart.

From this point of view we may see how to answer the question that is sometimes asked about the relation of Christ's life to His death, or about the relation of both to the Atonement. If we say that what we have in the Atonement is an assurance of God's character, does it not follow at once that Christ's teaching and His life contribute to it as directly as His death? Is it not a signal illustration of the false abstractions which we have so often had cause to censure when the death of Christ is taken as if it had an existence or a significance apart from His life, or could be identified with the Atonement in a way in which His life could not? I do not think this is so clear. Of course it is Christ Himself who is the Atonement or propitiation—He Himself, as St. John puts it, and not anything, not even His death, into which He does not enter. But it is He Himself, as making to us the revelation of God in relation to sin and to sinners; and apart from death, as that in which the conscience of the race sees the final reaction of God against evil, this revelation is not fully made. If Christ had done less than die for us, therefore—if He had

separated Himself from us, or declined to be one with us, in this solemn experience in which the darkness of sin is sounded and all its bitterness tasted,—there would have been no Atonement. It is impossible to say this of any particular incident in His life, and in so far the unique emphasis laid on His death in the New Testament is justified. But I should go further than this, and say that even Christ's life, taking it as it stands in the Gospels, only enters into the Atonement, and has reconciling power, because it is pervaded from beginning to end by the consciousness of His death. Instead of depriving His death of the peculiar significance Scripture assigns to it, and making it no more than the termination, or at least the consummation, of His life, I should rather argue that the Scriptural emphasis is right, and that His life attains its true interpretation only as we find in it everywhere the power and purpose of His death. There is nothing artificial or unnatural in this. There are plenty of people who never have death out of their minds an hour at a time. They are not cowards, nor mad, nor even sombre ; they may have purposes and hopes and gaieties as well as others ; but they see life steadily and see it whole, and of all their thoughts the one which has most determining and omnipresent power is the thought of the inevitable end. There is death in all their life. It was not, certainly, as the inevitable end, the inevitable "debt of nature," that death was present to the mind of Christ ; but if we can trust the Evangelists at all, from the hour of His baptism it was present to His mind as something involved in His vocation; and it was a presence so tremendous that it absorbed everything into itself. "I have a baptism to be baptized with, and how am I straitened till it be accomplished." Instead of saying that Christ's life as well as His death contributed to the Atonement—that His active obedience (to use the theological formula) as well as His passive obedience was

essential to His propitiation—we should rather say that His life is part of His death : a deliberate and conscious descent, ever deeper and deeper, into the dark valley where at the last hour the last reality of sin was to be met and borne. If the objection is made that after all this only means that death is the most vital point of life, its intensest focus, I should not wish to make any reply. Our Lord's Passion *is* His sublimest action—an action so potent that all His other actions are sublated in it, and we know everything when we know that He *died* for our sins.

The desire to bring the life of Christ as well as His death into the Atonement has probably part of its motive in the feeling that when the death is separated from the life it loses moral character : it is reduced to a merely physical incident, which cannot carry such vast significance as the Atonement. Such a feeling certainly exists, and finds expression in many forms. How often, for example, we hear it said that it is not the death which atones, but the spirit in which the Saviour died—not His sufferings which expiate sin, but the innocence, the meekness, the love to man and obedience to God in which they were borne. The Atonement, in short, was a moral achievement, to which physical suffering and death are essentially irrelevant. This is our old enemy, the false abstraction, once more, and that in the most aggressive form. The contrast of physical and moral is made absolute at the very point at which it ceases to exist. As against such absolute distinctions we must hold that if Christ had not really died for us, there would have been no Atonement at all, and on the other hand that what are called His physical sufferings and death have no existence simply as physical : they are essential elements in the moral achievement of the passion. It leads to no truth to say that it is not the death of Christ, but the spirit in which He died, that atones for sin : the spirit in which He died has its being in His death, and in

nothing else in the world. It seems to me that what is really wanted here, both by those who seek to co-ordinate Christ's life with His death in the Atonement, and by those who distinguish between His death and the spirit in which He died, is some means of keeping hold of the Person of Christ in His work, and that this is not effectively done apart from the New Testament belief in the Resurrection. There is no doubt that in speaking of the death of Christ as that through which the forgiveness of sins is mediated to us we are liable to think of it as if it were only an event in the past. We take the representation of it in the Gospel and say, "Such and such is the impression which this event produces upon me; I feel in it how God is opposed to sin, and how I ought to be opposed to it; I feel in it how God's love appeals to me to share His mind about sin; and as I yield to this appeal I am at once set free from sin and assured of pardon; this is the only ethical forgiveness; to know this experimentally is to know the Gospel." No one can have any interest in disputing another's obligation to Christ, but it may fairly be questioned whether this kind of obligation to Christ amounts to Christianity in the sense of the New Testament. There is no living Christ here, no coming of the living Christ to the soul, in the power of the Atonement, to bring it to God. But this is what the New Testament shows us. It is *He* who is the propitiation for our sins—He who died for them and rose again. The New Testament preaches a Christ who was dead and is alive, not a Christ who was alive and is dead. It is a mistake to suppose that the New Testament conception of the Gospel, involving as it does the spiritual presence and action of Christ, in the power of the Atonement, is a matter of indifference to us, and that in all our thinking and preaching we must remain within purely historical limits, if by purely historical limits is meant that our creed must end with the words "crucified, dead, and buried." To

preach the Atonement means not only to preach one who bore our sins in death, but one who by rising again from the dead demonstrated the final defeat of sin, and one who comes in the power of His risen life—which means, in the power of the Atonement accepted by God—to make all who commit themselves to Him in faith partakers in His victory. It is not His death, as an incident in the remote past, however significant it may be; it is the Lord Himself, appealing to us in the virtue of His death, who assures us of pardon and restores our souls.

One of the most singular phenomena in the attitude of many modern minds to the Atonement is the disposition to plead against the Atonement what the New Testament represents as its fruits. It is as though it had done its work so thoroughly that people could not believe that it ever needed to be done at all. The idea of fellowship with Christ, for example, is constantly urged against the idea that Christ died for us, and by His death made all mankind His debtors in a way in which we cannot make debtors of each other. The New Testament itself is pressed into the service. It is pointed out that our Lord called His disciples to drink of His cup and to be baptized with His baptism, where the baptism and the cup are figures of His passion; and it is argued that there cannot be anything unique in His experience or service, anything which He does for men which it is beyond the power of His disciples to do also. Or again, reference is made to St. Paul's words to the Colossians: Now I rejoice in my sufferings on your behalf, and fill up on my part that which is lacking of the afflictions of Christ in my flesh for His body's sake, which is the Church; and it is argued that St. Paul here represents himself as doing exactly what Christ did, or even as supplementing a work which Christ admittedly left imperfect. The same idea is traced where the Christian is represented as called into the fellowship of the Son of God, or more

specifically as called to know the fellowship of His sufferings by becoming conformed to His death. It is seen pervading the New Testament in the conception of the Christian as a man *in Christ.* And to descend from the apostolic age to our own, it has been put by an American theologian into the epigrammatic form that Christ redeems us by making us redeemers. What, it may be asked, is the truth in all this? and how is it related to what we have already seen cause to assert about the uniqueness of Christ's work in making atonement for sin, or mediating the divine forgiveness to man?

I do not think it is impossible or even difficult to reconcile the two: it is done, indeed, whenever we see that the life to which we are summoned, in the fellowship of Christ, is a life which we owe altogether to Him, and which He does not in the least owe to us. The question really raised is this: Has Jesus Christ a place of His own in the Christian religion? Is it true that there is one Mediator between God and man, Himself man, this man, Christ Jesus? In spite of the paradoxical assertion of Harnack to the contrary, it is not possible to deny, with any plausibility, that this was the mind of Christ Himself, and that it has been the mind of all who call Him Lord. He knew and taught, what they have learned by experience as well as by His word, that all men must owe to Him their knowledge of the Father, their place in the Kingdom of God, and their part in all its blessings. He could not have taught this of any but Himself, nor is it the experience of the Church that such blessings come through any other. Accordingly, when Christ calls on men to drink His cup and to be baptized with His baptism, while He may quite well mean, and does mean, that His life and death are to be the inspiration of theirs, and while He may quite well encourage them to believe that sacrifice on their part, as on His, will contribute to bless the world, He need not mean, and we may be sure

He does not mean, that their blood is like His, the blood of the covenant, or that their sinful lives, even when purged and quickened by His Spirit, could be, like His sinless life, described as the world's ransom. The same considerations apply to the passages quoted from St. Paul, and especially to the words in Colossians i. 24. The very purpose of the Epistle to the Colossians is to assert the exclusive and perfect mediatorship of Christ, alike in creation and redemption; all that we call being, and all that we call reconciliation, has to be defined by relation to Him, and not by relation to any other persons or powers, visible or invisible; and however gladly Paul might reflect that in his enthusiasm for suffering he was continuing Christ's work, and exhausting some of the afflictions—they were Christ's own afflictions—which had yet to be endured ere the Church could be made perfect, it is nothing short of grotesque to suppose that in this connexion he conceived of himself as doing what Christ did, atoning for sin, and reconciling the world to God. All this was done already, perfectly done, done for the whole world; and it was on the basis of it, and under the inspiration of it, that the apostle sustained his enthusiasm for a life of toil and pain in the service of men. Always, where we have Christian experience to deal with, it is the Christ through whom the divine forgiveness comes to us at the Cross—the Christ of the substitutionary Atonement, who bore all our burden alone, and did a work to which we can forever recur, but to which we did not and do not and never can contribute at all—it is this Christ who constrains us to find our representative with God in Himself, and to become ourselves His representatives to man. It is as we truly represent Him that we can expect our testimony to Him to find acceptance, but that testimony far transcends everything that our service enables men to measure. What is anything that a sinful man, saved by grace, can do for his Lord or for his kind, compared with what the sinless

Lord has done for the sinful race? It is true that He calls us to drink of His cup, to learn the fellowship of His sufferings, even to be conformed to His death; but under all the intimate relationship the eternal difference remains which makes Him *Lord*—He knew no sin, and we could make no atonement. It is the goal of our life to be found in Him; but I cannot understand the man who thinks it more profound to identify himself with Christ and share in the work of redeeming the world, than to abandon himself to Christ and share in the world's experience of being redeemed. And I am very sure that in the New Testament the last is first and fundamental.

JAMES DENNEY.

THE TEACHING OF CHRIST.

V.

It has recently been maintained[1] that while the discourses of the Fourth Gospel are trustworthy as a whole, and due to the Apostle John, the narrative is for the most part the work of a member of the School of St. John, whose purpose was to supply an historical framework for the discourses, and who did not hesitate here and there to imagine the events which he describes.

The theory is ingenious rather than convincing.[2] Most readers will feel that whether St. John is to be regarded as the writer or not, the Gospel which bears his name is a unity which cannot be satisfactorily distributed between two authors. But the attempt to do so will not have been without value if it calls attention to the subsidiary character of the Johannine narrative. The Synoptists are primarily historians or biographers; the writer of the Fourth Gospel regards history or biography as subservient to direct instruction. He has given us what is preeminently the Gospel of the Teaching of Christ.

Yet St. John's narrative stands always in close relation to the didactic element in his book. It gives point and reality to the discourses, which owe to it more than the reader may at first suppose. Happily the Evangelist has been able in every instance to recover the occasion upon which the teaching was given, or the circumstances out of which it arose. A mere collection of "Logia" would not merely have missed the literary charm which belongs to this Gospel; it would have been intrinsically less valuable. How much the narrative contributes to the right under-

[1] By Dr. H. H. Wendt (*Das Johannes-Evangelium*, Göttingen, 1900: E. Tr., Edinburgh, 1902).

[2] It is briefly but adequately answered by Dr. Lock, in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, iv. 2, p. 194 ff.

standing of the teaching will be evident if the reader tries to imagine any one of the great discourses divorced from its context; if, e.g., he separates the discourse of chap. v. from the Sabbath miracle which preceded it, or the teaching of chap. vi. from the miracle of the Loaves, or the pastoral imagery of chap. x. from the incidents of chap. ix.; or if he lose sight of the occasion of the farewell discourse in chapters xiv.–xvi. Moreover, the Gospel of St. John is rich in conversations which are of no less importance than the discourses, and in these the teaching gains immeasurably in interest and power from the dramatic form in which it is cast. It would no doubt have been possible to convey the instruction of chapters iii. and iv. by means of excerpts, or in a continuous form; but at what a sacrifice of strength, and even of momentous truth!

The narrative, however, serves a further purpose. It explains to a great extent the special character of the Johannine teaching. With the exception of the teaching upon the Bread of Life, the whole of the public discourses in this Gospel and nearly all the conversations belong to the Judaean Ministry.[1] But the social and religious atmosphere of Judaea and especially of Jerusalem, where most of the Judaean teaching was given, differed widely from that of Galilee; and if due allowance be made for this change of circumstances, it will go far to account for the new form in which the teaching is cast. There are other considerations which must not be overlooked, such as the greater capacity for assimilating the profounder truths that fell from the Master's lips which may reasonably be ascribed to St. John; but apart from this, it is natural to suppose that the deeper teaching was given with greater freedom at Jerusalem than at Capernaum, in the Temple precinct

[1] Only in John ii. 1–12, iv. 43–54, vi. 1–71, vii. 1–9, is the scene laid in Galilee; iv. 5–42 belongs to Samaria, and x. 40–xi. 16 to Peræa.

and in the hearing of the cultured and responsible people who made Solomon's Porch or the Treasury their place of resort,[1] than to the peasants, fishermen, toll-gatherers, and motley crowd of followers who thronged the Lord's daily progress along the shore of the northern lake.

All this might be worked out at some length, but our space forbids, and we must hasten to glance at the subject-matter of the Johannine teaching. It falls roughly under two heads. It is a self-revelation, in which the Lord unfolds to the Jews,[2] and yet more fully to the Twelve, the mystery of His own Person, mission, and work. It is also a revelation of the mystery of the spiritual life which characterizes the subjects of the Kingdom of God. Neither of these topics is absent from the Synoptic teaching, but in the conversations and discourses of the Fourth Gospel they are treated on a larger scale and exhibited in new lights.

1. In His self-revelation our Lord manifests in some respects the same reserve which we have noticed in the Synoptic Gospels. Though at Jerusalem men were freely discussing the possibility that Jesus was the Christ,[3] the Lord appears not to have expressly claimed the title, even if His words implied that it belonged to Him.[4] Moreover, at Jerusalem, as at Capernaum, He called Himself "the Son of Man," though perhaps not so frequently.[5] On the other hand, the public discourses of the Fourth Gospel are full of language which goes beyond any claim of Messiahship, as the Jews understood that office. Of these

[1] John viii. 20, x. 23.

[2] On the meaning to be given to οἱ Ἰουδαῖοι in this Gospel see Westcott, *Introd.*, p. ix.

[3] Cp. John vii. 26 ff., ix. 22.

[4] x. 24: εἰπὸν ἡμῖν παρρησίᾳ . . . εἶπον ὑμῖν καὶ οὐ πιστεύετε, cf. viii. 25. The only express statement seems to have been made to the Samaritan woman (iv. 26).

[5] The title occurs only in i. 51, iii. 13 f., viii. 28, ix. 35 (ℵBD), xii. 23 (cf. 24), xiii. 31.

self-manifestations the most remarkable are those which occur in the discourses of chapters v., viii., and x., all of which were delivered to hostile audiences,[1] and the second and the third (at least in part) within the Precinct.[2] It was under such circumstances that Jesus spoke as follows: "My Father worketh even until now, and I work." "What things soever He doeth, these the Son also doeth in like manner." "As the Father raiseth the dead and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom He will; for neither doth the Father judge any man, but He hath given all judgement unto the Son, that all may honour the Son even as they honour the Father." "For as the Father hath life in Himself, even so gave He to the Son also to have life in Himself." [3] "I am from above, I am not of this world." "Except ye believe that I am He, ye shall die in your sins." "As the Father taught Me, I speak these things." "I do always the things that are pleasing to Him." "I came forth, and am come from God." "Before Abraham was (γενέσθαι), I am (εἰμί)." [4] "I and the Father are One (ἕν ἐσμεν)." "The Father is in Me, and I in the Father." [5]

It is not surprising that the Jews of Jerusalem were in some cases bewildered, in others scandalized, by these extraordinary claims. Some asked, "Where is Thy father"? "Who art Thou"? Whom makest Thou Thyself? [6] Others saw quite clearly what Jesus meant; He "called God His own (ἴδιον) Father, making Himself equal with God"; "Thou, being a man," they said bluntly, "makest Thyself God." [7] On two occasions this conviction lashed them into a fury; they seized the fragments of marble which were

[1] See v. 16, viii. 59, x. 31, 39. The "believing" Jews of ch. viii. 20 are scarcely an exception.

[2] viii. 59, x. 20.

[3] v. 17, 19, 21 ff., 26.

[4] viii. 23 f., 28, 42, 58.

[5] x. 30, 38. [6] viii. 19. 25, 53. [7] v. 18, x. 33.

lying on the pavement of the courts, and would have stoned Him for a blasphemer then and there.[1]

Were they mistaken in their interpretation of His words? A large and growing body of modern theologians is of opinion that they were. The question is a vital one. Jesus taught as He did at the risk of His life, and must, therefore, have regarded this element in His teaching as of primary importance. That it was reserved for Jerusalem and for the Temple invests it with especial solemnity.

What then is the nature of the Sonship which our Lord claims in these discourses? Is it merely an ethical relation to God, a relation of love and trust and intimate fellowship, unique in its perfection, but the same in kind as that which belongs to all living members of His Church? Or is it, over and above this, an essential relation, involving a participation in the inner life of God? In support of the former view it is argued that in other passages the Lord attributes to the disciples the same distinctive features of Divine Sonship: "They are not of the world, even as I am not of the world"; "the glory which Thou hast given Me I have given unto them, that they may be one, even as We are One."[2] Such words show clearly that there is an analogy between the Sonship of Christ and the sonship of believers; the latter is, if we may dare to speak so, modelled upon the former; the ethical characteristics of the two differ only in degree. But the question before us is not answered by pointing out certain resemblances. Can we apply to the disciples of Christ, in any state of perfection which can be reached by a created nature, *all* that the Lord has claimed for Himself? Can they be said e.g. to have life in themselves *as the Father hath life in Himself?*[3] Would any degree of moral assimilation to God justify a merely human

[1] viii. 59, x. 31. [2] xvii. 16, 22.

[3] There is a sense in which believers may be said ζωὴν ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς (cf. John vi. 53), but not ὥσπερ ὁ πατήρ (v. 26).

being in saying, "I and the Father are One"? In nearly every one of our Lord's sayings about His Sonship there is something which cannot be transferred to His disciples, which the Christian consciousness refuses to regard as applicable to itself. Thus His words justify the Evangelist's deduction that He is the *μονογενὴς υἱός*, and even *θεὸς μονογενής*. It is not without significance that the writer of the Fourth Gospel does not permit himself to call believers 'sons of God'; they are 'children,' *τέκνα θεοῦ*,[1] but he reserves the title *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ* for our Lord.

On one occasion, indeed, Jesus seems to deprecate the logical import of His words. "Is it not written in your Law, 'I said, Ye are gods'? If He called them 'gods' unto whom the word of God came, and the Scripture cannot be broken, say ye of Him whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world, 'Thou blasphemest,' because I said 'I am the Son of God'?"[2] The argument is from the less to the greater: 'If Divinity could be ascribed by an inspired writer to mere mortal men who were entrusted with the Divine word in the ordinary way, how can it be denied to One who has been sent from God with a direct message to mankind'? Our Lord purposely limits Himself here to the lowest view which could be taken of His mission; even on that hypothesis He has the right to call Himself Son of God. But it is clear that He does this without prejudice to any higher claim, and His words cannot be taken to neutralize all that He has elsewhere said as to His essential oneness with the Father.

But it is to the farewell discourses of chapters xiv.–xvi. and the last prayer of Jesus in chap. xvii. that we must

[1] Cf. John 1. 12, xi. 52; 1 John iii. 1 f., 10, v. 2. *Τέκνον* is used by St. John of our Lord only in Apoc. xii. 4 f., where His human birth is in view.

[2] John x. 34. Cf. Ps. lxxxii. 6 f. (LXX: *ἐγὼ εἶπα Θεοί ἐστε, καὶ υἱοὶ Ὑψίστου πάντες· ὑμεῖς δὲ δὴ ὡς ἄνθρωποι ἀποθνήσκετε*).

look for the crowning self-manifestation of the Only-begotten Son. Here the atmosphere is entirely changed ; the Lord is no longer bearing witness to Himself before a hostile and menacing crowd, but taking the Twelve into His confidence,[1] or engaged in intimate communion with God. We are admitted into the sanctuary of the Master's spirit, and we see His Divine Sonship asserting itself both in His relations with the disciples and in His intercourse with the Father. "Believe on (εἰς) God," He says to the Twelve, "and believe also on (εἰς) Me." "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father." "If a man love Me . . . My Father will love him, and We will come unto him and make Our abode with him." [2] "I will send [the Comforter] unto you from the Father." [3] "He shall glorify Me, for He shall take of Mine and shall declare it unto you ; all things whatsoever the Father hath are Mine." "The Father Himself loveth you, because ye have loved Me, and have believed that I came forth from (παρά) the Father." "I came out from (ἐκ) the Father, and am come into the world ; again, I leave the world, and go unto the Father." [5] He prays : "O Father, glorify Thou Me with Thine own self with the glory which I had with Thee before the world was." "Father, that which Thou hast given Me, I will that where I am they also may be with Me, that they may behold My glory which Thou hast given Me ; for Thou lovedst Me before the foundation of the world." [6] It is right to set against this language one or two sentences which seem to point in an opposite direction, such as, "The Father is greater than I" ; "this is life eternal, that they should know Thee, the only true God, and Him whom Thou didst send, even Jesus Christ." [7] But these passages, however they may be interpreted, assign to Jesus

[1] Cf. John xv. 15. [2] xiv. 1, 9, 23. [3] xv. 26, xvi. 7.
[4] xvi. 14 f., cf. xvii. 9. [5] xvi. 27 f.
[6] John xvii. 5, 24. [7] xiv. 28, xvii. 3.

a unique position in the order of being. Who is this person who ventures to compare Himself with the Father, and coordinates Himself with the only true God, as one whom it is necessary to know in order to have eternal life? Nor do these statements really contravene the rest of the teaching. The superior greatness of the Father [1] is wholly consistent with our Lord's repeated attribution of His glory and His very being to the Father's gift; the title 'only true God' does not exclude from Godhead the Son, who is one with the Father. The Christology of the Fourth Gospel is not less truly monotheistic [2] than that of the Synoptists, though it recognizes more distinctly that in the Divine Unity there is a plurality of essential relations.

The Johannine teaching is not less full in reference to the mission and work of Christ. Our Lord constantly speaks of Himself as sent and commissioned [3] by the Father. The work of His life was to do the will of the Person who sent Him [4]; His words and His acts were spoken or performed in the name of God.[5] The end of His mission from one point of view was to bear witness to the truth [6]; from another, it was to save the world, to give eternal life to men.[7] But these two aspects of His work are one in fact, since the truth is a saving power, liberating men from sin and death.[8] The mission of Christ will end with His return to the Father, but it is to be followed or rather continued by a mission of the Spirit. Beyond this

[1] On the interpretation of xiv. 28 see the additional notes in Westcott.

[2] Cf. John v. 44, where again monotheism asserts itself in a discourse which claims Divine honour for the Son.

[3] Πέμπειν is used in iv. 34; v. 23 f., 30, 37; vi. 38 f., 44; vii. 16, 18, 28, 33; ix. 4; xii. 44 f., 49; xiii. 20; xiv. 24; xv. 21; xvi. 5; ἀποστέλλειν in iii. 17, 34; v. 36, 38; vi. 29, 57; vii. 29; viii. 42; x. 36; xi. 42; xvii. 3, 8, 18, 21, 23, 25; xx. 21. The two words are discussed by Westcott (additional note on xx. 21).

[4] iv. 34; vi. 38; ix. 4; xii. 49.

[5] v. 36; viii. 28 f.; xii. 49.

[6] xviii. 37.

[7] iii. 16 f.; x. 10; xvii. 2 f.

[8] viii. 32 ff, 52.

again Jesus foresees a general resurrection and judgment, in both of which He is to take the principal part.[1] There are, in short, no bounds to the powers which He claims in the domain of both flesh and spirit. "I am the Light of the world"; "I am the Resurrection and the Life"; "I am the Way, and the Truth, and the Life; no one cometh unto the Father but by Me."[2] These words, it is evident, extend further than the brief earthly ministry; they point to vast influences permeating all human history and that which lies beyond it; they reveal in dim outline a work which is in course of fulfilment to this hour and stretches forth into the infinite future.

Such teaching dazzles by its splendour. But if it is difficult to imagine it as proceeding from human lips, still less can we believe that it originated in the mind of the Evangelist. No adequate explanation of it can be found but that which the Evangelist himself has given. "The Word was God . . . in Him was life and the life was the light of men . . . and the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and we beheld His glory, glory as of the (an) Only-begotten from the (a) Father (*ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός*)— full of grace and truth."[3]

2. By the side of this great revelation of the Lord's Person and work, and in close connexion with it, the Fourth Gospel places another, the revelation of the Divine life in the subjects of the Kingdom of God.

Three classical passages[4] deal with this second mystery —the conversation with Nicodemus, the conversation with the Samaritan woman, and the conversation and discourse at Capernaum.

There is a remarkable contrast in the situations represented in the first and second of these interviews. In the first our Lord is seen in conference with a Pharisee, who is

[1] v. 21 ff.
[2] viii. 22; xi. 25; xiv. 6.
[3] i. 1–14.
[4] Chaps. iii., iv., vi.

also a member of the Sanhedrin;[1] in the second He converses with a woman who is not of pure Israelite blood, and whose Bible contained only the Pentateuch. One of these persons was an inquirer, the other thoughtless, and disposed to be captious. Both receive instruction according to their separate capacities, and it is interesting to study the great Master's treatment of each case, as well as the teaching itself. To Nicodemus, a "teacher of Israel," the Lord speaks of the mystery of the New Birth. He who would "see" or "enter into" the Kingdom of God must be "born from above."[2] Life in a Divine Kingdom must have a supermundane source. In the Synoptic Gospels the Kingdom is viewed chiefly in its outward and visible results, as it affects conduct; here for the first time the spiritual life which lies behind conduct is revealed in its genesis and growth. Spirit can be generated only by spirit. But spirit is invisible; the wind, its nearest analogue, which both in Aramaic and Greek shares its name (רוּחָא, *πνεῦμα*), can be heard but not seen as it sweeps along with irresistible force; in like manner the spiritual life eludes observation, and yet works the greatest wonders in the world. For spiritual life and spiritual birth, though from above, are enacted on earth (*ἐπίγεια*),[3] and are not transcendental conceptions, but facts of daily experience. Finally, Jesus connects this revelation with His own person and mission, and with the ultimate purpose of His coming. "We speak that we do know"; "no man hath ascended into heaven but He that descended out of heaven, even the Son of Man";[4] "the Son of Man must be lifted up, that

[1] iii. 1; cf. vii. 50.

[2] So on the whole it seems but to render *ἄνωθεν* in iii. 3, 7; cf. iii. 31, *ὁ ἄνωθεν ἐρχόμενος*, and xix. 11, *δεδομένον ἄνωθεν*; also James i. 17, iii. 17, *ἄνωθεν σοφία*.

[3] iii. 12.

[4] The words *ὁ ὢν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ* (ΑΓΠ), etc., are "Western and Syrian," and should probably be omitted; see W.H., *Notes*, p. 75.

whosoever believeth may in Him have eternal life."[1]

With the Samaritan woman another course is pursued. The Teacher starts with the scene which lay before Him. He "sat by the well," the gift of the patriarch Jacob,[2] from which for centuries daily supplies of water had been laboriously drawn.[3] In contrast with this earthly source of refreshment, He places the Gift of God,[4] and its store of "living water," which not only quenches thirst at the moment but becomes a spring of inward life.[5] In this teaching less emphasis is laid on the beginnings of the new life and on its mysterious nature and powers, and more on its source, course, and issue. It is the gift of Christ, Himself the Gift of God. It enters into man's nature, satisfies his deepest desires, and becomes within him a πηγὴ ζωῆς, ever sending fresh rills of life through his being till it ends in life everlasting. No direct mention is made here of the spiritual nature of this new life; yet the conversation does not end without a reference to this point. "God is Spirit, and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth." The water of life is the supply of the Spirit of Christ, as we learn from a later chapter,[6] and as indeed the conversation with Nicodemus has already suggested.[7]

The first miracle of the Loaves is not in the Synoptic Gospels the occasion of any teaching beyond a few remarks addressed to the Twelve.[8] But in the Fourth Gospel it leads to a series of conversations and discourses scarcely surpassed in importance by any other. We have first a conversation with the people who had crossed from the scene of the miracle to seek Jesus at Capernaum[9]; then a formal reply to "the Jews," delivered in part or in whole in the Capernaum synagogue[10]; and lastly, a few words of explanation addressed to His own disciples. In

[1] iii. 11, 13. [2] iv. 5. [3] *Ib.* 11, 15. [4] iv. 20; cf. iii. 16.
[5] iv. 23. [6] vii. 37 ff.; cf. Apoc. vii. 17; xxii. 1, 17.
[7] iii. 5, ἐξ ὕδατος καὶ πνεύματος.
[8] Mark viii. 14 ff. [9] vi. 26–40. [10] *Ib.* 43–51, 53–58.

the conversation with the ignorant people from Bethsaida our Lord simply reveals Himself as "the Bread of Life," in reference to the recent miracle; in His answer to the Jews He speaks of this Bread as consisting of His Flesh and Blood; while to His disciples He gives a key to the enigmas of His teaching. The teaching is briefly as follows:—The spiritual life requires spiritual food. Jesus is Himself this food, not, however, in His pre-existent life with God, but as the Word made Flesh and giving His flesh for the life of the world. The Incarnation and the Sacrifice are the sustenance of the spiritual man, who through them receives the life which is in Christ. The process is wholly spiritual, for in the things of the spirit the fleshly is of no avail. The words of Christ must therefore be carried into the region of the spiritual and unseen, though they are not on that account of less vital significance. They set forth the effects which His Manhood and His Death, when spiritually assimilated, exert upon our humanity, strengthening and refreshing the soul, renewing its wasted tissues, and preserving both soul and body to the life everlasting.[1]

But it is to the farewell discourse of chapters xiv.–xvi. that we must look for fuller light upon the mystery of the spiritual life, just as we sought there for our Lord's clearest self-revelation. In this great discourse He deals with men who already knew by experience the power of the new life, so far as it was possible to know it before the actual coming of the Paraclete.[2] With them He was able to speak more fully than to "those who were without."

[1] There is a striking correspondence between the spiritual facts taught in John iii., vi., and the two great Sacraments of the Gospel; and this may well have been in the mind of Christ when He spoke. But a sound exegesis will refuse to find a *primary* reference to the Sacraments in words addressed to Jewish hearers before the institution of either rite.

[2] See xiv. 17, ὑμεῖς γινώσκετε αὐτό, ὅτι παρ' ὑμῖν μένει καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν ἔστιν (BD*: ἔσται ℵAD²L).

In the earlier chapters two great laws of the spiritual life have come into sight. It is spiritual in its nature, and it is the gift of Jesus Christ. These principles are still paramount in the last discourse, but they are seen in new lights. The personal Spirit of God is at length disclosed as the Agent of spiritual life. When the Other Paraclete has come, He will teach the disciples all things, guide them into all the truth, remind them of the teaching of Christ, testify of Christ and glorify Him by interpreting His Person and work.[1] Upon the world His coming will have another effect. The world cannot receive Him, since it has no capacity for spiritual things,[2] yet it will feel His power without knowing whence it comes: convictions will be forced upon it which will change its attitude towards Christ and the Kingdom of God.[3] It may be said that all this refers rather to the mission which the Apostles would find themselves called to fulfil shortly after the Ascension and the Pentecost, than to the mystery of the life of the Spirit in the individual. Certainly our Lord does not describe the spiritual experience of ordinary believers, as it is described in the Epistles of St. Paul; for His teaching, far-reaching as its principles are, deals with the persons and circumstances which were immediately before Him. But His words about the Paraclete reveal, so far as it could be revealed at the time, a coming dispensation of the Spirit; and thus they supplement the teaching of the earlier chapters of this Gospel. They make known the existence of a Divine Person, proceeding from the Father and to be sent by the Son, whose very name suggests that He is the Principle of all spiritual life and power.

Yet these chapters which foretell the work of the Paraclete show no tendency to retract the claims which Jesus had Himself made upon the human spirit. As a matter of fact His claims are repeated in them, and even reinforced.

[1] xiv. 26; xv. 26; xvi. 13 ff. [2] xiv. 17. [3] xvi. 8.

The discourse begins with the command, "Believe on Me," and ends with the cry of triumph, "Be of good cheer, I have overcome the world."[1] Christ's Person and Christ's victory are the basis on which the entire Christian life is to rest. The life itself is to be one of sustained fellowship with the Master, and absolute loyalty to His commands. "Abide in Me and I in you . . . apart from Me ye can do nothing." "If ye keep My commandments ye shall abide in My love . . . ye are my friends, if ye do the things which I command you."[2] There is to be no transference from the old life of obedience to Christ to the new life in the Spirit; the latter is but the maturity of the former; the conditions are changed, but the continuity is unbroken. The Spirit does not come to supersede the Son, but to glorify Him.[3] The fulfilment of these words is seen in the heightened Christology of the Epistles, and in this very Gospel, perhaps the last gift of the Apostolic age to the future Church. It is seen in the whole history of the Church, and in the history of every Christian life. Both the Church and the individual are fruitful in proportion as they are loyal to Christ, and to His own conception of His Person and work. The spiritual life can flourish under no other conditions than those which were imposed upon it by Christ. It is not the Spirit of Christ which leads men to lower Christ's own estimate of His claims, or to minimize the terms of His self-revelation; and there is reason to fear that in proportion as such a tendency grows amongst us, there will be a falling off in the yield of the fruits of the Spirit, which are the *raison d'être* of the Christian Church.

Nothing in this wonderful book is more remarkable than its constant reference to faith in Jesus Christ as the basis of all spiritual life. It is not simply belief in the teaching of Christ on which St. John lays emphasis, but belief on Christ

[1] xiv. 1, xvi. 33. [2] xv. 4 f., 10, 14. [3] xv. 14.

Himself, as the personal object of trust and self-surrender. *Πιστεύειν* followed by *εἰς* is a favourite construction with St. John, and in reporting the sayings of Christ he may sometimes have used it rather from force of habit than with any settled purpose; but it certainly conveys an impression distinct in kind from that which is created by the same verb followed by a simple dative, implying trust in the person and not simply in the word of the object of faith.[1] This impression is confirmed in many cases by the context in which the phrase occurs, as e.g. by the coordination in chap. xiv. 1 of trust in Jesus with trust in God. The whole drift of the discussion as well as of the Evangelist's comments is to make personal faith in our Lord the primary condition of salvation. "This is the will of My Father that every one that beholdeth the Son and believeth on Him should have eternal life."[2] "He that believeth on Me, though he die, yet shall he live, and whosoever liveth and believeth on Me shall never die."[3] "I am come a light into the world that whosoever believeth on Me may not abide in the darkness."[4] "The Comforter . . . when He is come, will convict the world in respect of sin, because they believe not in Me."[5] It is idle to say, as Wendt does,[6] that "Jesus only takes account of His own person as the medium of the preaching of the Kingdom of God," and that "what He regards as the condition of attaining salvation is only the trustful reception of the salvation preached by Him." If it were so, much of His

[1] The construction *πιστεύειν τινί* or *τῷ λόγῳ τινός* occurs in ii. 22, iv. 21, 50, v. 24, 38, 46 f., vi. 30, viii. 31, 45 f., x. 37 f., xiv. 11; *πιστεύειν εἰς τινά* or *εἰς τὸ ὄνομά τινος* in i. 12, ii. 11, 23, iii. 16, 18, 36, iv. 39, vi. 29, *35*, *40*, vii. 5, 31, *38*, 39, 48, viii. 30, ix. *35*, 36, x. 42, xi. *25*, *26*, 45, 48, xii. 11, *36*, *37*, 42, *44*, 46, xiv. *1*, *12*, xvi. *9*, xvii. *20* (the numerals in italics represent verses in which Christ is the speaker). *Πιστεύειν εἰς* is not used in the LXX even as the equivalent of הֶאֱמִין בְּ; in the Synoptic Gospels it occurs only in Matt. xviii. 6; even in St. Paul it is rare. On the other hand it is used in 1 John v. 10, 13.

[2] John vi. 40. [3] xi. 25 f.

[4] xii. 46. [5] xvi. 9,

[6] *Teaching of Jesus*, E. Tr., ii. p. 309.

teaching would defeat its own object. The devotion to His person which He demands in all the accounts of the ministry, and which in the Fourth Gospel is characterized as "believing on Him," differs widely from a mere acceptance of His message, however unquestioning and sincere. He requires men to believe His words, but He requires them also to confide wholly in Himself, as the only begotten Son of God.

This paper began with the remark that the Fourth Gospel is preeminently the Gospel of Teaching. It is not less conspicuously the Gospel of Faith. We are accustomed to speak of St. John as the Apostle of Love, and the note of love is repeatedly struck in his Gospel [1] as well as in his Epistles. But the note of faith is heard even more distinctly both in the teaching of our Lord and in the comments of the Evangelist. St. Luke wrote his Gospel in order that Theophilus might know the certainty of the things which he had been taught.[2] St. John's purpose is not less plainly announced: "these are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing ye may have life in His name." [3] It is his aim to create in his readers a faith which issues in a life—a faith on the Divine Son, a life in the Spirit which they that believe on Him receive.

H. B. SWETE.

"THE NAME JEHOVAH IN THE ABRAHAMIC AGE."

THIS question-begging title is chosen because it insinuates a theory that the holy name which the Jews, from motives of reverence, vocalized with the vowels of Adonai, thereby disguising for us its original pronunciation, was actually in use as a divine name among the Babylonian contemporaries

[1] E.g. iii. 16, xiii. 34 f., xiv. 21 f., xv. 9 f., 12 f., 17, xvii. 23 ff., xxi. 15 ff.
[2] Luke i. 4. [3] John xx. 31.

of Abraham. There are many assumptions to be made before that can be considered proved. In order that those who are unable to check the theories of modern Babylonizers of the Old Testament may estimate the audacity, and simplicity too, of some whose opinions are often quoted as authorities, an attempt is made here to show the process by which such results are educed from the facts.

"The Abrahamic age" is a "catchy" title. It is meant to denote what is often loosely called by Assyriologists "the times of Ḫammurabi," more exactly "the period of the First Dynasty of Babylon." The estimates of the date of this dynasty differ widely, from B.C. 2300–2000, roughly. "Abraham" hardly covered all that time. The grounds for these estimates will be found set out in most Assyrian and Babylonian histories, or in the new Bible dictionaries. There is no need to deal with them here. But three things will be evident; that the date of Ḫammurabi is not exactly known; that Abraham's date is difficult to fix, in any sense; and that the attempt to synchronize them must depend upon other considerations than those of chronology alone.

What then is intended? The fourteenth chapter of Genesis, as it stands, makes the patriarch Abraham a contemporary of Amraphel king of Shinar, Arioch king of Ellasar, Tidal king of "nations," and Chedorlaomer king of Elam. Now if any one of these four kings can be proved identical with Ḫammurabi, or a known contemporary of his, we have it on the authority of Genesis that Abraham was contemporary with Ḫammurabi; and things, which occurred in the time of Ḫammurabi and his immediate predecessors or successors, can be said to be in the "Abrahamic age."

Now it has long been suggested [Rawlinson, Sayce, Hommel, etc.] that Amraphel was meant for Ḫammurabi. Certainly Shinar denotes Babylonia or some part of it, as

it includes Babel, Elrech, Calneh, and Akkad, which were certainly in Babylonia. That Amraphel is meant for Ḫammurabi is very generally accepted. But the correspondence between the names is not very close. The *p* for *b* is perhaps not a great difficulty. For the sign *bi*, with which the name Ḫammurabi usually ends, continually is used where the later writers would use *pi*. Further, the spelling Ammurapi actually occurs in Assyrian times. [K. 552, l. 5 f.] The presence of the *l* is more awkward. Professor Hommel points out that the sign *bé*, which could also be read *pil*, may have been used in the cuneiform document from which Genesis xiv. was derived. As the sign is rarely read *bé* in later times, but commonly so at the time of Ḫammurabi, this would support the contention that the cuneiform document in question was of that period. Also, it would show that the transcription was made at a later date by one who did not know how Ḫammurabi's name was pronounced.

Another way of accounting for the *l* is to suppose that the name Ḫammurabi could be read Hammu-rapaltu. This is supported by the fact that a tablet, which interprets the names of the kings who ruled "after the flood," gives for Ḫammurabi the interpretation Kimtu-rapaštu. This writer then thought the name meant something like "wide-spread family." It is not likely that he was right. The ending *-rabi* is too common in names at all periods of Babylonian history for that. It is more likely that *rabi* means "is great," and that Ḫammu is a divine name. The change of *rapaštu* to *rapaltu* is quite in accordance with the laws of phonetic change of consonants. [Delitzsch, *Ass. Gram.*, p. 119, (3)]. The objection is that we have a superfluous *t* now.

Another suggestion is that the name in the cuneiform document was really Ḫammurabi-ilu, a name which was borne by a witness to a document S. 146, in the Constanti-

nople Museum. [Scheil's *Une Saison de Fouilles à Sippar*, p. 123.] This name clearly means "Ḫammurabi is god." But it is not very likely that this was ever written as the name of the king himself. It will be seen that the *l* is a real difficulty in the way of the identification.

Then some support is obtained by making Arioch of Ellasar another way of writing Rim-Sin of Larsa, who was certainly a contemporary of Ḫammurabi. If this be proved, then we should be able to argue that Amraphel was Ḫammurabi, though we could not account for his *l*. How is this done? We find the name of a king of Larsa written with signs which usually denote "the servant of Sin." One of these—that denoting "servant"—is usually said to be read *eri* in Sumerian, and the name of the moon-god, Sin, is said to be *Aku* in Sumerian. Thus we should have a name Eri-Aku for the Sumerian reading of the name of the King of Larsa. Then this person has to be proved Rim-Sin. We must then suppose that while Ḫammurabi was partly recognized by the writer who transcribed his name as Amraphel, Rim-Sin was not. This writer had before him what, if he knew cuneiform well, he would probably have read Ardi-Sin, or perhaps translated Abdi-Sin, but for some reason chose to read as Sumerian Eriaku, and write Arioch. He further transposed the *r* and *s* in Larsa. Another way of accounting for Arioch is to suppose that Rim-Sin was read Riv-Aku, the representation of the Babylonian *m* by *v* or *w* being common enough; compare Evil-Merodach for Amêl-Marduk. This would be a hybrid name, one-half read phonetically, the other as Sumerian. The finding of a name Eri-Ekna, or Eri-(E)aku, by Dr. Pinches on tablets of the fourth century B.C. is another elusive support. For it is not known to belong to a king of Larsa, nor that the bearer was a contemporary of Ḫammurabi. [King, *Letters of Ḫammurabi*, I. p. liii.]

The same tablets which gave this possible origin for

Arioch also gave a name Tudḫula, which had a colorable likeness to Tidal, but did not give him a title which would mark him as king of "nations." In order to account for that title, it has to be assumed that Goyim, "nations," somehow replaces Gutium. But the name of a king of Gutium known to be contemporary with Ḫammurabi has yet to be discovered in cuneiform. The same tablets give a name, very curiously written, which it was suggested could be read Kudur-laggumal. This also was obtained by assuming unusual values for at least one sign. But it would be easily shown to be a variant for Kudur-lagamar. Such a name would then be of a well known Elamite pattern, several names like Kudur-Mabug, Kudur-Naḫḫuntu being known as belonging to Elamite kings. There is no difficulty about Lagamar, who is a well known Elamite goddess. The LXX, who read the name *Χοδολλογομορ*, furnish a link with Chedorla'omer. But the difficulty lay in proving that the cuneiform name had any right to be read as Dr. Pinches suggested, though, if that be so, both Arioch and Tidal seem more likely. The absence of Ḫammurabi from these tablets, of Gutium and Larsa, is to be deplored. A more seductive theory was due to Professor Scheil, who thought he had read Kudur-nuḫ-gamar on a letter of Ḫammurabi to Sin-idinnam of Larsa, preserved in the Constantinople Museum. This turned out to be an error altogether. The name was really Inuḫsamar. [King, *Letters of Ḫammurabi*, I. p. xxix. ff.] Hence, likely as the name is to have been that of an Elamite king, it has not yet been found in cuneiform.

The cuneiform originals suggested for the names in Genesis xiv. are therefore only ingenious conjectures. They may all be right, but as yet not one is proved. But supposing them all found on one document, how would Abraham, or Lot, appear? If the writer made such a muddle of the other names as the estimable scholars who

suggest these identifications suppose, what did he turn into Abraham? Surely no cautious scholar can go on assuming that a number of unproved suggestions gain in cogency by their multiplication. All we can say is that they help us to see how the names in Genesis may have arisen, if we have good reason to think that Abraham was contemporary with Ḥammurabi. But they surely do not justify the use of the term "Abrahamic age" as synonymous with the First Dynasty of Babylon. We may one day find reason to think that the four kings refer to quite a different period. We do not know the names of all the kings of Babylon, or of Larsa, very few of Elam, hardly any of Gutium. Why not wait a little longer?

The identifications may turn out right after all. We do not know all that Ḥammurabi did yet. It would have been in the early years of this reign, when he was not yet the open enemy of Elam, and the deposer of Rim-Sin, that he could appear as an ally. The events of his reign known to us, year by year, make no mention of such an expedition to the West. If it took place, and turned out so badly, we could not expect to know of it from him. But it might have helped to estrange the four allies and so pave the way for his successes against Elam and Larsa.

There is further a certain unfairness in using the name Jehovah or Yahweh as denoting what has actually been found at the time of Ḥammurabi. It is a popular version of the matter which slurs over the weak points in the argument. To take the occurrence of Yahweh in the "Abrahamic" age, either as a notable confirmation of the Holy Scriptures, or an attack upon their inspiration—for it seems that this sort of discovery can generally be used either way—is not fair to those who are unable to check the argument, if there is any. Just lately the lectures of Professor Delitzsch on *Babel und Bibel*, now published in this country (Williams and Norgate's

Crown Theological Library), have given a wide currency to a theory which has had the support of such great names as Hommel, Pinches, Sayce, Winckler, and others. But such questions are not to be settled by the authority of great names. In Germany the views, by no means original with Professor Delitzsch, of the way in which the cuneiform names involving such an occurrence of Yahweh could be read and interpreted, were very conflicting; and the discussion provoked has greatly cleared the issue. But even there the ignorance of what is possible was too often only matched by the readiness to assert and opine.

The name which English scholars write Yahweh, or Yahwè, and which the Germans write Jahve, intending the same pronunciation, is known to have been written in cuneiform as Jau, when Assyrian scribes had to write the names of Hebrew kings which contained the divine name as one element. We are here on sure ground. The transcription of the cuneiform signs into Roman characters which we shall use is that now general; and, remembering only that *j* may be sounded as *y* and *v* as our *w*, can afford no difficulty to the reader. Thus Jehu's name appears as Ja-u-a, Ahaz as Jau-ḫazi (for the fuller form Joahaz), Hezekiah as Ḫazaḳi-Jau. Azariah, once thought to be the king of Judah of that name, now usually taken to be a king of the North Syrian land of Jaudi, near Sendširli, is written Azri-Jau or Izri-Jau. Jau-bi'di was the name of a king of Hamath. (References for the inscriptions can be found in Schrader's *Keilinschriften u. d. Alte Testament*, 3rd edition, p. 465.) Here we have these reasons for regarding the cuneiform Jau to represent Yahweh, (*a*) that it corresponds to some Hebrew form of Yahweh in the names of persons which we know to be compounded of Yahweh; (*b*) that it is the name of a god as shown by the presence of the determinative of divinity before it in the name Jau-bi'di. Hence we can conclude either that Yahweh was worshipped

outside Israel at Hamath and Jaudi, or that Israelites had come to the throne there.

But there are a large number of names which occur in cuneiform where the whole complexion of the name makes us certain of the name Yahweh being part of it. Here we do not know the person named to be a Hebrew, for we cannot identify him with any known Jew or Israelite. In the Arsacide times, in the business documents of Murašû and Sons, of Nippur (Hilprecht, *Babyl. Exped.* ix., Proper names, and p. 27), we have such names as Jâḫû-lakim, Jâḫû-lunu, Jaḫû-natanu, Aḫi-Jâma, Gadal-Jâma, Ḫanani-Jâma, Jadiḫ-Jâma, Igdal-Jâma, Pad-Jâma, Peli-Jâma, Tiri-Jâma. Failing reason (*a*) above, we have reason (*b*) in the case of the first and third names, where the determinative of divinity is set before Jâḫû. Also the similarity of Ahijah, Gedaliah, Hananiah, etc., makes us pretty certain that Jâma answers to the word Jah at the end of Hebrew names. It is not necessary to multiply examples, as could easily be done for either Assyrian or late Babylonian times, nor need we now consider the other forms, such as Aja, Au, Iba, Ḫiba, etc., under which the name Yahweh has been recognized in cuneiform. They only indirectly bear on the names presently to be discussed as occurring under the First Dynasty of Babylon.

The first of these is Jaum-ilu. It is obvious to imagine that we have a name compounded of Yahweh; for Jaum is the same as Jau, only with the Babylonian mimmation added. As this final *m* is often omitted, and *m* itself is often written for *w*, we may suppose it silent or coalescing with the *u*, and in any case, have only an earlier writing for Jau. This was the Assyrian writing of Yahweh, and we may interpret the name, "Yahweh is God." Professor Sayce (*Expository Times*, ix. p. 522) was the first to point out this name (August, 1898), in a note headed "Yahveh in Early Babylonia." He compared Abum-ilu and the names

Jakub-ilu, Jašup-ilu. It would seem to be clear that Yahweh, originally a third person singular of a verb, had already become so fixed as a name as to be treated with a nominative ending *um*, as if a noun ending in *u*. The comparison with Abum-ilu, is a little disconcerting. Abum of course is the nominative of *abu*, "father," also a noun, and Abum-ilu will be "Father is God." Was then Abu a divine name like Jau? or ought we not to read "God is a Father"? If so, why not render "God is a Yahweh"? In view of the fact that Yahweh is really a verb, meaning (say) "he will be," does not the comparison with Abum-ilu suggest that we ought to render Jaum-ilu by "God will be." The words Jakub, Jašup are also third persons singular of verbs. If Jakub and Jašup were known to have already become divine names, we might think that Jakub-ilu, Jašup-ilu, meant "Jacob is God," "Joseph is God." But it is impossible not to suppose that the names may mean "God has been or done," whatever was meant by the verbs implied. The effect would have been greater if we had been left alone with Jaum-ilu, for then we could say without compunction, "Here we have clearly Jau with the mimmation, and Jau we know from Assyrian times to be the cuneiform transcription of Yahweh; therefore we can only have "Yahweh is God."

The next name on which Professor Delitzsch relies is read by him Jahve-ilu. It also occurs in the form Jave-ilu. It seems to have first been pointed out by Professor Hommel in 1900 (*Expository Times*, xi. p. 270). A discussion has arisen as to its reading, in view of the polyphony of the cuneiform sign *PI*. If it is not read Jahve, we have no support for the occurrence of Yahweh in the age of Ḥammurabi. There is no doubt it can be so read, no proof that it must be. Now this is exactly the right way to write Yahweh in cuneiform, and is in form a third person singular of a verb. We might scruple to say that Jau was a verb

third person singular, because it might be also a noun. But Jahve is a verb in appearance, and can only be used as a noun in the (unproved) case that Yahweh was already so fixed as a name that it could also be used as a noun. If Yahweh was already a divine name, it would be transcribed in cuneiform as Jahve, and here is a case of it. But as this name can obviously be read "God will be," it cannot be used to prove that Jahve is a divine name.

The case would be entirely different if we had the determinative of divinity before Jaum or Jahve, or if either of these words were compounded with one of those verb forms which we had above in compounds of Yahweh. Thus, if we have Jaum-lakim, Jaum-lunu, Jaum-natanu, or Jahve-lakim, etc.; or if either Jaum or Jahve were compounded with any element known to imply that the first part of the name was a divine name, we could be sure. But of all possible compound names this is exactly the one which does not prove its first element to be a divine name; X-ilu does not prove that X is a divine name. If X can only be a noun, it does. When X is only a verb form it does prove the opposite. The only hope that X can be a divine name, though in form a verb, is that the verb form has already become fixed as a name so as to be used as a noun in spite of its form. When X is Jahve, we do not know that.

Of course, Adad-ilu, Marduk-ilu, Nabû-ilu, Sin-ilu, Šamaš-ilu, are examples where the first element is a divine name, but we have independent proof that Adad, Marduk, Nabû, Sin, and Šamaš are the names of gods. But these names cannot be mistaken for verbs. Jakub-ilu, Jašup-ilu do not prove that Jakub, Jašup, are names of gods, they may be verbs. If we had Jakub-natanu, we should be nearer proving Jacob was a god. We may have independent proof of the fact. But even this would not prove that in the name Jakub-ilu we had the name of the god Jacob.

At the same period, that of the First Dynasty of Babylon, we have a string of names like Jahve-ilu in form;

such as Jabnik-ilu, Jadiḫ-ilu, Jazi-ilu, Jaḫbar-ilu, Jakub-ilu, Jakbar-ilu, Jamanu-ilu, Jambi-ilu, Jamlik-ilu, Ja'si-ilu, Jaḳar-ilu, Jarši-ilu, Jašbi-ilu, Jarbi-ilu, Jati-ilu. No one would maintain that Jamlik-ilu means "Jamlik is god," but "God reigns" or something of the kind. Leaving out the last two as doubtful, we have a dozen examples exactly like Jahve-ilu in form, where the first element is a third person singular of the verb and *ilu* is the nominative to it. The only chance that Jahve-ilu could be unlike these names is that Jahve was already so fixed as a divine name that its sense as verb was overlooked. It cannot be used to prove that Yahweh was already a divine name.

If it be objected that we have no other example of the verb used in forming names, we can account for that by the peculiar sense of the verb. What name could be formed with it? The sense is admitted to be something like "to be or become a protector, saviour, etc." Who but God would be said to be that? If Sin was a god of the people who used the verb, we might get Jahve-Sin. If it be objected that this meaning of the verb in Yahweh is later and not original, we must know what is to be taken as the real verb and sense, then we may look for examples. The later form Jâḫû, however, suggests the same verb as in Jeḫi-el, or the Phoenician Aduni-iḫa. The form Jâma, if really representing Yahweh, opens up the way to further parallels.

To sum up the whole position. We do know the cuneiform transcription of Yahweh at a time when it was the name of the god of the Hebrews, i.e. from the ninth century onwards. That form suggests that it had already lost, at least to the ear of a cuneiform writer, its obvious verb form, and was something like Jô, Jeho, or even Jah. Later it seemed like Jâhû, which is not so easily reconciled with Yahweh, and the final Jah was heard like Jâwa. But there is no proof, so far, that it was already used as a divine name so early as the First Dynasty of Babylon. If we ever find a proof of this, we may expect it was even then written

Jau (or Jahve ?) and we shall then admit that the names Jaum-ilu and Jahve-ilu may have meant "Yahweh is god." At any rate, they even now show that in all probability the verb from which Yahweh comes was in use among those foreigners in Babylonia, whatever we call them, who bore these names; which would readily explain the application of the name Yahweh to their god. One name coupling Jau or Jahve with a verb would be enough to show these were then divine names, or the occurrence of the determinative of divinity before either Jau or Jahve, unless the whole name was that of a deity or deified person.

The whole question has here been left open whether Yahweh is after all the original form. Since the Hebrews thought so, Exod. iii. 14, we may leave it so here. But if indeed the divine name was really in use before that event and amongst peoples not Hebrew, we may well doubt if this was the original form. It would be difficult to parallel it with another divine name that could be taken as a verb in the third person singular. The divine names are usually nouns or participles, where we can discern their meaning. The cuneiform transcription may be used to suggest the original form. But it is hazardous to use for that purpose transcriptions made after the name had taken the form Yahweh, or its contracted forms. We may rather look to some fresh information from the names of the period of the First Dynasty of Babylon; or from cuneiform tablets found on Palestinian soil, like the Lachish tablet, or Professor Sellin's recent discoveries.

It may seem to some an ungracious office merely to seek to prove a negative conclusion, or to advise suspension of judgement; but in what way can we be considered gainers if the theories advanced above are accepted without rigid proof? Does the Hebrew tradition really become more reliable, or the uniqueness of Israel's religious development more assured? Or is the gain in a destruction of these views?

C. H. W. Johns.

THE VALUE-JUDGEMENTS OF RELIGION.

II.

Critical and Constructive.

In the first essay an effort was made to state the theory of value-judgements as it is presented by the founder of the Ritschlian school and his two leading disciples, and to supplement this exposition by an account of some later developments of the theory due to some of the less prominent adherents. In these developments some of the difficulties have been relieved, some of the obscurities have been illuminated, and some of the criticisms of the theory in its less developed form have been met. Before passing to deal with these criticisms, it will be helpful for us to recall the prominent and distinctive features of the theory, the agreements as well as the differences among its exponents. Religion has a practical interest for man, and is, therefore, more closely related to his emotional and volitional functions than his intellectual. In scientific knowledge the intellectual functions are exercised to the exclusion as far as possible of the others, and its purpose is to know the object as completely and accurately as means and powers will allow, as it is in itself, and not as it affects the feelings or wishes of the knowing subject. In religious knowledge, on the contrary, the personal interest is not only permissible, but even essential, and the relation of the object to the subject as affecting his weal or woe is the primary consideration. Science, then, deals with facts, things as they are; religion with values, things as they are related to personal emotions and volitions. Scientific knowledge is expressed in theoretical judgements. While all the exponents of the theory hold that value-judgements do belong to religion, yet difference emerges on the question whether religious knowledge consists of value-judgements. *Ritschl*, followed by his son, insists that it does, as what he is

concerned to emphasize is the personal, practical, interest which his knowledge has for the religious subject. *Herrmann* is not explicit, but his phrase about positing "objects as real, exclusively on the ground of their value," seems to put him nearer Kaftan than Ritschl. *Kaftan* expressly denies that value-judgements constitute religious knowledge, and definitely asserts that it is composed of theoretical propositions based on value-judgements. His purpose is to remove an ambiguity which belongs to Ritschl's statement. He desires to put beyond all doubt what Ritschl intended, but failed clearly to express, that religious knowledge deals with objects as real as those with which science is concerned, although the mode of knowledge is different, in religion dependent, as it is not in science, on the value of these objects for the religious subject. *Scheibe*, who is even more explicit in insisting that religious knowledge deals with realities existing independently of personal wishes or aims, substantially agrees with him, but uses the phrase "postulates on the basis of value-judgements." *Reischle* rejects the term postulates, as it suggests that the existence of the objects is assumed solely on the ground of their value, and calls attention to an important fact in describing the propositions of faith as "judgements of trust directed to the normative divine revelation." He, too, suggests a further refinement of the theory in distinguishing the three standpoints from which value-judgements may be regarded, and in coining for value-judgements from the *epistemological* standpoint the new term *thymetic*. He agrees with Kaftan that in but few cases are the propositions of faith value-judgements in form; but as he insists on their difference in origin from the theoretical judgements, he rejects Kaftan's phraseology as misleading. All these writers, with their superficial differences in phraseology, are agreed substantially that religious knowledge deals with realities, but that this knowledge is not gained by the exercise of the

intellectual faculties alone, but is conditioned by man's capacity to experience values in objects, a capacity which in religion is essentially related to his purpose of self-realization in conflict with nature, but in dependence on God. That this valuation of objects, although expressed in the form of individual feelings, is no arbitrary, artificial subjective process, is shown by *Herrmann* in representing all these values as dependent ultimately on man's sense of subjection to an unconditional moral law, and by *Scheibe* in describing this judging of values as the application to objects of standards or norms which are an expression of a universal spirit in man, and by *Reischle* in distinguishing the natural and legal value-judgements from the ideal, which can lay claim to more than an individual value, even to universal validity. While *Ritschl* himself does not explicitly offer a proof of the truth of Christian religious knowledge, and his son follows him so far as to maintain that it is our individual experience of the worth of Christianity that alone warrants our hope that its truth will at last be universally acknowledged, both *Herrmann* and *Kaftan* elsewhere than in their formal expositions of the theory offer such proof; and *Reischle* insists on the necessity of such proof, and, as also does *Scheibe*, offers a proof based on practical considerations, while both agree that the theoretical reason cannot by itself offer any such proof, for the truth of Christianity, as of every other religion, can be known only where its worth is felt. To *Herrmann's* statement that science and religion deal with different realities, that in each truth has a different meaning, and *Ritschl's* opposition of the Christian world-view to metaphysics, the other writers are unfavourable. Even Ritschl's son holds that if each confines itself to its own province, they cannot come into conflict as rivals, but may even be helpful allies. Kaftan asserts that there is only one truth, and tries to show how the ultimate conclusions of science may be subordinated to

the testimony of religion. *Reischle* denies that the theory destroys the unity of knowledge, and involves a dualism, as the two ways of knowing are harmonious functions of one personality, and even their results tend to converge in the unity of man's spiritual life. *Scheibe* is even more explicit and emphatic in showing how the two modes of knowledge supplement each other; and he recognizes that theology in intellectually formulating the contents of faith must employ some of the categories of theoretical thought, and must in so far be subject to its criticism regarding the correctness or otherwise of their use. A comparison of these writers leads to the conclusion that Ritschl and even Herrmann, as pioneers of this movement, left in their exposition ambiguities and perplexities, which their followers have discovered and sought to remove. With what measure of success I shall afterwards strive to show, when I have dealt with the criticism directed against the theory by some English theologians.

I. *Criticism of the Theory by English Theologians.*

(1) The first objection urged against the theory of value-judgements is that it surrenders the reality of the objects of faith, reduces them to imaginations, illusions. "In principle," says Professor Denney, in his *Studies in Theology*, "this attempt to distinguish between the religious and theoretic, to assign separate spheres to reason and faith—for that is what it comes to—amounts to a betrayal of the truth; it is really an attempt to build religious certainty on indifference to reason, or scepticism of it: and reason always avenges itself by keeping in its own power something which is essential to faith." He gives what he regards as three illustrations of the vice inherent in the theory. Because Ritschl rejects the proofs of speculative theism, and confines himself to the revelation of God in Christ, the conclusion is drawn that, according to the

Ritschlian theology, "God is a necessary assumption of the Christian view of man's chief end; but scientifically—in its bearing on the interpretation of nature and history, for example—it may be left an open question whether there is a God or not." Again, with respect to Ritschl's statement about the miracles recorded in the Bible, that it is not the task of science to show that these do or do not contradict the assumption of the connexion of all phenomena according to natural law, nor yet the task of religion to recognize these recorded events as divine operations contrary to the laws of nature, the charge is made, "It is doing no injustice to the whole school of writers, which has magnified the religious at the expense of the scientific conception of miracle, and declined to acknowledge any obligation to be scientific in the matter, to say that in point of fact they reject miracle altogether, in any sense which gives it a hold on man's intelligence or a place in his creed." He continues, "In point of fact, the scientific interpretation is regarded as the only objectively true one by those who write in this strain; the religious one is a mere pious opinion which the pious man may hold for himself, but which he has no right to impose, and no means of imposing, on others." Lastly, Ritschl's description of the doctrine of the divinity of Christ as a value-judgement is regarded as warranting this still more serious accusation: "Though Jesus has for the Christian consciousness the religious value of God, He has for the scientific consciousness only the common real value of man. He is, in truth and reality, to the neutral consideration of science, mere man like any other; it is only the Werthurtheil, the subjective estimate of the pious Christian, that gives Him the value of God." In these criticisms the Ritschlian position is completely misunderstood and misrepresented. One must, protest most strongly against the tacit assumptions in these statements, that the Ritschlian school is itself indifferent to

the reality of the objects of faith, the truth of the value-judgements of religion, that it shares the critic's preference for science as a mode of knowing the supreme realities with which religion is concerned to that knowledge which is given only when the value of these realities for man's life is recognized, that it admits that science can give an authoritative judgement on such questions as the nature and purpose of God, the relation of miracles to law, or the divinity of Christ, and that religious knowledge has less certainty that it possesses the truth than is given to science. It is quite certain that the school of Ritschl affirms that all these questions lie beyond the province of science, that, just because it is neutral, the consideration of science cannot reach such a truth as the divinity of Christ, that consequently the affirmations of faith in these matters need not fear any contradictions of science. It is equally certain that Ritschl and his followers do not regard the estimate of the pious Christian as subjective in the sense that it is an individual opinion, which is just as likely to be mistaken as not, for, what ought never to be forgotten, Ritschl himself and his disciples no less emphasize the dependence of the Christian consciousness on the divine revelation in Christ as preserved in the Holy Scriptures and the Christian community. The Ritschlian theology is not put forward by its advocates as a fancy, a guess, or even a jest and a fraud, as Professor Denney's criticisms seem to suggest, but as a serious and honest effort to exhibit the truth of the Christian religion. In the first essay it was shown how the theory of value-judgements has been developed in the school with this as a main object, to put beyond doubt or question the reality of the objects of faith, the certainty of the truth of the religious knowledge expressed in value-judgements. Of the critics who, like Professor Denney, deny that it is the intention of the school unequivocally to affirm the existence of the objects of faith, *Reischle* justifiably affirms

that they "are fighting against a ghost of their own creation." As the question of the divinity of Christ is one of supreme importance, so that a theological school which did not honestly and confidently affirm the doctrine must forfeit its claim to the name Christian, we may dwell on it a little longer. It is surely a safe rule that we should try to understand a theory by means of its application in practice. Let us then see how Ritschl himself deals with the doctrine of the divinity of Christ. He is not content, as his critics seem to assume, to assert merely that Christian faith assigns to Christ divinity because He has for religious experience the value of God. He seeks to define the content and character of that divinity. May I be excused if I quote the summary which I have elsewhere given of Ritschl's teaching on the divinity of Jesus? "Be it noted that he maintains that the essence of God's love is fully and clearly revealed in Christ; that He in His teaching and life was independent of the world, owing nothing to it, and fearing nothing from it; that He was wholly successful in His work of reproducing in the members of His community His own consciousness of, and confidence in, God as Father; that, however, His relation to God was direct, whereas that of all others is mediated by Him; that His distinction from all others was in the original identity of His will with the purpose of God; that His life and work can be understood only as He is regarded as primarily, while His kingdom is regarded as secondarily, the object of the eternal knowledge and volition; that, consequently, as He is historically revealed to us, so He eternally exists for God." That this doctrine of the divinity of Christ is adequate I do not for a moment maintain, that it contains implications of thought which should have carried Ritschl nearer the doctrine of the creeds I have endeavoured elsewhere to show; but regarding it we may confidently say, that it is a great deal more than "the subjective estimate of the pious Christian."

This same charge is repeated in various forms by Professor Orr and Professor Mackintosh, but it is not necessary now more closely to examine their statements, as the same answer substantially can be given to them as has now been offered to Professor Denney.

(2) Another objection to the theory is this, that it divides the mind of man against itself. "We cannot have," says Professor Orr, "two kinds of truth with no sort of relation to each other. The mind cannot be divided into compartments, with its theoretic knowledge on the one side, and its religious knowledge hermetically sealed off from contact with the theoretic on the other." This is a moderate statement of the objection. This desirable virtue of sobriety of speech is quite thrown to the winds by Professor Wenley in a passage which is worth quoting as a specimen of the kind of criticism from which Ritschlianism has suffered in Britain. "From Monday till Saturday, knowledge dances among its phenomena, which it knows are not knowledge; on Sunday the other power moons among its realities, which cannot fail to impress it, but which may or may not exist. The knower of the lawful days doubts and cannot dream; the dreamer of the Sabbath believes and can never know. There is no possible appeal from Philip sober to Philip drunk. For this classical gentleman is now so constituted that he cannot but be always drunk and always sober at one and the same time." This may be show of wit; it is no proof of wisdom. That the mode of knowing changes with the object known is surely a simple fact beyond doubt or question; and why should Ritschlianism be so severely blamed for recognizing the fact, and giving expression to it? When Tennyson in the *Prologue* to *In Memoriam* distinguishes *faith* and *knowledge*, *knowledge* and *reverence*, *mind* and *soul*, he is with the less formal language of poetry doing what the Ritschlian school does more explicitly in this theory of value-judgements. When Christ requires the new birth as the condition of seeing as well as entering

into the kingdom of God, promises the vision of God to the pure in heart, makes knowledge of the doctrine dependent on doing of the will, when Paul declares that the spiritual realities are spiritually discerned, a distinction of modes of knowing is recognized. Is the Bible, too, to be charged with dividing the mind against itself? No knowledge is properly religious which is not the knowledge of a religious subject, and his religion cannot but affect his mode of knowing, impart to it a moral insight and a spiritual discernment which it would otherwise lack, bring within the range of his vision realities which the observation, experiment, and reasoning of science could not reach. The man who has never known the need, owned the worth, felt the power, and enjoyed the good of religion, is shut out of a realm of knowledge, which seems unreal to him, because he has not had any experience of it. He cannot pronounce judgement on the truth of Christianity because the organ of judgement is not yet developed in him. At the basis of the theory of value-judgements there lies a true recognition of a real difference in the modes of knowing. That the way in which the theory has been stated has always been above reproach cannot be maintained. Ritschl's exaggerated polemic against any admixture of metaphysics in theology, and Herrmann's extravagant contrast of two realities and two truths lend some colour to this charge, that the theory involves a dualism in knowledge. But, on the other hand, the other writers whose views have been discussed are at one in repudiating any such absolute separation of the theoretical and the value-judgements. They recognize that these are complementary functions of one personality, and that their results are not opposed, but harmonious. *Scheibe* recognizes that the teleological interpretation of the world, which we find in the value-judgements, is so far dependent on the causal, which is characteristic of the theoretical judgements, that for a complete definition of the objects of faith the former must use some of the categories of the

latter, and is subject to its jurisdiction as regards the use. *Reischle* recognizes that if historical investigation were to draw Jesus within the limits of mere humanity, so as to deny His unique nature, faith could not remain indifferent, but must disprove its right. Even *Ritschl* does not treat the theoretical judgements of science and philosophy as though they were hermetically sealed off from contact with his theology. He argues against materialism and pantheism as opposed to the Christian view of God and the world; in rejecting speculative theism he seeks to show the inadequacy of the idea of God its method yields. *Herrmann* and *Kaftan*, too, discuss the relation of science and philosophy to the religious consciousness, and subordinate their conclusions to the testimony it bears to the nature and purpose of the ultimate reality. If we do not confine our regard to a few verbal obscurities and difficulties in the statement of the theory, but view it as a whole as it is practically applied in the Ritschlian theology, we can convince ourselves that this objection is not justified.

(3) While I feel in justice bound to defend this theory against these two objections, my own attitude is by no means one of unqualified and unhesitating acceptance. I do most heartily welcome its emphasis on the fact that there is a realm of knowledge, which cannot be entered by those who are indifferent or hostile to religion, but which discloses its treasures and beauties only to those who fulfil the moral and spiritual conditions. I do also strongly hold with its advocates that faith does not live by the sufferance of science and philosophy, but has reasons of its own, and need not be alarmed by every conclusion apparently hostile to it, which may be advanced in their name, as when it cannot at once disprove these conclusions, it has its own inward assurance that it can get nearer to the heart of things than they can. In the statement of the theory, however, it seems to me some corrections are necessary, which, however, are not contradictory to its

real intention. (1) On the one hand it seems to me misunderstanding would be avoided, if it were made plainer that religious knowledge does not primarily consist of an appreciation of value, and secondarily of a perception of reality, but that there is a moral insight and a spiritual discernment of supersensuous eternal reality which is as sure an organ of knowledge as observation of, or experiment with, sensible objects, and that the exercise and development of this faculty of seeing Him who is invisible, and of living under the powers of the world to come depends on an interest in the higher ends of life, due to a recognition of their greater worth. There is an intellectual element in religious knowledge, which in the theory of value-judgements does not get justice done to it. Contemplation of and meditation on the objects of faith is as essential as valuation. There is a power of spiritual vision and there is a sense of spiritual value, and they are mutually conditioned. The worth of the reality, with which religious faith is concerned, cannot be felt until the sight of it is gained ; but the exercise and development of the power of sight is dependent on the sense of worth. To assign religious knowledge to man's emotional and volitional functions, and to separate it from his intellectual, is, it seems to me, to give an incomplete account of it. If, however, we are just to mind as well as heart in religion, then in dealing with the objects of faith we shall recognize that there are intellectual as well as practical interests to be considered, that religion has a need and a right to as adequate and satisfactory a knowledge of the objects to which it directs its affections and aspirations as possible. Ritschl's theological method from this standpoint will be seen to stop short of that full investigation, and thorough interpretation of the objects of faith, which religious knowledge may claim as its own. The point most to be insisted on is that in religious knowledge there is a perception of reality as well as an appreciation of worth. The

merit of the theory of value-judgements in my eyes is, that it has not only recognized the latter element, for that had been done before, but that it has made this recognition more explicit and emphatic than it had formerly been; its defect is that the former element has not been distinctly enough asserted. (2) Misunderstanding on the other hand would also be avoided if elements of the theory already found in Herrmann, Reischle, and Scheibe were made more explicit. It should be made clearer that the faculty of estimating values is not an individual function, subject to no law but subjective fancy and whim, but that it is the realization in the emotions of ideals of universal validity. Although it is said that there is no disputing about tastes, and although one work of art may delight the multitude, and disgust the trained art critic, yet it is admitted that there is an ideal of beauty, to which art should conform. In the same way, although the actual practice of men varies indefinitely, yet there is also an ideal of goodness, which is finding realization in social customs and standards. The relation of man to God cannot be without its ideal, however discordant have been the forms in the religions of the world in which men have sought and striven to reach this ideal. It appears to me a mistake to subordinate, as Herrmann seems to do, religion to morality, or to reckon, as Kaftan does, the propositions of faith as based on natural value-judgements, which are concerned with man's weal or woe. Religion has its ideal realized in the consciousness of Jesus Christ, and Christians have not only a right, but even a duty to insist that the norm or standard of value in all religions is the mind of Christ. That there is a perception of reality, and that value is determined by an ideal in religious knowledge—these are the two elements in the theory of value-judgements that in my opinion need to be asserted.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

(To be continued.)

THE LIFE OF CHRIST ACCORDING TO ST. MARK.

VII. The Healer, I. 29–34.[1]

We now learn that two of the disciples, Simon and Andrew, had a house in Capernaum, and that Jesus returned thither with James and John after the scene in the synagogue. Simon, it seems, was married, and his mother-in-law helped his wife to keep house. Jesus may have been a visitor there before, and have found a sympathy which He missed in His own home; but on this Sabbath the mother-in-law lay restless with fever, distressed that she could not entertain her friend. She heard her kinsfolk come home from the synagogue, and perhaps noticed some unusual excitement. Then they came to her room, and Jesus entered, and they followed Him. His very presence was always a healing balm and a refreshing cordial, but now as she looked up she saw a new light in His eyes, and wondered at an unwonted air of power, force, and authority. He came to her and took her hand, and she felt stronger, and moved as if to sit up; He raised her, and the fever passed away, and she was herself again. Forthwith she went to take her share in preparing the evening meal.

But the excitements of the day were not yet over, for there were other demoniacs in Capernaum besides the one who had been healed in the synagogue; and others besides Peter's wife's mother were ill. Loving care for these sufferers would be reinforced by the universal appetite for the marvellous; for a while, however, both were checked by the law of the Sabbath. But when the sun set a crowd gathered round Simon's house, bringing all the sick and all the demoniacs in the town; and the rest of the inhabitants came to look on. Such, at any rate, was the impression

[1] These studies do not profess to be an adequate historical or doctrinal account of Christ, but are an attempt to describe the impressions which the Gospel of St. Mark would make upon a reader who had no other source of information as to Christ and Christian theology.

made upon Jesus and His friends when their quiet evening was broken in upon by the cries of the eager throng. Jesus came forth to meet these new demands; the sun had set, and the brief twilight soon faded into darkness, relieved perhaps by the uncertain illumination of torches, or the cold, weird light of the moon. Again Jesus proved Himself master of disease and demoniac possession—"many" were healed—not all, some went away disappointed. Perhaps they had not faith, or Jesus' powers failed Him as time went on; and some may have despaired of getting their turn that night. "To-morrow," they may have said to each other as they turned homeward, "to-morrow we will come again, and our turn will come"; or "To-morrow the Prophet will have recruited His energy and will be able to heal our friends."

This time Jesus gave an added proof of His power over the demons. The demoniac in the synagogue had saluted Him as "the Holy One of God"—a dangerous title in a country which swarmed with fanatics looking for a Messiah to lead them against the Romans and their henchmen the Herods. Perhaps, too, at this stage of his career, the reader might suppose, Jesus shrank from the suggestion that He was the Messiah as from a blasphemy. Now, therefore, He silenced the demoniacs lest they should again suggest that He was the Messiah.

VIII. The Preaching in Galilee, I. 35–39.

The events just narrated involved a crisis in the spiritual life of Jesus almost as important as the Baptism or the Temptation; He had discovered His powers of healing, and perhaps also their limitation. What was their meaning in relation to His mission? The question was not easy to answer. For, on the one hand, the professional exorcist and wonder-worker was well known and little respected, and a reputation for miraculous powers might embarrass Jesus.

John the Baptist wrought no miracles; but, on the other hand, these mighty works relieved suffering and attracted hearers. After the Baptism He had sought solitude in the wilderness, and now He again needed to consider His life in undisturbed fellowship with God. Therefore early next day, before dawn, while His friends were still sleeping, He left the town, and found some lonely place, and gave Himself up to prayer.

But when His friends rose in the morning, and before they thought of disturbing Him, the bearers of sick folk began to beset the house. There would be some who had come the night before, but had missed their chance, and others who had not heard of Jesus till it was too late, so that they put off coming till the morning. Perhaps it was the arrival of a would-be patient that sent the disciples to look for Jesus. Simon went eagerly to call his Master to fresh marvellous works, and lo! the Master was not there. Simon looked for him hurriedly in the house, and then had to meet the applicants with a blank face, and tell them that he could not find Jesus. Then the crowd dispersed through the town to look for Him, but to no purpose.

At last the disciples hunted Him down in His retreat. "Every one is looking for you," they cried, overjoyed at having found Him, eager to take Him back at once to Capernaum, that He might work more miracles, and continue His triumphant career. But their high spirits received a severe check; Jesus would not go back to Capernaum.

"Let us go elsewhere," He replied, "to the neighbouring villages, that I may preach there also, for My mission is to preach."

Through His communing with God He had learnt that His mission was not to work miracles, but to declare the Kingdom of God; that He was first and foremost a Healer of souls. There was danger lest the beginning He had made at Capernaum should be marred by His reputation as

a wonder-worker; therefore, without hesitation, He sacrificed His newly won popularity, and quenched the enthusiasm of His followers. Whether the crestfallen disciples consented to accompany Him we do not know, we hear nothing more of them till after Jesus returned to Capernaum; but the Master Himself wandered from one Galilean synagogue to another, delivering His message, confronted again and again by demoniacs, from whom He drove out the demons; but there were no other healings—with one exception.

IX. The Leper, I. 40–45.

The narrative of St. Mark suggests by its silence that at this period Jesus refused to heal the sick; but the importunity of one suppliant overcame His reluctance; a leper begged for cleansing.

"If Thou wilt, Thou canst cleanse me." The leper had heard that Jesus refused to heal, but he believed that it was the will and not the power that was lacking; hence the words, "If Thou wilt." The suggestion that He was unwilling to relieve suffering touched Jesus to the quick, and overbore for the moment the interests of the Kingdom, and the social and religious decorum of the times. Jesus put out His hand, and *touched* the leper, and the leprosy left him, and he was cleansed. But this impulsive act of generosity seems to have been followed by something like a revulsion of feeling; the cleansing of this leper would encourage others to resort to Him, so that He would again be hindered in His work. Jesus tried in vain to guard against such consequences by sending the man away at once with strict orders to tell no one. Let him leave Galilee, and go away to the Temple at Jerusalem, and there fulfil the ritual observances appointed for the cleansing of a leper. But even the authority which had silenced demons could not keep the man quiet; he told the story everywhere, and the people supposed that Jesus was now willing to heal

anybody and everybody. Had He not *touched* a leper? When He tried to go into a town He found Himself hemmed in by a crowd too eager for healing of sick bodies to care for any ministry to sinful souls, so that He was compelled to imitate John and become a voice in the wilderness; and there the people flocked to Him as they had done to John; but the crowds were thinking more of wondrous works than of repentance and forgiveness.

X. The Paralytic, II. 1–12.

After some time Jesus ventured back again to Capernaum, and again probably made His home in Simon's house, and the people crowded in, and He preached to them. He had succeeded at last in making them understand that they must accept Him as a Teacher, and not chiefly as a Healer and Wonder-worker; He still wrought cures from time to time, but on the whole He succeeded in protecting His ministry from endless importunity. That he could do so without losing His hold on the people is a most convincing proof of the unique force of His personality. The following incident illustrates the changed conditions.

Instead of a crowd of sick folk a single paralytic found access to Jesus only through the persistence of His friends. In the present state of our information we cannot understand all the details, but the main facts are clear. Jesus sat teaching in a large room from which He could be seen and heard from outside; a crowd had gathered round the house, and the room was full except for a space in front of the Teacher. Four men carrying a paralytic, in default of the ordinary means of access, managed somehow to let down their burden through the roof, and thus place him before Jesus. Such persistence showed implicit confidence both in the power and in the goodwill of Jesus; and the audience wondered what response He would make, whether He would rebuke the intrusion, or utter some word of power, and heal the sufferer.

"Son," He said, "thy sins be forgiven thee." To a modern audience, and probably to many of those then present, these words would sound like an evasion of the demand for a miracle. The carnal mind would think that an offer of forgiveness to such a sufferer was mere mockery; but Jesus placed in the forefront that which was most important to Him, and also doubtless to the sufferer; His inspired insight had discerned that the paralytic craved healing for his soul as well as for his body.

But the gathering included critical theologians, for Jesus' doings had attracted the notice of the Jewish clergy; and there were scribes present to whom His words were blasphemy. In professing to forgive sins, He was usurping a prerogative of God Himself. Jesus read their thoughts, and answered them by word and deed; and in this answer He dealt with other thoughts, too, which have not been recorded.

"Why reason ye thus in your hearts? Is it easier to say to the paralytic, Thy sins be forgiven thee, or to say, Arise, take up thy rug and walk?"

"That," said many of His hearers to themselves, "is the very question we were asking ourselves."

But Jesus continued, with a change of tone, which again roused the expectations of His hearers,

"But that ye may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins."

Then He turned to the paralytic—

"I bid thee arise, take up thy rug, and go home."

A shock of new life throbbed through the half dead body of the paralytic, and he rose up before them all, took up his rug, and went out; and they were all astonished and glorified God.

We do not know why Jesus called Himself the Son of Man; the phrase sounds like a contrast to the demoniac's "Holy One of God." But this assumption of a distinct

title shows that Jesus had been meditating on His position. What was He? How was He to answer questions as to Himself and His mission? He chose a title which, whatever else it might mean, marked Him off from all other teachers, and claimed for Him a special position of His own. Moreover this incident lays renewed emphasis on the fact that the work of Jesus centred in forgiveness—atonement. It also marks a new development, Jesus recognizes His powers of healing as an assurance of His divine mission, and a public credential of His authority.

XI. The Tax-Gatherer, II. 13–17.

During this second visit to Capernaum there was another calling of a disciple sufficiently remarkable to be described in some detail, because the new disciple was neither religious[1] nor respectable, and because this was the very reason why Jesus called him. Up to a certain point the circumstances remind us of the call of the first four disciples. Jesus was again walking by the lake; again He saw a man busy with his regular work, and bade the man follow Him, and the command was promptly obeyed. This disciple too was of the lower middle class, a tax-gatherer or revenue officer in charge of a local branch of the customs. Such men are usually obnoxious on account of their profession, and in Palestine they served the unpopular Herods; many of the class made their office an opportunity for cruel extortion. Their work, too, brought them into close contact with men and things of all sorts, so that they could not observe the laws as to ceremonial cleanness; and yet Jesus invited one of these men to become His disciple, follower, and friend. The new disciple's name is given as Levi ben Alphaeus.

Levi did not separate himself from his own class when he became a disciple. We hear next of a great gathering

[1] In the current sense of the term.

at a meal, perhaps in Levi's house, perhaps in that of Jesus, at which many of His disciples were present, and also many tax-gatherers and "sinners"; and Jesus actually ate with these who were unclean. The piety of orthodox Jews was far more astounded than we should be if we saw a revival preacher taking a pipe and pot of beer at a public house in amicable conversation with the regular customers. The scribes of the Pharisees gasped out their indignant surprise, "He is eating with tax-gatherers and sinners!" Jesus heard, and replied that He did so of set purpose, "The healthy do not need a physician, but those who are sick: I did not come to call the righteous but sinners."

This is the clue to the calling of Levi; he was made a disciple, not in spite of, but because of, his disreputable social and religious standing—amongst other reasons. Jesus had associated Himself with sinners in seeking baptism from John; He had taken up John's message of repentance and forgiveness; and He had made forgiveness the prelude to His greatest work of healing. His mission was to sinners, therefore He had amongst His disciples a tax-gatherer, one of the lapsed masses of His time, who could help Him to approach them, and so gain their confidence.

For these "sinners" were not exclusively, or even chiefly, criminal or immoral, but rather corresponded to our lapsed masses, many of whom live in surburban villas. They were Jews who were not "good" Jews, in a stronger sense than that in which many Englishmen are not "good Churchmen." They were careless alike of the ritual and of the moral demands of the Law, and thus seemed both to themselves and to others shut out from any religious life. Moreover as the religion of Israel was an essential feature of patriotism, they were further degraded by being shut out from the highest ideals and aspirations of the national life. Such twofold exclusion implied loss of self-respect, and of moral stimulus, so that these sinners would share

the lax morality of those who have lapsed from the control of patriotic and religious public opinion.

But Jesus setting about the work of founding the Kingdom of God, appealed specially to this class. We read that, even before He called Levi, His growing influence was shown by the many disciples who followed Him, and these already included "sinners," a class conscious of the unfavourable judgement of public opinion, and half inclined to believe that the condemnation was just, might be ready to listen to a message of repentance and forgiveness.

XII. The Bridegroom, II. 18–20.

Jesus further outraged Jewish orthodoxy by neglecting the religious exercise of fasting, even while it was being observed by the disciples of His old master—John. His reason for this neglect throws a flood of light upon His thoughts at this time concerning Himself and His work.

"Why," said He, "should His disciples fast while the *Bridegroom* was with them?"

He called His message the Good News; He rejoiced in His power to heal body and soul, so that He could think of Himself as the Bridegroom, the happy occasion of gladness to all about Him; His disciples were the Bridegroom's friends, who shared His joy. Fasting is not a usual feature of wedding celebrations. In time, indeed, the marriage feast would end, the Bridegroom and His friends would separate, and life would fall back into every-day routine, in which fasting might find a place; but these were the great days of the inauguration of a new dispensation. The promise of the Kingdom seemed near and bright; the spirit thereof was abroad upon the earth, and in God's own time would take to itself such a body, such outward form, as He willed; and Jesus, God's beloved Son, Son of Man, Good Physician, Bridegroom, was to be the great agent of its coming.

XIII. New Wine, II. 21–28.

This incident as to fasting is another illustration of the attitude of Jesus towards the popular religion. He had already healed on the Sabbath; had touched a leper; had professed to forgive sins; had called a tax-gatherer to be a disciple; and had eaten with sinners. Now He neglected fasting; in the sequel we shall see that He persistently broke the Sabbath.[1] In His overflowing confidence and energy He did not hesitate to affront the popular religious leaders at every turn. This policy is formulated in the sayings about the new patch, and the new wine-skins, and is further illustrated by the incident of the plucking of the ears of corn on the Sabbath. "The old garment," said Jesus, "could not be mended with a patch of new cloth, and the new wine could not be put into old bottles; it would burst them." The traditions of the scribes could not be the laws of the kingdom, and the Spirit which descended upon Jesus at His Baptism was too mighty to be confined within the narrow limits of Pharisaic Judaism. Jesus made it clear with the utmost frankness that He could not be either a follower or an ally of the scribes. The prominent feature of their religion was a multiplicity of ceremonial observances; the essentials of the faith of the Kingdom were to do justice, and love mercy, and walk humbly with God. Jesus did not try to combine the two; the free spiritual life must be substituted for the bondage of tradition.

The incident of the plucking of the ears of corn gave Jesus an opportunity of stating His views of the Sabbath. He and His disciples were taking a walk through the corn-fields on the Sabbath, and the disciples began to pluck the ears of corn. Some Pharisees who were present regarded this as a breach of the Sabbath, and remonstrated with Jesus. He replied by citing a case from the Old Testament

[1] According to the views of the Pharisees.

to show that ritual ordinances were not absolutely binding, but might be set aside in the interests of humanity. According to the law, only priests might eat the shewbread, but when David and his companions needed food, the High Priest gave them the shewbread; so, too, the laws of the Sabbath need not be observed in all their strictness when men were hungry and needed food. "The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath"; and the Son of Man was Lord of the Sabbath. Jesus, therefore, was quite prepared to set His authority against that of the scribes as to the way in which the Sabbath should be kept.

In this connexion we must refer to a previous incident. When Jesus cleansed the leper, He sent him to Jerusalem to fulfil the legal ritual. But we must remember that the Jerusalem priests belonged for the most part to the Sadducees, the conservative party of aristocratic ecclesiastical officials, who were opposed to the Pharisees. The position of Jesus resembled that of many great religious leaders. He found revealed religion corrupted; the Pharisees, the most active and fervent religious party, held a corrupt form of the true faith with intolerant fanaticism, and claimed that the corruption was the only true form of the religion of Israel, or, to use a modern term, the only true orthodoxy. Jesus repudiated much of the popular Pharisaism, yet His teaching really represented the ancient faith of Israel. The true successor of the Old Testament was not the system of the Pharisees which elaborated the literal phrasing of its formulæ and ordinances; but the message of Jesus which made the Old Testament a stepping stone to larger truths and a higher life. Like many other teachers in a similar position, Jesus desired to remain within the ancient religious organization, and to obtain the recognition of its official heads. We may use one or two modern illustrations, on the understanding that the application is to be strictly limited to the one point, the

desire of a religious leader to be loyal to the officials and organizations of his Church, although he is at variance with the form of it which is popularly regarded as orthodox. From one point of view the position of Jesus might be compared to that of John Wesley; and from another to that of an opponent of popular ritualism appealing to the Anglican bishops.

W. H. Bennett.

POST-EXILIC JUDAISM.[1]

Perhaps the truest thing to say of this volume is the most pleasant, namely that it meets the high expectations excited by its subject and its author. Written with exceptional scholarship, it outstrips all other works in the same field, and for years to come it will form an indispensable handbook to the study of post-exilic Judaism, or indeed of that Judaism which, during the three centuries subsequent to the Maccabean age, constitutes the background of early Christianity. Bousset's method is to present the religious life of this epoch in successive sections. He assumes the historical outline, which has been so frequently and sufficiently surveyed by others. But the method of strictly historical treatment is set aside, partly because the available materials are insufficient for the purpose of fixing definite stages in the development, partly because he considers that a certain unity of spirit and aim underlies and to some degree dominates the varied phenomena and divergent phases of the religion.

The introductory section (pp. 6–52) upon the sources and literature has been compiled with extraordinary competence and care. Bousset, among other conclusions of interest,

[1] *Die Religion des Judentums im neutestamentlichen Zeitalter*, by Wilhelm Bousset: Berlin, Reuther und Reichard, 1903.

agrees to reckon Psalms 44, 74, 76–80, 83, 85, 89, and 108, 110, 118, 149, as Maccabean, puts 4 Esdras (in its final edition) into Domitian's reign, and—in opposition to Wellhausen—decides for its priority to Baruch. In noticing Baldensperger's tendency to idealize the apocalyptic faith of Judaism in opposition to the current legal conceptions (see also pp. 196–197) he has the rare frankness to admit that in his own essay on "die Predigt Jesu in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judentum" (1892, pp. 10–41) he committed the opposite error of exaggerating the contrast between Jewish and evangelical piety. Like Professor Charles, he apparently believes in the composite authorship of the Psalms of Solomon (p. 275, note 1).

The dominant thesis of the book is then developed. Put briefly, it amounts to this, that the piety of Judaism after the Maccabees developed in the direction of a Church, and that its subsequent literature betrays strongly marked syncretistic tendencies. The former trait is especially significant (pp. 61 f.). When the religious life of the people parted for various reasons from nationalism and politics, it did not relapse into mere individualism; on the contrary, it sought expression in a religious community, whose organization was able to spread beyond Palestine and retain for itself the members of the rapidly increasing diaspora. Corresponding to this, the historian finds, there developed a spiritual unity and self-consciousness powerful enough to resist the disintegrating influences of Hellenic culture. Thanks to the influences of the law, the cultus, and the synagogues, the Jew learnt to preserve his distinct piety, and even to propagate it, nor was it until the bitter conflicts with Rome that the natural tendency to extension and missionary propaganda was overpowered by the exclusive element which was latent in the faith. The second section (pp. 54–184) of the volume is occupied with a detailed survey of this crystallization of Jewish religion

into a definite yet not unaggressive church; whilst the third section (pp. 185–276) elaborates the more national side of the faith in its eschatology and apocalyptic speculations. The complementary aspect of Jewish individualism, bound up with the growing stress on future retribution and reward, is analysed in the opening pages (pp. 277–290) of the fourth section, the rest of which summarizes with great ability, thoroughness, and psychological insight, the theology and ethics of the later Judaism. As a supplement to this, the divergent types of piety, which undoubtedly persisted within the general unity of the faith, are estimated in the sixth section, which treats of the relation between the centripetal tendencies of Palestinian Judaism and the centrifugal movements in the diaspora (pp. 405–410), of Philo (pp. 411–431) with his dependence on Hellenic theosophy, and of the Essenes (pp. 431–443) with their foreign traits. Accepting the Philonic origin of the *de vita contemplativa*, Bousset finds in the Therapeutæ (pp. 443–447) a still further proof of the versatile and varied character of Judaism at this period; and this conclusion leads him naturally in the closing section (pp. 448 f.) to examine the origin and extent of the luxuriant syncretism which prevails so markedly throughout the complex of later Jewish theology. This forms one of the freshest passages in the whole book. Perhaps Hellenic and Egyptian influences are dismissed rather curtly. But ample justice is done to the influence of Zoroastrianism upon the later Judaism, a point upon which Bousset is in substantial agreement with investigators like Cheyne and Stave. The summary (pp. 453–458, 461 f.) of evidence bearing upon this problem is capitally done; it forms a healthy corrective to Gunkel's exploitation of Babylonian influence; and the argument is all the more convincing by its freedom from crude extravagance on the one hand and from vague airy statements on the other. The historical

outcome of such religious fusion is briefly noticed in the closing sentences of the volume. "Not merely one religion but the contact of Eastern religions in the period of Hellenic culture contributed to the origin of Christianity. Alexander the Great had to come and found the Hellenic empire: forms of national culture from the Tigris and Euphrates had to converge on Rome and Alexandria, in order to create the conditions requisite for the origin of the gospel. Judaism was the retort in which the heterogeneous elements were collected. Then came, by means of a creative miracle, the new creation of the gospel" (p. 493).

The serviceableness of this admirable volume is enhanced by a good index, which should have included, however, a list of the more salient texts referred to throughout its pages. This might have been managed without rendering the book unwieldy. Yet, even without it, Bousset has here sketched a picture of Jewish religion during the New Testament age, at which (to adopt Goldsmith's sentence) the student will for many years be glad to turn and look and turn to look again.

James Moffatt.

STUDIES IN THE FIRST EPISTLE OF JOHN.

I.

The Advocate and the Propitiation.

My little children,
I write these things to you in order that you may not sin.
And if any one should sin,
We have an Advocate with [1] the Father—Jesus Christ the righteous
And He is, Himself, the propitiation for our sins,
Not however for ours only, but also for the whole world!—1 *John* ii. 1, 2.

The opening paragraph of this letter (i. 1–4) introduced the author as one who had seen, and known by the most certain signs, the light of the eternal life in Jesus Christ, who writes out of the wealth of his knowledge and his joy to make his friends full participators with him. In the second paragraph (*vv.* 5–10) it was shown how and with what effect the light of God, as He stands revealed in Christ, falls upon the darkness of human life. It discloses the deep chasm, the antagonism and recoil by which the Divine nature separates itself from all sin, and the sacrifice which it has made, crossing that gulf, to remove sin from human nature (*vv.* 6–7). In the debate thus occasioned between God

[1] Πρὸς τὸν πατέρα=almost "*addressing* the Father." There are four prepositions in constant use in Greek covered by the English *with* of personal intercourse: σύν signifies *conjunction*, μετά *accompaniment*, παρά *presence with* (as in John xvii. 5), πρός *converse with* (as in John i. 1, and here). "πρός is *adversus* rather than *apud* (Vulgate), and with the accusative signifies either the direction of motion, or the relation between two objects" [or *attitude* of one person to another]. "We may fittingly call the preposition here πρός *pictorial*" (Alexander, in *Expositor's Bible*). The expression is ethical, and not in any way local.

and men concerning sin, in the struggle between the world's darkness and the new light rising upon mankind with the advent of Christ, some yield by a sincere confession and find forgiveness and a thorough cleansing, which puts them in communion with God and with their fellows (*vv.* 7–9); in others the darkness resists condemnation and even pretends to be light, entangling and entrenching itself in the desperate falsehood of giving the lie to God (*vv.* 6, 8–10).

We are brought, then, at the beginning of the 2nd chapter to the very decided position that what the Gospel aims at is *the abolition of sin.* Every word that St. John writes here, all that he has heard and learned from his Master and that he has to teach to others, tends and bends to this one point. Not the "forgiving of sins" alone, but the "cleansing" of man's life "from all unrighteousness"—to this the fidelity and the righteousness of God are pledged in the new covenant founded upon the death of Christ. St. John as well as St. Paul had to combat the Antinomianism which fastens itself in so many insidious forms upon the doctrine of Justifying Grace, upon the proffer of a full and free remission of sins. With tender urgency and a true fatherly solicitude the Apostle states the object of his Epistle: "My little children,[1] I am writing these things to you, to the end that you may not sin." There was a real danger, as verse 7 in the next chapter intimates, of St. John's disciples falling into the Antinomian snare: "Little children," he says, "let no one deceive you. The man that *does righteousness* is righteous (ὁ ποιῶν δικαιοσύνην δίκαιός ἐστιν), even as He (i.e. Christ) is righteous." Imputed righteousness that does not translate

[1] It is the first time that this characteristic compellation (τεκνία), recurring six times later on, appears in the Epistle. In this single instance (as the genuine text stands) is τεκνία qualified by the appropriative and appealing μου.

itself unto actual righteousness, justification which bears no "fruit into sanctification," a forgiveness that fails to make a man thereafter clean from sin, is a wretched delusion; it is pictured in rough fashion by the proverb of (2 Peter ii. 22) "the sow" that "washed herself, to roll in the mire." The message that the holy Apostle has brought from the light of God will miss its mark utterly if it does not make its receivers "light in the Lord," and reproduce in them individually the image of Jesus Christ amongst men (cf. *vv.* 4, 28, 29; iii. 3, 10, 16, 24; iv. 7, 11–14, 20; v. 18).

At the outset St. John had stated his purpose in quite a different way. "These things we write to you, that our joy may be made full"; he was writing, it seemed, from sheer gladness of heart, out of his irrepressible delight in the truths he has learned, and with the longing that his fellow-men may share them. But this first, instinctive aim implies the second, which is deliberate and reflective. He is not the man to take pen in hand simply to relieve his personal feelings and for the sake of self-expression; the knowledge that has filled the universe with radiance for himself, shines for all men; so far as may be, it shall radiate through him. But it must shine unto salvation. Where men remain impenitent, or unsanctified, under the light of the Gospel, when they deny their sins outright or cloak and shelter them behind a profession of faith, they are worse men and not better for their knowledge; in such cases the preacher's delight in his message becomes sorrow and shame. "Greater joy," he writes elsewhere, "I have not than this, that I hear of my children walking in truth" (3 John 4). The joy that wells up in his soul as he puts pen to paper and calls up the image of his children with whom he is holding converse on the things truest and most precious to him and to them, will be "made complete" and the old man's cup of salvation filled to the brim with the

wine of gladness, if the purpose of his letter be answered in those who read—a purpose identical with that of God's eternal will in Christ—if they realize the Christian character, if sin in them be wiped out and done with for ever.

The Apostle's little children cannot say "that they have not sinned," nor "that they have no sin" (i. 8, 10); but they understand that now, since they have been forgiven and cleansed by the blood of God's Son, they must not and need not sin. But "if," as experience had then proved and continues to prove, if this unmeet contingency should occur, "if any should sin"—any of those whom the Apostle is addressing, who have tasted forgiveness and come into God's light—if such a man after all this should commit sin, are we then to despair of him and count him as cut off from the brotherhood and for ever lost to God? No! the Apostle cries: "*We have an Advocate before the Father*—One whose intercession may avail in this emergency (cf. v. 16, 17). Let us put the case into His hands." Since the hypothesis, "if any one sin," [1] is contrasted with the purpose of this Letter, viz. "that you may not sin," it is evident that the contingency in question concerns the readers; the possibility contemplated is that of some act of sin committed by a Christian man—an act contradictory of his calling and proper character—contra-natural in one "begotten of God"—a paradox in point of principle, but such as must practically be reckoned with. And when in passing from the protasis to the apodosis of the hypothetical sentence and showing how this sad eventuality

[1] Any other Greek writer but St. John would have used δέ instead of καί in the ἐάν clause. The prevalence of the conjunction καί, and the preference of the simple copulative to the adversative and illative connexion of sentences, forms the most marked syntactical feature of his style and imparts its predominant Hebraistic cast. The occurrence of δέ in the last clause of verse 2 is the more remarkable because of the infrequency of this particle with St. John.

must be met, the writer replaces the indefinite "any one" (τις) by the communicative "we" (where we should expect "*he* has an Advocate"), he does not mean to identify the two pronouns by way of hinting that this "any one" might prove to be himself for example, and that each of the readers might in turn be in the offender's plight; he conceives the community as concerned in the personal case of transgression and seeking a remedy. "If one member suffers, all the members suffer with it"; "if any man" amongst us "sins," all are distressed, and our comfort is that the Head of the Church feels our trouble—that "we have an Advocate with the Father," who will not fail in His part of Intercessor. It is not, abstractly, "*There is* an Advocate"; with a clear and joyful sense of our common possession in the heavenly Paraclete, the Apostle writes, "*We have* an Advocate," as when the writer to the Hebrews concludes, in his climactic style, "Such a High Priest we have."

This fine turn of expression illustrates in the most natural and unconscious way the oneness of believers in Christ, and implies that sympathetic involvement of the society in the moral failure of the individual which St. Paul enforces in writing to the Galatians: "Brethren, if a man be overtaken in any trespass, you that are spiritual, restore such a one in a spirit of meekness, looking to thyself, lest thou also be tempted" (vi. 1). With an instance like that of St. Peter's fall and recovery in his memory and recalling the anticipatory prayer of Jesus for the offender's restoration, St. John might well express his hope in such terms as these. The consolation was needed. Amongst the infant Churches of the time, gathered out of heathenism and with its allurements and persecutions searching them at every point, while the passions and habits of Gentile life ran strongly in their blood, relapses were painfully frequent, and the utmost

tenderness and firmness were necessary in dealing with them.

The Apostle John admits that a genuine Christian, a truly cleansed and saved man, may lapse into sin ; and yet he writes later on, in the 3rd chapter, *vv.* 6, 9 : "Every one who abides in Him (in Christ) does not sin (*οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει*) ; every one that sinneth (*ὁ ἁμαρτάνων*) hath not seen Him, neither knoweth Him. . . . Every one who is begotten of God, does not commit sin (*ἁμαρτίαν οὐ ποιεῖ*), because His seed is in him ; and he cannot sin, because he has been begotten of God." These contrary implications cannot be quite logically adjusted to each other. Sin in Christian believers is a paradox, and has always something intolerable and almost monstrous about it. The contradiction is relieved, however, by observing that the verbs relating to sin are in the latter passage in the *present* tense of the Greek, denoting a continued or even habitual action, whereas we have in our text (*ἐάν τις ἁμάρτῃ*), a subjunctive *aorist*, which imports a single occurrence, and may include no more than the barest act of sin once committed and followed by a deep repentance, such as was the memorable fall of Peter. Indeed, when Jesus Christ appears in the next clause as *Advocate*, this presupposes the confession of the culprit and his own petition for mercy. The Paraclete is invoked for one who is in admitted need and peril. Christ's intercession is no screen for sin. He is no Advocate for the wilful, persistent wrong-doer, but for the sinner who loathes and renounces his offence, for the backslider who bemoans his fall. On the sincere penitent's behalf He is ready to interpose ; He makes haste to send the message, "Go, tell His disciples —*and Peter*—He is risen again!" The condition "If we confess" (i. 9) is indispensable for the advocacy of the righteous Intercessor, as it is for the forgiveness promised by the righteous Judge.

1. It is in this connexion that our Lord Jesus Christ comes to receive one of His great titles, given to Him *ipso nomine* only in this single passage of the New Testament. Virtually He assumed it when in His discourse of leave-taking at the Last Supper He introduced the Holy Spirit to the disciples as "*another* Paraclete" (John xiv. 16), "given that He might be with" them "for ever." The Spirit of truth was sent "from the Father" to be the pleader of Christ's cause against the world and amongst men, to conduct His case in time to come, and to be in this capacity the Guide and Inspirer of His people, not dwelling visibly with them as He had Himself done, but veritably *in* them.

The term παράκλητος—with its equivalent in the Latin *Advocatus*—belonged to the sphere of civil life, and was familiar in the usage of the ancient courts. It passed early as a loan-word into Jewish (Aramaic) use, and is found repeatedly in the Targums and the Talmud; it was, not improbably, current in the Palestinian dialect of our Lord's time. So in the Targum upon Job xxxiii. 23, פְּרַקְלִיטָא is antithetical to קַטֵּיגוֹרָא (κατήγορος or κατήγωρ, *accuser*; see Acts xxiii. 30, etc., Rev. xii. 10): "there appeareth one angel as *defender* amidst a thousand *accusers*." Philo employs the word as in common vogue in the Hellenistic Jewish vocabulary; he speaks in one passage (*De Vita Moysis*, 673c) of the Levitical high priest in language curiously parallel to this verse of St. John: "It was necessary for him who is dedicated to the Father of the world to employ as advocate one who is altogether perfect in virtue, to wit, a son [of God], in order to secure both amnesty of sins and a supply of most abundant blessings."[1] The Paraclete was a figure at once recognized by our Lord's disciples, when He assigned this rôle to the Holy Spirit as

[1] ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἦν τὸν ἱερωμένον τῷ τοῦ κόσμου πατρὶ παρακλήτῳ χρῆσθαι τελειοτάτῳ τὴν ἀρετὴν υἱῷ, πρός τε ἀμνηστίαν ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ χορηγίαν ἀφθονωτάτων ἀγαθῶν.

His representative and His Church's patron and defender in face of the accusing world; its fitness is equally manifest when the like part is ascribed to the Lord Himself, intervening in the Father's presence as the spokesman of His offending brethren. Our Lord's disciples had known Him in the days of His flesh as their *παράκλητος πρὸς τὸν Πατέρα*: the prayer reported in the 17th chapter of John's Gospel was only the last of many such pleadings on their account; and on the cross, when He prayed for His executioners, "Father, forgive them," it was seen how widely His intercession extended to a "whole world" of sinners. What He had been upon earth, they knew Him still to be now that He is "with the Father"—Jesus Christ, the same yesterday and to-day, "who also maketh intercession for us." St. John's "Paraclete" is synonymous, therefore, with the "High Priest after the order of Melchizedek," who forms the chief subject of the Epistle to the Hebrews[1]; and all that is set forth in that lofty argument respecting the character and functions of "the great Priest who hath passed through the heavens," who hath "entered in once for all into the holy place, having obtained an eternal redemption," may be carried over to the account of the "Advocate" here in view.

This rarer title, however, brings the Mediator in some sense nearer to us. The High Priest is a grand exalted person, clothed with a solitary and solemn dignity, "holy, guileless, undefiled, separated from sinners, and made higher than the heavens," and all this is true of our Paraclete; but under St. John's designation He is pictured as friendly, approachable, intimate, entering into and associating Himself with the case of the accused. While the High Priest, in His public duty and acting upon

[1] With Philo Judæus the High Priest is the *παράκλητος* of Israel before God; cf. Heb. v. 1, etc.

His own initiative, offers His sacrifice and makes intercession for the people's sins, the Advocate listens to each sinner's confession and meets the specific accusations under which he labours. The relationship between advocate and client constituted a personal tie of a settled character, involving acquaintanceship and often kinship between the two. The παράκλητος of the old jurisprudence, and in the best times of antiquity, was no mere hired pleader connected with his client for the occasion by his brief and his fee; he was his patron and standing counsel, the head of the order or the clan to which the accused belonged, bound by the claims of honour and family association to stand by his humble dependent and to see him through when his legal standing was imperilled; he was, in fact, his client's natural protector and the appointed captain of his salvation. Such a Paraclete "we have"—"a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God," but more than this, an interested, brotherly Pleader, who enters thoroughly into the conditions of each case and makes our suit personally His own. There is this difference further, that while the Priest as such is concerned only to interpose with His offering for sin, the Advocate takes into his account the entire situation and needs of his clansman. Any danger, any grave necessity or liability to which the client is exposed, calls forth his sympathy and constitutes a claim for counsel and aid.

There are two personal conditions determining the success of an advocate in such a pleading as is here supposed. (1) There must be *character and competency* in the paraclete. He is described as "Jesus Christ the righteous." His name, with the record lying behind it, guarantees the worth of the person and His standing and interest with the Father; it is a pledge of kindness, skill, authority, of human affinity and Divine prerogative, of power and merit and suitability, of all that can give value to the intercession that He carries

on for sinners. If Jesus Christ speaks for us—being all that the gospel reports of Him, all that St. John and his readers knew and had proved Him to be—we may trust and not be afraid. A gracious hand is stretched out, a mighty voice uplifted on behalf of sinning, suffering men. He is wise no less than pitiful. He will not embark on a lost cause, nor undertake an impracticable task. But the peculiar ground of confidence present to the Apostle's mind lies in the epithet δίκαιος: our Advocate for the brother whose sin we deplore, is "Jesus Christ the righteous!" This assures us not merely of the rectitude of our Mediator, but of His status and effective right as the sinless to plead for the sinful, —nay more, as the approved Son of God, "The Word with God"; it implies the righteousness of His action in the matter in hand and the soundness of the plea He advances. He is master of the law, knowing and fulfilling all its conditions; He sues in the name of law and right; His character and antecedents warrant us in assuming that He will urge no argument, He will take up no position in representing our case, which justice does not approve while compassion prompts it. What the Apostle Paul said of God, the Acquitter of sinful men, that in the forgiveness of the Gospel He is "*just Himself* and the justifier of him that is of faith in Jesus" (Rom. iii. 26), is equally true *mutatis mutandis* of the sinner's Advocate: He is righteous Himand righteously pleads the cause of transgressors. This quality in the Paraclete makes our confidence perfect, and makes the remission He gains for us safe and sure. Pardon is not wrested from justice by some overpowering appeal to pity, nor enforced by regard for the person of the Pleader; it is grounded upon strict right. The case is won by a Paraclete who could not lower Himself to advocate an unjust suit; while the Judge, though Father, is of such integrity that He will only forgive when and so far as He can be "faithful and righteous" (i. 9) in doing so. This is a

vital point in St. John's doctrine of Redemption. The realization of it gives a security, and a moral grandeur and power, to the salvation of the Gospel, which is wanting when it is presented in a one-sided and sentimental way, as though the love which actuates it were disregardful of God's declared law and of the moral order of the universe.

2. The other encouraging condition of Jesus Christ's advocacy, as it is here viewed, is afforded by *the name of Him to whom it is addressed.* The Paraclete on our behalf appeals to "the Father." Drawing near through Christ with our confessions, we find the Father in God where we expected only the Judge. *The Father*—His Father and ours—cannot be implacable, hard to persuade, or ready to raise occasions against us and to press the points of law to our disfavour. Where the judge is absolutely just and can come only to one conclusion, much still depends for the form of his decision and the mode of execution that may be prescribed on the kindliness or otherwise of his disposition. When St. John declares that "we have a righteous Advocate *before the Father*" it is not love pleading with justice—so the gospel has often been distorted—it is *justice pleading with love* for our release!

Here lies the key—one key, at least, of many—to the Apostle Paul's rich doctrine of Justification by grace through faith, in the fact that God is one, is Himself, and His *whole* self, in each act of His administration towards mankind. He is not divided into Judge *and* Father—righteousness and mercy, law and love—acting now in one quality or office and now in another. He would not be just in His attitude and dealings with guilty men, not just either to them or to Himself, if He did not remember His paternal character, if the considerations, the mutual claims and responsibilities, attaching to fatherhood and filiation did not enter into His estimate and supply

the factors upon which His judgements of condemnation or acquittal, of favour or penalty, are based. The two "forensic" Epistles of Paul, those in which he argues out his doctrine of Justification in legal and dialectic terms, are prefaced by the wish of "Grace and peace from God our Father" (Rom. i. 7) and by the assurance of deliverance from an evil world "according to the will of God our Father" (Gal. i. 4). The Apostle has not forgotten these ascriptions, nor divested God of His essential Fatherhood, when he lays down his great thesis that "the *righteousness* of God is revealed" in the gospel, "of faith, for faith" (Rom. i. 17). It is an artificial theology which divorces the juridical and paternal relationships in the Godhead, and makes the Divine Fatherhood less fundamental to the teaching of the Epistles than it is to the message of Jesus in the Gospels. For John at any rate, this text is sufficient to forbid the assumption of any such schism in the Godhead or discrepancy in apostolic doctrine. The advocacy that Christ exercises, the "propitiation" He presents, are offered to "the Father." The nature of that expiation, the form and matter of the Advocate's defence, are such as the Father justly requires, such as will satisfy Him when He meets His guilty and sin-confessing children, such that on the ground thus afforded, and in answer to the pleas advanced and the reasons given, He may righteously and faithfully forgive (i. 9).

3. The competence of the Advocate being established, and the favourable conditions evident under which He appears, it is necessary to examine the ground on which He presents Himself before the Father-judge. Pardon, most certainly, is not to be obtained for the guilty on the mere asking, nor because of the interest and personal merit of the Suitor. Otherwise it had been enough to say, "We have an Advocate, Jesus Christ the righteous,—let Him only speak, and our suit is won!" The complementary sen-

tence, "He is the propitiation for our sins," would then have been mere surplusage. This some of us, with our light and easy notions about sin, may be ready to suppose; but neither Christ Himself nor His Apostles were of this way of thinking. The general institutions of religion, the analogies of human justice at its best and strongest, the deep instincts of conscience, dictate the axiom that the priest approaching God on behalf of guilty men *must have somewhat to offer*. The Pleader is simply "out of court" unless He brings in His hand a propitiation,—some satisfaction to the outraged character of God or (to put the same thing from another point of view) to the violated law of the universe, and some guarantee thereby afforded on the sinner's part that his offence shall cease. That is to say, the Paraclete must bring the propitiation with Him, or His best pleading is null and void. God the Father is "faithful and righteous to forgive us our sins, if we confess"—there is the only condition required upon our part; but it suffices in virtue of the pre-condition established by the sacrifice of the cross and on the ground of the expiation made by "the blood of Jesus" (i. 7, 9). This fundamental condition of Jesus Christ's successful mediation it depended altogether on Himself to supply. There was no ground in humanity outside of Him, upon which the Advocate could base a sufficient plea. The old ritual propitiations were unavailing, as the writer to the Hebrews so pathetically shows; these offerings did but express the need for some real sin-offering; they appealed for, while they foreshadowed, its accomplishment. "*He* is the propitiation"—He and none else, none less—even "Jesus Christ the righteous."

The word ἱλασμός [Hebrew כִּפּוּרִים, (כִּפֶּרֶא), *cover*] is one about the meaning of which there should not be much dispute.[1] This precise term is employed but twice in the

[1] See the art. *Propitiation*, by S. R. Driver, in Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*. ἱλασμός signifies etymologically the *act* or *process* of propitiating;

New Testament, here and in chap. iv. 10 of this Epistle, where it has the same application to the person of the Redeemer: God "loved us," the Apostle writes, "and sent His Son a propitiation for our sins." It is a term purely religious (as the verb *ἱλάσκομαι*, on which it rests, is principally), used in classical Greek of the sacrifices or prayers which are the means of *appeasing*, or *making propitious* [*ἵλεως*, *ἱλάσκομαι*], the offended gods. In the Greek Old Testament, *ἱλάσκομαι* or *ἐξιλάσκομαι*, and their derivatives, come into play chiefly and most distinctively as the equivalents of the verb כִּפֶּר, with its group of dependent nouns. It is fairly certain that this Hebrew word has not departed far from its radical meaning, *to cover*, and that the root-idea of propitiation as expressed in the Jewish ritual was that of *covering* sin from the eyes of God, of interposing between His wrath and the offensive object that provoked it, so that the punitive anger which otherwise must strike, should be averted and turned to favour. There is this far-reaching difference, however, between the conception of Atonement presented in revelation and that prevailing in Gentile religions, that while men elsewhere are driven under the pressure of their guilt to invent appeasements for their gods, God Himself prescribes and furnishes to Israel the propitiations which He deems to be necessary. Mercy was no less patent than justice in the forms of sacrifice instituted by the Mosaic covenant; if the God of Israel required to be placated, He was eminently placable, making overtures to transgressors and paving the way for their restored access to His sanctuary. While "propitiation" connotes anger in God, a just displeasure against sin carrying with it penal consequences, and this implication cannot be eliminated by any fair dealing with the word, Biblical Greek carefully avoids making *God* the object of *ἱλάσκεσθαι*,

then, like some other nouns in *-μος*, the *means* or *agency* effecting propitiation.

ἱλασμός, or the like,—the obvious construction in the terminology of natural religion. The Holy One of Israel is not *made* gracious by the satisfaction offered Him ; in His very anger He *is* gracious ; the appeasement He gives order for, and invites from His sinning people, proves His pity for them.

The appointment of the Son of God under the new covenant as Priest and Mediator for the race, and the provision which constitutes Him the sacrificial Lamb of God, develop this unique element of Old Testament expiation in the most astonishing way ; the idea of propitiation, which assumed in the ethnic cults gloomy and revolting forms, is touched with a glorious light of Divine grace and condescension. It is largely expounded in the Epistle to the Hebrews : " At the consummation of the ages " One " hath been manifested " who comes " to put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself "—a Being far above the angels and whose throne is for ever, yet " in all things made like to His brethren, that He might prove Himself a merciful and faithful High Priest in the things pertaining to God." Thus the Son of God qualifies Himself " to make propitiation for the sins of the people " (Heb. ii. 17) ; and the sacrifice of the Cross is the goal of all God's earlier revelations of Himself. St. Paul coincides with St. John in this interpretation of the death of Jesus, using in his classical passage on the Atonement (Rom. iii. 23–26) the term ἱλαστήριον where the latter has ἱλασμός : " Whom God set forth, in His blood, a propitiatory (victim) through faith." [1] The heathen notion,

[1] ἱλαστήριον is the more concrete expression, construed as accusative masculine (see Sanday and Headlam's Note *ad loc.*)—" a propitiatory person," " in a propitiatory character "; ἱλασμός, the more abstract—" a (means of) propitiation," one in whom propitiation is realized. It may be convenient here to note the distinction between ἱλασμός and its synonyms, well stated by Driver in the article above referred to : " The death of Christ is represented in the New Testament under three main aspects, as a λύτρον, *ran-*

natural to man's guilty conscience, of the hostility of the gods who seek to avenge themselves on evil men and plan their ruin, is confounded by this disclosure. Wrath against sin, indeed, there is in the Godhead—the antipathy of the absolute Holiness to the false and impure, which burns everlastingly to consume its opposite. Propitiation cannot be forgone; God cannot deny Himself, nor the Fountain of law make terms with "lawlessness" (iii. 4). But in wrath He remembers mercy toward His offspring. Beneath the very fire of His anger there glows the fire of His love. If He requires a moral expiation, He shall provide it. If sin must be branded with a condemnation that otherwise would crush and consume the sinner, there is the Son of His love who will bear the weight of that sentence, who will die the death which transgression entails; and the Father "did not spare His own Son," when confronting this liability and humbling Himself unto the death of the cross; He "gave Him up for us all." There is a paradox for human language, a mystery of the depths of God beyond all our soundings, in the double aspect of the Christian ἱλασμός, in the unity of the Divine wrath and love, the coincidence of mercy and penalty, judicial infliction and fatherly restoration, meeting in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ. Modern thought stumbles and struggles hard against this offence, which is its peculiar σκάνδαλον τοῦ σταυροῦ, its cross in the Cross; but no stumbling at it will displace it. With whatever subtlety such words as "propitiation" and "reconciliation" are explained away, there they remain in the lexicon of the New Testament to assert the stern element of sin-avenging justice in the character of God. The death of Jesus Christ attests for all time and to

soming from the power of sin and spiritual death; as a καταλλαγή, setting 'at one,' or *reconciling* God and man, and bringing to an end the alienation between them; and as a ἱλασμός, a *propitiation* breaking down the barrier which sin interposes between God and man, and enabling God again to enter into fellowship with him."

all mankind the fearful consequences which the sin of our race, under the operation of Divine law, brings upon all who are entangled in it.

The Apostle's language recalls the scene of the Israelite "day of Atonement" (יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, *ἡμέρα ἐξιλασμοῦ*), the day of "affliction" for the sins of Israel. We see the high priest, after he has first filled the shrine with the smoke of incense, bearing the blood of the bullock slain for himself and his family to present it in the Most Holy Place (such sacrifice for *Himself*, the writer to the Hebrews explains in chap. vii. 26–28, our High Priest had no need to make), then killing the goat which represented the guilty people in the sight of Jehovah, and carrying its blood in turn before the Presence. This blood of the sin-offering he sprinkled once on the golden lid of the ark which held the law (designated for this reason the "mercy-seat," כַּפֹּרֶת, *ἱλαστήριον*; see Heb. ix. 5), and seven times in the vacant space before it (Lev. xvi., xxiii. 28–32), which "blood of sprinkling" was called emblematically the כִּפּוּרִים, the *covering* of the people's sins from before the face of God. This was the culminating office of the high-priestly service; its occasion was the one day of the year in which Aaron or his successor entered the Holy of holies—alone, and "not without blood"—to "make reconciliation for the sins of the people." The renewal of the favour of God toward Israel, and the maintenance of His covenant of grace with His people and of its status of adoption and privilege, were made conditional upon this yearly propitiation; the lesser, current sin-offerings and sacrifices, negotiated through other priests, were auxiliary and supplementary thereto, realizing for individuals and for minor occasions what was wrought in the solemn and collective expiation made by the High Priest once in each year. "The blood of Jesus, God's Son," of which the Apostle spoke in such arresting words in chap. i. 7, is the substance, for "the whole world," of that true *ἱλασμός*

which the blood of the animal victim slain by Aaron on the Day of Atonement represented typically for the nation of Israel. This blood "cleanseth from all sin," while that serves rather as "a remembrance made of sins year by year" (Heb. x. 1–3).

St. John's "propitiation" (ἱλασμός) is synonymous with St. Paul's "atonement" or "reconciliation" (καταλλαγή, Rom. v. 1–11, etc.); both terms are associated with the Hebrew כִּפֶּר and its congeners and equivalents. But while the Pauline expression signifies the *restoring of peace* between parties estranged and striving with each other, the Johannine imports the *restoring of favour* toward the condemned and banished; with Paul rebels, with John culprits are forgiven. The one Apostle sees those who were in the enemy's camp brought over and received on amnesty into the service against which formerly they had borne arms—"translated out of the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of the Son of God's love," like himself who was "before a blasphemer and persecutor and wanton injurer" of his Lord, but "had obtained mercy"; the other Apostle looks on a company of the sin-stained, the filthy and leprous, thrust far away from the sanctuary with the "dogs" that "are without," but who "have washed their robes and made them white in the Lamb's blood," and now "have the right to come to the tree of life, and to enter by the gates into the city (Rev. xxii. 14, 15).

But how great the cost at which this right was won by our Advocate! Here was the task and labour of His mission—to "take away the sin of the world." Other aid, it appears, our heavenly Friend could render to men with comparative ease. Hunger, disease, madness, even death, as the record tells, He had power in the days of His flesh to remove or reverse by a mere stroke of His authority. But a lifting of the eyes to heaven, a sentence of blessing,

—and five loaves become food for five thousand men; but a word of rebuke,—and wind and waves lay down hushed at His feet and the storm is gone; a word from the holy lips of Jesus,—and the demons of madness fled from their tormented prey, the convulsed frame and frenzied brain are restored to sanity; a single word, "Lazarus, come forth!" —and the sheeted dead issues from the tomb where he had lain four days, and gropes his way back a living, breathing man. These things were no such great achievement for our Paraclete, seeing He was the Lord of nature from eternity, one with the world's Creator. But when it came to the putting away of sin, ah, this was a different matter. Mere power is of no avail in moral affairs, in what touches conscience and character; nor is goodwill, at its best, of any efficacy unseconded by wisdom and a just direction of its impulses. Here lay the Redeemer's problem, the *quaestio vexata* of the ages—how to set guilty and evil men right with God. Let those who make light of sin, who regard human transgression as venial and excusable and suppose that our heavenly Father, being gracious and sovereign, might easily condone, out of mere prerogative and decree and by way of generous compassion and magnanimity, the offences of His weak and foolish creatures, let those who so regard the Divine government and turn the grace of God into a soft indulgence, consider what befell our Advocate in adopting the cause of sinners and dealing for them with the eternal Righteousness.

The laws of physical nature, which express one side of the Divine character and embody certain great principles of its working, are not gentle in their treatment of misdoers, nor in their treatment of those involved in the misdoing of others. Mechanics, chemistry, physiology, biology proclaim the fact that "the ways of transgressors are hard"—hard for themselves, and for all who tread in their steps.

Throughout the regions of natural law, sloping upward toward the moral, "every transgression and disobedience receiveth a just recompence of reward," and "the mills of God" grind, swiftly or slowly, retribution with the most exact and infallible certainty of sequence. No defiance, no negligence, is overlooked or fails of its amercement. In all these vast provinces of His kingdom lawlessness is searched out and visited with a sleepless and exemplary chastisement. When one enters into the spiritual sphere of existence, new forces of love and remedial grace come into play; but they do not neutralize nor supersede the action of retributive law which runs through the government of God; lower laws may be subordinated, they are not overridden or set at nought when we pass into the higher and more complex conditions of life. From the fall of a stone, flung heedlessly, which maims a child, or the flight of an arrow pointed by hatred at an enemy's breast, up to the sufferings of the Redeemer under the load of a world's sin, there is one God, one law, one element of righteousness and truth, that fills the universe of being and "worketh all things in all."

When our Advocate steps forth to shield transgressors, when He "comes into the world to save sinners," He engages Himself to a work of inconceivable pain and difficulty. There is a satisfaction to be made, a "chastisement of our peace" to be laid upon Him, without which God cannot be truly reconciled to the world, nor the world to God. Neither the Divine nature nor the human conscience, in the last resort, would allow this obligation to be evaded. The Paraclete, if He is really to stand by us and go through with our case, though He be the eternal Son of God, cannot get away from this necessity; no favour, no prerogative exempts Him from the consequences, when He has once become the surety for sinners. He must *pay the price* of our redemption. And God Himself,

the Father, will not spare the Son of His love the shame and suffering thus incurred—cannot spare Him, in His utter love and pity, since the law that yokes these consequences to transgression and determines such effects from such causes is integral with His own being. In the consent of the Son thus to endure the cross to which men's sin brought Him, the Father sees the very image of His own righteousness and mercy; He recognizes the oneness of love and justice which inheres in His own holiness, and which, presented in the offering of Calvary, constitutes it the "perfect sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world." In virtue of this complete accord between the act of Jesus in yielding Himself to the cross, and the laws of moral being that centre in and proceed from the nature of God Himself, this sacrifice became (to use St. Paul's strong expression) "an odour of sweet smell," a veritable and on all accounts just and fitting propitiation in the estimate of God.

Having espoused our cause, the righteous Advocate goes to all lengths with it. He will hold back from no exertion, no cost that the case demands. His honour, His blood are at His brethren's service; "the Good Shepherd lays down His life for the sheep," He "emptied Himself" in descending from His seat with the Father to a bondman's place; lower still, "He humbled Himself even to the death of the cross,"—to the nethermost of ignominy and anguish. What the sacrifice cost Him, what it cost to God who "spared not His own Son," is a reckoning infinitely beyond our moral calculus. The scene of Gethsemane allows a moment's glance into the mystery of Divine grief over human sin. There the Redeemer wrestles with His task, now forcing itself in its appalling weight upon His human consciousness. He shrinks from the cross in such horror that, if we read the story aright, the very blood forced itself from His tortured veins. "Father,"

He cries, "if it be possible let this cup pass!" Thrice the challenge is addressed to the All-righteous and All-merciful by the Son of His good pleasure. Was the Father deaf, think you, to the entreaty of those quivering lips? If there had been any other way, if it had been possible upon any less exacting terms to cancel man's transgression, would not that way have been discovered? No; it was not possible with God to pass over sin without atonement, to accept the plea of our Advocate without propitiation rendered.

The Priest must become Himself the victim, for His intercession to prevail. He must lay upon the altar no goats or calves of the stall—this was only a preluding and symbolizing of sacrifice—but in good earnest He must *by Himself* purge our sins, and "enter in the right of *His own blood* once for all into the Holy Place, obtaining eternal redemption for us." "HIMSELF the propitiation for our sins"—*αὐτὸς ἱλασμός ἐστιν*: this is the triumph and wonder of St. John's sentence! The Advocate flings His own life into the plea; He speaks by His blood. He steps, as one should say, from the pleaders' bench into the dock to cover the prisoner's person with His own; He puts His unspotted holiness and the wealth of His being at the service and in the actual place of the unworthy criminal, that He may bear in his stead the brunt of condemnation and by sharing his penalty, in such form as is possible and fitting to innocence, may save him from its fatal issue and recover him for goodness and for God.

Such a propitiation can be of no mere local validity, of no bounded or national interest and operation. The grandeur of the person, the moral glory and essential humanity of the sacrifice, bespeak for it a universal scope. A "propitiation," St. John writes, "not for our sins only, but indeed *touching the whole world*." The Church's Paraclete is the world's Redeemer. Jesus Christ the righteous

is the champion and vindicator of our race, the High Priest of mankind. His sin-offering, presented by the Son of God and Son of man, avails without limit; it covers in its merit and significance all the families of man and the ages of time; He has "obtained an eternal" and a world-embracing "redemption"; even as "there is one God"—so, St. Paul argues (1 Tim. ii. 5–7), "there is one Mediator between God and men, Himself man, viz. Christ Jesus, who gave Himself a ransom for all." The universal expiation of sin has been made, one that countervails and counteracts sin in its essence and innermost working—not as a specific Jewish liability, but as a common attribute of human nature. So this Paraclete stands forth as the Friend and Healer of His kind everywhere and always, the Sin-bearer of humanity. He wears on his official breastplate not the names of the twelve tribes of Israel any longer, but of every tribe and kindred over the face of the wide earth. In His perpetual intercession Jesus Christ bears the weight of the whole world's cares and sins before the Father of men. His earthly experience, in life and death, has made Him competent to be "a priest for ever" and for the whole body of mankind.

The words that first directed the Apostle John to his Master were those spoken in his hearing by the Baptist on the Jordan banks—startling words, which looked already beyond the Jewish horizon, which showed a faith outleaping the narrow bounds of the speaker's ancestry and rearing, and a knowledge in him of things revealed otherwise than by flesh and blood: "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away *the sin of the world*!" That patient Lamb of God, then submitting meekly to the Baptist's ordination, had filled the Apostle's life with His presence. He had displayed many an unlooked-for attribute of power, and received many a new name of honour from His disciples' lips since that day. But this is still His distinctive glory, this the

act on which the kingship of Jesus Christ for ever rests, that by His righteous sacrifice of love He has "taken away the sin of the world." The eternal song of angels and of men is that which St. John heard in his Apocalypse: "Worthy is the Lamb that hath been slain, to receive the power and riches and wisdom and might and honour and glory and blessing!"

GEORGE G. FINDLAY.

THE RESURRECTION OF OUR LORD.

I.

THE EVANGELIC TESTIMONY.

THE New Testament constantly declares, and the Church all down the centuries has believed, that on the third day after He had been crucified on Calvary and laid, a mangled corpse, in Joseph's Sepulchre, Jesus revived, came forth, appeared to His disciples, and finally returned to His glory. The disciples saw the empty Sepulchre; they saw the wound-prints on His hands and feet and side; and at this hour, if the testimony of the New Testament be true, He is not a bodiless spirit in the Father's House but wears the form which He wore on earth, glorified but still scarred by His sore Passion. In the midst of the Throne He is still a Lamb as though it had been slain (Rev. v. 6).

This is a stupendous affirmation, and it is no marvel that all down the centuries it has been the jest of unbelievers and to believers an exceeding mystery. It looks on the face of it so incredible, so impossible, nay, so absurd. Nevertheless the New Testament writers advance it with unfaltering emphasis, fully realizing how incredible it must appear, yet asserting it without hesitation or doubt as a most certain and incontrovertible fact; and they deliberately hang upon it the most momentous issues. On the fact of the Resurrection they stake not only their own

veracity but the very truth of Christianity, confessing that, should it be disproved, they would stand convicted of imposture and the hope of the Gospel would perish. "If," says Paul, "Christ hath not been raised, then void is our message, void also our faith; and we are being found also false witnesses for God, forasmuch as we witnessed of God that He raised the Christ. . . . If Christ hath not been raised, vain is your faith, still are ye in your sins" (1 Cor. xv. 14–15, 17). According to the Apostle, there are two conditions of salvation, and one is faith in the Resurrection: "If thou confess with thy mouth Jesus as Lord, and believe in thy heart that God raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved" (Rom. x. 9). It is the fashion of our day to account the fact of the Resurrection as of little moment, the religious ideal which Jesus disclosed and its abiding influence on the souls of men being regarded as alone essential. Whether this be a legitimate conception or not, the fact remains and must be reckoned with that it is not the conception of the New Testament, and, if we rest there, then our Christianity is not the Christianity of the Apostles: we have discarded as immaterial what seemed to them the very foundation of the Faith.

In his *New Life of Jesus* Strauss made the remarkable statement that the Resurrection was the test of his Mythical Theory, and, if he had failed in his previous work to account for it without any corresponding miraculous fact, then he must retract all that he had said and abandon his whole undertaking. And he was right. The Resurrection is the citadel of the Christian faith. While it stands nothing is lost; should it fall, the long battle would be ended. And all down the ages the assailants of the Resurrection have pursued two methods of attack. They have sought, on the one hand, to undermine its foundations by demonstrating the unreliability of the evangelic narratives, and have laboured, on the other, to show how the belief

that Jesus had risen originated in the minds of the primitive believers. And the attack has recently been renewed along the familiar lines by Professor P. W. Schmiedel in the last volume of the *Encyclopædia Biblica*. There is really nothing novel in his article on the Resurrection, nothing that has not been already urged; yet it is worthy of attention. It is written not only with exhaustive knowledge but with a due appreciation of the greatness of the issues and a remarkable hesitancy to pronounce a final verdict. Schmiedel advocates the vision-hypothesis, but he is undisguisedly conscious of its insufficiency. He adopts it simply because no better may be had, and he frankly confesses toward the close of his elaborate discussion that "for all that has been said in the foregoing paragraphs the most that can be claimed is that it proves the possibility—the probability if you will—of the explanation from subjective visions." One rises from a perusal of this article gratefully conscious that destructive criticism has lost much of its unfaltering assurance and that faith has reason to lift up its head and take courage.

It is proposed in the present article to follow the first line of attack and endeavour to determine the value of the evangelic testimony to the Resurrection. It might have been expected that, since it is so fundamental and such tremendous issues hang upon its acceptance or rejection, the New Testament writers would take peculiar care to attest the fact of the Resurrection and fortify it by unimpeachable credentials; and it is discomfiting to find that, so far at least as the Synoptists are concerned, precisely the contrary is true. The evangelic narratives, elsewhere so remarkably accordant, here fairly bristle with discrepancies which refuse to be harmonized even by the most violent expedients. It is hardly too much to say that they agree only in their unfaltering and triumphant proclamation of the fact that Jesus rose and appeared to His disciples.

1. All the Evangelists agree that it was womanly love that paid the first visit to the Sepulchre on that ever memorable Sunday morning and was rewarded with the first vision of the Risen Lord. But here their agreement ends. According to Matthew the visitants were Mary Magdalene and the other Mary (xxviii. 1); according to Mark, Mary Magdalene, Mary the mother of James, and Salome (xvi. 1); according to Luke, "women who had followed Him from Galilee" (xxiii. 55, xxiv. 1), including Mary Magdalene, Joanna, and Mary the mother of James (xxiv. 10); while according to John Mary Magdalene went alone (xx. 1). It should not, however, be overlooked that, when Mary ran to Peter and John and told them that the Sepulchre was empty, she cried, "*We* know not where they have laid Him," as though she had companions.

2. The Evangelists differ as to the time of the visit. According to Matthew, it was "late on the Sabbath, when the light was dawning unto the first day of the week" (xxviii. 1). This language seems self-contradictory, since, according to Jewish reckoning, the Sabbath ended and the first day of the week began at nightfall; but τῇ ἐπιφωσκούσῃ εἰς μίαν σαββάτων does not mean "at the dawn of the first day of the week." The signification of the phrase is determined by Luke xxiii. 54.[1] The light that was breaking was not the light of dawn but the light of the lamps which were kindled at the commencement of the new day. Matthew's language is therefore self-consistent and means that as soon as the Sabbath ended (cf. Mark xv. 56*b*) and the first day of the week began, i.e. at nightfall, the women hastened to the Sepulchre. According to Luke, however, they went at "deep dawn" (xxiv. 1);[2] according to Mark

[1] See Lightfoot, *Hor. Hebr.*, and Wetstein *ad loc.*

[2] Cf. Plat. *Crit.* 43A, where ὄρθρος βαθύς=πάννυπρῳ. Phrynichus defines ὄρθρος as τὸ πρὸ ἀρχομένης ἡμέρας ἐν ᾧ ἔτι λύχνῳ δύναταί τις χρῆσθαι, "ubi nox abiit nec tamen orta dies" (Ov. *Amor.* I. v. 6). βαθύς because the darkness looks like a deep chasm,

"very early, when the sun had risen" (xvi. 2); whereas John says that Mary went "early, while it was yet dark" (xx. 1). The desperateness of the harmonistic case is illustrated by Jerome's comment: "Quod diversa tempora istarum mulierum in Evangeliis describuntur, non mendacii signum est, ut impii objiciunt, sed sedulæ visitationis officium, dum crebro abeunt ac recurrunt, et non patiuntur a sepulchro Domini diu abesse vel longius."

3. The object of the visit was, according to Mark (xvi. 1) and Luke (xxiv. 1), to embalm the Lord's body; according to Matthew (xxviii. 1) and John (xx. 1), simply to see the Sepulchre.

4. According to Mark (xvi. 1) they bought the spices after the Sabbath was past; according to Luke (xxiii. 56) they had bought them on the Friday evening betwixt the burial and the commencement of the Sabbath.

5. Matthew (xxviii. 2–3) says that the stone was rolled away from the Sepulchre after the arrival of the women: there was a great earthquake, and an angel descended from heaven and rolled the stone away and sate upon it.[1] Mark (xvi. 3–4), Luke (xxiv. 2), and John (xx. 1), knowing nothing of the earthquake nor, thus far, of the angel, agree that on their arrival they found the stone already removed.

6. Matthew (xxviii. 2, 5) and Mark (xvi. 5) say that there was one angel, the latter calling him "a young man" (*νεανίσκον*); Luke (xxiv. 4) and John (xx. 12), that there were two, the former calling them "men" (*ἄνδρες*).

7. Matthew's angel was outside the Sepulchre seated on the stone which he had rolled away from the entrance (xxviii. 2, 5).[1] According to Mark (xvi. 5) the women entered the Sepulchre and saw the young man clad in a white robe already there, seated on the right side. According to Luke also they entered the Sepulchre, but they

[1] Cf. Celsus' sneer (Orig. *C. Cels.* v. 52): *ὁ γὰρ τοῦ θεοῦ παῖς, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐδύνατο ἀνοῖξαι τὸν τάφον ἀλλ' ἐδεήθη ἄλλου ἀποκινήσοντος τὴν πέτραν.*

found it empty, and it was while they were wondering that the two men suddenly appeared beside them in flashing raiment (xxiv. 3–4).[1] According to John Mary fled away on seeing the stone removed and told Peter and John that the Lord had been taken away. They went and searched the Sepulchre, and saw only the cast off cerements, and not till they had gone and Mary had returned, did the two angels appear. As she peered in she saw them "sitting, one at the head and one at the feet, where the body of Jesus had lain" (xx. 1–12).

8. According to Matthew (xxviii. 7) and Mark (xvi. 7), the angel bade them go and tell the disciples and, adds Mark, Peter that the Lord had risen and would meet them in Galilee. Luke (xxiv. 6–7) omits the command and represents the angels as merely reminding them that, while yet in Galilee, Jesus had predicted His Betrayal, Crucifixion, and Resurrection.

9. According to Matthew (xxviii. 8), Mark (xvi. 8), and Luke (xxiv. 9), the women hastened away from the Sepulchre, but, according to Mark, they "said nothing to any one, for they were afraid"; [2] according to Luke, though unbidden by the angels, they "told the whole story to the Eleven and all the rest," but gained no credence: "these words appeared in their sight as an idle tale, and they disbelieved the women" (xxiv. 11). According to Matthew (xxviii. 8–10), as they were hurrying to tell the disciples,

[1] T.R. ἐξελθοῦσαι (ℵBCL Tisch. WH: ἀπελθ.) in Matt. xxviii. 8 is harmonistic. Euth. Zig.: εἰ καὶ οὐκ ἐμνημονευσεν ὁ Ματθαῖος ὅτι εἰσῆλθον εἰς τὸ μνημεῖον, ἀλλὰ νῦν εἰπὼν ὅτι ἐξῆλθον ἐνέφηνεν ὅτι πρῶτον εἰσῆλθον.

[2] Euth. Zig. on Matt. xxviii. 8 comments harmonistically: οὐδενὶ δὲ οὐδὲν εἶπον τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἐντυγχανόντων αὐταῖς κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν. Mark's Gospel is broken off abruptly at *v.* 8, *vv.* 9–20 being a later supplement and quite valueless. There is no knowing what the missing conclusion may have contained. The apocryphal *Ev. Petr.* gives an account closely resembling Mark's of the visit of the women to the Sepulchre. It concludes τότε αἱ γυναῖκες φοβηθεῖσαι ἔφυγον and proceeds to narrate an incident similar to John xxi. 1 sqq. The MS., however, breaks off after a few sentences.

Jesus Himself met them and reiterated the angel's behest. Their story was evidently believed, for the Eleven repaired to Galilee as they were bidden (xxviii. 16). John (xx. 2–10) makes Mary of her own accord, ere she had seen the angels, run, not to the Eleven, but to Peter and John and tell them that the Sepulchre was empty. They immediately repaired thither and found it so. Cf. Luke xxiv. 24.[1]

10. When, according to Matthew (xxviii. 9), Jesus met the women, including Mary Magdalene, and greeted them on their way from the Sepulchre, they laid hold of His feet and worshipped Him; nor did He repulse them. But when, according to John (xx. 17), He revealed Himself to Mary at the Sepulchre and she would have clung to Him, He forbade her.

11. According to Luke (xxiv. 41–43), when Jesus appeared to the disciples in their lodging in Jerusalem on the evening of the Resurrection-day and they could not believe that it was He but took Him for a spirit, He reassured them and conquered their doubt by asking for some food. They gave Him a piece of a broiled fish,[2] and He took it and ate it in their presence. This touch is omitted by John in his account of the incident (xx. 19–25).

12. Luke (xxiv.) represents the Ascension as taking place from the Mount of Olives late on the Resurrection-day, crowding all the appearances of the Lord into that brief space and making Jerusalem and its neighbourhood the scene of them all. According to Matthew (xxviii. 16–20) and John (xxi.) the disciples repaired to Galilee and there met with Jesus. According to John (xx. 26), they remained at least a week in Jerusalem ere betaking themselves northward. In the *Acts of the Apostles* (i. 3) Luke says that forty days elapsed between the Resurrection and the Ascension; and it might be supposed that the twenty-

[1] Luke xxiv. 12 is spurious.

[2] Tisch. WH. om. *καὶ ἀπὸ μελισσίου κηρίου.*

fourth chapter of his Gospel is a compendious narrative, omitting between the 43rd verse and the 44th all that occurred in Galilee, were it not there prevailed in early days a tradition that Jesus rose and ascended on the self-same day.[1] The fact seems to be that Luke had this tradition before him when he wrote his Gospel, and by the time he came to write his later book he had ascertained the truth, and silently but pointedly corrected his error.

Thus inconsistent are the evangelic accounts of the Resurrection, and a frank recognition of their inconsistency is the first and indispensable step toward a solution of the problem. It seems at the first glance as though there were no escape from the alternative which Strauss presents: either we must "adhere to one of the four accounts as pre-eminently apostolic, and by this rectify the others," or we must "confess that in all the evangelic accounts of these first tidings of the Resurrection we have before us nothing more than traditional reports."[2] It is, Strauss maintains, the latter course that must be preferred, and nothing then remains but to abandon all faith in the historicity of the Resurrection. A tissue of discordant legends were truly a feeble attestation of so stupendous an affirmation.

Yet it is on the face of it impossible to acquiesce in this conclusion. It is beyond question that the Apostles believed with exultant faith that Jesus had arisen, and the conviction rescued them from despondency and sent them forth with resolute hearts to preach and die. They must have been right well assured that their faith was true, or it would never have nerved them to sacrifice and toil and martyrdom. If their faith was a delusion, then a delusion

[1] Cf. *Ep. Barn.* xv. § 9: διὸ καὶ ἄγομεν τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ὀγδόην εἰς εὐφροσύνην, ἐν ᾗ καὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ φανερωθεὶς ἀνέβη εἰς οὐρανούς.

[2] *Leb. Jes.* III. iv. § 137.

has proved itself the most potent of all factors in the shaping of history, despite that surest of moral laws that falsehood is ever weak and evanescent, and it is truth that is mighty and prevails.

And an attentive scrutiny of the evangelic narratives discovers order amid their chaos and a firm foothold for faith. It is a remarkable fact and in truth the clue to the solution of the problem, that when the Synoptists came to tell the story of the Resurrection, they parted company with the Evangelic Tradition, "that fairest memorial," as Weizsäcker terms it, "which the primitive Christian community has raised for itself." [1] Up to that point they had employed "the Fair Deposit" (1 Tim. i. 14) as their staple material; allowing themselves indeed a large measure of editorial freedom in the manipulation of it, yet so faithfully reproducing it that their narratives exhibit an almost verbal agreement and may be arranged in parallel columns. A glance at Tischendorf's *Synopsis Evangelica* reveals that the common Tradition begins with the advent of the Baptist and ends with the Crucifixion, comprehending, that is, the active ministry of our Lord; and thus it appears that for their narratives of the two supreme events of our Lord's Birth and His Resurrection the Synoptic Evangelists—i.e. the redactor of Matthew's Aramaic Book of Logia, Mark the interpreter of Peter, and Luke the companion of Paul, none of them eye-witnesses—had to fall back upon other sources of information.

The failure of the Tradition just where its testimony is most needful is matter for profound regret. Let it be distinctly understood that, whatever it may mean, it does not mean that the Apostles knew nothing of the Resurrection or had any doubt about it. It is absolutely certain that they believed it and that it was the burden of their preaching. For Paul it was the supreme fact, the very

[1] See Expositor, July 1901, pp. 16–28.

foundation of the Faith; and at the commencement of his ministry he had a conference with the Apostles, the men who had been with Jesus, and laid his Gospel before them, and in after days he publicly claimed that they had approved it (Gal. i. 18–ii. 9). Why then is the Resurrection omitted from the Apostolic Tradition? In regard to the omission of the Lord's Birth and the Silent Years it is enough to say that the Apostles included in the Tradition only what they had themselves seen and heard; but they had been witnesses of the Resurrection.

There are two considerations which go some way toward a solution. One is that, when the Tradition took shape, the wonder of the Resurrection was at its height. The purpose of the Tradition was to prevent the facts of the Lord's ministry from being forgotten or distorted; but the Resurrection was an amazing and overwhelming fact which had happened but yesterday and was fresh in every mind. The very fact that it was deemed needless to record it is an evidence of its notoriety and certainty. And it was deemed all the more needless forasmuch as the Lord's Return was believed to be imminent. It was enough, the Apostles thought, to proclaim the fact that He had risen and keep His words and works fresh and clear in remembrance. Again, it is remarkable, though in no wise inexplicable, that the Apostles always speak with a certain reticence about the Resurrection. They proclaim the fact but they refrain from entering into particulars. As time went on and still the Lord did not return, John, the last living eye-witness, yielded to the importunities of the believers and wrote the wondrous story.[1]

> "Imminent was the outcry 'Save our Christ!'
> Whereon I stated much of the Lord's life
> Forgotten or misdelivered, and let it work."

Yet even John hesitated when he came to speak of the

[1] Eus. *H. E.* iii. 24.

Resurrection. The twenty-first chapter of his Gospel is an after-thought, a subsequent addition. He stopped when he had told what happened in Jerusalem during the first week. Here he ended his Gospel, and it was probably not only the importunities of the Ephesian elders but a desire to silence the wild story which had got abroad regarding himself (xxi. 23), that moved him to take up his pen again and reveal what had happened at the Sea of Galilee. In truth it is no marvel that the Apostles should have observed such reticence. The story was too sacred to be divulged. The Risen Lord had manifested Himself unto them and not unto the world, and they remembered His word, "Keep the mysteries for Me and for the sons of My house." [1]

When the Synoptists took in hand the task of writing their Gospels, they laboured under this disadvantage, that the Apostles had dispersed in prosecution of their missionary labours and were inaccessible for inquiry and consultation. In the Oral Tradition, so far as it went, they had an amplitude of trustworthy material; but it stopped short with the Crucifixion, and for the episode of the Resurrection they had to be content with such information as they could glean among the believers. Vague talk was all that they had to go upon, and from the fact that their narratives comprise hardly anything beyond the visit of the women to the Sepulchre, it is a fair inference that they learned only what the women had divulged. And this meagre information would be distorted at once by the excitement of the moment (cf. Matt. xxviii. 8; Mark xvi. 8) and by the subsequent process of transmission from mouth to mouth.

Luke pushed his inquiries further than his predecessors (i. 1–4), and his diligent research has rescued from oblivion that story of what befell Cleopas and his nameless companion

[1] Clem. Rom. *Hom.* xix. § 20: μεμνήμεθα τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν καὶ διδασκάλου ὡς ἐντελλόμενος εἶπεν ἡμῖν· τὰ μυστήρια ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς υἱοῖς τοῦ οἴκου μου φυλάξατε. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* v. 10. § 63.

on the road to Emmaus. The story carries its own credentials. It shines amid its surroundings like a gem in a heap of dust. It is likely that Luke, in the prosecution of his inquiries, got it from the lips of Cleopas, and the Greek name of the latter—Cleopas being short for Cleopatros [1] and quite unconnected with Clopas (John xix. 25) — suggests that he belonged to the circle of Joanna, the wife of Chuza, Herod's steward. Throughout his narrative there is evidence of a close intimacy between Luke and this circle of believers.

There are thus three distinct strata of evangelic testimony to the Resurrection: the vague talk reported by the Synoptists (Matt. xxviii. 1–10, 16–20; Mark xvi. 1–8; Luke xxiii. 56–xxiv. 11 [12], 36–53); that exquisite story which Luke's research has rescued from oblivion (xxiv. 13–35); and the clear and full narrative of John (xx.–xxi.) Each has its peculiar value. The Synoptic traditions are from their very nature worthless as history, yet they constitute a testimony of no little weight to the fact of the Resurrection. They prove that it was universally recognized and was much on the lips of the rank and file of the believers. And, moreover, loose and inaccurate as they may be, they are never very far from the truth. They are in every case vague reports, distorted versions of actual occurrences. The Lucan passage and the Johannine narrative stand out clear and strong, and the more closely they are scrutinized, the more convincingly do they assert their title to historicity. There is at least one point where they are linked together and undesignedly attest each other. "And," says one of the wayfarers to Emmaus (Luke xxiv. 24), "certain of our company went away to the sepulchre, and found it even as the women said." While this is a plain contradiction not only of the accounts of Matthew (xxviii. 8–9) and Mark (xvi. 8) but of Luke's own previous statement (xxiv. 11), it entirely agrees with John's narrative (xx. 3–10).

[1] Cf. Antipas = Antipatros.

As soon as the true character of the Synoptic narratives is recognized, the history of the Resurrection is disencumbered of several bewildering accretions and assumes a distinct and harmonious shape. It is a subordinate yet by no means unimportant gain that the real errand of the women—if there were indeed others besides Mary—to the Sepulchre stands revealed. It is impossible that they should have gone, according to the confused traditions of Mark and Luke, to embalm the Lord's body. There was no need for them to perform that rite of reverence. It had already, according to John (xix. 39–40), been performed with lavish hands by Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathæa, who had been "disciples but secret ones for fear of the Jews" and thought to make amends for their cowardice by this tardy homage; and all the Synoptists agree that the women had witnessed the burial. The body had already been embalmed, and they knew it. Moreover, it had lain over thirty hours in the Sepulchre ere they went thither, and in that sultry climate the process of decomposition must already have set in. The Synoptists know nothing of the embalming by Nicodemus and Joseph, and the anointing by the women is the loose version thereof which had reached the ears of Mark and Luke. The fact is that it was not at all to embalm the body that the women went to the Sepulchre, but, as John implies and Matthew expressly alleges, to see the Sepulchre. In that sultry climate, where immediate interment was necessary, it sometimes happened that a trance was mistaken for death, and the buried man revived in his sepulchre. And thus the idea had arisen that for three days after death the soul hovered round the tomb loath to forsake its tenement of clay, and during the three days the mourners cherished the hope that it might resume its tenancy, and visited the sepulchre from time to time to see if their dead had awoke. But when three days had elapsed and they saw the face disfigured by corruption, they abandoned their

hope.[1] The women went to the Sepulchre, not to embalm the Lord's body, but, according to Jewish custom, to see if haply He had come to life again.

There is, however, a still greater gain which results from a perception of the real nature of the Synoptic traditions. These traditions represent Jesus as performing with His resurrection-body, "the body of His glory," the same carnal functions which He had performed while He wore "the body of His humiliation." It appears indeed that to those to whom He manifested Himself, the Lord's body was not only visible but tangible (cf. John xx. 27),[2] and it is abstractly conceivable that when, according to Matthew, the women met Him as they hastened from the Sepulchre, they should have laid hold on His feet. The objection is that in what is doubtless the true version of this incident (John xx. 11–18), when Mary Magdalene would have laid hold on Him, Jesus forbade her. "Do not cling to Me," He said, not, obviously, because He was impalpable, but because He would fain dissipate Mary's delusion that He would henceforth abide with His disciples. He had not returned to stay. She must not imagine that the old relationship would be resumed. "Do not cling to Me; for I have not yet ascended unto the Father."

It is, however, wholly different when Luke represents Jesus as eating in the presence of the disciples (xxiv. 41–43). Though this is mysterious ground, it may without presumption be held as certain that the spiritual body no longer

[1] See Lightfoot and Wetstein on John xi. 39. *Beresh. Rabb.* 114. 3 "Tribus diebus anima vagatur circa sepulchrum, exspectans ut redeat in corpus. Cum vero videt quod immutatur aspectus faciei recedit et relinquit corpus." *Mass. Sem.* 8: "Historia: Inviserunt quendam, atque ille revixit, vixitque viginti quinque annos et postea est mortuus. Alterumque qui revixit et genuit quinque filios, et postea obiit."

[2] Contrast a curious tradition in Clem. Alex. *Adumbr. in Ep. Joan.* i. (Dindorf's ed. iii. p. 485): "Fertur ergo in traditionibus, quoniam Joannes ipsum corpus quod erat extrinsecus tangens, manum suam in profunda misisse et ei duritiam carnis nullo modo reluctatam esse, sed locum manui præbuisse discipuli."

performs the gross functions of the flesh. "In Heaven," according to our Lord's express declaration, "they neither marry nor are given in marriage"; and it is inconceivable that He should have carried to Heaven a body which needed food, and no less inconceivable that such a body should have been capable of passing through closed doors (John xx. 19, 26; cf. Luke xxiv. 36).

In this connexion two theories have been advanced with a harmonistic tendency. One is the blunt and obvious notion that when Jesus took the broiled fish and ate it in presence of the disciples, He acted *κατ' οἰκονομίαν*. He ate supernaturally, and the miracle was designed to establish the disciples' faith and assure them of the reality of His presence.[1] The other theory, modern and more subtle, is that betwixt the Resurrection and the Ascension the Lord's body underwent a process of sublimation. It was "in a state of transition and change, upon the boundary of both worlds, and possessed the impress or character both of this world and of the next."[2] It were indeed conceivable that there should have been such a process, gradually purifying His body of fleshly qualities and advancing it to a glorified condition, but it is difficult to conceive the possibility of His body being at the self-same stage so sublimated that it could pass through closed doors and so gross that it required food (John xx. 19–25; Luke xxiv. 36–43).

Nor is it necessary to maintain a position so embarrassing and, if the epithet may be employed without impropriety, so grotesque. Only in one place (Luke xxiv. 41–43) is it alleged that the Risen Lord ate, and the passage is simply

[1] Euth. Zig.: *οὐχ ὡς ἔτι δεόμενος τροφῆς ἀλλὰ πρὸς πλείονα πίστιν καὶ βεβαιοτέραν ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ μὴ δοκεῖν φάσμα. ὥσπερ δὲ ὑπερφυῶς ἔφαγεν, οὕτω καὶ ὑπερφυῶς ἀνάλωσεν ἅπερ ἔφαγε.* Cf. Joan. Damasc. *De Fid. Orth.* iv. 1.

[2] Martensen, *Chr. Dogm.* § 172. This theory was anticipated by Origen. *C. Cels.* ii. 62: *καὶ ἦν γε μετὰ τὴν ἀνάστασιν αὐτοῦ ὡσπερεὶ ἐν μεθορίῳ τινὶ τῆς παχύτητος τῆς πρὸ τοῦ πάθους σώματος καὶ τοῦ γυμνὴν τοιούτου σώματος φαίνεσθαι ψυχήν.*

an unhistorical tradition. It occurs in Luke's narrative of that appearance to the disciples in their lodging at Jerusalem which John also records. It is absent from John's narrative, and is obviously a faint echo of the incident by the Sea of Galilee (cf. John xxi. 5, 9, 13). It is remarkable that alike in the Lucan narrative of the supper at Emmaus and in the Johannine narrative of the breakfast on the shore of the Lake it is plainly implied that, while He gave food to His disciples, Jesus Himself took none (Luke xxiv. 39; John xxi. 12, 13).

In his narrative of the appearance to the disciples at Jerusalem on the evening of the Resurrection-day Luke has introduced a singular sentence which is absent from the parallel narrative of John. "Handle Me," Jesus is represented as saying, "and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye behold Me having" (Luke xxiv. 39). Ignatius quotes the saying in a similar though less gross form: "I know and believe that even after the Resurrection He was in flesh. And when He came to Peter and his companions, He said to them, '*Grasp, handle Me and see; for I am not a bodiless dæmon.*' And straightway they touched Him and believed, being mingled with His flesh and spirit. . . . And after the Resurrection He ate and drank with them as fleshly, though spiritually united to the Father."[1] Jerome says[2] that Ignatius quoted the saying from the apocryphal *Gospel of the Hebrews*, and this fact indicates its true character. It is simply one of the unhistorical traditions which floated about the primitive Church. It reached Luke, ever watchful for fresh material, and he incorporated it in his Gospel, inserting it in what he judged a suitable place. It may be that Paul had heard this tradition which represents the Risen Lord as saying, "A spirit

[1] *Ep. ad Smyrn.* iii. λάβετε, ψηλαφήσατέ με καὶ ἴδετε, ὅτι οὐκ εἰμὶ δαιμόνιον ἀσώματον.

[2] *Script. Eccles.* under *Ignatius.*

hath not flesh and bones as ye behold Me having," and had it in his mind when he wrote (1 Cor. xv. 50): "This I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the Kingdom of God, neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." Luke's is indeed the Pauline Gospel, yet his acceptance of a tradition so alien from Paul's fundamental conception of the Person of Christ evinces his independence. He was no mere echo of his master and friend.

DAVID SMITH.

THE VALUE-JUDGEMENTS OF RELIGION.

II.

CRITICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE (*continued*).

II. *The Relation of Religious Knowledge to Science and Philosophy.*

(1) HAVING discussed the theory of value-judgements, as presented by Ritschl, Herrmann, and Kaftan, as developed more fully by Otto Ritschl, Reischle, and Scheibe, as criticized by Denney, Orr, and Wenley, and having indicated wherein the theory seems still defective, I may now venture to deal briefly with the problem to the solution of which this theory is a contribution. What is the relation of religious knowledge to science and philosophy? That this question is being asked at all is a proof that there is a rift in our intellectual lute which makes the music of a harmonious view of God, man, and the world mute. That there is a discord felt in human thought on the highest themes, and that an escape from it is desired by our finest minds is proved by such lines as Tennyson's:

> "Let knowledge grow from more to more,
> But more of reverence in us dwell;
> That mind and soul, according well,
> May make one music as before."

Let us then consider how this discord has arisen, and how the harmony can once more be gained. God, self and the world, these are the last terms of man's knowledge, and the attempt may be made to look at the sum of being from each as a standpoint. If the world is the starting-point, then we have science; if self, philosophy; if God, theology, which is sifted and ordered religious knowledge. Science deals with objects in space and events in time, and seeks to find out their natures and causes. In philosophy man asks, what relation has the world to himself, for what reason it is as it is, what purpose it serves. In theology man presses above and beyond world and self to find the ground for their relation to one another in a larger and higher unity, which can embrace and explain both, God. But man is not left merely to infer this unity-in-difference from self and world, but by the very constitution of his manhood has an intuition of that unity, the witness of God to Himself, the light of all man's seeing; and the history of religion is the development of this intuition of God, which, as God is active and man responsive in the development, is also the progress of revelation, until an idea of God is reached which is recognized gradually as adequate for the explanation of the Universe. Theology is the statement of all that is given in this idea of God, not as it might be speculatively inferred from the relation of the world and self, but as it has been practically attained in the course of man's religious experience. Accordingly science, philosophy, and theology are different modes in which human intelligence is exercised. Science deals with the world as an object of knowledge, and by observation, experiment, inference and hypothesis seeks to explain what it is, and how it has come to be what it is. It assumes that the object is known, but neglects the relation of the object known to the subject knowing. Here philosophy comes in, and

asks what knowledge is, and what guarantee we have of the truth of our knowledge, the correspondence of thought and reality. But man finds in himself not only this ideal of truth, but also other ideals; and he cannot but ask if these have any universal validity, if they cast any light on the ultimate cause, the essential nature, and the final purpose of the world. In pursuing this inquiry philosophy is led to recognize the idea of God, the absolute reality which explains the existence in this unity-in-difference of world and self. It is not with this speculative idea of God with which theology is primarily concerned. For theology religion is not, as it has been too often for philosophy, only one element in man's life, but it is the element of supreme importance. In religion God is no inferred idea, but an experienced reality, and to religion theology attaches itself. Each of these methods of using the intellect develops its own type of mind. Exclusive attention to one aspect of reality generally involves an incapacity to appreciate the significance, and estimate the value of other aspects. The man of science, with his solid results in the explanation of nature's laws, and the adaptation of its forces to minister to human comfort, is prone to despise the abstract speculations of the philosopher; and the philosopher, with his confidence in the capacity of reason, if not to solve all mysteries, at least to set bounds beyond which human knowledge must not dare to go, is incredulous of the claim of theology, that in religion man knows more of God than reason can discover. The theologian too may be so absorbed in the one idea of God, as to neglect the minute and accurate study of nature and history which would alone qualify him to pronounce judgement on the statements of science or the conclusions of philosophy. While there are some well proportioned minds, which assign to each mental function its proper place, yet it is to be feared that the modern tendency is to ever greater

specialization, and consequently to a wider separation of interests, and a deeper misunderstanding among those who are pursuing divergent paths of thought. It may be useful, therefore, to consider how the relation of these three modes of knowledge has been conceived at various times within that course of human development of which our complex European culture is the result.

(2) In Hebrew history religion was so dominant a factor that science and philosophy gained no independent development. In Greece religion exercised less influence over human thought. At first science and philosophy were not separated by difference of purpose, or variety of method. The attempt to explain the world as a whole, the task of philosophy, came before the attempt to explain its parts, the work of science. While attempts were made to find some rational explanation of the popular mythology, the problem of the relation of science and philosophy on the one hand, and of theology on the other, was never raised. In Philo's writings we have an interesting attempt to combine the religious history of the Hebrews and the philosophical speculations of the Greeks, and in Neo-Platonism a pathetic effort to save Paganism by giving to its myths a speculative interpretation. In the Christian Church the logical methods and the metaphysical categories of Greek philosophy were in course of time adopted in the formulation of its theology ; and while the alliance was undoubtedly useful in securing the acceptance of Christian ideas, yet these ideas had to undergo modification as a result of it. During the Middle Ages the mind of man was bound in the fetters of ecclesiastical dogma, and all thought which was not submissive to the faith of the Church was suspected and condemned. The Reformation was not simply a religious revival, it was also an intellectual emancipation, and science in the works of Bacon, and philosophy in the writings of Descartes, first entered on a

development independent of theology. It is only when the distinctness and the independence of the three modes of knowledge are recognized that the problem of their relation to one another becomes important. Theology by prescriptive right for a time continued to claim the primacy, although it could not keep science and philosophy in absolute dependence. Kant exposed the defects of the theology of his age, and tried to subordinate theology to philosophy in his *Religion within the Bounds of Pure Reason*, in which the Christian truths and facts are explained as somewhat imperfect attempts to express what is much better said in the critical philosophy. Here a mutilated theology was forced into the scanty garments of an ethical theory. Hegel declares the religious consciousness inferior to the speculative, and that the images of religion need to be translated into the ideas of philosophy. A school of theologians in Germany has sought to show Hegelianism as latent in Christianity, and Christ as the discoverer of an idea of which Hegel has made the full and proper use. Modern science, not in its workers in any field of inquiry, but in its thinkers who have tried to survey all its territory, Comte and Spencer, has denied theology any claim to be called knowledge, and has reduced philosophy to be a humble dependent on science. In contemporary thought, therefore, both science and philosophy have attempted to subordinate or supersede theology. To such treatment theology cannot submit, for it is the guardian of religion, and religion is a constant and essential element of human experience, a permanent and potent factor of human history. The more thorough the investigations of psychology, and the more extensive the inquiries of history, the clearer the proof that man is religious, and that for every man who has owned its claim and felt its power religion is the supreme element in his

experience. Theology, as giving intellectual expression to man's religious knowledge, cannot submit to any indignity from any other form of man's mental activity. Science as a reasonable account of man's sense-experience cannot claim any greater certainty than, or superior value to, theology as the interpretation of religion for thought. Philosophy cannot claim to have given an adequate solution of the problem which intelligible existence presents, when it overlooks or belittles that element in human nature, that factor in human history, which by its essential character proclaims itself the supremely significant, the relation of man to that absolute existence on which all finite existences depend. If religion be what it claims so be, theology can never consent to take the lowly place and play the humble part which science and philosophy have recently attempted to assign to it.

(3) The Ritschlian theology, with its theory of value-judgements, attempts to deal with this problem, how theology may assert its position and fulfil its function in spite of this opposition of science and philosophy and in independence of them. There can be no doubt that it recognizes fully the claim of religion to yield a conception of the nature and purpose, and a certainty of the existence of God which neither philosophy nor science can give or take away. Instead of admitting that this knowledge is in any way inferior to that of science or philosophy, it asserts the incompetence of both to give any final answer to the questions which are answered by religion. Both may attempt to solve the ultimate problems of existence, but then they abandon the safe and sure methods, which are the boast of science, but which will not carry philosophy far in its more ambitious effort; they are yielding to a religious impulse, are invading the province which is distinctively the property of religion, and then come into

onflict with it. While, as has already been shown, Ritschl seems to recognize the legitimacy of this invasion, and thus the probability of this conflict, yet the view of the most of his followers is, that, if religion on the one hand, and science with philosophy on the other, confine themselves to their own provinces, there need be no conflict whatever. Such a question cannot be conclusively argued in the abstract, but must be dealt with in the concrete. A few illustrations will do more to clear up the position than arguments for or against the views of Ritschl or his followers. *First*, let it be frankly conceded that as regards the facts, causes, laws of nature, science has the exclusive right to pronounce judgement. The theology which contradicts geology or anthropology on the physical origin and development of nature and man needlessly exposes itself to attack. When science insists on applying the same categories to life and mind in man as to inanimate and irrational nature, then philosophy may step in, and bid science confine itself within its own frontiers, unless it is prepared in annexing new territory to augment its categories, and revise its methods. Physical categories cannot be applied to explain mental, moral, social, religious phenomena; the methods of the laboratory do not disclose he secrets of the soul of man. Whether we can have a science of mind, society, history, religion, is too large a question to be discussed here, but it is relevant to our present purpose to insist that philosophy as a criticism of categories in the widest sense, as determining their order and estimating their worth, has an important function to fulfil in defining the limits within which certain categories are applicable. This is certain that the methods of observation, experiment, inference, and hypothesis, as practised by science, are inadequate to deal with the last questions thought can ask itself, the ultimate cause, the

essential nature, the final purpose of the Universe. These methods even are inadequate to explain and interpret the highest elements in experience, and the mightiest factors in history, man's freedom, reason, conscience, worship. Philosophy must take up the questions left by science, and must strive, by duly recognizing the significance of the ideals which man seeks to realize for the interpretation of the reality, which conditions all his endeavours, to conceive the world as a unity, and its cause, nature, and purpose in such a way as not only to meet man's questions, but even in its answers to do justice to the demands of conscience and the soul's needs. A philosophy may fail to assign its full importance to religion and the testimony which it bears as regards the highest reality, and its conclusions may, therefore, come into conflict with religious knowledge. The criticism which is relevant then is not that philosophy may not deal with these questions, but that this philosophy has not taken into account the full reality to be interpreted. One cannot but feel that even German idealism, which seems to me on the whole the type of philosophy which has the closest affinity with the Christian religion, fails because it does not give to the fact of Christ the decisive authority in the solution of the problems of thought, life and duty, which Christian faith accords to Him. Christian theology can meet philosophy here on its own ground, and show that in neglecting this fact, what Christ is for faith, it has omitted the most valuable part of the reality which it undertakes to interpret. Although every philosophy is incomplete which does not do full justice to the knowledge which religion possesses, yet we ought not, as the Ritschlian school seems to do, to deny that, apart from man's practical necessities, there is an intellectual demand for an intelligible unity of all knowledge, which philosophy seeks quite legitimately to

meet. The world-view of the man who recognizes the intellectual significance of the Christian faith, and seeks in his philosophy to do justice to it, will, however, fall short of the world-view of him who knows its practical value. Intellectual appreciation cannot accomplish what personal experience can. The man who has found his highest good in Christ sees a light on the world which is seen by none who have not had this experience. Here is the truth of the theory of value-judgements, which have a place in philosophy even. Whether philosophy shall be materialistic or idealist depends on the value assigned to matter or mind. Whether it shall be optimist or pessimist on the worth assigned to the weal or woe of life. Beauty, truth, goodness, all the ideals of life appeal in different degrees to different men, and a man's world-view will depend, if it is a personal conviction and not a conventional opinion, on the significance which he assigns to each. Liberty, immortality, God, ideas of the practical reason, mean much or little to a man according to the estimate he practically has formed of life and duty. Value-judgements are not, therefore, peculiar to religion, nor do they cut off its knowledge from all other. An important practical consequence, however, follows from the recognition of the importance for religious knowledge of this sense of value. The religious man, who has this sense, may confidently reject the criticism of the objects of faith which is offered to him by the irreligious man who lacks it, even as the musician may scorn the censure of the deaf, or the painter the blame of the blind. There is a realm of reality which religion alone can enter and explore, and on which science and philosophy can pronounce neither approval nor condemnation. The pious man, in so far as he is dealing with objects of faith, can confidently face all their pretensions, and be sure that they cannot take away his certainty.

(4) It must be recognized, however, that as the objects of faith in the Christian religion present themselves not only in the supersensuous region of the spiritual and ideal, but in historical reality, it is impossible to make religious knowledge quite indifferent to science and philosophy. To take a few questions, certain events are recorded in the Holy Scriptures, which faith regards as miraculous, as not explicable by the ordinary course of nature as familiar to our common experience, but as evidences of divine guidance and bounty. Religion is not concerned to prove that these events are due to a divine interference with nature—that is a theory of miracles which may or may not be true—but it is concerned to hold that these events did actually take place. Whether the miracles of Christ are an absolute breach in the continuity of nature or not is a secondary question; the primary is this, did He heal the sick, calm the storm, rise from the dead? If science denies even the possibility of these events, then theology cannot shirk the task of showing that science is incompetent to deal with the question, as the reality which it has observed and explained does not warrant it in pronouncing on the limits of possibility in a region which it has not explored. If philosophy denies the probability of such events, theology can ask philosophy whether it has so solved the problem of sin, suffering, and death, as to disprove the necessity for such a divine redemption from the evils of life. If criticism denies the trustworthiness of the records, theology must carefully examine the grounds of this denial. It can be proved that the records inspire confidence by their mental sanity, their moral sincerity, and their religious elevation, that the portrait of Jesus they present is so harmonious, beautiful, perfect, that it cannot be regarded as an invention, but only as a copy of reality, that distrust can be awakened only if an attitude of incredulity towards the supernatural is assumed. It

seems certain to me that much that is asserted in name of historical method is really due to this incredulity. Whether there is a supernatural, whether miracles are possible, these are questions, which neither science nor philosophy, apart from religion, can answer, but of which faith holds the key. If it could be proved that Christ, as He exists for faith, has no reality, even if it could be proved that Jesus was not what the Gospels represent Him to have been, then certainly the whole character of our faith would be changed. But history has not the means to yield such a proof, and over against the suspicions and surmises of criticism we can put the certainties of our experience of Christ's saving power. In the present intellectual situation, if the legitimate functions of science and philosophy are distinguished from the specious pretensions advanced in their name, faith need not be afraid, but may be of good cheer, for there is no knowledge truly man's which can take away its Lord.

(5) At the beginning of this discussion the standpoints of science, philosophy, and theology were distinguished as due to the difference of the objects of knowledge, world, self, and God. Whether we subordinate science and philosophy to theology, as I believe we ought to do, depends on the value we assign to our knowledge of each of these objects. Although God is the wider and higher and richer conception than world or self, yet if our knowledge of God is more defective than our knowledge of world and self, theology cannot advance its claim to primacy. Only if we believe that God has so revealed Himself to us, that in the light of our knowledge of Him we can understand the meaning and worth of all finite existence as otherwise we could not, can we confidently make our consciousness of God regulative of all our thought. The answer to all such questions as those discussed above depends ultimately on what we value most—

our perception of the world, our reflexion on ourselves, or our vision of God as revealed in Jesus Christ. To the man who so sees God the problem of the world and self has been solved, and his religious knowledge has a value greater far than all science and all philosophy.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

THE APOSTOLIC BENEDICTION.

"The Grace of the Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God and the communion of the Holy Ghost be with you all, Amen."—2 *Cor.* xiii. 14.

THE ordinary formula of courtesy, by which Greek letters, addressed to equals or inferiors, were concluded in the first century of our era, consisted of one word, ἔρρωσο or ἔρρωσθε, *Farewell.* A familiar instance is afforded from the Acts of the Apostles by the letter which the Apostolic delegates carried to Antioch, announcing the decrees of the Council of Jerusalem.[1] But this letter is only one among many hundreds which have come down to us formed on the same model and ending in the same way. The formula was almost universal, and we find it adopted (with some slight additions) in the second century by Christian writers so well known as Ignatius and Polycarp.[2] It is only when we realize that this was the usual way of signing a letter that we recognize the distinctiveness of Paul's signature. In none of his Epistles does he adopt the customary phrase ἔρρωσο: but he strikes out a formula for himself. It is always the same formula, and he tells us in one of his earliest letters that it was adopted of deliberate purpose. *The salutation of me Paul with mine own hand, which is the token in every Epistle: so I write. The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all.*[3] *The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ,* or sometimes more succinctly *Grace be with you*; that is the parting salutation which he substitutes for the familiar ἔρρωσο, *Farewell.* Ἔρρωσο had

[1] Acts xv. 29.

[2] E.g. Ignat. *ad Eph.* xxi., ἔρρωσθε ἐν Θεῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἐν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ: *ad Magn.* xv., ἔρρωσθε ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ θεοῦ: *ad Rom.* x., ἔρρωσθε εἰς τέλος ἐν ὑπομονῇ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ: *ad Smyrn.* xiii., ἔρρωσθε ἐν χάριτι θεοῦ. The conclusion of the Epistle of Polycarp to the Philippians is not extant in Greek, but there can be no doubt that the Latin version *incolumes estote in domino Jesu Christo* represents ἔρρωσθε ἐν τῷ Κυρίῳ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ.

[3] 2 Thess. iii. 17, 18.

indeed become as formal and as unsuggestive of meaning as our "Good-bye," or as the expressions of friendship and regard with which among ourselves letters even to a chance acquaintance are concluded. And if any one thinks that the signature adopted by St. Paul in its place was an obvious signature for an apostle to use, he has only to turn to the Epistles of St. Peter and St. John to see how far this is from the facts. *Peace* not *grace* was the blessing which they invoked as they closed their letters of counsel and reproof.[1]

The Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the Love of God and the Communion of the Holy Ghost be with you all. Once only does St. Paul write his signature and his parting message in this fuller and more comprehensive form. And the last words of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians have become so familiar to us that perhaps we do not always realize how much the words mean, or how instructive they are in regard to the faith of the Christian Church in the very earliest period of which we have a contemporary record.

I. In the first place, the use of this threefold formula of benediction, and more particularly the absence of any accompanying explanation, suggest to us that the teaching of the early Church must have been more explicit as to the nature of God, and as to the revelation of the Personality of God which was made in Christ, than is always recognized. It is true, indeed, that the profound questions as to the Divine Personality which pressed for a solution so soon as the Christian faith came into contact and collision with Greek philosophy, had not been definitely stated at so early a period of the Church's life as the period of St. Paul's labours. And it is no doubt also true that simple Christian believers in the earliest age did not understand all the philosophical implications of the revelation of God

[1] 1 Peter v. 14, εἰρήνη ὑμῖν πᾶσιν τοῖς ἐν Χριστῷ. 3 John 15, εἰρήνη σοι.

in Christ any more than simple Christian believers in any succeeding age have done. No reasonable person can expect to find the phraseology of the Nicene Creed or of the Athanasian Creed in the New Testament; these great confessions are stated in terms which have reference to the controversies of the times when they were produced, and which would be misleading, if not meaningless, unless those controversies were kept in view. But none the less the statements of the Creeds as to the Triune Personality of the Supreme, as to the several "Persons"—for so we must continue to call them in default of a better term—as to the relations between the several "Persons" of the Godhead are ultimately based on the language of Gospels and Epistles alike, which presupposes the belief of the first Christians that the Supreme Being whom they worshipped was not a solitary Monad, but was in some sense Triune.

If we recall the circumstances under which St. Paul wrote *ἡ χάρις τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ ἡ κοινωνία τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν*, we shall see how significant the words are. He was addressing correspondents who were somewhat critical and who had shown that they were very ready to find fault with him. The party at Corinth which had called in question his authority was not likely to accept without scrutiny any novel doctrine from St. Paul. And on a question so fundamental as the Being of God—a question too which was not by any means strange to the speculative intellect of Greece—it was inevitable that any formula which brought other names into connexion and parallelism with the Name of the Supreme Being would be challenged, were there any doubt as to the authority on which the formula rested. *The Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the Love of God and the fellowship of the Holy Ghost be with you all.* This is quite

unlike anything in the Old Testament, where the Fount of all grace and love and blessing is consistently spoken of as One. It is, indeed, more emphatic in its Trinitarian teaching than any other passage in St. Paul's Epistles. And the incidental way in which this teaching is introduced witnesses, more conclusively than any elaborate argument could, to the belief of St. Paul and of his correspondents that the nature of Deity was not simple but admitted of inner distinctions. That such a belief, prevalent as it was within thirty years after the death of Christ, must have been able to appeal for support to the teaching of Christ Himself is a natural inference. No other could speak with assurance on the subject of His relation to the Father from whom He had come, and to the Spirit whom He was to send. And that the doctrine of the Trinity was little likely to grow up of itself on Hebrew soil, the long history of the later controversies between Jews and Christians sufficiently proves.

The justification, then, for this conjunction of the Names of the Father, Son and Spirit in one formula of benediction must have been quite unmistakable, before any pious Christian brought up, as St. Paul had been, in the bosom of Judaism, could have ventured upon it. And the simplest hypothesis is to find the justification in the words which Christian tradition ascribed to the Christ when He was giving His last commission to His Church : *Go ye therefore, and make disciples of all the nations, baptizing them into the Name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost.*[1] It may be admitted that the evidence that these very words were spoken by Christ is not quite free from ambiguity, for we are in the dark as to the date when St. Matthew's Gospel assumed its present form ; and, further, a baptismal formula, triple in form, is not once again mentioned in the New

[1] St. Matt. xxviii. 19.

Testament.[1] Yet when the words are read in conjunction with the history of the Church's ritual in the second century, and particularly when they are read in conjunction with passages in St. Paul's letters like the passage before us, we feel that if not these very words, then words of equivalent significance must have been present to the mind of the early Church. St. Paul could not have ventured to use such a formula were he not convinced of its harmony with the teaching of his Master; and while baptism in the Name of the Lord Jesus alone may have been deemed adequate at an early stage of the Church's life, it could hardly have been so quickly superseded by the formula of the threefold Name were it not felt that the latter was justified by the teaching of Christ Himself.

We have, in brief, reached this point. The language of the farewell salutation in the Second Epistle to the Corinthians presupposes earlier teaching in regard to the Triune nature of God, and its similarity to the Baptismal formula suggests the source from which it was probably derived.

For all that, we cannot say that the doctrine of the Trinity is *formulated* in the New Testament. It was not an age of formal creeds; it was an age of faith—of faith so strong that, for the moment, its intellectual aspects seemed of minor consequence. And the order in which St. Paul places the clauses of his benediction is characteristic of the practical point of view from which he expounds Christian doctrine. He begins, not as a metaphysician would, with the Name of God the Father, but with the Name of Christ. For, after all, he is only expanding his customary salutation. His signature must begin with the message of grace, whatever else he may add to it. He is

[1] I have tried to show in the EXPOSITOR for Jan. 1902 that the words of St. Matt. xviii. 19 do not necessarily prescribe a *formula* to be recited in the baptismal ritual.

not thinking of speculative theology, but of his correspondents at Corinth, to whom he is writing a message with his own hand. And so this letter, full of varying moods, of rebuke and rejoicing, of sorrow and perplexity and affection, is not ended quite like his other letters. He would have his friends realize how full of significance is the signature which he has chosen. When they read: *Grace be with you*, he would have them think of all that is implied in the grace of Christ. This is the core of the message with which he has been entrusted. For it is through the grace given by Christ, and through the right use of it, that man learns something of the Love which God has for man, as it is through the grace of Christ that the Love of God manifests itself, and is reflected in the love which man has for his fellows. No doubt, when we try to reduce our poor thoughts about God to system and coherence, the first place, in the order of logic, is occupied by the conception of the Divine Love which encompasses all that It has called into being, which, as Eternal Love, has always had fit objects of affection within itself, for *God is love*. That is a fruitful line of thought; it has been followed some distance by all the great Christian theologians, beginning with St. John. But it is not the direction in which St. Paul's thoughts are travelling in the passage before us; nor does it suggest what is here in his mind.

For, it is not knowledge so much as practice which concerns men who have a work to do in the world. And if we strive sincerely to fulfil our work, we learn very soon that the hindrances in our path are not altogether of the world's making. For our worst failures, our own indolence or weakness or sin is responsible. This we recognize in proportion as we are honest with ourselves. And it is because the message of Christ is a message of help and grace, bringing the power of recovery as it breathes the inspiration of

hope, that is ever fresh and new. The power of Christ's grace, startling even to the man himself, reveals to him—though it may be in strange fashions and by slow degrees—that there is a Providence which guards his life and is not careless of his failures. The grace of Christ, which St. Paul puts first in the order of benediction, is the revelation of the love of God. The recognition of the grace of Christ, as strong to help and defend in temptations of flesh and spirit, is the revelation of the love of God, the love which God has for man. Each soul learns, or may learn, for itself that, as St. John has it, it was because *God loved the world that He sent His Son.*

Each soul learns, or may learn, the revelation of love for itself; yet will the lesson be but half learnt if it stop short here. For the same Love of God manifests Itself in the world and in the Church even now—not indeed in invisible Incarnation of the Divine, such as those saw who companied with Christ in the flesh—but in and through the Spirit, whose fruit is love and peace.

The fellowship of the Holy Ghost be with you all. What did St. Paul mean by that? That the men to whom he wrote should be inspired by the Divine Spirit to think and do all rightful things? No doubt that was a part of his meaning; it is part of the meaning the prayer usually has for us. But it is not the primary and direct application of his words. The balance of the sentence, the parallelism of its clauses, assure us of that. For, as *the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ* means the grace which Christ gives to man, and as *the Love of God* means the love which God bestows on man,[1] so *the Communion of*

[1] This is a point of exegesis which is often overlooked. The "love of God" with St. Paul always means the love which God has for man, e.g. Rom. v. 5, viii. 39, 2 Thess. iii. 5; cp. also Rom. xv. 30, Eph. ii. 4, Col. i. 13. So the "love of Christ" in his phraseology *always* means the love which Christ has for man, e.g. Rom. viii. 35, 2 Cor. v. 14, Eph. iii. 19, and not conversely the love which man has for Christ. That is, the genitive of

the Holy Ghost must mean the communion which is the Spirit's gift. The κοινωνία the fellowship, the sense of membership, the brotherly kindness, the joy and strength of being members one of another: this is all the gift of the Holy Ghost. It is this blessing which St. Paul prays may come upon the Corinthian Church, rent and distracted by faction, to whom his last word before he invokes the blessing is *Be of the same mind; live in peace.*[1] There is no thought nearer to St. Paul's heart than the thought of human brotherhood in Christ, as there are few words more characteristic of his style than the word κοινωνία and its cognates—*members one of another.*[2] *All the members being many are one Body.*[3] *The Bread which we break is a* κοινωνία, *a communion of the Body of Christ.*[4] And in 2 Cor. xiii. 14 he places the blessing of κοινωνία, the common life in Christ, which is the Spirit's gift, as on a par with the blessings of Christ's grace and God's love. The fellowship of the Holy Ghost, the mutual trust and reverence and affection, which are the fruits of the Spirit; herein is to be the issue of Christ's grace and the manifestation of God's love in these later ages of the world and of the Church.

Men try to fathom the depths of the Divine nature, and they find themselves baffled again and again. It must be so, for God perfectly understood would cease to be the Supreme Object of faith and hope, would cease to be God. Of the doctrine of the Blessed Trinity in its deeper relations, the warning of the wise man is still wise: *God is in heaven and thou upon earth: therefore let thy words be few.*[5]

the person after ἀγάπη in St. Paul's Epistles is always subjective; he often uses the verb ἀγαπάω to express man's love towards God, but never the substantive ἀγάπη. St. John's usage, on the other hand, varies, the genitive after ἀγάπη sometimes being subjective and sometimes objective (cp. St. John v. 42 and 1 John ii. 5, 15, iii. 17, iv. 9, v. 3) but St. Paul's is not doubtful.

[1] 2 Cor. xiii. 11. [2] Rom. xii. 5. [3] 1 Cor. xii. 12.
[4] 1 Cor. x. 16. [5] Eccles. v. 2.

But of its practical results, St. Paul will teach us, if we permit him, as he taught the Greeks. He will teach us that God is love, despite all appearances to the contrary, despite all sorrow and failure through all the changes and chances of life.

He will teach us that the grace of Christ is a power which is even now within our reach, in prayer and in sacrament, to deepen, chasten, purify our lives, so that they may be fashioned after the One Perfect Example.

He will teach us that the common life of men, with its common ambitions and disappointments, its common joys and common fears, in the family, in the world, in the Church, is the very Body of Christ—that this common life is so sacred and precious a thing, just because it is, in its perfection, the gift of God's Spirit—it is the fellowship of the Holy Ghost.

J. H. Bernard.

THE EPISTLE TO HEBREWS AS THE WORK OF BARNABAS.

In a paper already published in the Expositor (June, 1902), reasons were given for believing: first, that Barnabas was a far greater figure in the eye of the Apostolic Church, especially in Palestine, than is usually realized to-day; and next, that his standing was due not only to goodness of heart, but also and equally to deep religious insight. If these positions be conceded, it is no longer allowable to start with a *præjudicium* against Barnabas as unequal to the authorship of a writing of such authority and ability as "The Epistle to Hebrews." On the other hand we are able to do justice to his positive fitness for the task, as at once a Hellenist and a Levite.

Consider Barnabas for a moment as a Hellenist. He was a Cypriot; and we must picture the Jews of Cyprus as under the influence both of Jerusalem and Alexandria. Doubtless they would partake of the "Alexandrine" mode of thought, which was really far from confined to Alexandria or to the one type best known to us through Philo. But the ultra-idealism to which many Jews tended in the peculiarly philosophic atmosphere of Alexandria might well be qualified by the local conditions of an island closely connected with the Syrian mainland. And in the case of Barnabas we know that his family, like himself, had intimate ties with Jerusalem, as indeed was natural, owing to its Levitic origin. Such a dual training finds its counterpart in the mingled idealism and realism of the thought in *Hebrews*.

Then, again, Barnabas was a Levite. This accords with the form taken by the great argument, in which the superiority of the New Covenant or religious relation between God and man, and indeed its final or absolute character, is

made to appear over against the transient and shadowy forms of the earlier or Mosaic covenant. How significant of Levitic training and sympathies is the following, where the Law is treated as relative to Priesthood, and not *vice versâ*. "Now if there was perfection (i.e. absolute religion) through the Levitical priesthood—for under it[1] hath the people received the law—what further need that another priest should arise after the order of Melchizedek, and not be reckoned after the order of Aaron? For the priesthood being changed, there is made of necessity a change also of (the) law" (vii. 11 f., cf. 20–22). Here, then, we have a man who apprehends religion on the side of priestly mediation, with a view to securing for the sinful perfect access to the holy God and abiding communion. And it is characteristic of him that the very nerve of his appeal, both as theoretical and practical (viii. 1–2, x. 19–25), is the absolute priesthood of Jesus, whose suffering even unto death thus became the deepest ground of salvation and hope. Through His sufferings He became qualified (ii. 10; v. 8–10) to offer the sacrifice of an absolutely filial and obedient will (x. 5 ff., cf. v. 8), for the initial sanctification or consecration of His brethren (x. 10, 14); as also to aid them in their efforts to maintain that consecration as sons, unto perfect sonship (xii. 1–10, 14), by His human sympathy (ii. 11–18, iv. 14–16, v. 2) and heavenly intercession (iv. 14–16, viii. 1 f., x. 19–22, xii. 24).

But as our author's argument is not framed for his own edification but for that of his readers, we pass at this point to consider the conditions which evoked this passionate appeal, with its "logic on fire." For it is really incorrect to think of it as an epistle at all. It calls itself a hortatory utterance (λόγος τῆς παρακλήσεως, xiii. 22): it is preaching raised

[1] The original, ἐπ' αὐτῆς, suggests that the Priesthood is fundamental to the Law as a system; cf. Luke iv. 29, ἕως ὀφρύος τοῦ ὄρους ἐφ' οὗ ἡ πόλις ᾠκοδόμητο.

to the highest power. Still better, it is prophecy, remonstrating and entreating, as an Old Testament prophet warns and entreats, or as James in his prophetic address to the true Israel in dispersion. Indeed there are many valuable hints towards an understanding of each of these two great New Testament "preachments" (as Carlyle would have said), to be won from a comparative study of "Hebrews" and James. They represent conditions in kindred communities of Hebrew Christians, perhaps at almost the same period of development. The danger of apostasy, implied by *Hebrews*, may not yet have emerged into any prominence when James wrote his encyclical appeal, probably on the basis of reports brought by pilgrims to the Jewish feasts, or by brethren otherwise visiting the parent Church. But the predisposing causes were already present, in the special trials against which James would brace the brethren's powers of endurance, and in the state of being in "two minds" which jeopardized the steadfastness of many, sick at heart with the long-deferred hope of Messiah's glorious return in victory. What, then, were the conditions with which the readers of *Hebrews* had to grapple? Here one cannot do better than quote Dr. Hort's terse summary.[1]

"The religious condition of these Jewish Christians shows plainly the dangers to faith which inevitably beset that form of Jewish Christianity which we have seen to have been legitimate in Palestine, the adoption of the Gospel without any disuse of the Law. It was only for a time that such a combination could be legitimate, and now the hour was at hand when it could be legitimate no longer. Meanwhile, before the announcement of the hour by the trumpet of Divine judgments, the mere force of long-continued custom had rendered possible a state of things which threatened to destroy all reality in men's allegiance to the Gospel. The freshness of power with which it had first

[1] *Judaistic Christianity*, 157 f.

laid hold on them had died away, while the deep-seated instincts of ancestral custom preserved all their tenacious influence, and were aided by the corresponding spiritual degeneracy which made a religion of sight easier, and apparently more substantial, than a religion of faith. Then it would seem that the pressure of the unbelieving Jews, in the midst of whom the Jewish Christians were living, was now becoming heavier and more intolerable, in great measure, doubtless, owing to the unrest caused by the signs of approaching Roman invasion. Thus, without abjuring the name of Jesus, His professed followers in Palestine were to a large extent coming to treat their relation to Him as trivial and secondary compared with their relation to the customs of their forefathers and their living countrymen, and to give up that gathering together in Christian congregations which gave outward expression and inward reality to membership in the true people of God and of His Christ. We hear nothing about circumcision, and nothing about Gentile Christians. The Christianity here rising may be justly called a Judaistic Christianity; but it was rather the product of a degeneracy in heart and mind than the expression of a conscious doctrine or theory."

These Jewish Christians "were in danger of apostatizing from the faith, because of persecution endured on account of it, and also because of doubts concerning its truth." [1] Such doubts coincided with a cooling of zeal due to disappointment with the practical outcome of the gospel. In their eyes it belied its apparent promises. When they had welcomed it and had felt the uplifting of Spirit which its reception brought, they had regarded its salvation as consisting partly in the assurance of forgiveness of past sins, but partly, and still more, in the sure hope it vouchsafed of speedy participation in the Messianic kingdom which the

[1] A. B. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Hebrews; the first Apology for Christianity* p. 7.

return of Jesus the Messiah might usher in at any moment, and certainly before the passing of the generation that had witnessed His humiliation and shameful death. As this longed-for consummation tarried year after year, they found it ever harder to live on hope of this kind, devoid as it was of a due sense of Messiah's present significance for their daily life, with its temptations and trials. The only explanation they had to place between themselves and growing sickness of heart was the patriotic one, that delay meant the coming over of their fellow-Jews as a nation to belief in Jesus Messiah. But as years wore on, little occurred to feed this hope, and much to kill it. They felt, like Israel of old, led out into a trying "wilderness" experience, bereft of the old consolations, while the Land of Promise, the Rest of God, seemed intolerably far off—if, indeed, it was ever to break upon their vision at all. There lay the haunting doubt that began to overshadow their souls. What if all their early rapture and devotion, in the face of bitter opposition, had been for naught, based on a delusion? Were not even Messiah's personal followers dying, one by one? Was distinctness from the main stream of the national life really justified in the light of experience? What did their new faith bring them, *here and now*, to compensate for all the sacrifices its open profession entailed? They were weary of the long strain: they were half inclined to give up the struggle within and without, and to fall back upon the spiritual resources of the national religion as God-given and tried by age-long use. They were beginning to "drift away," to "draw back."

To Barnabas such falling away from a higher and more real spiritual experience, to a lower (vi. 5), was nothing less than apostasy from God as a living God (iii. 12), because from His word as living and active in the conscience (iv. 12). It meant relapse into the sphere of relatively formal and "dead" works (ix. 14), after breathing the vital

air of the Spirit (vi. 4, x. 29). But how was this to be prevented? Not by any flogging of fagged and harassed souls to fresh efforts; not by mere appeals to stand firm or try harder; but rather by giving them a new conception altogether of the conflict in which they were engaged and of the resources within their reach. They needed new motive power; and this might be theirs, if only they could be taught to think more adequately of the nature of the salvation which they already shared (v. 12–vi. 5), and above all of the person and work of Him whom they had accepted as God's Messiah. It was here that their faith had proved itself so defective: they had not found in Jesus the full reality of all, and more than all, that they had been wont to seek under the less effective forms of the pre-Messianic economy. They had not learnt even to look to Him for the spiritual equivalents of Mosaic law and ritual, in virtue of which their communion with God might be on a totally new and higher level in point of confidence and intimacy. In a word, they had not found in Jesus that absolute provision for sin—as hindering man's approach to, and joyous fellowship with, the Father of spirits—which was promised by prophecy to Messiah's people, in virtue of Messiah Himself and His relation to His own. True, they regarded Jesus as their Leader[1] into the Messianic relation to God, which included forgiveness of past sins and a certain participation in the gifts of the Spirit, joy-giving and wonder-working: but for anything beyond this, they did not for the present look to their Messiah. They were waiting for Him to lead them actually into the promised Rest by His visible return in power, which should also cancel all the perplexing features of His first advent, with its humiliation, suffering, and even death. So little had they grasped the genius of

[1] The incidental use of this title in Heb. ii. 10, xii. 2, shows it to have been a category familiar to the readers. This is confirmed by its use in the early Petrine speeches in Acts (iii. 15, v. 31), which are generally admitted to be representative of primitive Palestinian Christianity.

the gospel they had accepted, that they saw no saving virtue, no means of grace for daily living, in these most distinctive characteristics of their Lord's ministry. They did not see that a suffering Leader of Salvation befitted man (ii. 10 ff.), who has to be disciplined through suffering to real sonship (xii. 2–10); nor that His very suffering and death qualified Him as the absolute Priest of humanity (ii. 17 f., iv. 15–v. 10), in whom Sacrifice and Mediator coalesced into one. Hence the whole stress of the Epistle is on these themes, evidently unfamiliar to them and so needing proof at every point. Particularly is this the case with the notion of Jesus as High Priest and absolute Sacrifice, who was thus able, here and now, to save to the uttermost those who habitually approach God through Him (vii. 25).

This is plain enough when we read the Epistle with care, remembering that emphasis on the writer's part means special lack of insight on his readers' side[1] (cf. v. 11). But there is one part of this great apology for Christianity as the absolute form of revealed religion, which has received less notice than is its due, yet which is most significant of the situation contemplated. It is found in chapters iii–iv., and begins with a broad statement of the superiority of Jesus, the representative of their "profession," to Moses, the representative of past Judaism. Almost immediately, however, the writer concentrates attention on the fact that Israel under Moses failed to enter into God's Rest, the blissful state of life in the Promised Land which was forfeited by "hardness of heart" and "unbelief" in the wilderness. Further, it is hinted that a like spirit had never been really absent from Israel since, in that the promised Rest had never been won. And yet God had renewed the

[1] See A. B. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, pp. 10–20, for the contrasts between the old and the new covenants, and what these imply in the readers. "The writer is not repeating but *creating* theology."

promise since that first failure (iv. 6–10). "There is, then, in reserve a *sabbatism* for the people of God" (iv. 9): some must one day enter in. "Let us be zealous, then, to enter into that Rest"—aye, let us be zealous—"lest any fall in the like fashion of disobedience."

Note the bold and severe judgment on Israel's past,[1] and on the inadequacy of its great leaders to achieve the task of leading God's people into Rest. Moses had failed; so too had Joshua. If the condition in which this former "Jesus" established the Chosen People in the Holy Land had been satisfactory, God would not have pointed forward to a future day when Rest should be theirs. But if so, then how retrograde to fall back (as some seemed like to do) upon the ordinary religious community of Israel; and how dangerously sinful! It was like the very unbelief[2] which forfeited God's Rest, when Israel was in the wilderness. The carcases of that generation fell in the wilderness. Let Christians take heed in this their period of wilderness trial, a trial which was soon to end.[3]. For the penalty of infidelity to the "heavenly calling" through the greater

[1] The importance of this line of argument, as part of Christian apology over against unbelieving Judaism, becomes more apparent when we observe that it underlies also Stephen's apology in Acts vii. This contains an implicit comparison between Moses, the God-sent "Leader and Deliverer" (vii. 35), whom Israel distrusted to their own hurt, and Jesus, the greater Prophet, whom God should raise up (vii. 37). The moral is, that hardness of heart had ever marked Israel as a whole.

[2] This seems to be what is meant by "the deceitfulness of sin" (iii. 13), and "the sin that doth so closely beset" (xii. 1). The opposite of "faith" is the instinct to "draw back," daunted by the trials of endurance involved in obedience. "He *endured* as seeing Him that is invisible," is the description of the man of faith, faced by the seductions of the world of sense (xi. 27).

[3] Perhaps the writer has partly in mind the fact that he and his readers were living in the fourth decade of their trial of faith and patience, when he speaks of the Day as visibly approaching (x. 25), and of the quiet little while that yet intervenes (x. 37). But his chief ground for believing the end near was doubtless the massing of the forces of hostility to Messiah's followers, both in Judaea and in the world-empire beyond, which was a sign of the last hour.

Leader, must be even more terrible than that which befell those who disobeyed the call through Moses.

The psychological situation of *Hebrews* points pretty clearly to the locality of its first readers. "Priesthood, sacrifices, ancient covenant, commonwealth—these were the chief things that seemed substantial and solid beside the Christian realities that were losing their power of attraction." Our author "therefore dwells on their inexorably transitory nature," and that with an impassioned emphasis and iteration which can only mean that his readers lived where the Holy City and its temple were overshadowing practical realities. Here the contrast afforded by James' Epistle,[1] in which sacrificial worship, as of only occasional significance to the members of the Dispersion, is not alluded to, is instructive; and it surely points, as Hort and many others maintain, to Palestine as the home of these Hebrew Christians. Hort, indeed, goes too far when he would include Jerusalem in the region in question; but when Dr. A. B. Davidson would exclude even "any church in its immediate neighbourhood," we must ask what exactly is meant. Would he exclude all the semi-Gentile seaboard between Joppa and Caesarea? If not, we may find in this very region the community or communities of which we are in quest. To them all the conditions above described in Hort's words would apply, along with some others that would seem to suit the maritime plain better than the Highlands of Judaea.

To begin with, it is interesting to observe the nautical metaphors used to bring home both warning and reassurance. There is the figure of a craft drifting with the tide away from its safe moorings (ii. 1); and, again, of the hope

[1] Dr. A. B. Davidson seems to overlook the force of this contrast, in inclining to "some community of the Dispersion in the East . . . with a Hellenistic type of Judaism" (p. 18).

in Christ as "an anchor of the soul," holding firm in the sure ground "within the veil" (vi. 18 f.). Such suggest familiarity with the sea, not only in the writer but also in his readers. Further, the vivid picture of the race in the amphitheatre, with the cloud of spectators nerving the competitors to put forth all their efforts, would be comparatively lost on ordinary Judaean Christians, but would be full of suggestion to men living in or near to a semi-Greek city like Caesarea, where such non-Jewish sports were within the experience of even Hebrew Christians. Finally, the allusions to their history and to their besetting vices appear to look in the same direction. They do not seem to have borne the full brunt of the early persecutions that befell the Palestinian Church (x. 33 f.) So far, in fact, they had not "suffered unto blood" in the conflict in which Jesus, Faith's Pioneer and Consummator, had shown the way.[1] On the other hand, they had, from the first and down to the time in question, "ministered to the Saints" (vi. 11)—not necessarily those of Jerusalem and its environs in particular, of whose needs we happen to have special knowledge (2 Cor. viii. 4, ix. 1, with Rom. xv. 26); and to judge from xiii. 5, it looks as if there were a good deal of wealth among them. Finally, the sins of the flesh against which, in the same context (xiii. 4), they are warned, are more likely to have infected Jewish society on the seaboard than further inland.

When one tries to think out these conditions, the thought of a place like Caesarea on the coast comes naturally to mind. The Church there was of primitive foundation; and though from an early date it contained some members of Gentile

[1] See A. B. Davidson, *ad loc.* (p. 235). "The natural sense is that they had not yet been persecuted unto death, and from the Apostle's manner of regarding the community as a moral person having a continuous history (v. 11-14, vi. 10-12, x. 32-37, xiii. 7), this seems to be said of their whole life as a Church"—as it could not be said of the Christians in a region including Jerusalem.

birth, these were probably the small minority, and would moreover be drawn from the class of proselytes—men, that is, who had adopted in some degree Jewish forms of piety. Their presence, therefore, would not be inconsistent with the phenomena of the Epistle. The main body of the Christians in Caesarea, and in its region, would be Hebrews by birth as by thought and feeling, while yet living on the borderland[1] between Palestinian and extra-Palestinian conditions. Thus, in all respects, Caesarea seems superior to Antioch,[2] as the destination of our Epistle; and it is strange that its claims seem hardly to have been considered seriously by scholars at large.[3] Let us try to supply this defect.

What was the situation in Caesarea during the years immediately before the fierce outbreak there, which precipitated the inevitable conflict with Rome in A.D. 66? Josephus tells us that under Felix the jealousy between the wealthy and influential Jewish element in the city and the non-Jewish native population reached the burning point. "Neither the Jews nor the heathen were satisfied with this state of things; each of the two parties claimed for itself exclusively the government of the city. Already towards the close of the official career of Felix there were sanguinary struggles on the subject; in consequence of which, Nero, whose advisers had been bribed by the heathen party, deprived the Jews of their equal rights and declared the

[1] It seems certain that Caesarea, like Askalon, still ranked as part of the Holy Land, and as for the most part "clean," in contrast to strictly Gentile soil. This means that Jews living in it would be in close relations with the Temple system (e.g. paying priestly tithes), and would not need prolonged purification before sharing in its worship: see *The Jewish Quarterly Review*, xiii. 683 ff.

[2] In favour of which Rendall finally decides, after reaching the sure general conclusion which he expresses thus: "In Palestine, then, or its neighbourhood, I would fix the locality of the Hebrew Church" (*Epistle to the Hebrews*, xviii.).

[3] Moses Stuart, in particular, is one of the rare exceptions.

heathen sole governors of the city." Schürer, whose words have just been quoted, in the new edition of his *Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes* (Dritte Auflage, ii. 107 n.) reckons the imperial rescript on the subject as "certainly not later[1] than A.D. 61." "This letter," writes Josephus, "became the occasion of the subsequent miseries that befell our nation; for when the Jews of Caesarea were informed of the contents of this letter to the Syrians, they were more disorderly than before, till a war was kindled" (*Antiquities*, xx. viii. 9). In the light of this we can imagine how strong must have been the patriotic feeling stirring in the breasts of the Jews in Caesarea from about 60–66 A.D. And this could not but have reacted upon the position and sentiments of the more strictly Jewish section of the Christians in that city.

To continue the probable course of events for the sake of clearness, we observe that the parallel march of events in Jerusalem must, about this time, have stimulated Jewish feeling in Caesarea in a way highly unfavourable to Jewish Christians. For Josephus goes on to record the friction which arose between Festus, the new governor (under whom the restriction of Jewish rights actually occurred), and the Jews, particularly in Jerusalem. But in this case it was the Jews who were successful in an appeal to the Emperor, on a matter touching their sensibilities as to the Temple. The date of their embassy, consisting of ten principal men, including Ismael the High Priest, is fixed by the fact that Ismael, who was kept in Rome as a hostage, was succeeded

[1] The reason being that Pallas, who died in A.D. 62, after being for some time under a cloud, was then still high in favour. Büchler (*Jewish Quarterly Review*, xiii. 689) assigns this struggle touching equal citizen-rights (*ἰσοπολιτεία*) to A.D. 59–60, and thinks that two or three years later there was another case of friction between the Jews and Gentiles in Caesarea, traces of which survive in the Talmud (Tosifta, *Oholoth*, xviii. 16). Confirmation of the earlier date may be found in the fact that Poppæa was already a potent factor in Nero's action, and retrenchment of Jewish rights was less likely to occur henceforth: comp. her intervention in A.D. 60–61, referred to below.

in the high priesthood by Joseph Kabi in A.D. 61. We are told further that its success was due to the influence of Poppæa; so that the Jews had every reason to take heart at the thought that they had now a powerful friend at court. The fruit of this was soon evident in the bold line taken by the Sanhedrin under the lead of Ananus, the successor of Joseph Kabi, whose tenure of office may not have extended beyond the year A.D. 61 in which he was appointed. Taking advantage of the interval between the death of Festus and the arrival of his successor Albinus, "the High Priest Ananus the younger, being of a rash and daring spirit, and inclined, like the Sadducees in general, to severity in punishing, brought to trial James the brother of Jesus, who is called the Christ, and some others before the court of the Sanhedrin; and having charged them with breaking the laws, he delivered them over to be stoned. The better class of citizens and those who were versed in the laws were indignant at this, and made complaints both to Agrippa and Albinus, on the ground that Ananus had no right to summon the Sanhedrin without the consent of the procurator: and Agrippa in consequence removed him from the high priesthood" (*Antt.* xx. 9. 1, and comp. 8. 8 for a similar division of feeling in Jerusalem).

It is altogether likely that the movement in Jerusalem, which led up to the martyrdom of the leading Christian there, had a reflex influence on the lot of Hebrew Christians in Caesarea, where national feeling was already so stirred. And in this connexion it may be remembered that the last touches were just about this time being put to the Temple that had so long been in process of completion, a circumstance which would bring the national system of religion very much to the front in all Jewish minds. Now it is almost certain that our Epistle was written to meet something like a sudden crisis in the religious situation of its readers; and that this crisis was occasioned, though not

wholly caused, by special pressure from outside, is strongly suggested by various turns of phrase in the Epistle itself. Thus the pointed reference to their splendid devotion evoked by persecution in "the former days" (x. 32 ff.), suggests an implicit contrast to their present attitude under somewhat similar conditions. It is surely "boldness" of this order that they are urged not to cast away, in that now too "they have need of patient endurance"[1] (ὑπομονῆς), lest they "shrink back" from the cost of frankly showing their colours. So the allusion in xiii. 3 to "those in bonds" and "evil entreated," within reach of their aid, points to serious persecution as then active in their region at least. And, lastly, Jesus' own endurance of the cross, in despite of shame, is set before them for contemplation and comparison,[2] along with the reminder that they "have not yet resisted unto blood" in the arena of the struggle with sin, where its assault is delivered largely through other human wills (xii. 3 ff.). The analogy here implied shows that very severe persecution is on the horizon, though it has not yet reached and tried these Christians to the full extent.

Can we draw a further inference, and argue that the persecution in view was connected with the martyrdom of James, the Lord's brother, probably early in A.D. 62? I think we can. No event could happen more calculated to bring about in any Palestinian community the acute crisis reflected in *Hebrews*, than the sudden removal of him who in the eyes of his believing countrymen at any rate was *Oblias*, the "Fenced-wall of the People."

[1] The word is used in a connexion full of the associations of persecution in Rev. i. 9. So in our Epistle the verbal form occurs in x. 32, "Ye endured a great conflict of sufferings," and in xii. 2, of Christ's endurance of the cross.

[2] Such is probably the force of the remarkable phrase ἀναλογίσασθε γὰρ τὸν . . . ὑπομεμενηκότα, which Davidson renders "bring into analogy," which implies that the readers, too, were exposed to "the gainsaying of sinners" in like manner with Jesus their model.

In view, too, of the blank thus created, Barnabas might well feel himself invested with enhanced responsibility and authority in relation even to certain Palestinian Christians who, perhaps, had looked hitherto somewhat askance at him as an apostle of liberal Judaeo-Christianity. He would naturally feel constrained to speak out more clearly than ever before, as to the supersession of the rudimentary by the final form of spiritual religion, if a great object-lesson had just been afforded by the practical apostasy of the official heads of Judaism from "the living God," as represented by so true an Israelite as James. Yet he is doubtful whether some of his readers will receive his message as of God (xiii. 18, 22). It might be too strange and revolutionary in their eyes, to be accepted save on higher authority than he possessed to them.

Thus we may assign *Hebrews* to the early summer of 62 A.D., a date which also fits the personal references at the end. Its writer is anxious to hurry to his readers' side, but is hindered by some duty sufficient to detain him even at such a crisis. He also sends news that "our brother Timothy is set at liberty"; and adds the hope that he will reach the place from which the letter was being written in time to make a joint visit to the readers. Finally he sends the greetings of certain persons hailing from Italy (*οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰταλίας*, a phrase which in its context may mean persons resident in Italy, though another sense is possible). All these data cohere readily, if we may assume what the allusion to Timothy itself suggests in the light of 2 Tim. iv. 9, 21. Assume that Timothy, on hurrying to Paul's side to share the closing hours of his imprisonment, became involved in the charges which proved fatal to his father in Christ (c. 61–62 A.D.); but that the case against him broke down, probably because there was not the same array of personal influence working against him, a comparatively obscure personage. A similar cause, namely the

critical turn taken by Paul's case about the time of the hearing referred to in 2 Tim. iv. 16; cf. i. 15), may well have brought Barnabas to Italy—possibly in response to an appeal from Paul to come and watch over the interests of their common gospel in Rome (for the need, cf. Phil. i. 15 ff., ii. 20 f.). The performance of this sacred charge, now doubly needful after the staggering stroke inflicted by Paul's death, might well detain Barnabas for a little longer in Italy, even after the news of the crisis in Palestine had reached him. As Timothy was probably arrested and tried in Rome, while our writer speaks of him as at a distance, we infer that he himself was not then at Rome. Say, then, that he was at Brundisium, and the conditions of the problem seem fully satisfied (including the nautical metaphors of the Epistle).

To sum up our conclusions in the fewest possible words, *Hebrews* was written by Barnabas from Italy, probably from a seaport, whence he hoped to sail very shortly—accompanied, if possible, by Timothy, fresh from an imprisonment connected with that of St. Paul. This was in A.D. 62, in the spring of which James, the Lord's brother, suffered in Jerusalem. It was, perhaps, his death at the hands of the Jewish authorities which precipitated the crisis in the communities[1] addressed in this writing, and of which Caesarea may be taken as type. But the nature of its argument throughout implies that the tendency to practical apostasy from the gospel, which *Hebrews* aims at checking, had its roots far back in an inveterate habit of mind. It was due in large part to a mode of conceiving the gospel which failed to do justice to its character as the absolute form of religion, to which Judaism as such was but preparatory.

VERNON BARTLET.

[1] "*Omnes*" *eos salutari jubet: nam ii, ad quos scribit, multis in locis erant.* Bengel on Heb. xiii. 24.

THE LIFE OF CHRIST ACCORDING TO ST. MARK.[1]

XIV. The Man with the Withered Hand, III. 1-6.

The sayings of Jesus as to the Plucking of the Ears of Corn show that He was not merely a mystic or a popular orator, but a careful thinker and skilful in dialectic. He acted on rational principles, and could justify Himself to inquirers, critics, or opponents. They also bring out another fact which is still more forcibly illustrated by the present incident: although Jesus was attacking the tenets of the Pharisees, He thought He might convert them to His views, and subdue them to His authority.

It was already clear that Jesus was an enemy of the Law as it was interpreted by tradition; but, in order that they might take action against Him with the assurance of success, the Pharisees needed convincing evidence of some notable breach of the Law on His part. Accordingly, they chose a Sabbath when Jesus would be in the synagogue, and arranged that there should be present a man with a withered hand; they themselves also attended to see what Jesus would do. It was a public challenge, which shows how completely Jesus was understood to have committed Himself to lax views on the Sabbath. There was no urgency about a withered hand that seemed to call for a relaxation of law. Probably, under ordinary circumstances, Jesus would not have chosen the day of rest for healing this man. But now the sufferer might cherish hopes of immediate relief, and Jesus would not disappoint him. Moreover, if He had declined the challenge, He would have seemed to

[1] These studies do not profess to be an adequate historical and doctrinal account of Christ, but are an attempt to set forth the impression which St. Mark's account of our Lord would make on a reader whose only source of information was the Second Gospel, and who knew nothing of Christian dogmatics.

endorse the authority of the Pharisaic tradition, and He was more concerned to break the bondage of ritual than to draw fine distinctions as to what might or might not be done on the Sabbath. Accordingly, he bade the man stand forth, and turned to the scribes, and said :

" Is it right on the Sabbath to confer a benefit, or to inflict an injury, to save life or to kill ? "

His critics were silent ; the synagogue was crowded with devoted followers of Jesus, and it is waste of breath to argue with a popular hero surrounded by his admirers. He looked round on them with anger, being grieved for the hardness of their hearts, astonished and grieved to the point of anger that there should be men so callous as to set the exact observance of a ceremonial law above the happiness, even for a few hours, of a fellow-creature. But this was not all ; Jesus would hardly have been so astounded at the familiar callousness of fanatics. His words were a personal appeal, tender with chivalrous sympathy, burning with righteous enthusiasm, and energized by the indwelling Spirit of God ; and against all these the scribes had hardened their hearts.

The Pharisees had made their challenge ; Jesus had replied by His appeal ; and this had been rejected. So, without further delay, Jesus accepted the challenge ; He bade the man stretch forth the withered hand, and as he did so it became natural like the other. The Pharisees were satisfied ; they had an overt act of disobedience to the Law, committed in the presence of many witnesses ; and forthwith they went out to consider how they might use this advantage. They now called to their councils a party of whom we read for the first time, the Herodians, or partisans of the Herods. Usually the Pharisees and the Herods were at variance with each other ; but by this time the influence of Jesus in Galilee was a danger to the government, and the Herodians were ready to ally themselves with the Pharisees against the common enemy.

XV. The Growing Influence of Jesus, III. 7–12.

To avoid the dangers threatened by this alliance, Jesus and His disciples left the town and withdrew to the shores of the lake. The next few verses give a brief account of the influence and activity of Jesus ; crowds flocked to Him, not only from Galilee, but also from Judaea and Jerusalem, from Idumaea, from the regions east of the Jordan, and from the territory of Tyre and Sidon. The great attraction was His gift of healing. The sick and the demoniacs " fell upon Him," hustled and jostled Him, so that in order to continue His teaching, He was obliged to address the crowds from a boat on the lake at a little distance from the shore. The demoniacs continually hailed Him as the Son of God, in spite of constant attempts to silence them.

XVI. The Calling of the Twelve, III. 13–19.

The success of Jesus involved Him in many difficulties ; the hatred of His enemies was rendered more violent, and He was hampered by the inconvenient importunity of His admirers. The multitudes that constantly gathered round Him and followed Him were a danger to public order, and a hindrance to the preaching of the Kingdom. Jesus now sought to lessen this embarrassment, and at the same time to provide for more effective preaching on a larger scale. He had already specially called five disciples; He now chose twelve, to whom He gave the special name of Apostles ; they were to follow Him, and also at times to go forth and preach and cast out demons. No doubt, at the same time, Jesus dismissed His miscellaneous followers to their homes, there to live according to His teaching, and to be ready to obey any further instructions they might receive from Him. His personal following, indeed, would not be always limited to the twelve, nor would all the twelve always be with Him ; fresh crowds gathered from time to time. But the twelve were the official representatives of the Kingdom ;

they limited the responsibility of Jesus, and enabled Him to promulgate definite teaching.

The list includes the four fishermen who were first called; and, although the tax-gatherer Apostle is not mentioned as Levi, we should naturally suppose, even without any additional information, that he is present in the list under another name. Of the four original disciples, three receive new names, partly to mark the solemnity of their vocation, partly to distinguish them from new members of the brotherhood who bore the same names. Simon was surnamed Peter, *petros*, "rock," in token, as we should suppose, of his strength, firmness, and determination, and to distinguish him from another Simon, the Cananaean or Zealot, one of a class of patriotic fanatics eager to peril life and liberty for Israel and the Law. The sons of Zebedee, James and John, were surnamed Boanerges, which, according to St. Mark, means "Sons of Thunder," perhaps men of a fiery and impetuous spirit, endowed with the eloquence natural to their character. The original four stand at the head of the list, and, first of all, Peter, but his brother Andrew is placed fourth; clearly he was less important than James and John, whose names intervene. Last of all comes Judas, the Man of Kerioth, branded as the Traitor, but as yet no shadow of coming treachery had fallen upon the mind of Judas, or of his fellow-Apostles, or of his Master.

W. H. Bennett.

(*To be continued.*)

TRAVEL AND CORRESPONDENCE AMONG THE EARLY CHRISTIANS.

MANY writers on many occasions have perceived and described the important part which intercommunication, whether by personal travel or by epistolary correspondence, between the widely separated bodies or congregations of early Christians played in determining the organization and cementing the unity of the Universal Church.[1] Yet perhaps all has not been said that ought to be said on the subject. The marvellous skill and mastery with which all the resources of the existing civilization were turned to their own purposes by St. Paul and by the Christians generally may well detain our attention for a brief space.

Travelling and correspondence by letter are mutually dependent. Letters are unnecessary until travelling begins: much of the usefulness and profit of travelling depends on the possibility of communication between those who are separated from one another. Except in the most simple forms, commerce and negotiation between different nations, which are among the chief incentives to travelling, cannot be carried out without some method of registering thoughts and information so as to be understood by persons at a distance.

Hence communication by letter has been commonly

[1] The present writer has referred to it more than once (*The Church in the Roman Empire*, pp. 364 ff., 437, etc.); and he has made a more elaborate study of the subject for an article in the fifth volume of Dr. Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible* on Travel in New Testament Times, a few of the results of which are here set forth in an expanded form.

practised from an extremely remote antiquity. The knowledge of and readiness in writing leads to correspondence between friends who are not within speaking distance of one another as inevitably as the possession of articulate speech produces conversation and discussion. In order to fix the period when epistolary correspondence first began, it would be necessary to discover at what period the art of writing became common. Now the progress of discovery in recent years has revolutionized opinion on this subject. The old views, which we all used to assume as self-evident, that writing was invented at a comparatively late period in human history, that it was long known only to a few persons, and that it was practised even by them only slowly and with difficulty on some special occasions and for some peculiarly important purposes, are found to be utterly erroneous. No one who possesses any knowledge of early history would now venture to make any assertion as to the date when writing was invented, or when it began to be widely used in the Mediterranean lands. The progress of discovery reveals the existence of various systems of writing in the most remote periods, and shows that they were familiarly used for the ordinary purposes of life and administration, and were not reserved, as some scholars used to believe, for certain sacred purposes of religion and ritual.

This discovery that writing was so familiarly used in early time has an important bearing on the early literature of the Mediterranean peoples. For example, no scholar would now employ the argument that the existence of the Homeric poems as great continuous poems was impossible without the ready use of writing, and therefore belongs to a comparatively late day—an argument which formerly seemed to tell strongly against the early date assigned by tradition for their composition. The scholars who championed the early date assigned by tradition to those great works used to labour an attempted proof that they were composed and preserved

by memory alone. That is, however, extremely improbable; but we need now have no doubt that from remote antiquity writing was ready to preserve them.

A similar argument was formerly used by older scholars to prove that the Hebrew literature belonged to a later period than the Hebrew tradition allowed; but the more recent scholars who advocate the late date of that literature would no longer allow such reasoning, though it may be doubted whether they have abandoned as thoroughly as they profess the old prejudice in favour of a late date for any long literary composition, or have fully realized how readily and familiarly writing was used in extremely remote time, together with all that is implied by that familiar use.

That prejudice still exists, and it operates in two ways. In the first place, there is a feeling that it is more prudent to bring down the composition of any ancient work to the latest date that evidence permits. Such an argument is commonly used, and it rests ultimately on the old prejudice that people have become gradually more familiar with the art of writing as the world grows older, and that one should not, without distinct and conclusive proof, attribute the composition of a work of literature to an early period.

In the second place, there is also a very strong body of opinion that the earliest Christians wrote little or nothing. It is supposed that partly they were either unable to write, or at least unused to the familiar employment of writing for the purposes of ordinary life; partly they were so entirely taken up with the thought of the immediate coming of the Lord that they never thought it necessary to record for future generations the circumstances of the life and death of Jesus, until lapse of long years on the one hand had shown that the Lord's coming was not to be expected immediately, and that for the use of the already large Church some record was required of those events round which its faith and hope

centred, while on the other hand it had obscured the memory and disturbed the truth of those important facts.

This opinion also rests on and derives all its influence from the same old prejudice that, at the period in question, writing was still something great and solemn, and that it was used, not in the ordinary course of human everyday life and experience, but only for some important purpose such as the registration of great and important events for the benefit of future generations. Set aside that prejudice, and the whole body of opinion which maintains that the Christians at first did not set anything down in writing about the life and death of Christ—strong and widely accepted as it is, dominating as a fundamental premise much of the discussion of this whole subject in recent times—is devoid of any support.

But most discussions with regard to the origin, force, and spirit of the New Testament are founded on certain postulates and certain initial presumptions, which already contain implicit the whole train of reasoning that follows, and which in fact beg the whole question at starting. If those postulates are true, or if they are granted by the reader, then the whole series of conclusions follows with unerring and impressive logical sequence. All the more necessary, then, is it to examine very carefully the character of such postulates, and to test whether they are really true about that distant period, or are only modern fallacies springing from the mistaken views about ancient history that were widely accepted in the eighteenth and most part of the nineteenth century.

One of those initial presumptions, plausible in appearance and almost universally assumed and conceded, is that with regard to the absence of early registration of the great facts in the beginning of Christian history. This presumption we must set aside as a mere prejudice, contrary to the whole character and spirit of that age, and entirely im-

probable: though, of course, definite disproof of it is no longer possible, for the only definite and complete disproof would be the production of the original documents in which the facts were recorded at the beginning.

So much may be said at once, summing up in a sentence the opinion which arises from what is stated in the following pages. So far as antecedent probability goes, founded on the analogy and the general spirit of preceding and contemporary Greek or Graeco-Asiatic society, the first Christian account of the circumstances connected with the death of Jesus must be presumed to have been written in the year when Jesus died.

But the objection will doubtless be made at once—If that be so, how can you account for such facts as that Mark says that the Crucifixion was completed by the third hour of the day (9 a.m., according to our modern reckoning of time), while John says that the sentence upon Jesus was only pronounced about the sixth hour, i.e. at noon. The reply is obvious and unhesitating. The difference dates from the event itself. Had evidence been collected that night or next morning, the two diverse opinions would have been observed and recorded, already hopelessly discrepant and contradictory. One was the opinion of the ordinary person, unaccustomed to note the lapse of time or to define it accurately in thought or speech: such persons loosely indicated the temporal sequence of three great events, the Crucifixion, the beginning, and the end of the darkness, by assigning them to the three great successive divisions of the day—the only divisions which they were in the habit of noticing or mentioning[1]—the third, sixth, and ninth hours.

[1] Matthew once mentions the eleventh hour, but without any accuracy of observation: he merely uses a proverbial expression, indicating that the allotted time had nearly elapsed, Matt. xx. 9. Mark and Luke mention only the three great divisions. The precise note in Acts xix. 9 (Bezan text), "from the fifth to the tenth hour" is a precise record in a style quite out of keeping with Luke's looseness in respect of time: it is there-

Ordinary witnesses in that age would have been nonplussed, if they had been closely questioned whether full three hours had elapsed between the Crucifixion and the beginning of the darkness, and would have regarded such minuteness as unnecessary pedantry, for they had never been trained by the circumstances of life to accuracy of thought or language in regard to the lapse of time.

The other recorded statement was the opinion of an exceptional man, who through a certain idiosyncrasy was observant and careful in regard to the lapse of time, who in other cases noted and recorded accurate divisions of time like the seventh hour and the tenth hour,[1] and who had observed and noted the passage of time, which was unnoticed by others, at the trial. The others would have been astonished if any one had pointed out that noon had almost come before the trial was finished. He alone marked the sun and estimated the time, with the same accuracy as made him see and remember that the two disciples came to the house of Jesus about the tenth hour, that Jesus sat on the well about the sixth hour, that the fever was said to have left the child about the seventh hour. All those little details, entirely unimportant in themselves, were remembered by a man naturally observant of time, and recorded for no other reason than that he had been present and seen or heard.

It is a common error to leave too much out of count the change that has been produced on popular thought and accuracy of conception and expression by the habitual observation of the lapse of time by hours and minutes. The ancients had no means of observing the progress of time.

fore marked as a later addition, embodying an interesting tradition, and my former hesitation whether it should be regarded as original Lukan or as a correct tradition added in the second century was unnecessary. I should now say that one who is sufficiently familiar with the style of Luke cannot long feel doubt.

[1] John i. 39, iv. 6, iv. 52.

They could only make a rough guess as to the hour. There was not even a name for any shorter division of time than the hour. There were no watches; and only in the rarest and most exceptional cases, were there any public and generally accessible instruments for noting and making visible the lapse of time during the day. The sundial was necessarily an inconvenient recorder, not easy to observe. Consequently looseness in regard to the passage of time is deep-seated in ancient thought and literature, especially Greek. The Romans, with their superior endowment for practical facts and ordinary statistics, were more careful, and the effect can be traced in their literature. The lapse of time was often noted publicly in great households hour by hour by the sound of a trumpet or some other device, though the public still regarded this as a rather overstrained refinement—for why should one be anxious to know how fast one's life was ebbing away?[1] Occasionally individuals were more accurate in the observation of time, owing to their habit of mind, or because they were more receptive of the Roman spirit of accuracy.

The progress of invention has made almost every one in modern times as careful and accurate about time as even the exceptionally accurate in ancient times, because we are all trained from infancy to note the time by minutes and to suffer loss or inconvenience occasionally from an error in observation.

But it does not follow that, because the ancients were not accustomed to note the progress of the hours, therefore they were less habituated to use the art of writing. It is a mere popular fallacy, entirely unworthy of scholars, to suppose that people became gradually more familiar with

[1] See Petronius, 26. The use of the trumpeter to proclaim the lapse of time was kept up until recent time (if not still) in the old Imperial city of Goslar, where, in accordance with the more minute accuracy characteristic of modern thought and custom, he sounded every quarter of an hour, as a friend tells me. I did not hear him when I visited Goslar.

writing and more accustomed to use it habitually in ordinary life, as time progressed and history continued. The contrary is the case; at a certain period, and to a certain degree, the ancients were accustomed to use the art familiarly and readily; but at a later time writing passed out of ordinary use and became restricted to a few who used it only as a lofty possession for great purposes.

It is worth while to mention one striking example to give emphasis to the fact that, as the Roman Empire decayed, so familiarity with the use of writing disappeared from society, and a knowledge of writing continued only as the possession of a few persons, who were for the most part connected with religion. About the beginning of the sixth century before Christ, a body of mercenary soldiers, Greeks, Carians, etc., marched far away up the Nile towards Ethiopia and the Sudan in the service of an Egyptian king. Such persons as those hired soldiers of fortune were likely to belong to the least educated section of Greek society, and, even where they had learned in childhood to write, the circumstances of their life were not of a kind likely to make writing a familiar and ordinary matter to them, or to render its exercise a natural method of whiling away an idle hour. Yet on the stones and the colossal statues at Abu Simbel many of them wrote not merely their name and legal designation, but also accounts of the expedition on which they were engaged, with its objects and its progress.

Such was the state of education in a rather humble stratum of Greek society six centuries before Christ. Let us come down to eleven centuries after Christ, when great armies of Crusaders from the west were marching across Asia Minor on their way to Palestine; those armies were led by the noblest of their peoples, statesmen, warriors, and great ecclesiastics; they contained among them persons of all classes, burning with zeal for a great idea, pilgrims at once and soldiers, with numerous priests and monks. Yet,

so far as I am aware, not one single written memorial of all those crusading hosts has been found in the whole country.[1] On a rock beside the lofty castle of Butrentum, commanding the approach to the great pass of the Cilician Gates—that narrow gorge which they called the Gate of Judas, because it was the enemy of their faith and the betrayer of their cause—a castle which they must have occupied before they could approach the Gates, there are engraved many memorials of their presence; but none are written; all are mere marks in the form of crosses.

Probably there were in that small body of mercenaries who passed by Abu Simbel six hundred years before Christ, more persons accustomed to use familiarly the art of writing than in all the hosts of the Crusaders; for even to those Crusaders who had learned how to write the art was far from being familiar, and they were not wont to use it in their ordinary everyday life, though they might on great occasions. In those seventeen hundred years the Mediterranean world had passed from light to darkness, from civilization to barbarism, so far as writing was concerned. Only recently are we beginning to realize how civilized in some respects was mankind in that early time, and to free ourselves from many unfounded prejudices and prepossessions about the character of ancient life and society.

The cumbrousness of the materials on which ancient writing was inscribed, may seem unfavourable to its easy or general use. But it must be remembered that, except in Egypt, no material except of the most durable character has been or could have been preserved. All material more ephemeral than stone, bronze, or terracotta, has inevitably been destroyed by natural causes. Only in Egypt the

[1] Even in Palestine, where they were in permanent possession for a long period, written memorials of them are exceedingly rare: one occurs in Pal. Expl. Fund Quart. Statement, 1901, p. 408, and another is referred to in the same place, p. 409.

extreme dryness of climate and soil has enabled paper to survive. Now the question must suggest itself whether there is any reason to think that more ephemeral materials for writing were never used by the ancient Mediterranean peoples generally, or that Egypt was the only country in which writers used such perishable materials. The question can be answered only in one way. There can be no doubt that the custom which obtained in the Greek lands in the period best known to us had come down from remote antiquity; that custom was to make a distinction between the material on which documents of national interest and public character were written and that on which mere private documents of personal or literary interest were written. The former, such as laws, edicts, and other state documents, which were intended to be made as widely and generally known as possible, were engraved in one or two copies on tablets of the most imperishable character and preserved or exposed in some public place;[1] this was the ancient way of attaining the publicity which in modern time is got by printing large numbers of copies on ephemeral material. But those public copies were not the only ones made; there is no doubt that such documents were first of all written on some perishable material, usually on paper. In the case of private documents, as a rule, no copies were made except on perishable materials.

Wills of private persons, indeed, are often found engraved on marble or other lasting material; these were exposed in the most public manner[2] over the graves that lined the great highways leading out from the cities; but wills were quasi-public documents in the classical period, and had been entirely public documents at an earlier time, according to their original character as records of a public act affecting the community and acquiesced in by the whole community.

[1] See Expositor, Dec. 1888, vol. viii. pp. 407–8.
[2] Expositor, *loc. cit.* p. 408.

Similarly, it can hardly be doubted that, in a more ancient period of Greek society, State documents were likely to be recorded on less perishable substances, than those which were only of a private character and of merely personal or literary interest. This view, of course, can never be definitely and absolutely proved, for the only complete proof would be the discovery of some of those old private documents, which in the nature of the case have decayed and disappeared. But the known facts leave no practical room for doubt.

Paper was in full use in Egypt, as a finished and perfect product, in the fourth millennium before Christ. In Greece it is incidentally referred to by Herodotus as in ordinary use during the fifth century B.C. How long it had then been used there no evidence exists; but there is every probability that it had been imported from Egypt for a long time, and Herodotus says that before paper came into use on the Ionian coast skins of animals were used for writing. On these and other perishable materials the letters and other commonplace documents of private persons were written.

Accordingly, though few private letters older than the imperial time have been preserved, it need not and should not be supposed that there were only a few written. Those that were written have been lost because the material on which they were written could not last. If we except the correspondence of Cicero,[1] the great importance of which caused it to be preserved, hardly any ancient letters not intended for publication by their writers have come down to us except in Egypt, where the original paper has in a number of cases survived. But the voluminous correspondence of Cicero cannot be taken as

[1] When communication was possible, he and Atticus often wrote every day to one another. Their letters were written conversation, as Cicero often says.

a unique fact of Roman life. He and his correspondents wrote so frequently to one another, because letter-writing was common in the Roman society of the time. It was easier and safer to send letters than it had been in earlier time: the civilized world, i.e. the Roman world, was traversed constantly by messengers of government or by the letter-carriers of the great financial and trading companies. Commercial undertakings on such a vast scale as the Roman needed frequent and regular communication between the central offices in Rome and the agents in the various provinces. There was no general postal service; but each trading company had its own staff of letter-carriers. Private persons who had not letter-carriers of their own were often able to send letters along with those business communications.

In proportion to the opportunities for transmission, at least as many letters probably were written in the Greek as in the Roman time. The power to write and the inclination were there: opportunities were not quite so frequent. But the number of persons living in strange cities, the activity of intercourse, commercial, educational, and political, were great in the Greek period, especially after the time of Alexander the Great.[1]

The one condition which was needed to develop epistolary correspondence to a very much greater extent in the Roman Empire was a regular postal service. It seems a remarkable fact that the Roman Imperial Government, keenly desirous as it was of encouraging and strengthening the common feeling and bond of unity between different parts of the Empire, never seems to have thought of establishing any postal service within its dominions. Augustus established an imperial service, which was maintained throughout subsequent Roman times; but it was strictly confined to

[1] The busy character of that period has been described in the Expositor, Dec., 1901, p. 406.

imperial and official business, and was little more than a system of special Emperor's messengers on a great scale.

The failure of the Imperial Government to recognize how much its own aims and schemes would have been aided by facilitating communication through the Empire was connected with one of the greatest defects of the Imperial administration. It never learned that the strength and permanence of a nation and of its government are dependent on the education and character of the people: it never attempted to educate the people, but only to feed and amuse them. The Christian Church, which gradually established itself as a rival organization, did of itself what the Government aimed at doing for the nation, and succeeded better, because it taught people to think for themselves, to govern themselves, and to maintain their own union by their own efforts. It seized those two great facts of the Roman world, travelling and letter-writing, and turned them to its own purposes. The former, on its purely material side, it could only accept: the latter it developed to new forms as an ideal and spiritual instrument.

In the early Roman Empire travelling, though not rapid, was performed with an ease and certainty which were quite remarkable. The provision for travelling by sea and by land was made on a great scale. Travellers were going about in great numbers, chiefly during the summer months, occasionally even during the winter season. Their purposes were varied, not merely commerce or government business, but also education, curiosity, search for employment in all departments of life. It is true that to judge from many expressions used in Roman literature by men of letters and moralists, travelling might seem not to have been popular. Those writers often speak as if travelling, especially by sea, were confined to traders who risked their life to make money, and as if the dangers were so great that none but the reckless and greedy would incur them; and the opinion

is often expressed, especially by poets, that to adventure oneself on the sea is an impious and unnatural act. The well known words of Horace's third Ode are typical.

But that point of view was traditional among the poets; it had been handed down from the time when travelling was much more dangerous and difficult, when ships were small in size and fewer in numbers, when seamanship and method were inferior, when few roads had been built, and travel even by land was uncertain. Moreover, seafaring and land travel were hostile to the contentment, discipline, and quiet orderly spirit which Greek poetry and thought loved to dwell on and to recommend: they tended to encourage the spirit of disorder, rebellion against authority, self-confidence and self-assertiveness, which was called by Euripides "the sailors' lawlessness" (*Hecuba*, 602). In Roman literature the Greek models and the Greek sentiments were looked up to as sacred and final; and those expressions of the Roman writers were a proof of their bondage to their Greek masters in thought.

When we look deeper, we find that very different views were expressed by the writers who came more in contact with the real facts of the Imperial world. They are full of admiration of the Imperial peace and its fruits: the sea was covered with ships interchanging the products of different regions of the earth, wealth was vastly increased, comfort and well-being improved, hill and valley covered with the dwellings of an increasing population: wars and pirates and robbers had been put an end to, travel was free and safe, all men could journey where they wished, the most remote and lonely countries were opened up by roads and bridges.[1] It is the simple truth that travelling, whether for business or for pleasure, was contemplated and performed under the

[1] See the passages quoted from Philo and Pliny, Appian and Plutarch, Epictetus, Aristides, etc., by Friedländer in the early pages of the second volume of his *Sittengeschichte*.

Empire with an indifference, confidence, and, above all, certainty, which were unknown in after centuries until the introduction of steamers and the consequent increase in ease and sureness of communication.

The impression given by the early Christian writings is in perfect agreement with the language of those writers who spoke from actual contact with the life of the time, and did not merely imitate older models and utter afresh old sentiments. Probably the feature in those Christian writings, which causes most surprise at first to the traveller familiar with those countries in modern time, is the easy confidence with which extensive plans of travel were formed and announced and executed by the early Christians.

In Acts xvi. 1 ff. a journey by land and sea through parts of Syria, Cilicia, a corner of Cappadocia, Lycaonia, Phrygia, Mysia, the Troad, Thrace, Macedonia, and Greece is described, and no suggestion is made that this long journey was unusual or strange, except that the somewhat heightened tone of the narrative in xvi. 7–9 corresponds to the rather perplexingly rapid changes of scene and successive frustrations of St. Paul's intentions. But those who are most intimately acquainted with those countries know best how serious an undertaking it would be at the present time to repeat that journey, how many accidents might occur in it, and how much care and thought would be advisable before one entered on so extensive a programme.

Again, in xviii. 21 St. Paul touched at Ephesus in the ordinary course of the pilgrim-ship which was conveying him and many other Jews to Jerusalem for the Passover. When he was asked to remain, he excused himself, but promised to return as he came back from Jerusalem by a long land-journey through Syria, Cilicia, Lycaonia, and Phrygia. That extensive journey seems to be regarded by speaker and hearers as quite an ordinary excursion. "I must by all means keep this feast that cometh in Jerusalem;

but I will again return unto you, if God will." The last condition is added, not as indicating uncertainty, but in the usual spirit of Eastern religion, which forbids a resolve about the future, however simple and sure, to be declared without the express recognition of Divine authority—like the Mohammedan "inshallah," which never fails when the most ordinary resolution about the morrow is stated.

In Romans xv. 24, when writing from Corinth, St. Paul sketches out a comprehensive plan. He is eager to visit Rome: first he must go to Jerusalem, but thereafter he is bent on visiting Spain, and his course will naturally lead him through Rome, so that he will, without intruding himself on them, have the opportunity of seeing and affecting the Romans and their Church on his way.

Throughout mediæval times nothing like this off-hand way of sketching out extensive plans was natural or intelligible: there were then, indeed, many great travellers, but those travellers knew how uncertain their journeys were, and they would hardly have expressed such rapid plans in a matter of serious business, because they were aware that any plans would be frequently liable to interruption, and that nothing could be calculated on as reasonably certain: they entered on long journeys, but regarded them as open to modification or even frustration: in indicating their plans they knew that they would be regarded by others as attempting something great and strange. But St. Paul's method and language seem to show clearly that such journeys as he contemplated were looked on as quite natural and usual by those to whom he spoke or wrote. He could go off from Greece or Macedonia to Palestine and reckon with practical certainty on being in Jerusalem in time for a feast day not far distant.

It is the same with others: Aquila and Priscilla, Apollos, Silas, Epaphroditus, Timothy, etc., move back and forward, and are now found in one city, now in another

far distant. Unobservant of this character, some writers have argued that Romans xvi. 3 could not have been addressed to correspondents who lived in Rome, because Aquila and Priscilla, who were in Ephesus not long before the Epistle was written, are there spoken of as living among those correspondents. Such an argument could not be used by persons who had fully understood that ubiquity, independence of mere local trammels and connexions, and quite a marvellous freedom in locomotion, are strongly marked facts in the early Church. That argument is one of the smallest errors into which this false prepossession has led many scholars.

Communication by letter supplemented mere travelling. Such communication is the greatest factor in the development of the Church; and the present writer has elsewhere attempted to show that the bishops derived their importance in great degree from being the representatives of the several congregations in relation to each other, charged with the duty of hospitality to travellers and with the maintenance of correspondence.[1]

The Christian letters contained the saving energy of the Christian Church, for in correspondence flowed its life-blood. Thus arose a new kind of letter, hitherto unknown in the world. The Christians developed the letter into new forms, applied it to new uses, and placed it on a much higher plane than it had ever before stood upon. In their hands communication by letter became one of the most important, if not the most important, of the agencies for consolidating and maintaining the sense of unity among the scattered members of the one universal Church. By means of letters the congregations expressed their mutual affection and sympathy and sense of brotherhood, asked counsel of one another, gave advice with loving freedom and plain speaking to one another, imparted mutual comfort and en-

[1] *The Church in the Roman Empire*, p. 361 ff.

couragement, and generally expressed their sense of their common life. Thus arose a new category of Epistles.

Deissman,[1] following older scholars, has rightly and clearly distinguished two previously existing categories, the true letter—written by friend to friend or to friends, springing from the momentary occasion, intended only for the eye of the person or persons to whom it is addressed—and the literary epistle—written with an eye to the public, and studied with careful literary art. But he has erred in trying to reduce all the letters of the N.T. to one or other of these categories. Though he shows some vague sense of the insufficiency of the two older categories, yet he has not seen with sufficient clearness, nor stated with sufficient precision, that in the new conditions a new category had been developed—the general letter addressed to a whole congregation or to the entire Church of Christ. This class of letters are true letters, in the sense that they spring from the heart of the writer and speak direct to the heart of the readers; that they rise out of the actual situation in which the writer conceives the readers to be placed; that they express the writer's keen and living sympathy with and participation in the fortunes of the whole class of persons addressed; that they are not affected by any thought of publication for a wider public than the persons immediately addressed. On the other hand, the letters of this class express general principles of life and conduct, religion and ethics, applicable to a wider range of circumstances than those which have called forth the special letter; and the letters appeal as emphatically and intimately to all Christians in all time as they did to those addressed in the first instance. Such letters have a certain analogy to the edicts and rescripts by which Roman law grew, documents arising

[1] See Deissman, *Biblical Studies* (an improved edition of his *Bibelstudien* and *Neue Bibelstudien*), also his article on "Epistolary Literature" in *Encycl. Bibl.* ii. p. 1323.

out of special circumstances but treating them on general principles. As expressing general truths and universal principles, those letters must have been the result of long and careful thought, though the final expression was often hasty and roused by some special occasion. This more studied character differentiates them from the mere unstudied expression of personal affection and interest.

Those general letters of the Christians express and embody the growth in the law of the Church and in its common life and constitution. They originated in the circumstances of the Church. The letter of the Council at Jerusalem (Acts xv. 23 ff.) arose out of a special occasion, and was the reply to a question addressed from Syria to the central Church and its leaders; the reply was addressed to the Churches of the province of Syria and Cilicia, and specially the Church of the capital of that province; but it was forthwith treated as applicable equally to other Christians, and was communicated as authoritative by Paul and Silas to the Churches of Galatia (Acts xvi. 4).

The peculiar relation of fatherhood and authority in which Paul stood to his own Churches developed still further this category of letters: but that is a subject too wide to treat in a brief article. Mr. V. Bartlet has made some good remarks on it in Dr. Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, i. p. 730.

A still further development towards general philosophico-legal statement of religious dogma is apparent on the one hand in Romans, addressed to a Church which he had not founded, and on the other hand in the Pastoral Epistles. The latter have a double character, being addressed by Paul to friends and pupils of his own, partly in their capacity of personal friends—such portions of the letters being of the most intimate, incidental, and unstudied character—but far more in their official capacity as heads and overseers of a group of Churches—such parts of the letters being really

intended more for the guidance of the congregations than of the nominal addressees, and being, undoubtedly, to a considerable extent merely confirmatory of the teaching already given to the congregations by Timothy and Titus. The double character of these Epistles is a strong proof of their authenticity. Such a mixture of character could only spring from the intimate friend and leader, whose interest in the work which his two subordinates were doing was at times lost in the personal relation.

The Catholic Epistles represent a further stage of this development. First Peter is addressed to a very wide yet carefully defined body of Churches in view of a serious trial to which they are about to be exposed. Second Peter, James, and First John are quite indefinite in their address to all Christians. But all of them are separated by a broad and deep division from the literary Epistle written for the public eye: they are informed and inspired with the intense personal affection which the writers felt for every individual of the thousands whom they addressed.

A serious study of all the early Christian Epistles from this point of view is much needed, and would bring out in strong relief their real, human, individual, and authentic character. The seven letters to the seven Churches contained in Revelation i.–iii. are full of touches special to the individual Churches, many of which have hardly been observed in modern times, but which show close personal knowledge of the cities on the part of the writer; and yet they are written on a uniform plan, which gives them a certain literary type to a degree and of a kind differing from any of the other letters. They stand by themselves, written in the inspiration of one single occasion, which expressed itself suitably to the individual circumstances of each of the seven Churches, yet conformably to certain general lines.

This remarkable development, in which law, statesman-

ship, ethics, and religion meet in and transform the simple letter, was the work of St. Paul more than of any other. But it was not due to him alone, nor initiated by him. It began before him and continued after him. It sprang from the nature of the Church and the circumstances of the time. The Church was imperial, the Kingdom of God; and its leaders felt that their letters expressed the will of God. They issued their truly imperial rescripts. "It seemed good to the Holy Spirit and to us" is the bold and regal exordium of the first Christian letter.

Christian letters in the next two or three centuries were often inspired by something of the same spirit. Congregation spoke boldly and authoritatively to congregation, as each was moved by the Spirit to write: the letter partook of the nature of an imperial rescript, yet it was merely the expression of the intense interest taken by equal in equal, and brother in brother. The whole series of such letters is indicative of the strong interest of all individuals in the government of the entire body; and they form one of the loftiest and noblest embodiments of a high tone of feeling common to a very large number of ordinary, commonplace, undistinguished human beings.

Such a development of the letter was possible in that widely scattered body of the Church only through the greatly increased facilities for travel and intercourse. The Church showed its marvellous intuition and governing capacity by seizing this opportunity. In this, as in many other ways, it was the creature of its time, suiting itself to the needs of the time, which was ripe for it, and using the conditions and opportunities of the time with true creative statesmanship.[1]

That Christian official and private correspondence—and the small number of letters that have been actually preserved to us gives a wholly inadequate idea of its extent—

[1] Colossians iv. 5, as interpreted in *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 149.

was indubitably carried by Christian messengers: Epaphroditus, Tychicus, and so on, are examples of a whole class. As soon as we begin to work out the idea of the preparations and equipment required in practice for this great system, we find ourselves obliged to admit the existence of a large organization. The Church stands before those who rightly conceive its practical character, as a real antagonist in the fullest sense to the imperial government, creating and managing its own rival administration. We thus understand better the hatred which the Imperial Government could not but feel for it, a hatred which is altogether misapprehended by those who regard it as springing from religious ground. We understand too how Constantine at last recognized in the Church the one bond which could hold together the disintegrating Empire. Whether or not he was a Christian, he at least possessed a statesman's insight. And his statesmanlike insight in estimating the practical strength of rival religions stands out as all the more wonderful if he were not a Christian at heart; for (though many years of his youth and earlier manhood had been spent in irksome detention in the East, where Christianity was the popular and widely accepted religion), yet his choice was made in the West, the country of his birth and of his hopes, where Mithraism was the popular and most influential religion: it was made amid the soldiery, which was entirely devoted to the religion of Mithras.

W. M. Ramsay.

NOTES FROM THE PAPYRI.

III.

In venturing to send a further gleaning of N.T. words which appear in various documents of "profane" Hellenistic Greek, to supplement those which appeared in the Expositor for April, 1901, and February, 1903, I must ask indulgence for the want of system which will be easily observable throughout. To examine the vocabulary of the papyri was not my object when I began reading them, and I have never made any systematic effort to do so. Professor Deissmann will bring his own work up to date better than any one else can do it for him. But I have found in experience that unexpected light is always being thrown on N.T. words and phrases from their appearance in documents which I have searched for grammatical phenomena; and before I turn to the task of gathering together the conclusions which the grammar of the papyri has induced, I should like to "dump" some mere miscellaneous lexical notes which have presented themselves, on the chance of their contributing towards the complete index of Biblical words in the papyri which some one should give us when the time comes.

A new volume of *Oxyrhychus Papyri* has recently come from the busy workshop of Drs. Grenfell and Hunt, and there are a few other recent collections which I have added to my sources.[1] In these notes I have not restricted my-

[1] The following abbreviations will be used, mostly as in the preceding articles. (Words dealt with in the first article will be marked with * those in the second with †.)

(*a*) Papyri. B.U.=*Berlin Urkunde.* P.P.=*Petrie Papyri.* B.M.=*British Museum Papyri.* T.P.=*Turin Papyri.* L.P.=*Leyden Papyri.* C.P.R.=*Corpus Papyrorum Raineri.* G.=Grenfell's *Greek Papyri* (1895). G.H.=*Gr. Pap.*, 2nd series, by Grenfell and Hunt. R.L.=*Revenue Law of Ptolemy Philadelphus.* O.P.=*Oxyrhynchus Papyri.* F.P.=*Fayûm Papyri.* A.P.=*Amherst Papyri.* Tb.P.=*Tebtunis Papyri.* To these add Ch.P.=

self to occurrences which antedate the Biblical writings, but have attempted merely to illustrate the use of words in the *κοινή*, whether classical or new, when they have been made use of by the sacred writers.

ἀβαρής.—B.U. 248 (2/) *ἐάν δέ σοι ἀβαρὲς ᾖ, χρῆσόν μοι ὀνάριον*. The physical sense is cited from Aristotle; the metaphysical, as in 2 Cor. xi. 9, appears in Plutarch (59c).

ἅδης.—Without suggesting that there is anything to be called a real parallel with Rev. xxi. 8, it may be worth while to quote O.P. 33 (see below under *γογγύζω*)—*τίς ἤδη τὸν δεύτερόν μου ἅδην προσκυνοῦντα καὶ τοὺς πρὸ ἐμοῦ τελευτήσαντας . . . μετεκαλέσατο*; i.e. "facing death for the second time."

ἀδικέω.—In the sense of *harming* something inanimate (Rev. vi. 6, vii. 2, 3—the latter paralleled in Thucydides), cf. B.C.H. 1902, p. 217: *ἐάν τις τὴν στήλην ἀδικήσει, κεχολωμένον ἔχοιτο Μῆνα καταχθόνιον*.

†*ἄδολος*.—A still earlier ex. of the formula containing this word is B.U. 1005 (iii/), *πυρὸν νέον ἄδολον κ[αθαρὸν ἀπὸ παντός]*.

αἰώνιος.—Without pronouncing any opinion on the special meaning which theologians have found for this word, I must note that outside the N.T., in the vernacular as in the classical Greek (see Thayer's *Grimm*), it never seems to shake off the sense of *perpetuus* (see Deissm. 383).

Chicago Papyri, ed. Goodspeed; N.P.=*Geneva Papyri*, ed. Nicole; M.P.=*Magdola Papyri* (in *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* [B.C.H.] 1902); B.P.=*Ptolemaic Papyri*, ed. Botti; *Archiv*=*Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, ed. Wilcken.

(*b*) Inscriptions. I.M.A.=*Inscr. Maris Aegaei*, first 3 vols. Letr.=*Inscr. lat. et grecques de l'Egypte*, ed. Letronne. J.H.S.=*Journal of Hellenic Studies*.

(*c*) iii/, ii/, i/=3rd, 2nd, 1st. cent. B.C.; 1/, 2/, etc.=1st, 2nd, etc. cent. A.D. (Where these are absent the document is undated.) Deissm.=Deissmann's *Bible Studies*. LS=Liddell and Scott WM=Winer-Moulton's *N.T. Grammar*.

It is a standing epithet of the Emperor's power, from Hadrian's time at least: B.U. 176, *τοῦ αἰωνίου κόσμου τοῦ κυρίου Καίσαρος*. Even in B.U. 303 (586 A.D.) and 309 (602 A.D.) we have still *τοῦ αἰωνίου Αὐγούστου* (Maurice). In B.U. 531 (2/) [*αἰω*]*νίαν μοι λοίπην* (i.e. *λύπην*) *παρέχειν μέλλεις* points the same way (see also below, on *ἀμετανόητος*).—The etymological note in Thayer's *Grimm*, though less antiquated than usual, suggests the addition of a statement on that side. *Αἰέν* is the old locative of *αἰών*, as *αἰές* is of **αἰώς* (acc. *αἰῶ* in Aeschylus), and *αἰεί*, *ἀεί* of **αἰόν* (Lat. *aevum*), three collateral declensions from the same root. In the Sanskrit *āyu* and its Zend equivalent the idea of *life*, and especially *long life*, predominates. So with the Germanic cognates (Gothic *aiws*). The word, whose root it is of course futile to dig for, is a primitive inheritance from Indo-Germanic days, when it may have meant "long life" or "old age"—perhaps the least abstract idea we can find for it in the prehistoric period, so as to account for its derivatives.

ἀκωλύτως.—The sonorous, literary-seeming word which closes the *Acts* is found in the vernacular as a legal word: O.P. 502 (2/) *χράσθω . . . τοῖς μισθουμένοις αὐτῇ ὡς πρόκειται ἐπὶ τὸν χρόνον ἀκωλύτως* (a lease, drawn according to legal formula); N.P. 11 (4/), 60, *δεσποτεύειν αὐτῶν ἀκωλύτως*.

ἀλέκτωρ.—See Rutherford, *New Phryn.* 307, for its history in classical Greek. It occurs in Tb.P. 140 (i/).

ἀληθινός.—Occurs in B.U. 742 (early 2/) . . .] *ἵνα σοι μεταδῶμεν, εἰ ταῖς ἀληθιναῖς ἀντὶ φερνῆς ἡ παραχώρησις ἐγένετο καὶ εἰ ἡ μονὴ προτέρα ἐγένετο τῆς σιτολ(ογίας)*. This sentence has two notable Johannine words, and the loss of its context is unfortunate. An inquiry into an *ἀπογραφή* follows. Also in a "*βίβλος ἀπόκριφος Μοῦσεως*," L.P. *w*. (2/3), *τὴν ἀληθινὴν μορφήν*.

ἀμετανόητος.—In G.H. 68 (3/) this late word comes in a formula repeated in *ib.* 70, the two documents being duplicate deeds of gift making over the fourth part of an undertaker's business. *ὁμολογῶ χαρίζεσθαι σοι χάριτι ἀναφαιρέτῳ καὶ ἀμετανοήτῳ . . . μέρος τέταρτον κ.τ.λ.* In the similar document, G.H. 71, *αἰωνίᾳ* replaces *ἀμεταμελήτῳ* in the same formula. It is passive, "not affected by change of mind," like *ἀμεταμέλητος* in Rom. xi. 29.

ἀμφότεροι.—On B.M. 336 (2/) Kenyon observes, "*ἀμφότεροι* = *πάντες* in late Byzantine Greek . . . and it is possible that colloquially the use existed earlier." The text here has the names of five men, "*ἀμφότεροι ἱερεῖς*." Despite Bury's paper on this late usage (*Class. Rev.* xi. 393), it is hard to disagree with Kenyon's suspicion that it was not only the last two of these five who were priests; and in Acts xix. 16 this interpretation of *ἀμφοτέρων* would undeniably simplify the narrative. My inclination to this account (which I repeat from my paper in *Class. Rev.* xv. 440) is somewhat strengthened by N.P. 67 and 69 (4/), where *ἀμφότεροι* is used of four men.

ἀπάντησις.—Tb.P. 43 (118 B.C.) *παρεγενήθημεν εἰς ἀπάντησιν* —a formal reception of a newly arriving magistrate—demolishes yet another "Hebraism." Polybius (v. 26) has *εἰς τὴν ἀπάντησιν*, "at his reception," which is not quite enough by itself to dispose of the derivation of the LXX. (anarthrous) phrase from לִקְרַאת.

ἀποστάσιον.—In B.U. 1002 (55 B.C., a copy of a demetic bill of sale "*μεθηρμηνευμένης κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν*") we have *ἀποστασίου συγγραφή*, "bond of relinquishing (the sold property)."

†*βαστάζω*.—For the meaning "carry away" (John xii. 6, xx. 15) B.U. 46 and 157 (both 2/)—cited by Deissmann—reinforce those I have given before. Is not this the meaning in Matt. iii. 11, referring to the well known custom of "removing" the guests' sandals as they en-

tered the entertainer's house? It would be the slave's work both to "take away the sandal," as here, and to "wash the feet," as in John xiii. Now that this use of *βαστάζω* is so firmly established for the vernacular, it seems far the easiest way out of a not very serious "difficulty." (Cf. Menzies in *Hibbert Journal*, ii. 186.) We may get on without the *splendide emendax*, Prof. Cheyne.

βιάζομαι.—The absolute use of *βιάζομαι*—see Deissm. 258—may be reinforced by M.P. 1 (iii/), as read by Crönert (*Rev. d'études grecques*, xvi. 192 ff.): *περὶ δὲ τοῦ βεβιασμένους* [*αὐ*]*τοὺς κατεσπαρκέναι*. Add Tb.P. 6 (ii/) *τινὰς δὲ καὶ βιαζομένους*, "some who even take forcible possession." Whether this is to be used in Matt. xi. 12 is another matter: to me at any rate it seems most improbable. But it helps to destroy Cremer's argument (*ap.* Deissm. *l.c.*). With Luke xvi. 16 cf. F.P. p. 48 *μηδενὸς εἰσ*[*βιαζο*]*μένου* (suppl. Strack), date ii/i. Strack, cf. T.P. 1 (ii/) *εἴπαμεν τῶι μὲν Ἑρμίαι μὴ εἰσβιάζεσθαι*, and L.P. *g* (i/). Add B.U. 1004 (iii/). In Arrian's account of Alexander's death we have *βιάσασθαι ἰδεῖν*.

γαστήρ.—The phrase *ἐν γαστρὶ ἔχειν*, found in Herodotus, has early Hellenistic warrant in M.P. 4 (iii/).

†*γλωσσόκομον*.—Add for this form O.P. 521 (2/). Outside Hellenistic (cf. Hicks, *Stud. Bibl.* iv. 5) it occurs twice near the end of the Will of Epicteta, a lengthy Doric inscription from Thera, dated by Michel (*Recueil d'inscr. grecques*, 789 ff.) about 200 B.C. The shorter form, seen in the N.T., is thus very well attested. B.U. 824 (1/) has *γλοσσοκομῖον*.

γογγύζω.—O.P. 33 (2/) *Κύριε, κάθῃ, Ῥωμαῖοι γογγύζουσι*, "Lord, you sit still, the Romans are murmuring." This most interesting papyrus reports an interview between Marcus Aurelius and a rebel, whom the Emperor tries hard to save from his fate, showing extraordinary forbearance with the man's rude bluster.

γυμνός.—The familiar sense of γυμνός = "with only the χιτών" comes out well in M.P. 6 (iii/) ὡς ἤμην γυμνὸς ὑπ' αὐτῶν: the complainant had been stripped of his ἱμάτιον.

δειπνέω.—In O.P. 524 (2/) (cf. 111 in same terms, also F.P. 132, both from 3/) there is the following invitation to a wedding δεῖπνον: ἐρωτᾷ σε Διονύσιος δειπνῆσαι εἰς τοὺς γάμους τῶν τέκνων ἑαυτοῦ ἐν τῇ Ἰσχυρίω(νος) α[ὔριον] ἥτις ἐστὶν λ ἀπὸ ὥρας [θ]. The hour, 3 p.m., is filled in from O.P. 110, 523 (see below, κλίνη). The time illustrates the elasticity of δεῖπνον, "dinner," and relieves some of the difficulty in Luke xiv. 16 ff., where an ἄριστον seems demanded by the details.

δέον ἐστί.—B.U. 981 (79 A.D.) ὡς δέον ἐστί σε ἐπιστεῖλαι shows a construction found in ℵ^{c}ACKLP, etc., in 1 Pet. i. 6.

διαβάλλω.—Tb.P. 23 (ii/) ἀπέφαινεν ἠδικῆσθαι ὑπὸ σοῦ καὶ Δημητρίωι ἠναγκάσθαι διαβαλεῖν, "had been compelled to complain to D," shows that malice need not be assumed in Luke xvi. 1 any more than falsehood.

δικαιώματα twice in T.P. 1 (ii/) means apparently "arguments of counsel": thus παραναγινωσκομένων αὐτοῖς ἐξ ὧν παρέκειντο δικαιωμάτων ὧν ἑκάτερος ᾑρεῖτο.

διότι = ὅτι in B.U. 1011 (ii/) διότι γὰρ πολλὰ ληρώιδη καὶ ψευδῆ προσαγγέλλεται, κατανοεῖς καὶ αὐτός. So in Rom. viii. 21 according to ℵD*FG.

διχοτομέω.—The word occurs in a Christian inscription from Lycaonia (3/), published in J.H.S. 1902 (p. 369), with the meaning "tear one's heart asunder." See the text in my paper in *Expos. Times*, 1903, p. 430.

δοκίμιος.—Add to Deissm. 259, B.U. 717 (2/) χρυσίου δοκιμείου "pure gold."

δόκιμος.—The combination of Rom. xiv. 18 (cf. xii. 2) is partly illustrated by a papyrus of 153 A.D. (*Atene e Roma*, March 1901), ἀργύριον δόκιμον νομειτευόμενον ἀρεστόν. In the same papyrus the Lucan διετία occurs (Deissm.

258); also *ἐμβαδεύειν εἰς αὐτόν*, "enter into possession of" a house, which is presumably the (class.) word found in the MSS. text of Col. ii. 18.

δῶμα.—In O.P. 475 (2/) *βουληθεὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ δώματος τῆς αὐτῆς οἰκίας παρακύψαι καὶ θεάσασθαι τὰς κροταλιστρίδας*—of a young slave who was killed in trying to see a performance of castanet-players in the street below—"*δῶμα* clearly indicates a room on an upper floor, and probably means the same as *δωμάτιον*, i.e. a bedchamber" (G. and H.). "The top of the house" is clearly the meaning, whether a top room or the flat roof (as in N.T.).

†*εἶ μήν*.—Tb.P. 22 (112 B.C.) is slightly earlier than the occurrence I previously gave. I have now five passages from 1/ to warrant this form, and two from ii/; Deissm. has one from 1/ and two from i/. Its true vernacular character is at any rate clear, however we explain it.

ἐκτινάσσω.—In the illiterate B.U. 827 we find *ἐκτίνασσε τὰ ἔρια καὶ τὰ ἱμάτια*, apparently as part of a "spring cleaning."

†*ἐλαιών*.—The existence of this noun in Acts i. 12 is still denied by Blass (*Grammatik*,[2] 33), even to the extent of removal by conjecture. The exceeding frequency of its occurrence in the papyri was noted in my former paper. I may add that the formation is a favourite one; to my *φοινικών* (for which add N.P. 38 (3/)—also Aelian and Josephus) add now *καμηλών*, "camel-shed," O.P. 507 (2/), 533 (2/3), B.U. 393 (2/)—cf. *ἱππών*. The specializing of the *-ών* suffix ("place of . . .," as in *ἀνδρών*, *γυναικών*, *κοιτών*, etc.) for *groves* is found in *δαφνών*, *ἀμπελών*, *φηγών*, *πιτυών*, *μηλών*, *κυπαρισσών*, *συκών*, *Ἑλικών* ("willow mountain")—the last a specially good parallel for *Ἐλαιών*, if the etymology is sound. Cf. Brugmann, *Kurze Vergl. Gramm.* § 414.

†*ἐν*.—In O.P. 488 (2/3) *παρέγραψεν πλέον τῆς ὑποστάσεώς μου ἐν ὅλῃ ἀρούρῃ μίᾳ καὶ πρὸς κατ' ἔτος*—"registered

more than any actual substance *by* one whole aroura and more each year"—yet another example of the tendency to attach ἐν to a simple dative without really altering the sense. The growing confusion of εἰς and ἐν is well shown by Hatzidakis, *Einleitung*, 210; but we should not be justified in treating it as more than inchoate in 1/.

†ἐν τοῖς.—Add O.P. 523 (2/) ἐν τοῖς Κλαυδίου, "at C.'s house."

ἐνεδρεύω.—O.P. 484 (2/) διέσταλκέν μοι ὡς ἐνεδρεύσαντι Δίδυμον . . . περὶ πυροῦ, "has served on me a charge of *defrauding* D. about some wheat." Cf. Demosthenes, 836. 13, εἰ μὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἐνηδρεύθημεν, "*deceived* by time" (LS).

ἔνοχος.—In an edict of the prefect Aulus Avillius Flaccus (1/), we find θανάτωι ἔνοχος ἔσ[τω], which prompts Wilcken (*Archiv* i. 169) to observe on Matt. xxvi. 66 that the prefect writes better Greek than the Evangelist. "Or is the illogical gen. θανάτου only a MS. corruption due to the fusion of *u* and *o* vowels in the later vernacular?" The dat. after ἔνοχος is perpetual in the phrase ἦ ἔνοχος εἴην τῷ ὅρκῳ.

ἐπακολουθέω.—N.P. 22 (37–8 A.D.) ἐπηκολλούθηκα τῇ προκειμένῃ διαγραφῇ.

†ἐπιβαλών.—I am encouraged by Dr. Kenyon to suspect that first thoughts were best here, after all. Mark xiv. 72 has to be reckoned with in any case; and when we find ἐπιβαλὼν συνέχωσεν in a Ptolemaic papyrus, an *à priori* probability may be admitted for a similar meaning in the two passages. Now though ἐπιβολή certainly means "banking up" in Tb.P. 13, and perhaps also in the fragmentary B.U. 1003 (iii/), we have not yet found an example of ἐπιβάλλω = ἐπιβολὴν ποιοῦμαι. On the contrary, in the Gizeh Ptolemaic papyri, published by Drs. Grenfell and Hunt in *Archiv* i. 57 ff., we have ὑπάρχοντος ἐν τῇ σημαινομένῃ πόλει βασιλικοῦ χώματος, ἐπιβαλόντες

δὲ κ.τ.λ., where the proximity of χῶμα does not prevent ἐπιβ. meaning "attack." I incline therefore to return to my first view, that Euthymius' gloss ἀρξάμενος ("set to and . . .") was essentially right, supported as it is by the ἤρξατο κλαίειν of D, the Old Syriac, the Peshitta, Gothic, etc.

ἐρωτάω.—In the sense of αἰτέω this is really too common to need illustration; Deissm. has only a few citations, but they may be multiplied indefinitely, and שְׁאַל certainly need trouble us no more.

εὐσχήμων.—B.U. 926 (2/) παραγενομένων τῶν κρατίστων εὐσχημόνων shows the word as a title, which illustrates the use in Acts. So B.U. 147 (2/3).

ἡγοῦμαι.—The participle ἡγούμενος (Heb. xiii. 7, Acts xv. 22, etc.) is a title: B.U. 270 (2/) ἡγούμ. κώμης; O.P. 294 (1/) ὁ ἡγούμενος τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, "the marshal of the strategus"; F.P. 110 (2/), etc. In F.P. p. 264 G. and H. have a note on the various meanings of this "ambiguous title," which sometimes describes a president and sometimes an underling of an official.

ἡλικία.—The word is common, but I do not remember a place where it means "stature." It often denotes "manhood," as B.U. 168 (2/), τοῖς ἀτελέσι ἔχουσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, "of age."

ἡσυχία.—B.U. 614 (3/) τὰς ἡσυχίας με ἄξοντα. A curious use of the adverb in L.P. *n* (ii/), ἔνσιμος ἡσυχῇ, "*mildly* snub-nosed"!

καινός.—Ch.P. 30 (2/) καινῷ καμηλείτῃ, "a new camel-driver." We have also οἴνου καινοῦ, *ib.* The word is presumably obsolete in the modern vernacular, if one may judge by the title of Palles' version, "ἡ νέα διαθήκη."

καμηλικός.—In O.P. 498 (2) we find καμηλικοὶ λίθοι, stones not too heavy for a camel, but too heavy for other beasts. This is remarkably like μύλος ὀνικός, Mark ix. 42, which

has not, I believe, been paralleled hitherto. (Noted in *Athenæum* for Nov. 7). *Ὀνικός* itself occurs B.U. 913 (1/).

κατὰ λόγον.—This phrase (Acts xviii. 14) occurs in Ch.P. 4 (ii/)—an "*ἐπιστολὴ συστατική*" (2 Cor. iii. 1)—*εἰ ἔρρωσαι καὶ τἆλλα σοι κατὰ λόγον ἐστίν.* Also B.P. 3 (Ptolemaic), same formula.

καταβαρέω.—O.P. 487 (2/) *ἐμοῦ καταβαρηθέντος ἐν ταῖς λιτουργίαις* shows this Pauline word in a very uneducated document.

*†*καταντάω.*—Add O.P. 481 (1/), 482 (2/) and B.U. 902 (2/) to my list for the meaning "descend to an heir."

κατατίθεμαι.—B.U. 596 (1/) *τοῦτο ποιήσας ἔσῃ μοι μεγάλην χάριταν κατατεθειμένος.* The phrase (twice in Acts) is classical.

καταφρονέω.—N.P. 6 (2/), *τὸν Πεκῦσιν καταφρονεῖν μου τῆς ἡλικίας*, is much like 1 Tim. iv. 12, even to the position of the pronoun. So N.P. 31 (2/) *καταφρονῶν μου τῆς χηρείας*, and similarly M.P. 2 *καταφρονῶν ὅτι ὁ ἀνήρ μου τετελεύτηκεν.* The formula is accordingly associated with petitions from defenceless people wronged by those who presumed on their defencelessness; the word does not denote a mere feeling of contempt—it is *active.* We may infer that Timothy is told not to let men *push him aside* as a stripling; and in all the N.T. passages the action encouraged by contempt seems implied, rather than the mental state.

κιβωτός.—This (classical) word appears in F.P. 121 (1/) *ἐν τῇι κειβωτῶι τῶν ἀσκῶν ἧι ἔχεις παρὰ σοί.* So B.U. 717, together with *κόφινος.*

**κλίνη.*—To the invitation note quoted in my first paper (p. 279 f.) may be added the following: O.P. 523 (2/) *ἐρωτᾷ σε Ἀντώνιο(ς) Πτολεμ(αίου) διπνῆσ(αι) παρ' αὐτῶι εἰς κλείνην τοῦ κυρίου Σαράπιδος ἐν τοῖς Κλαυδ(ίου) Σαραπίω(νος) τῆι ις ἀπὸ ὥρας θ.* Notice the advance here

upon the other (O.P. 110), where the feast was at the Serapeum: when the idol's table was set in a private house, the difficulty of avoiding the *εἰδωλόθυτον* must have been specially great, if the Christian was not to avoid all social intercourse with heathen neighbours. The document illustrates Lightfoot's vivid pages (*Historical Essays*, 15 ff.) on "the *ubiquity*, the *obtrusiveness*, the *intrusiveness* of paganism." [1]

κολλάω.—F.P. 112 (1/), a letter from the illiterate farmer Gemellus alluded to at the end of my last paper, has *καὶ μὴ τοῦς* (=*τοῖς*) [. . .?. . .] *ἀριθμὸν ταυρικὸν κόλλα*, "do not unite a number of bulls to (or *with*) the [?]." The lacuna prevents our defining *κολλάω* exactly, which is the more unfortunate as this is the only citation I can make for this common N.T. word, except the 4/ magic papyrus B.M. 46.

†*κοράσιον*.—Add B.M. 331 (2/), where it means "lad." Also B.U. 887 (2/), 913 (3/), of female slaves.

κοσμοκράτωρ.—The Emperor Caracalla receives this title in an Egyptian inscription (*Archiv* ii. 431 ff., no. 83.

κτάομαι.—Occurrences of pres. and aor. may help some difficult N.T. passages. Tb.P. 5 (ii/) they have decreed . . . *μηδ' ἄλλους κτᾶσθαι μηδὲ χρῆσθαι κ.τ.λ.*, "nor shall any other persons *take possession of* or use the tools." O.P. 259 (23 A.D.), I swear *εἶ μὴν κτήσεσθαι ἡμέρας τριάκοντα ἐν αἷς ἀποκαταστήσω* "that I *have* 30 days"; *ib. μὴ ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντός μου χρόνον ἕτερον κτήσεσθαι μηδὲ μετάγειν, κ.τ.λ.* "I have no power to *obtain* a further period of time":—here we seem to have the rather com-

[1] One does not differ lightly from Sanday and Headlam, but I find it hard to believe that Rom. xiv. has no special reference. The libations and the *εἰδωλόθυτα* which would be in evidence at every banquet would perpetually force the example of Daniel and his companions upon the thoughts especially of Jewish Christians, who presumably supplied most of these scrupulous *ἀσθενεῖς*. St. Paul wishes his reference to have an absolutely general application, and therefore abstains from specializing it as in 1 Corinthians.

mon confusion of aor. and fut. infin. O.P. 337 (2/) *καὶ ὧν ἐὰν καὶ ἴδια κτήσωνται μεθέτερα.*

†*κύριος.*—In addressing a brother or other near relative, add N.P. 50 (3/) *κυρίῳ μου ἀδελφῷ*, 52 *κύριε πάτερ*, 55, 57 *κ. ἄδελφε.* O.P. 528 (2/) *τῇ ἀδελφῇ καὶ κυρίᾳ.*

λικμάω.—Still literal in B.U. 698 (2/).

†*λογεία.*—There is a note on this word in O.P. ii. 184. It "is used for irregular local contributions as opposed to regular taxes"—an excellent illustration of the Pauline use. The editors further refer to some exx. quoted by Wilcken (*Ostraka*, i. 253 ff.), where the reference is to a tax for the priests of Isis: in B.U. 515 (2/) also it "may mean a contribution for religious purposes." *λογεύω* occurs in Tb.P. 5 (118 B.C.) and 6 (140 B.C.).

†*λούομαι.*—To my former illustration of Matt. vi. 17 add O.P. 528 (2) *ιβ φαῶφι ἀφ' ὅτε ἐλουσάμην μετ' ἐσοῦ οὐκ ἐλουσάμην οὐκ ἤλιμ(μ)ε (=ἤλειμμαι) μέχρει ιβ Ἀθύρ.* Note the precision with which the fond husband observes an exact month's abstinence from the bath, by way of moving his hard-hearted wife to return.

†*μεσιτεύω.*—The derived *μεσιτεία* in B.U. 445 (2/) *ἐκ τῶν τῆς μ. ἀρουρῶν.* So 907 (2/) with *ὑποθήκη.* The verb is in B.U. 906 (1/) and 709 (2/).

μενοῦνγε.—The position of this at the beginning of a clause in Rom. x. 18 (cf. Luke xi. 28) may be paralleled by *μέντοιγε* standing first, O.P. 531 (2/), A.P. 135 (2/).

†*μικρός.*—For *μ.* in the place of a surname (like Mark xv. 40) add especially N.P. 28 (2) *παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ Στοτοήτιος ἐπικαλουμένου Μικροῦ*, which I must confess is not encouraging to the meaning *junior*, though one remembers that in America to-day there would be nothing unusual in finding "Stotoetis jr." the father of a grown-up son. Further exx. are Ch.P. 30 (2/) *μικρῷ Ἀφροδ(ισίῳ), Ἀφροδ. καμηλ(είτῃ) μικ., Ἀφροδ. μικ. quater*—other persons of the same name figure in this ledger, twice without de-

scription, then *Ἀ. τέκτονι, ποιμένι Ἀ.*, and twice before a lacuna. O.P. 530 (2/) *Θαισοῦν τὴν μικράν* (following *ἀσπάζου τὰ παιδία . . .*, which seems to include Thaisous); 533 (2/3) *ἀσπάσασθε τὸν μεικρὸν Σερῆνον καὶ Κοπρέα καὶ τοὺς ἡμῶν πάντας κατ' ὄνομα* (a grown-up Serenus figures earlier in the letter); 582 (2/) *λέγοντα δεδωκέναι τῇ μεικρᾷ*. For the meaning *junior* Leemans' (*ap.* Deissm. 144) remains the only certain evidence.

μογιλάλος.—O.P. 465 (a 2/ copy of a probably Ptolemaic astrological calendar) *οὗτος ποιεῖ νάνους τίκτεσθαι . . . οὗτος μογιλάλα, οὗτος κωφά, οὗτος νωδά*, etc. This may be the earliest appearance of the word, except perhaps that in LXX.

μονή.—B.U. 742 (early 2/)—see under *ἀληθινός* above. It is apparently the term of residence which was ended by the *παραχώρησις*.

νεκροί.—In J.H.S. xix. 92, a sepulchral inscr. of 2/, we have *χαῖρέ μοι μῆτερ γλυκυτάτη καὶ φροντίζετε ἡμῶν ὅσα ἐν νεκροῖς*—the correlative of the N.T. *ἐκ νεκρῶν*. Note the alternation of singular and plural where the reference is identical.

νή.—O.P. 33 (2/) *νὴ τὴν σὴν τύχην οὔτε μαίνομαι οὔτε ἀπονενόημαι, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ εὐγενείας . . . ἀπαγγέλλω* (cf. Acts xxvi. 25). B.U. 884 (2/3) *νὴ γὰρ τοὺς θεοὺς οὐκ ἔχωι λοιπὸν τί σοι γράψωι*. Note *νή* with negatives: in 1 Cor. xv. 31 used correctly.

νῖκος.—Apparently for *νίκη* in B.U. 1002 (55 B.C.).

†*ὁμολογέω*.—B.P. 2 (Ptolemaic) will illustrate the very common meaning *promise* (class.), as in Matt. xiv. 7 *al.* For the meaning *declare* may be cited the recurring formula *ὁμολογῶ ἀπέχειν* in receipts.

†*Ὀνήσιμος*.—Add N.P. 4 (3/), name of an official, and a relief sacred to Zeus, lately found at Cyzicus, J.H.S. xxiii. 75 ff., no. 19. (The name *Τρυφῶσα* occurs in no. 17.) For *Χρήσιμος* add O.P. 478 (2/), the second

name of Dionysius, a citizen of Oxyrhynchus; and Τι. Κλαυδίου Χρησίμου in an Egyptian inscr. (1/), *Archiv* ii. 431 ff., no. 30.

*†οὐ μή.—Add B.P. 4 (Ptolemaic) εἰ μὴ τὴν μήκωνα [*sic leg.* ed. *Μήκωνα*] συνάξεις, οὐδείς σε ἀνθρώπων μὴ ὠφελήσηι. There is no doubt about the emphasis here. See my note on N.P. 51 in *Expos. Times*, 1903, p. 429. I shall return to the subject in the EXPOSITOR shortly.

οὐχ ὁ τυχών.—Add to Deissm. 255 T.P. 1 (ii/) εἰς οὐ τὰ τυχόντα βλάβη, and N.P. 3 (2/) πληγὰς οὐ τὰς τυχούσας ἡμεῖν ἐπήνεγκεν. (Deissmann's B.U. 36 is now dated in Trajan's reign.)

†παρά.—Cf. for 1 Cor. xii. 15 M.P. 11 (iii/), where παρὰ τὸ c. inf. occurs thrice meaning *because*. (See WM. 504.) In B.U. 998 (101 B.C.) τῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ *bis* seems to be "his family": I need not cite some additional passages for the meaning "agents."

παραθήκη.—C.P.R. 29 (2/) γέγονε εἰς με ἡ π. B.U. 856 (early 2/) ἀποτεισάτωσαν . . . [τὴν παρα]θήκην διπλῆν. 1004 (iii/) ἃς εἶχεν ἐν π. παρὰ τῆς μητρός.

παρακύπτω.—O.P. 475 (2/—quoted above under δῶμα) shows very clearly the meaning "look down," thus reinforcing Hort's argument on 1 Pet. i. 12.

παροξύνομαι.—*Archiv* i. 202 shows this class. word in an inscr. of iii/ ἐφ' οἷς παροξυνόμενοι οἱ νεώτεροι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι π[ολῖτ]αι οἱ αἱρ[ούμενοι] βέλτιον [πολιτεύεσθ]αι κ.τ.λ.

πλεονεκτέω.—A.P. 78 (2/) μ[ου] πλεονεκτῖ "overreaches me." F.P. 124 (2/) has the noun, of a son who defrauds his mother of her allowance.

†πληροφορέω.—Add O.P. 509 (2/) πεπληροφορημένος τοῖς ὀφειλομένοις μοι, "paid in full." B.U. 747 (2/) in same sense.

ποταπός.—This Hellenistic form occurs in the mime fragment, O.P. 413 (Roman period), ποταπὰ περιπατεῖς; "where are you walking from?"

προβεβηκώς.—T.P. 1 (ii/) π. ἤδη τοῖς ἔτεσιν (class.). Luke adds ἐν, whereof more hereafter.

πρόνοιαν ποιοῦμαι.—*Archiv* i. 169 (1/), A.P. 40 (ii/) *al.* As early as Demosthenes with gen., as in Rom. xiii. 14, and so A.P. 137 (3/), 144 (5/).

πρὸς.—B.U. 113 (2/) π. καιρὸν παρεπιδημεῖν, "for a time," not as in Sophocles = καιρίως. J.H.S. xix. 302 (Christian) ὃς δὲ [ἂν κακὴν] κεῖραν (= χεῖρα) προσενένκῃ, ἔστε (= ἔσται) αὐτῷ πρὸς θεόν: cf. Heb. iv. 13.

προσευχή.—Among Strack's Ptolemaic inscriptions (*Archiv* ii. 536 ff.) there are notes of five Jewish "places of prayer" in Upper Egypt, and many in Lower. Strack remarks that the Jews do not hesitate to dedicate their προσευχή for the welfare of the king, but they never give him the usual divine title. Note especially one inscr. from Upper Egypt (iii/) βαθιλεὺς Πτολ. Εὐεργέτης τὴν προσευχὴν ἄσυλον—a remarkable privilege to grant.

προσέχω.—Absol. = *attend* (class.), in M.P. 22 (iii/) ὁ δὲ οὐ προσέσχεν.

προσκαρτερέω.—Common in papyri, as O.P. 484 (2/), to *attend* a court, 486, etc.

προσφάγιον.—B.U. 916 (1). O.P. 498 (2/) a stone-cutter's wages to be 4 drachmae a day, with ἄρτου ἕνα καὶ προσφάγιον, "a loaf and relish" (G. and H.). The apostles had presumably taken ἄρτοι with them as usual (cf. Mark viii. 14, an isolated omission) in the fishing expedition of John xxi.: the question of Jesus (*v.* 5) relates to the other element in an ordinary meal.

σαργάνη.—B.U. 417 (2/3), B.M. 236 (4/); σαργανείλων (gen.) in Ch.P. 30 (191 A.D.) is supposed by the editor to be a diminutive.

Σιλβανός.—The name is common, and regularly so spelt, except in B.U. 954 (6/). O.P. 335 (85 A.D.) is interesting: a house is bought from Παῦλος by Νικαίᾳ Σιλ[βα]νῷ Φουβίου τῶν ἀπ' Ὀξ(υρύγχων) πόλ(εως) Ἰουδαίων. I have noted half-a-dozen later exx.

σκεῦος.—Its general character is well maintained. There is the common phrase ἐπίπλοα σκεύη "moveables (and)

furniture." Thrice in G.H. = effects, property, once that of a church. So in O.P. 139 (7/) *μηχανικὰ σκεύη*, 348 (2/3) *σκεύη κλίνης*.

†*σκύβαλον*.—*Σκύβαλος*, O.P. 43 (3/), is a proper name (of a dyer)!

σπεκουλάτωρ.—Ch.P. 30 (2/) *σπεκουλ(άτορι)*.

στιβάς.—Still = *mattress* in O.P. 520 (2/).

†*συμψάω*.—Cf. *καταψάω* in B.U. 1011 (ii/) *σοῦ τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας καταψῶντος*, presumably, as in Polybius, "to smoothe down."

συνείδησις.—Cf. O.P. 532 (2/), where the neuter *συνειδός* is used in this sense—*ὑπὸ κακοῦ συνειδότος κατεχόμενος*.

συνευωχέομαι.—B.U. 596 (1/).

συνίστημι.—In sense *commend* (class.) common in papyri. P.P. 30 (iii/) *πολλάκις μὲν γέγραφά σοι παραγενέ[σ]θαι καὶ συστῆσαί με ὅπως . . . ἀπολυθῶ*. O.P. 330, 331, 332, 334 (all 1/) *ὁ συνεσταμένος ὑπὸ (τοῦ δεινός)*. See above under *κατὰ λόγον*.

†*σῶμα*.—A clear case of *σώματα* = *slaves* in O.P. 493 (early 2/), *τὰ ἄπρατα τῶν σωμάτων*.

σωτήρ.—Some vivid light by contrast is thrown on John iv. 42 and 1 John iv. 14 by an Egyptian inscription in *Archiv* ii. 431 ff., no. 24. *Νέρωνι . . . τῶι σωτῆρι καὶ εὐεργέτηι* (cf. Luke xxii. 25) *τῆς οἰκουμένης*! Of course both these titles were claimed regularly by the Ptolemies, and the same phrase is used by Vespasian (no. 28; but the *τῆς οἰκουμένης* is peculiar to Nero. If Nero is to be recognized in the Apocalypse (which is perhaps not quite axiomatic), his appropriation of this title is in striking accord with the principle which in this Book always makes the devilish parody the Divine. (I may refer to my treatment of this in Hastings' *D.B.* iv. 992*a*.)

ὑπέρ.—In accounts = "on a/c of": *ὑπὲρ ὀψωνίου* O.P. 514 (2/), *ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ ἐργατῶν* 522 (2/), etc.

ὑπόστασις.—There is a note on the technical force of this

common word (=*property*, as O.P. 138) in O.P. ii. p. 176. It is used for "the whole body of documents bearing on the ownership of a person's property, deposited in the archives, and forming the evidence of ownership." This gives a striking sense in Heb. xi. 1: "Faith is the *title-deed* of things hoped for."

φαινόλιον.—With this spelling (contr. *φελόνης* in 2 Tim. iv. 13), O.P. 531 (2/) *τῶν πορφυρῶν φ.* "purple cloaks." But in B.U. 816 (3/) *φαι*[λο]*νίων* is read by Wilcken.

φάσις.—T.P. 1 (ii/) *φάσεσι*=*verbis tantum*. B.U. 830 (1/) *ἔπεμψέ μοι φάσιν ὅτι Πρόσχες αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ.* "a message."

φθάνω.—For *φ. εἴς τινα* cf. B.U. 613 (2/); 522 (2/) *τῆς εἰς ἅπαντός* (=*-ἁς*) *σου φιλανθρωπίας κύριε φθανούσης* (gen. abs.). Other uses: A.P. 72 (2/) *φθάσασα*=*at once*; O.P. 237 (2/) *ὅτι φθάνει τὸ πρᾶγμα ἀκρειβῶς ἐξητασμένον*; *ib.* *εἰ ἔφθακας ἅπαξ προῖκα δοὺς τῇ θυγατρί σου, ἀποκατάστησον*; G. 53 (4/) *φθάνομεν ἀποδείξειν*.

φιλοστοργία.—Common in wills, where bequests are made *φ. ἕνεκεν*, or *κατὰ φ.* So O.P. 490, 492 (2), J.H.S. xix. 91 (2/).

χάρις τῷ θεῷ.—For this parenthetical phrase (cf. 1 Cor. xiv. 18) cf. B.U. 843 (1/2) *γωνώσκειν σε θέλω ὅτι χάρις τοῖς θεοῖς ἱκάμην εἰς Ἀ. ἓξ ἡμέρες* (=*-αις*). In P.P. 29 (iii/), as in Rom. vi. 17, it is a main clause—*χάρις τοῖς θεοῖς πολλὴ εἰ ὑγιαίνεις*.

χρεία.—With *ἀναγκαία* (Tit. iii. xiv.) in G.H. 14 (iii/), c. gen. and *ἔχω*. For Acts vi. 3 cf. B.U. 18 (2/) *παραγγέλλεται* (=*-ϵ*) *ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς ἐγχιρισθείσης αὐτοῖς χρείας*.

χρόνος.—Sometimes the Modern Greek meaning *year* seems to be approaching. So the Christian inscription (J.H.S. 1902, p. 369—referred to above under *διχοτομέω*) *τῇ συνζησάσᾳ μοι χρόνους ὀλίγους*; and note N.P. 50 (3/), where in the formula *ἐρρῶσθαί σε ὡς πλείστοις ἔτεσειν εὔχομαι*, the word *ἔτεσιν* takes the place of the usual *χρόνοις*: the writer is rather a "Baboo" Greek.

JAMES HOPE MOULTON.

THE TEACHING OF CHRIST.

VI.

We have now taken the evidence of the four Gospels severally in reference to the Teaching of our Lord. Each Gospel has yielded its special contribution to the great subject, and has impressed upon us its characteristic view. It remains in this last paper to collect the results, without regard to the sources from which they have been obtained.

Irenaeus, in a well known passage, represents the Gospels as a "quadriform" unity; a single Gospel, presenting four aspects of the One Incarnate Life.[1] This conception expresses a spiritual fact. When we compare the Synoptic Gospels with one another, and their united testimony with that of the fourth Gospel, we become conscious that notwithstanding wide differences of matter and treatment, the four are fundamentally agreed in their portrait of the Master and their presentation of His teaching. The same Teacher speaks in all. This conviction justifies us in combining their evidence for the purpose of gaining a general view; indeed, such a process is a necessary complement to the separate examination of the documents.

1. Our Lord began His Galilean ministry by announcing that the Kingdom of God was at hand.[2] This idea was at once the starting-point of His teaching and its basal truth. The term is nearly limited to the Synoptists, and possibly it was not used by Jesus in His public preaching except in Galilee;[3] but the conception meets us everywhere.

[1] Iren. iii. 11. 8, *ὁ τῶν ἁπάντων τεχνίτης λόγος . . . ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν τετράμορφον τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, ἑνὶ δὲ πνεύματι συνεχόμενον.*

[2] Mark i. 15; Matt. iv. 17.

[3] In St. John it occurs only in the conversation with Nicodemus (iii. 3, 15).

The term itself was not new,[1] but the conception was transfigured under the hands of Christ; its full contents were revealed for the first time. The faith of the Psalmists and Prophets had pictured the Almighty Ruler of the world as seated on His throne in the highest heaven, and from thence directing and controlling the universe. So far as the Divine Kingdom had its seat on earth, it was located at Jerusalem, and its representative was the reigning King of the Davidic line, or when that line ceased, the expected Messiah. Jesus did not disturb these convictions, which indeed embodied substantial truth. But the Christian idea rises far above them. As Christ preached it, the Kingdom of Heaven is not a territorial empire, whether limited to the land of Israel or co-extensive with the world, but a personal reign, the rule and sway of God over the hearts and lives of men. This Kingdom of God is not "here" or "there"; it has no local centre; its seat is in the inner man.[2] It finds its expression in character and life. Its practical results may be learned from the Beatitudes which stand on the threshold of Christ's New Law. They propound the paradox of the Christian life—the blessedness of spiritual poverty and sorrow, of self-forgetfulness and self-dissatisfaction; they exalt into the first rank of virtues the mercy, the purity of heart, the labouring for peace, which reflect the character of God.[3] As the Sermon proceeds, it reveals the new attitude towards God upon which this life rests: an attitude which brings a constant sense of His presence, a firm trust in His love, submission to His will, desire of His approval, imitation of His perfections.[4] To live thus is to

[1] For examples of its use in pre-Christian Jewish literature see *Ps. Sol.* xvii. 4, ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ ἡμῶν. *Orac. Sibyll.*, iii. 47, βασιλεία μεγίστη ἀθανάτου βασιλῆος ἐπ' ἀνθρώποισι φανεῖσα. For its use in the Targums cf Deissmann, *Words of Jesus*, etc., p. 91 ff.

[2] Luke xvii. 21.

[3] Matt. v. 1–9.

[4] Matt. v. 45, 46, vi. 1, 4, 6, 19, 25 ff.; vii. 11.

reverse the general aims and conduct of mankind; the man who would enter the Kingdom, or even discern its true nature, must be born from above, of water and the Spirit, since only that which is born of the Spirit is spirit, i.e. possesses an affinity to the spiritual nature of God or a capacity for spiritual truth.[1]

While the Kingdom of God, as it was taught by our Lord, is primarily the present exercise of the Divine sway over hearts dominated by the Spirit, He looks forward to the extension of this spiritual reign until it has covered the earth with subjects of the Kingdom and issues in a sinless life of unimaginable glory in the presence of God. Thus He teaches His disciples to pray "Thy Kingdom come," although they had already received the Kingdom in its initial stage. Though the reign of God begins within, it works its way from the centre of human life to the circumference, and from the individual life to society in general; it is as leaven which, hidden in the meal, spreads until the whole is leavened.[2]

2. It is noteworthy that in all this teaching about the Kingdom of God mention is scarcely ever made of God as King[3]; when the King appears, it is usually Christ Himself, exercising supreme authority in His Messianic character, as God's Representative.[4] Of God Jesus speaks usually as Father; "My Father," "thy Father," "your Father," or simply "the Father," without indicating the person or persons to whom He stands in a paternal relation. The idea was taken over from the Old Testament; the Prophets teach the Fatherhood of God. But it is in the teaching of Christ that this view of God becomes for the first time a dominant note. In the Sermon alone, this

[1] John iii. 3, 5 f.
[2] Matt. xiii. 33.
[3] See, however, Matt. v. 35, xviii. 23, xxii. 2.
[4] E.g. in Matt. xxv. 34–40, xxviii. 18; John xviii. 37.

title is used seventeen times; even in the second Gospel it finds a place, whilst in the fourth it meets us at every point. Moreover, on the lips of Christ it receives a new meaning, and is little short of a new revelation. In the Gospels, God is not simply the Father of Israel in virtue of His covenant with the chosen people, or the Father of all men, inasmuch as they are His rational creatures, made in His image and after His likeness; the relation is at once more fundamental and more intimate. The Fatherhood of God, as it is seen in the light of the Gospel, is the counterpart of the Love of God, which embraces the world and is not finally alienated even by its sin. No unworthiness however great, no fall however deep, no separation however long, destroys the relation; it is held in suspense, it is dormant till repentance comes, but it still exists. When the sinner turns to his Father, he finds that the Father has been waiting for him; a welcome is ready: he takes his place in the Divine household, not as a servant but as a son; there is joy not only in the presence of the angels but in the fatherly Heart of God. From that hour there begins the regular exchange of paternal and filial intercourse; trust, prayer, love, service, on the one hand, and acceptance, grace, restoration of the inheritance, upon the other.[1] It is only in the sinner who repents that the paternal love of God finds free exercise, because it is only in his case that there is any capacity for understanding or reciprocating it, any response of filial feeling or performance of filial duty. But the mission of Jesus, which was the highest expression of the Divine love, was addressed to sinners without distinction;[2] and His whole teaching had for its aim to bring all men to realize the Divine Fatherhood, and to claim their place in the Divine Family.

3. The relation of Jesus to the Father, and His place in the Kingdom of God, were less fully set forth in His Gali-

[1] Luke xv. 18 ff. [2] Mark ii. 17; Luke xix. 10.

lean teaching. Until the Galilean ministry was near its close, He did not even declare Himself to be the Christ; and when He did, the disciples were forbidden to make Him known in this character.[1] In contemporary Jewish thought the word suggested ideas largely alien to the purpose of His ministry; if with us it is the symbol for all that is purest and strongest in humanity, this is due to our use of "Christ" as a synonym for the personal name of our Lord. Jesus Himself, if we may judge from the Gospels, used it but rarely, and advanced personal rather than official claims. Personally, He claimed to be at once the Son of Man, representing humanity both in its weakness and its potential glory; and the Son of God, representing Deity, and fulfilling in the highest degree the filial relation to God. Both titles had their origin in the Old Testament, the Son of Man in Daniel's vision,[2] the Son of God in the second Psalm and in other foreshadowings of the Messianic King. But in the teaching of Jesus both acquire a new significance. They are complementary to one another, and taken together they reveal the mystery of His dual character. They proclaim Him to be a true member of the human family, and indeed its very flower and crown, and at the same time to stand in a peculiar and unique relation to God. At first sight it may seem as if when He calls God His Father the Lord claims for Himself no more than He attributes to every subject of the Divine Kingdom, or at most a merely official superiority. But when we examine the meaning of His Sonship, as disclosed not only in the fourth Gospel but in some of the sayings recorded in the first and third, it becomes evident that it differs from the sonship of believers not in degree but in kind. Jesus is the "Only Begotten," i.e. the Only Son; His relation to the Father is *sui generis*; the Father is His Father in a sense in which He is not and

[1] Mark viii. 30. [2] Dan. vii. 13.

cannot be the Father of any other. His Sonship is pre-existent; it involves essential oneness with the Father; it is the basis of a perfect knowledge of the Father, it carries with it a right to all that the Father has. The author of the prologue to St. John's Gospel has surely not misread this element in our Lord's teaching when he writes, "The Word was God."

Of His mission Jesus speaks with greater freedom. Here He departs altogether from the popular conception of the Messianic *rôle*. He does not connect His work with the restoration of Jewish independence, or with His own nation or generation in any exclusive way. He was sent to humanity; if He began by evangelizing a corner of Palestine, the larger purpose was kept steadily in view. He came to be the "Light of the world," to "bear witness to the truth," to be Himself "the Truth," the Ideal in which the yearnings and hopes of the race should be realized. He came to be the life of men, saving them from sin which is death, restoring them to fellowship with God, the Source of life. To these great ends He directed all His thoughts and energies; He had no object in life but to fulfil the work for which He had been sent into the world. His death served the same great purpose, and served it in the highest degree. The Cross was first foretold upon the occasion when His Messianic character was first distinctly acknowledged.[1] It was not simply a foreseen consequence of His mission, but a true and essential, perhaps the most essential, factor in its fulfilment. He began by preaching the Cross merely as the symbol of self-sacrifice, the example which every disciple must follow in his daily life. But as the Passion approached, He proceeded to represent it as bound up in some unexplained way with the salvation of mankind. The thought had been with Him from the first; in the conversation with Nicodemus, at the first passover of the

[1] Mark viii. 32 ff.

ministry, He had likened Himself to the Brazen Serpent, lifted up in the wilderness to heal serpent-bitten Israel.[1] But toward the end it was taught more openly: He must give His life, He said, a ransom for many;[2] the Shepherd must die for the sheep;[3] the seed-corn must fall into the earth and die, or it would abide alone.[4] Jesus, if lifted up from the earth, would draw all men unto Him;[5] His Blood was the blood of the New Covenant, shed for many unto remission of sins.[6] The many-sidedness of this teaching will not escape the notice of the reader; there are few aspects of the Atonement which do not find an anticipation in the words of Christ. Yet He propounds no doctrine, but merely bears witness to the manifold fruits of the Passion.

Beyond His Cross and Passion the Lord foresaw not only His Resurrection and Ascension, but His future Coming. The basis of the teaching is again supplied by a few familiar texts from the Old Testament;[7] but the application of these prophecies, the interpretation they receive, the place which they fill in Christian eschatology, are due to our Lord Himself. If the Apostolic letters and the Apocalypse have filled in the picture, the bold outline is the Master's own. Not the least remarkable feature in the teaching of Christ is His calm assurance of future triumph and glory, expressed under conditions of humiliation and mortality.

4. From the teaching of Christ as to His own person and mission we pass to His teaching in reference to the Holy Spirit. The Spirit of God appears in the Old Testament as the principle of the Divine energy manifested in creation and providence, in the ordinary endowments and work of life and in the inspiration of the prophetic order. The earlier

[1] 2 John iii. 14.
[2] Mark x. 4 f.
[3] John x. 11.
[4] John xii. 24.
[5] *Ib.* 32.
[6] Mark xiv. 34.
[7] 6 E.g. Dan. vii. 5; 13 Ps. cx. 1.

teaching of Christ scarcely carries us beyond this view of the Spirit, except in one particular; the sphere of the Spirit's work is no longer limited to Israel, but is regarded as co-extensive with the Kingdom of Heaven and the family of God. Our heavenly Father, we are assured, will give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him. The gift of the Son there includes the gift of the Spirit;[1] "if any man thirst," Jesus cried in the Temple, "let him come unto Me and drink.[2] All who enter the Kingdom have been born of the Spirit, and the Spirit in their hearts becomes "a well of water springing up into eternal life."[3] Such sayings prepare us to expect a fuller and wider manifestation of the Spirit under the New Covenant, but they do not touch the question of the Spirit's personality and relation to the Father and the Son, or the details of the Spirit's work.

These deeper teachings were reserved for the hearing of the Apostles on the night before the Passion. Then at length it became possible and necessary to speak of the dispensation which would follow the Lord's Death and Resurrection. The occasion determined the form of the revelation. The Twelve were troubled and dazed by the near approach of the Master's departure. It would take from them the Counsellor on whose guidance they had hitherto depended in every time of need. The Lord promised that He would send another Counsellor, a second Paraclete, who would recall His teaching and continue it. The term παράκλητος in this connexion was, so far as we know, entirely new; but Jesus hastens to identify the coming Paraclete with the "Holy Spirit"[4] of the Psalms and the Prophets; it was the same Spirit who had inspired the Prophets and baptized the Son, by whom the work of the Son was to be carried forward and onward. The whole drift of the discourse compels us to regard the Spirit as a

[1] Luke xi. 13. [2] John vii. 37. [3] John iii. 5, iv. 14.
[4] John xiv. 26, ὁ δὲ παράκλητος, τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον.

personal agent, distinct from the Father, distinct also from the Son, and yet in the closest relation with Both. He—the masculine pronoun is advisedly employed[1]—is to be sent by the Son from the Father, or to be sent by the Father in the Son's Name; He receives from the Son that which the Son Himself has received from the Father. He issues forth from the Father, a statement which refers no doubt to the temporal mission of the Spirit, but seems to presuppose the eternal relation which the Church teaches in the "Nicene" Creed.[2] The general effect of this teaching is to place by the side of the Father and the Son a third Divine Person, another eternal Phase of the One Divine life; an interpretation which our Lord after His resurrection sealed with His approval when He instituted Baptism into the Name of the Three in One.

As to the operations of the Paraclete Spirit Jesus speaks with reserve; it is to the Epistles, written in the light of Christian experience, that we must look for a fuller pneumatology. But He marks out the great outlines of the Spirit's work after the Pentecost; His conviction of the world, His teaching of the Church, His glorifying of the Christ, His illumination of human life with the hope of the world to come.

5. From the doctrine of the Holy Spirit our thoughts pass naturally to the doctrine of the Church in which the Spirit came to dwell. Here again the germ of the later Christian teaching is to be found in the words of Christ. The Church is mentioned in the Gospels twice only, and on both occasions in the first Gospel. In two of the Matthean *logia* the Lord speaks of His disciples collectively as the *ecclesia*,[3] the counterpart of the "congregation" of Israel; in the first

[1] Ἐκεῖνος (John xiv. 26, xv. 26, xvi. 8, 13 ff.) refers without doubt to ὁ παράκλητος, but it carries on the suggestion of personality which that title conveys.

[2] John xv. 26, ὃ παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐκπορεύεται. The Creed uses ἐκ instead of παρά. [3] Matt. xvi. 18, xviii. 17.

the Christian *ecclesia* is the whole body of believers, the ἐκκλησία καθολική of a later age; in the second the term is applied to a particular community, assembled together for worship or mutual counsel. It is interesting to note this double use of the word at its first appearance in the New Testament, in sayings attributed to our Lord Himself.

Christ regarded Himself as the Founder of a new Israel, a Divine Society upon earth. It was in His thoughts from the first, when He gathered disciples round Him, and when out of them He chose twelve and brought them into the closest association with Himself. The Twelve were in one sense the germ of the Christian ministry; in another they were the original *ecclesia*. Jesus foresaw the indefinite expansion of the Church and provided for it. This Gospel must be preached throughout the whole world, and wherever it was preached the nations would flock into the fold. To cement the union of His disciples, the Lord instituted Baptism; to maintain it He gave the Eucharistic Food of His Body and Blood. These were among His last preparations for the new order which was to follow the Ascension. But the future of the Church had occupied His attention months before the Passion. A whole series of parables, beginning with the days of the Galilean ministry, reveals the deep interest which the subject possessed in the eyes of Christ. The Sower and the Seed, the Tares, the Mustard Seed, the Leaven, the Dragnet, the Great Supper, the Ten Virgins, are obvious examples; they describe the process of the Church's growth, its adulteration and ultimate purification, the relation of individual disciples to the body, and other kindred matters upon which ecclesiastical history has thrown a flood of light. In these parables, it is true, the Church is not mentioned by name; it is the Kingdom of Heaven which they profess to illustrate. The conclusion has been too hastily drawn that the Kingdom is

identical with the Church. The two conceptions, though related, are distinct; the Kingdom is the spiritual principle which the Church exhibits in a concrete form, and it transcends the Church as the spiritual transcends the visible.

Nevertheless, the Church is no mere accident of the Divine Kingdom, but its greatest present result. A vast spiritual corporation, charged with the evangelization of the world, designed to receive all classes and races of mankind, invested with magnificent powers and assured of an indestructible vitality, is surely as splendid a conception as can be found even in the teaching of Christ. The Architect of this building of God, who laid its foundations in the obscurity of Galilee and foresaw its progress and completion, was master of the Divine art of inspiring and regenerating human life on a great scale.

6. With this vast design in His thoughts, Jesus was not less mindful of the needs of the individual. Indeed, it is with the spiritual life of the individual that the great bulk of His teaching is concerned. If the third Gospel treats it with special fulness and tenderness, there is no Gospel and no part of the teaching from which it is absent. It has been said that our Lord was inspired by the "enthusiasm of humanity," [1] and this is a true account of His spirit, if it be understood that His zeal for the salvation of the race never led Him to overlook the interests of individual men. The regeneration of the world to which Christ pointed was not to be attained by ignoring the needs of personal life. Nothing is more impressive in the records of His ministry than the minute care which He bestowed on those who sought His help. He did not heal or save men in the mass, but had a word for each: "Son, thy sins are forgiven"; "daughter, be of good cheer; thy faith hath made thee whole." [2]

This individualism pervades His teaching. As the

[1] *Ecce Homo*, c. xvii. [2] Mark ii. 6; Matt. ix. 22.

Physician of souls, He detected in every man a deep-seated disease which demanded separate treatment. His remedies are two, repentance and faith. Repentance is the sinner's return to his Father, with his pride broken, his delight in sin changed to aversion, his repugnance to God converted into a desire to be numbered among His servants. Faith makes the return possible, assuring the penitent of acceptance, and inspiring him with the spirit of sonship. Christ speaks of faith in God, faith in the Gospel, the message of the Love of God, faith in Himself as the Son of God and the Saviour of men. On the last point He insists with a frequency and earnestness which shew the importance He attached to it. Trust in Jesus Christ is co-ordinated with trust in God; it includes a loyal devotion which shrinks from no sacrifice and refuses no command; it is accompanied by a love for the Master which takes the first place among the forces that move human conduct.

Each individual life, as Christ sees it, is shaping its own destinies, whether good or evil, and will receive from Him, as the Supreme Judge of men, its final award. There will be a general judgment of the race, but in this, as in the work of salvation, full recognition will be made of the claims of the individual.

7. Our Lord's teaching with regard to future rewards and punishments calls for careful consideration.

Jesus Christ was not sent into the world to judge it, but to save it,[1] and on more than one occasion He distinctly refuses the office of judge.[2] Yet His life and teaching had the effect of a judicial process, since men are judged in the sight of God according to their attitude towards the Incarnation. "He that believeth not hath been judged already; and this is the judgement, that light is come into the world, and men loved the darkness rather than the light."[3] The

[1] John iii. 17. [2] Luke xii. 14; John viii. 14, 15.
[3] John viii. 18, 19.

remark is, perhaps, due to the Evangelist and not to Christ, but it gives the substance of much of His teaching. This judgment is still in progress: the Church retains the sins which she is not able to remit. But the Lord also contemplates a judgment which is to come at the end of the present order, and which He connects with His return and the general resurrection of the dead. In this He will sit as Judge "in the glory of the Father with the Holy Angels." The manifestation of the glorified Christ will, it seems, bring to a climax the work of judgment which began with His Incarnation, and will reveal to the world and to each individual the true character of all lives.

Of the doom of the ungodly our Lord speaks in terms borrowed from the popular religious teaching of His time. There is a Valley of Hinnom in the spiritual world, where the worm that feeds upon dead souls does not die, and the fire that consumes them is not quenched. The imagery is not unduly strong to depict the agony of a conscience awakened too late, of an ever-present memory of opportunities gone beyond recall. But Christ adds to these familiar descriptions; and His own words on the subject, if less realistic, are not less terrible. The unprofitable servant is cast into the outer darkness; those who have not done what they could for Christ in the person of His brethren shall go away into eternal punishment. Whether by this expression we are to understand an absolutely interminable sentence is a question which, perhaps, does not admit of an answer. "Eternity," in the sense commonly attached to the word, is an abstraction with which our Lord does not deal. He speaks of the consummation of the present *αἰών*, and of a new order which will take its place. A sin which passes unforgiven into that coming age is an *αἰώνιον ἁμάρτημα*, "an eternal sin," [1] and the punishment that will overtake it there a *κόλασις αἰώνιος*, "an eternal punishment." [2] But the *αἰὼν*

[1] Mark iii. 29.

[2] Matt. xxv. 46.

ὁ ἐρχόμενος, the future order, cannot be measured by our standards. We unconsciously transfer to it the conditions of time and space—a tendency which is apparent in modern discussions of this painful question. It is enough to know, on Christ's assurance, that the sentence upon the sinner involves the loss of all that the coming age holds of blessedness and hope.

"But the righteous into eternal life." So Christ paints the future of the true members of the Kingdom. The higher life of the Spirit, begun on earth, will be matured and perfected in the world to come. Here and there in His teaching the veil is partly drawn back and the life is revealed, though necessarily in terms borrowed from present experience. Men who have used their talents well shall receive more; greater endowments, larger stewardships, a wider domain, increased opportunities of service. The principle which will guide the award is stated: "Unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance." [1] There will be no dull uniformity of goodness or place; though all true servants enter into the joy of their Lord, they enter with powers of enjoyment varying widely according to their use of opportunities. In Christ's view there is no breach of continuity between the past and the future, between the temporal and the eternal. His judgment will but interpret and give effect to the results of human life, carrying these forward into a new order where they will serve as the ἀφορμή of the life of the world to come.

These are but faint outlines of some of the chief features in the Teaching of Christ, regarded as a whole. Our Lord did not teach systematically; His words arose out of the circumstances in which He moved, and were adapted to the intelligence of the persons whom He addressed; and this is one of the secrets of their inexhaustible charm. Yet in

[1] Matt. xxv. 29.

His teaching there are master-thoughts which dominate the whole, and bind it into a unity; and when these are brought together, it is seen to constitute a body of religious truth which has for its aim the regeneration of human life.

It is sometimes said that Christ was an eclectic, who based His teaching on ideas which already had a place in Palestinian, Alexandrian, and even Oriental thought. The theory in this form is baseless, but it may at once be conceded that our Lord deliberately built on Old Testament foundations, and availed Himself of contemporary ideas and forms of speech. It is the wisdom of a teacher to begin with the knowledge which men already possess, and to use the materials that lie in his path. But in doing this Jesus by a spiritual alchemy transformed into gold all that He touched. Nor did He by any means limit Himself to the work of lifting up current conceptions to a higher level, and breathing into them a new spirit. There are new things as well as old in the treasure which the Master has committed to the scribes of the Kingdom of Heaven, and the new are "things which eye saw not and ear heard not, and which entered not into the heart of man,"[1] until they were revealed by Jesus Christ. But let the teaching, old or new, be considered as a whole, and where can its like be found? It provides for all the spiritual needs of men, covering the whole domain of the inner life. It regulates conduct for all time by asserting principles of universal application. It fixes the highest standards, and at the same time supplies the strongest motives for endeavouring to reach them. "Love your enemies," it commands, adding, "that ye may be sons of your Father which is in heaven," and "ye shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect."[2]

If it be objected that an attempt to reconstruct society on such lines as these is chimerical, and as a matter of fact

[1] 1 Cor. ii. 9. [2] Matt. v. 44, 48.

has never been realized, the answer is that the character which Christ sets before men, and which He Himself exhibited, is one which with us can have only its beginnings in the present life. He works and would have men work for the eternal and the infinite. The Kingdom of Heaven within us must ever be an ideal which is above our present efforts, pointing us on to another state where it will have its perfect work. Meanwhile it is not inoperative or destitute of results. If the world has not yet been transfigured by the teaching of our Lord, no other teaching has done so much to make its crooked ways straight and its rough places plain. If the teaching of Jesus Christ has not yet produced a perfect saint, it has planted in the lives of tens of thousands a principle which makes for perfection, and will attain it, as our faith assures us, in the day of the Lord's Return.

H. B. Swete.

STUDIES IN THE FIRST EPISTLE OF JOHN.

II.

The True Knowledge of God.

And in this we know that we have come to know Him:
If we be keeping His commandments.
He who says, "I have come to know Him," and is not keeping His commandments,
Is a liar, and in him the truth is not;
But whosoever is keeping His commandments,
Verily in this man the love of God has been perfected.
In this we know that in Him we are:
He who says that he abides in Him,
Is bound, even as *He* walked, to walk also himself.

—1 *John* ii. 3–6.

Fellowship with God, St. John laid down at the outset (i. 3, 6), is the purpose of the Christian revelation. This "fellowship" now resolves itself into *knowledge* (ii. 3) of and

love to God (*v.* 5), with *commandment-keeping* for its test (*vv.* 3–5), and a fixed *abiding in God* for its result (*vv.* 5, 6), while *the earthly walk of Jesus* supplies its pattern and standard (*v.* 6).

The goal of Divine fellowship has been in view throughout; it preoccupies the mind of every reader who sympathetically follows the Apostle. So that when at this point the writer speaks of "having known Him," of "keeping His commands"[1] or "His word," of "being in Him," "abiding in Him," there should be no doubt that "God," or "the Father," is intended by the personal pronoun; although "Jesus Christ" (*vv.* 1, 2) supplies the nearest grammatical antecedent, and is therefore by some interpreters assumed under the *αὐτόν κ.τ.λ.* of *vv.* 3–6. But the predicates *παράκλητος* and *ἱλασμός* given to Christ in the foregoing verses, assign to Him a relatively subordinate and mediating position; "the Father," before whom the Advocate pleads and to whom "the propitiation" is offered, remains the supreme and commanding Presence of the entire context. Hence when at the close of this paragraph "Jesus Christ the righteous" has to be referred to again (in *v.* 6), a distinct pronoun is employed; He is brought in as *ἐκεῖνος*, *ille*, "that (other) one"; cf. iii. 3, 5, 7, iv. 17.[2]

Fellowship with God is the true end of our existence—"the life" for man. It "was manifested" in Jesus, God's Son (i. 2, 3), but manifested in contrast and conflict with its opposite, as "light" confronting and revealing "darkness" (*vv.* 5 ff.). *Sin* is "the darkness," even as "God is light"; it is the death of man's life of fellowship with God. Sin has severed mankind from God everywhere; and for any

[1] In the parallel passage, *vv.* 2, 3, *αἱ ἐντολαὶ αὐτοῦ* are God's "commands"; so *ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ* in i. 10=*ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ* of ii. 14—never *τοῦ Χριστοῦ*, or the like, in these Epistles.

[2] Our English idiom, with only *He* to employ for *αὐτός* and *ἐκεῖνος* alike in these successive sentences, lends itself to ambiguity—a deficiency tha tembarrasses repeatedly the interpretation of this Epistle.

man in his own case to deny the fact, or the disabling effect, of sin is to become utterly false, giving the lie to God Himself (*vv.* 6, 8, 10). The barrier of sin Christ has removed for those who confess, its stain He has cleansed away by the sacrifice of His blood (i. 7, 9, ii. 2). But even in those once cleansed a new defilement is sometimes contracted, and the barrier is set up again; for which evil case resort is made to the intercession of our righteous Advocate, who provides in Himself an expiation for sin of perpetual and universal efficacy (ii. 1, 2). Verse 2 of the second chapter completes the circle of thought which set out from verse 5 of the first, since it brings "the whole world" under the scope of that "propitiation" which removes the bar put by man's sin against his communion with God, which restores the light of God to a world heretofore lying in darkness, a world estranged from God and ignorant of Him but now to be reinstated in His knowledge and His love.

With that former circle of thought rounded off (i. 5–ii. 2), St. John's mind according to its manner takes a second and wider concentric circuit (ii. 3–17), setting out again from the original point. In the first movement of this new flight the idea is repeated, with a change of accent and expression, that furnished the primary theme of the Epistle, viz. the opposition of light and darkness raised by the Gospel message. Verses 3–5 in this section are parallel to verses 6 and 7 of the first chapter; but alike on the positive and negative side of the antithesis the second representation is less ideal and more explicit and matter-of-fact than the first: "fellowship" has opened out into "knowledge" and "love"; "walking in the light" is translated into "keeping God's commands"; of the man who in the former instance "lies" and "does not the truth," it is now said that "he is a liar and the truth is not in him"—the act of falsehood growing into a fixed character and state. The "walk" of Jesus Christ (*v.* 6) gives to the conception of the true life as

"walking in the light" (i. 7) a concrete expression by means of which the ideal is crystallized into historical fact and reveals in clearest outline its loftiness and beauty.

The general connexion of thought is unmistakable. Verses 3–6 do not continue the strain of verses 1, 2, which form indeed a kind of appendix to chapter i. and reach their climax in *περὶ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου*; the *καί* of verse 3 looks beyond the foregoing context to the great fundamental saying of i. 5, *ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστιν*, of which the writer has to make further and very practical and searching application. But the links of association in St. John's writings are curiously crossed and interlaced. The more simple his language and obvious the grammatical relation of his sentences, so much the more recondite, and difficult to trace, in its finer movements, is the interplay of his thought. We must always bear in mind that there are *two* parties to a letter. An epistle is a dialogue. We have to put ourselves in the place of writer and readers alternately, to imagine what the latter would think or say while we listen to what the former is saying, at each step of the argument or appeal that is going on, to read their rejoinders and possible misunderstandings between the lines and to see how the writer anticipates and deals with them as he proceeds. From the side of this other party to the Letter there is apparent, after all, a line of connexion between verses 1, 2 and 3–6, which is wrought in with the main and substantial association binding this paragraph to chapter i. The Apostle has just admitted the occurrence of sin amongst Christian men, the possibility of a lapse from grace in one or other of his "little children"; he has shown that for this lamentable case relief is afforded by the intercession of Christ. But this is a provision of which the Antinomianism of the human heart may take a base advantage. The Christian, hitherto faithful, hearing what St. John has just written (in *vv.* 1, 2), might be tempted to say in his own mind:

"There is hope for the backslider; then I am not lost, even if I backslide! God is a merciful Father; Christ has died to expiate all sin and is my Intercessor. If under this overwhelming pressure I give way, His hand will be stretched out to save me. I may stumble, but I shall not utterly fall." We can understand how natural and how perilous such a reflexion would be; this identical inference, drawn from his doctrine of grace, St. Paul had to combat amongst the first Gentile disciples (Rom. vi. 1): "Let us continue in sin, that grace may abound"; God delights in forgiveness, since the full and grand propitiation for sin has been made by the sacrifice of Jesus Christ—*a little more to forgive* can make no difference to Him! It was this danger attaching to the gospel of free pardon for sinners, a liability especially great in the case of half-trained converts from heathenism, which led the early Church to surround with so much terror and to prevent by the strongest fences and precautions of discipline the contingency of relapse after baptism. The possibility of such abuse of his message of sin-cleansing through the blood of Jesus was not absent from St. John's mind.

For this reason his doctrine of obedience and practical holiness follows immediately, with keen insistence, upon that of the atonement and remission of sin. As St. Paul makes sanctification the concomitant of justification and works of love the proof of a sound and saving faith, so with St. John commandment-keeping becomes the test of real knowledge of a sin-pardoning God. A penitent backslider like Peter will be forgiven; but Peter was not a *calculating* backslider. He did not argue to himself, "Jesus is very kind; God is an indulgent Father, who will not be implacable toward a weak man so fearfully tried; I may risk the sin,"—and then rap out the denial and the shameful oath. Such an offence would have been immeasurably worse than that committed, and quite un-

likely to be followed by a speedy and sincere repentance. A deliberate transgression on the part of a Christian professor, presuming on God's mercy and discounting the guilt of sin by the value of the atonement, is an act that shows the man to be ignorant of God, and to have no true will to keep His commands. He has a heart secretly set upon sin, and ready to go as far in it as he dare. There is more hope of a reckless, prodigal transgressor than of him.

1. Here is the sign, then, of sin forgiven and cleansed away, and the manifestation of a changed heart dwelling in fellowship with God. *The keeping of His commandments is the test and pledge* of an abiding knowledge of the Father. "This is the love of God," the Apostle virtually writes in verse 3, "that we keep His commandments"; and this is the knowledge of God, "that we keep His commandments" (cf., for St. Paul, 1 Cor. vii. 19; Rom. ii. 13, viii. 4). A sentimental love and a theoretic knowledge are equally vain, being without obedience, like the "faith without works" which St. James rejected as "barren" and "dead in itself" (ii. 14-26). The equation of *knowledge, love, commandment-keeping* is completed when we add to the two propositions just quoted a third, which is found in chapter iv. 7, "Every one that loveth . . . knoweth God."

The "keeping" that is meant is the habit and rule of the man's life. This is indicated by the (continuous) present tense in the forms of τηρέω that are used (cf. iii. 24, v. 3, 18) —τηρῶμεν, τηρῶν, τηρῇ—in distinction from the *aorist*, ἐάν τις ἁμάρτῃ, of verse 1 above, which suggests a single and, as it may be, quite incidental act of sin. Thus, for example, confession of Christ was the bent of Peter's whole life, to which the denial in Caiaphas' hall was the lamentable and ever-lamented exception; and "*keeping* God's commandments" is presumed—not simply doing what they prescribe, as men will obey perforce rules with which they have no sympathy,

no conformity of will. To keep (τηρεῖν) is to watch with observant care, as one keeps a safe path and a cherished trust, as Christ kept "His Father's commandments, abiding in His love," as He kept in the Father's name His own which were in the world (John xv. 10, xvii. 12), as the Apostle Paul would have the Ephesians (iv. 3) "keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace." Such heedful and willing observance pays honour to the command, holding it sacred for its own sake and for the Giver's, and "esteeming all His precepts concerning all things to be right." A rational fellowship with God of necessity includes harmony with His law; for this is no string of arbitrary enactments, but the expression of God's own nature as that bears on human conduct and looks to see itself reflected in the nature of men created in its image. It is impossible for the man who really *knows* God—His awful holiness, His all-encompassing presence and all-searching scrutiny, and His infinite bounty and tender fatherliness—to disregard His will and to behave as a command-breaker. A conscience so callous argues the destruction in the soul of all sensitiveness to the action of the spirit of God. "How can I do this great wickedness, and *sin against God?*" the tempted man exclaims, who has set the Lord always before him. Knowing God, men cannot at the same time practise sin, any more than with open eyes in the daylight a seeing man can stumble as if in darkness.

If it be asked what were the commandments of God whose keeping the Apostle insists upon as due from his disciples, these injunctions must be found in the moral law of Israel, as that was expounded by Jesus Christ and reduced to its spiritual principles. The great majority of the readers were converts from Paganism of the first or second generation, and had made acquaintance with Divine law through the Old Testament scriptures. The Apostles used the Ten Commandments as the basis of detailed

ethical instruction to catechumens, and to children (Rom. xiii. 9; Eph. vi. 2, etc.). So the Church has wisely done ever since. But the Ten Commandments of Moses were comprehended and glorified in the two precepts of Jesus (cf. Rom. xiii. 8–10), on which, He declared, "hang all the law and the prophets"; for in love to God and man they find their vital spring and quickening centre.

Such settled, steadfast obedience to God's rule in human life is evidence to the obedient man that he has gained a knowledge of God, and has tasted of eternal life: "Hereby," to use the language of chap. iii. 19, "we shall know that we are of the truth, and shall assure our heart before God"; and so it stands in this passage: "Hereby we *know* that we know Him." The same evidence St. Paul states in his own way, when he writes, "If by the Spirit you are mortifying the deeds of the body, you shall live; for as many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are God's sons" (Rom. viii. 13, 14). The Christian obedience of love is a token to the world—to "all men" (John xiii. 34, 35)—of a true discipleship; but it is proof to the disciple himself first of all, and he has full right to the comfort afforded by this witness of the Spirit of Christ in him. "Hereby we know," says St. John in another place (iii. 24), "that He abideth in us, by the Spirit which He gave us." The Lord Jesus alone possessed this assurance without defect or interruption; He could say, "I have kept my Father's commandments, and abide in His love"; "I do always the things that please Him."

The reader of the Greek will note the play upon the verb γινώσκω in verse 3, which has no exact parallel in the New Testament:[1] γινώσκομεν ὅτι ἐγνώκαμεν αὐτόν. The continuous, or inceptive, *present* in the governing verb (recurring in verse 5) is followed in the de-

[1] A doubling of οἶδα occurs in John xvi. 30, νῦν οἴδαμεν ὅτι οἶδας πάντα; but here there is no variation of the tense and the repetition has no special significance.

pendent sentence, as again in the fourth verse, by the *perfect* tense, signifying a knowledge won and abiding (*cognovimus*, Vulgate),—"a result of the past realized in the present" (Westcott; see his full note *ad loc.*; and cf. *vv.* 13, 14, iii. 6, 16; 2 John 1; John viii. 55, xiv. 9, xvii. 7, for this emphatic tense-form). The A.V. in rendering the sentence "We do know that we know Him," almost reverses the relation of the two tenses, while the R.V. leaves the difference unmarked and distinguishable only by the stress of the voice to be placed upon the second *know*. St. John's meaning is, "We perceive, we are finding out and getting to know, that we have known God, —that we exist in God" (*v.* 5). There is a growing discernment by the believer of his own estate, a recognition of the work of grace upon him and of the Divine knowledge imparted already to him through Christ, a sounding of the depths of God within himself and an *εἰδέναι τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ χαρισθέντα ἡμῖν* (1 Cor. ii. 12), far removed from self-righteousness and spiritual pride, which brings to the Christian man, as his faith ripens, a profound thankfulness and security. In this peace of God, whose tranquillity the Apostle knows, he would have his readers at rest and satisfied.

Doubtless St. John, in prescribing the above test for the professors of the knowledge of God, had in view the Gnostics of his day, the men of the *γνῶσις ψευδώνυμος* (1 Tim. vi. 20), who when he wrote had become numerous and formidable to Apostolic Christianity. These teachers resolved the knowledge of God into elaborate metaphysical ideas; they made communion with God a matter of abstract contemplation and methodized symbolic observances, while moral principles, and the authority of revealed truth were largely ignored or superseded in their systems. They claimed on the ground of their speculative insight, and the "mysteries" reserved for their initiates, to be

exclusive possessors of "the truth." They vaunted themselves as the enlightened, the emancipated, raised by their superior "knowledge" quite above the common simple Christian, who "walks by faith" and knows not "the deeps" (Rev. ii. 24) of Divine wisdom. With such pretenders confronting him and seeking to seduce his flock—the "antichrists" and "false prophets," as he afterwards bans them (*v.* 18, iv. 1)—the Apostle sets up this mark, no other than that which his Lord prescribed for the detection of their like: "By their fruits ye shall know them"; "He that says, I know God, and keeps not His commands, *is a liar*, and the truth is not in him." A low morale, due to the subtlety that confounds moral distinctions or the cleverness that plays and trifles with them, is one of the surest signs of a religion corrupted by intellectual pride.

ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἀλήθεια οὐκ ἔστιν, "*in him* the truth is not"—in the man claiming acquaintance with God, but living in violation of His law. "The truth" lies far remote from those who "profess that they know God, but by their deeds deny Him" (Tit. i. 16). Truth consorts with men of lowly heart, such as make no boast of their knowledge but in love to God faithfully "keep His word" (*v.* 5). Of two sorts of men the Apostle declares that "the truth (of Christ, of the Gospel) is not in" them—the Pharisaic moralist who declines all confession of sin (i. 8, 9), and the immoral religionist who would fain make communion with God compatible with sin. These pretenders the Apostle of love passionately denounces, in language recalling that which our Lord used of the devil, as John relates in chap. viii. 44 of his Gospel. "In the truth he (ὁ διάβολος) standeth not, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh the lie, he speaketh out of his own; for he is a liar, and the father thereof." So near does this self-deceit lie to the source and beginning of all falsehood; so fatally does a religious profession without the ruling sense of right

and duty destroy the conscience and undermine the inmost truth of our being.

2. Passing from verse 4 to verse 5, we find knowledge transformed by a sudden turn into love. Since the latter verse is the formal antithesis of its predecessor, being introduced by the contrastive δέ, and ὃς δ' ἂν τηρῇ αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον represents in the new protasis ὁ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶν, one expects the apodosis to run ἐν τούτῳ ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστιν. But the writer is not content with this logical completion of the sentence, for γνῶσις he substitutes ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ, and the bare ἐστίν he replaces by the richer predicate τετελειωται. From this it appears that while commandment-keeping is the test of a genuine knowledge of God, *love is its characteristic mode.* The man who truly knows God, does not make much of his knowledge; he is not in the habit of saying, like the Gnostic, ἔγνωκα αὐτόν—"I have got to know Him," "I have found out God," "I know all mysteries and all knowledge," "I have fathomed the depths of Deity"; but he shows his love to God by stedfast obedience to command, and in practical obedience love has its full sway and reaches its mark.

In this quiet exchange of ἀγάπη for γνῶσις St. John assumes all that St. Paul argued and unfolded with his vehement eloquence in 1 Corinthians viii. and xiii., concerning the emptiness of a loveless knowledge. γνῶσις must be steeped in ἀγάπη, the science of Divine things penetrated and transfused with charity, or it loses its own virtue of truth; it becomes one-eyed and purblind, stumbling itself and misguiding those who follow it. While the other Apostle habitually contrasts the two powers and in writing to the Corinthians who were affecters of philosophy, appears to belittle knowledge in magnifying love, St. John rises above this opposition and rather exalts knowledge as he identifies it with love; indeed he uses the rival terms as practically interchangeable. He can

conceive no knowledge of God in which His love is not chiefly recognized and grasped in its manifold relations (see iii. 1, iv. 7–16), and no love of God in man to compare with that awakened by the display of His love to man in Jesus His Son. To declare that one *knows* God—such a God as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ—and that one *loves* God is in effect one and the same thing; and the man who says the former without demonstrating the latter, betrays his own falsehood.

That *love* to God means keeping His commands goes almost without saying. For indeed the first and great commandment is, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God." All other commands depend on this, and subserve and apply it; they presume in man this disposition of love to his Maker and Lawgiver. Love to God is the sum of religion, as the love of God is its source. This affection can, therefore, admit of no divided and partial sway—it demands "all the heart, and all the mind, and all the soul, and all the strength"; it cannot acquiesce in any arrested development, in any crooked or stunted growth of our moral nature. It makes for *perfection*, and it works to this end along the lines of obedience and loyalty in commandment-keeping. "Whosoever keeps His word, in him the love of God has been perfected"—is brought to its ripe growth and due accomplishment in character and life. "Truly"—verily and veritably—this is so with him who is loyal to God's word; while the disloyal man, the commandment-breaker, "is a liar" when he pretends to seek perfection, or professes any sort of communion with the God whom he neither loves nor serves.

St. John's bold τετελείωται is not to be evaded nor softened down, either in this place or in chap. iv. 12, ἡ ἀγάπη αὐτοῦ τετελειωμένη ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν, "the love of Him is in us made perfect." He enunciates in some sort here, and in iv. 17, 18, a doctrine of "perfect love," of full sanctification—a devo-

tion to God that is complete as it covers the man's whole nature and brings him to the realization of his proper ends as a man, a love that is regnant in his soul and admits of no motive or temper opposed to itself, and yet that is progressive as his nature grows and his being attains a larger capacity for God. The statement, it should be observed, is hypothetical, and is one of principle; it stands clear of all defeats of experience and defects of love in the individual. The point of the Apostle's assertion is not that love to God "*has been* perfected" in this or that Christian saint, though in himself and in others like him an experience of this nature was, to all intents and purposes, attained; but that wherever "God's word" is verily "kept," is apprehended, cherished, and held fast in its reality and living import, there, and there only, "the love of God *is perfected*." No love to God in any man can be imagined that is more perfect, that reaches a higher range and a richer development than that which comes of the true keeping of His word, than that which is fed on Scripture and finds its root and nourishment in the teachings of revelation.[1]

GEORGE G. FINDLAY.

1 St. John's perfecting of love by obedience has an instructive parallel in St. James' perfecting of faith by works: ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἡ πίστις ἐτελειώθη, ii. 22. The verb τελειόω in these instances has much the same force as when it is said, ἡ γραφὴ ἐτελειώθη (John xix. 28; more commonly, ἐπληρώθη, πεπλήρωται), in a case where some word of Scripture comes to its furthest realization, and attains the *ne plus ultra* of its significance. τελειόω has besides a further connotation, pointed out by Westcott, in this passage: "Both τελειοῦν and ἐπιτελεῖν are used of Christian action (Phil. iii. 12, Gal. iii. 3). But in τελειοῦν there is the idea of a continuous growth, a vital development, an advance to maturity (τελειότης, Heb. v. 14, vi. 1). In ἐπιτελεῖν the notion is rather that of attaining a definite end (τέλος): Contrast James ii. 22 (ἐτελειώθη) with 2 Cor. vii. 1, ἐπιτελοῦντες ἁγιωσύνην. and Acts xx. 24, τελειῶσαι τὸν δρόμον; with 2 Tim. iv. 7, τὸν δρόμον τετέλεκα."

(*To be continued.*)

FOREIGN LITERATURE ON THE NEW TESTAMENT.

SOME part of the ground covered by Herr Bousset has been almost simultaneously explored, with great minuteness, in Ernst Böklen's *die Verwandtschaft der jüdisch-christlichen mit der Parsischen Eschatologie* (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1902, M. 4).

The object of this monograph is to discuss, or rather to present material for a discussion of, the relations between Zoroastrianism and early Christianity in the department of eschatology, where the analogies and coincidences of the two religions are mainly, though not exclusively, visible. It was time that such investigations should be attempted. The long series of researches conducted by scholars like Kohut, Spiegel, Darmesteter, Cheyne and Lehmann has laid bare the data available for determining the influence of Mazdeism upon post-exilic Judaism, and in the apocalyptic Judaism from Enoch downwards Parsi traces are both numerous and significant. As early Christian eschatology drew considerably upon such apocalyptic traditions, it is natural to suppose that, indirectly at least, it should betray some slight dependence upon such conceptions. And, as a matter of fact, this is demonstrable, particularly throughout the book of Revelation. In our own country, Professor J. H. Moulton, whose investigations seem unknown to Herr Böklen, has done very competent pioneering work in this field of research. But much remains to be won, and a sober, critical survey of the whole question is one of the desiderata of the day. Unfortunately the present essay does not go far toward supplying the want. For one thing, it is marked by wealth and width of reading rather than by historical judgment. Herr Böklen's plan is to sketch, first of all, the Parsi conception of the individual soul's future after death, and then to collect more or less relevant

parallels to the various items of the doctrine from Jewish, classical, early Christian, Mohammedan and Mandean sources. In a succeeding section (pp. 69 f.) he develops in the same fashion the final future of the world according to Zoroastrian eschatology, appending here again a rich heap of coincidences and analogies. For these citations, both from Parsi and other writings, every student will feel heartily indebted to Herr Böklen's laborious research. But, even although one may be disposed to agree with his final judgment (which is hurriedly tacked on, pp. 144–149) inclining to a verdict of *non liquet* in the meantime, the reasons for it are not adequately marshalled, nor does this somewhat tentative conclusion (substantially that of Hübschmann, twenty-four years ago) follow with any cogency from the preceding pages, which are descriptive and interesting rather than characterized by any constant impact of critical judgment upon the evidence. This is due, in part, to the limitations of the author's method. The question of the relation between the eschatologies of Zoroastrianism and early Christianity cannot be approached with any security except across a preliminary consideration of this wider and prior question: apart from the medium of Judaism, is there any proof that Mazdeism could or did come into direct contact with early Christianity? The answer to this involves a study of the spread of Zoroastrianism or Magism in the East during the first century of our era, as well as an investigation of the Mithra-cult and similar Iranian developments in the syncretism of the age. It also demands a delimitation of "early Christianity." For, while the influence of Zoroastrianism upon Gnosticism and certain forms of Christianity during and after the second century is patent, it is unscientific to write as if the historical conditions which underlay such a relationship were necessarily in existence during the first century. How far, and in what way, any early Christians in Palestine and Asia Minor were

acquainted with Zoroastrian tenets, is the first question to be asked. And when this is ignored, as it is by Herr Böklen, or when writings from the first three or four centuries of early Christian literature are promiscuously cited as if they rested on the same historical and religious plane, the method must be pronounced unsound and the results precarious. Such parallels or analogies as are adduced become as unreliable as statistics, even when they are not verbal and fallacious. The correct estimate of their significance depends upon the accurate appraisement of prior historical factors and religious presuppositions. Herr Böklen fails to appreciate the latter, nor does he make any attempt to place his readers in the proper position for focussing his picture or for sifting either the early Christian or the Zoroastrian quotations which he has accumulated with conscientious and painstaking labour. The value of his timely monograph would have been doubled had he seen his way to preface it with some historical survey of the period or periods during which any inter-action of Mazdeism and early Christianity occurred, and also with a lucid statement of the literary problems which attend the higher criticism of the Avesta. He is of course alive to the uncertainty regarding writings like the later Bundahis, and very properly assumes the pre-Christian age of the Gâthas and the bulk of the Vendidad. But I am afraid he has presupposed in his readers a better knowledge of current Avestan criticism than some of them are at all likely to possess or to secure easily.

5. Finally it is to be noted that in the new series of the *Texte und Untersuchungen* two essays have been issued, this year, which are of special moment for the New Testament critic. One, appealing to the textualist, is Dr. R. Janssen's attempt to reconstruct the Greek text of the Fourth Gospel employed by Nonnus the Egyptian, whose metrical paraphrase of that gospel appeared at the beginning of the 5th

century (*das Johannes-Evylm. nach der Paraphrase des Nonnus Panopolitanus*). The value of this text has been already recognized, and even exaggerated, by Blass, at whose instigation and with whose assistance the Michigan scholar has worked. Its main interest is the light which it may throw upon the circulation of earlier texts in whose wake it seems to follow. For example, a careful collation shows that the Nonnus text possesses striking affinities, too striking to be merely accidental, with the text of Chrysostom, the Syriac versions (particularly the Sinaitic), and the Latin versions (especially *e*). So far as I can judge, its affinities with Hort's "neutral" type are less than its agreements with A D, etc. But these relationships, which outweigh any independent value of the text, are problems to be worked out elsewhere. Meanwhile, one has to acknowledge with gratitude the immense labour spent by the author on this small essay; it is a pity that he could not enter into the wider textual questions raised by his studies, but what he has done is well done and welcome. The result is naturally problematical at various points, owing to the delicate nature of the task. Yet Dr. Janssen has worked with great self-restraint and patience, and the one complaint one has to make about his textual notes is that occasionally, as e.g. in the case of the Coptic versions, they fail to exhibit an altogether adequate conspectus of the evidence, as that bears upon the comparative criticism of Nonnus.

Dr. Wrede's *die Echtheit des 2 Thess. Briefsuntersucht*, which deals with a problem of literary criticism, decides that this epistle must have been copied from, or consciously moulded upon, 1 Thessalonians, and that the author wrote not earlier than 100 A.D. The discussion of the eschatology (pp 40 f.) furnishes no very convincing arguments. Wrede's really strong point against the Pauline authorship is the

amount of self-repetition and the detailed resemblances between the two epistles. These parallels are printed in full and examined with keen care; but one doubts whether the admitted difficulty occasioned by this feature is less insurmountable than the other difficulties involved in any of the pseudonymous hypotheses. The latter press so heavily on Wrede that, in opposition to Schmiedel, he gives up the seventh decade date entirely, as too soon after Paul's death. Rejecting *en route* Spitta's attempt to save the epistle by means of Timothy's authorship (p. 36), and finding in iii. 17 a reference to some collection of Pauline epistles, he reverts to the close of the century, thus agreeing with Holtzmann in opposing the more conservative view which has recently been winning doughty adherents like the Dutch Baljon, the Swedish Kolmodin, Professor Bacon in America, and Mr. Askwith in this country. As I have said, the strength of this clever essay lies in its display of the literary relationship between the two Thessalonian epistles, rather than in the attempt to provide a positive historical setting for the pseudonymous letter, although it must be allowed that the treatment of 2 Thess. ii. 4 and Rev. xi. 1–2 is on the right lines, and that the parallel to iii. 6 f. adduced from Hippolytus (p. 49) is more than interesting. The monograph shows all the subtlety which is the strength and weakness of the author's work: subtlety allied to a certain rigour. But, while admitting the particular difficulty emphasized by this vigorous, frank study, I am still inclined to think that the Thessalonians were diverted, like poor Ariadne in Plutarch's tale, by actual forged letters, which were written during Paul's absence, and that the *ἀνομία* may have been Caligula's blasphemous claim to worship or something similar.

JAMES MOFFATT.

INDEX.

PAGE

Rev. T. Barns, M.A.
The Catholic Epistles of Themison 40

Rev. Professor Vernon Bartlet, M.A.
The Epistle to Hebrews as the Work of Barnabas . . 381

Rev. Professor W. H. Bennett, D.D.
The Life of Christ according to St. Mark . . 106, 306, 397

Very Rev. J. H. Bernard, D.D.
The Apostolic Benediction 372
God as Spirit 195

Rev. Hugh Black, M.A.
The Gospel of Work 63

Rev. Arthur Carr, M.A.
A Note on St. John vii. 52: A Prophet or The Prophet . 219

Rev. James Denney, D.D.
The Atonement and the Modern Mind . . 81, 161, 241

Rev. Professor S. R. Driver, D.D.
Translations from the Prophets: Jeremiah xxii., xxiii. . 12

Rev. Professor G. G. Findlay, D.D.
Studies in the First Epistle of John:
1. The Advocate and the Propitiation . . . 321
2. The True Knowledge of God 455

Rev. Professor A. E. Garvie, M.A., D.D.
The Value-Judgements of Religion . . 142, 182, 294, 360

Edgar J. Goodspeed, M.A.
Did Alexandria Influence the Nautical Language of St. Luke? 130

Rev. J. Hoatson, M.A.
James Martineau and Frederic Robertson: a Study of Influence 202

Rev. C. H. W. Johns, M.A.
"The Name Jehovah in the Abrahamic Age" . . . 282

Rev. James Moffatt, D.D.
Some Recent Foreign Literature on the New Testament 153, 468
Post-Exilic Judaism 317

PAGE

Rev. Professor J. H. Moulton, M.A., Litt.D.
Notes from the Papyri 423

Professor W. M. Ramsay, D.C.L., LL.D.
Travel and Correspondence among the Early Christians . 401

Rev. David Smith, M.A., Tulliallan.
The Resurrection of our Lord :
1. The Evangelic Testimony 344

Rev. T. H. Stokoe, D.D.
The Edition of the Revised Version, with Marginal References, 1898 1

Rev. G. S. Streatfeild, M.A.
The Fatherhood of God: a Study in Spiritual Evolution . 24

Rev. Professor H. B. Swete, D.D.
The Teaching of Christ 116, 267, 440

Rev. Professor Theod. Zahn, Litt.D.
Missionary Methods in the Times of the Apostles . 73, 227

INDEX TO TEXTS.

PAGE

Genesis xiii. 14 . . . 135
Exodus iii. 14 293
iv. 22 31
xx. 2 32
Leviticus xxiii. 28–32. . . 337
Deuteronomy xiv. 1 . . . 32
xviii. 15–19 . . 225
xxix. 24 . . 13
28 . . 16
2 Kings ii. 3–12 . . . 21
xxiii. 31–35 . . . 14
36 . . . 14
xxiv. 8–16 . . . 15
xxv. 27–30 . . . 15
1 Chronicles iii. 15 . . . 14
2 Chronicles xxxii. 30 . . 135
Job xxxiii. 23 327
Psalms ii. 7. 32
xiv. 1. . . . 195
xxxvi. 12 . . . 18
xliv. 2. . . . 127
lxxiv. 2 . . . 32
lxxvii. 19. . . . 197
lxxxvii. 6 . . . 16
cxxxix. 7 . . . 197

PAGE

Proverbs xiv. 26 . . . 32
Isaiah i. 26 17
iv. 3 16
vi. 3 197
xxiv. 6 18
xxx. 6 135
xliii. 3 32
lix. 19 140
Jeremiah xxii.–xxiii. 8 . . 12
6–7 . . . 22
14, 26. . . 22
xxiii. 5 . . . 23
9–40 . . . 18
14, 32 . . 323
xxxi. 29–35 . . 32
Ezekiel iii. 16–21 . . . 32
xx. 46 135
Daniel vii. 13 444
viii. 5 135
Hosea iv. 8 16
xi. 1 31
Matthew ii. 4 226
iv. 17 440
v. 44 454
xi. 12 155

	PAGE
Matthew xi. 27	37
xii. 28	155
xiii. 38, 43	35
xviii. 6	281
xx. 9	405
xxi. 28	38
xxviii. 15	76
xxv. 29	453
xxviii. 1	347
2–3	348
19	235, 375
Mark i. 1–8.	106
9–11	108
12–13	110
14–15	111
16–20	112
21–28	113
29–34	306
35–39	307
40–45	309
ii. 1–12	310
6	450
13–17	312
17	443
18–20	314
21–28	315
iii. 1–6	397
7–19	399
29	452
viii. 14	276
30	444
ix. 1	156
xii. 1	119
xv. 56	347
Luke ii. 49	123
iv. 21	116
29	382
v. 25–27	38
ix. 56	130
1	74
29	117
x. 30–37	122
xi. 5–8	119
13	447
20	155
xii. 32	35
54	140
xiii. 29	140
xiv. 15	117
xvi. 19–31	121
xvii. 10	120
21	441
xviii. 1, 9	117
9–14.	119
xix. 12–27	120
xxiv. 1	348
29	140
41–43	350
John i. 12	36, 272
20	223

	PAGE
John i. 39	406
ii. 1–12	268
iv. 24	195
43–54	268
v. 44	274
vii. 1–9	268
vii. 17	212
37	447
52	219
viii. 20	269
44	35
x. 24	269
34	272
xi. 5	125
xii. 6.	426
xiii. 33	442
xvi. 12	24
38	212
xix. 25	355
30	123
xx. 19	358
xxi. 1	349
Acts i. 8	235
12.	429
iii. 15	386
22.	223
iv. 3	140
ix. 19–22	231
xi. 25	232
26	157
xiii. 10	36
xiii. 16–26	238
xiv. 4	74
xv. 5	76
29	372
xvi. 4	419
xvii. 29	38
xviii. 4–7	238
xix. 9	405
xxii. 15, 21	236
17, 21.	231
xxiii. 30	327
xxvii. 12	131
xxviii. 2	130
Romans i. 5	235
7	332
iii. 23–26	335
iv. 4	120
v. 1–11	338
viii. 14.	35
ix. 4	37
x. 4	135
9	345
xi. 13	235
22	130
29	426
xii. 5	379
xiv. 17	154
18.	428
xv. 19	231

	PAGE
Romans xv. 19	236
26	390
1 Corinthians i. 12	73
25	214
ii. 9	454
iii. 4–15	73
iv. 9	74
ix. 5	74
19–21	235
x. 16	379
xii. 12	379
xv. 1	128
10.	230
14	345
50	360
2 Corinthians i. 15–17	233
ii. 17	75
viii. 4	390
x. 15	75
xi. 4	76
5, 13	73
9	424
26	76
32	231
xii. 1–5	232
11	73
xiii. 11	379
14	372
Galatians i. 4	332
17	231
ii. 1	332
4	76
7–10	237
8	59
iii. 1	55
iv. 13	77
vi. 1	325
13	78

	PAGE
Ephesians ii. 2	36
iii. 1-12	235
v. 18	57
Colossians i. 13	155
24	265
24–27	235
ii. 18	429
iii. 6	36
iv. 5	421
1 Thessalonians ii. 6	74
2 Thessalonians iii. 17, 18	372
1 Timothy i. 14	352
ii. 5–7	343
7	235
Hebrews i. 3	201
ii. 10	386
iv. 13	437
v. 1	328
vii. 11	382
ix. 5	337
11, 12	225
x. 1–3	338
xii. 9	38
xiii. 24	396
James i. 17	39
1 Peter ii. 21	225
v. 14	373
2 Peter ii. 22	328
1 John ii. 1–2	321
3–6	455
v. 19	37
3 John 4	323
15	373
Revelation i. 9	394
v. 6	344
xii. 10	327
xxi. 8	424
xxii. 14, 15	338

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